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PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY AS A WHOLE

B. M. LAING, M.A., D.LITT.

ile subject of the present paper is the central conception of a ilosophy that has been particularly dominant and influential, d the following remarks are prompted because of difficulties perienced in the attempt to understand that philosophy. The n of the paper is to point out what seems to be a serious defect that type of philosophy; but it is even more its aim to emphasize a danger into which philosophy in all its forms may easily fall, it against which it must exercise precautions.

The philosophy in question regards philosophy as the impulse vards wholeness. It defines philosophy as a study of reality as a ole in contrast to the sciences which deal with specific sections reality. Now there are initial difficulties in this attitude. What is question may be only a matter of definition, and even then sumably only definition of a purely provisional nature. But nitions may seriously mislead. When philosophy is said to be a ly of reality as a whole, is it known that reality is a whole, or only being assumed that it is a whole? If it is known to be, or assumed to be, a whole, it must be known or assumed to be a le of a certain kind. It cannot be admitted that reality is known e a certain kind of whole nor even to be a whole at all. It is the ness of philosophy to establish whether it is or it is not a whole. what sort of whole it is. But if that has to be established, it is ly safe to define philosophy as a study of reality as a whole. It t altogether safe even to assume it. Assumptions certainly are even by the sciences; but assumptions may be made of such a

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form and under such constances as to be a source of error. The o may be made in a special case to facilitate a solution to a definit problem; or something may be assumed which has to be established that is, it may be the answer that is assumed. The only justifiably initial attitude towards philosophy is to define its nature by formu lating its central or its most general problem; and in reference t reality the problem would be: Is reality a whole? And involved i that would be the question: Is it a specific kind of whole, and, if se what is its specific nature? These questions would require a proliminary definition or consideration of different kinds of wholes. would have to be decided whether there was only one thing the could be called a whole or whether there were different kinds wholes. It is possible that such a preliminary consideration wou lead to a view of philosophy as an attempt to discover wheth there were any characters or relations that pervaded all sections reality and that were therefore universal. Philosophy would th have to be distinguished from the special sciences by the generali of its problem. Such a view of philosophy involves no prejudgme of the question whether reality is a whole. The answer to th question will depend on whether any all-pervasive characters : discovered.

The force of these requirements is brought home by a mark feature of those theories which interpret philosophy as a study reality as a whole. That feature is their inability to define in cl and unambiguous terms what it is they are searching for, a likewise their inability to get hold of anything which will sati some demand which they cannot clearly specify. The present par will endeavour to show this confusion that is present—a c fusion that is only intensified by the vagueness and ambiguities phraseology.

The immediate question which is to be discussed is: How wholeness to be understood? Is there any one particular way which it is to be understood? Statements such as "unity is the r of all things" or "everywhere the one comes before the many" unsatisfactory, for they have no clear meaning and require eluc tion. The meaning of unity is just as obscure as that of wholen It is a matter not merely of metaphysical interest, but of log moral, social, and political interest, for the ideas of unity wholeness are employed in all these spheres. It is all the r important because the wholeness of reality is generally discussed reference to, and in contrast to, various kinds of wholes which capable of scientific investigation.

In the type of philosophy under discussion, as well as in o philosophies, emphasis is laid on a distinction between a sother whole, a whole such as mind, an organic whole, a mechanical w

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THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY AS A WHOLE

nd an aggregate. These distinctions are largely due to the influence the comparatively new biological and psychological sciences, pecially biology, with its conception of organism and organization. reaction set in against the older conceptions, which were formuted by physical science, and which were applied to the interpretation of society and of the nature of reality. Such interpretations ased on these older conceptions are now usually labelled "mechanial." The conceptions of the newer sciences are held to be more uitable for the understanding of reality. Under the influence of ssumptions, partly psychological and partly axiological (for instance, ich as that embodied in the statement that we must interpret ality in terms of the highest that we know), mind was supposed constitute the model of a whole in the light of which reality ould be understood.2 With the development of the social sciences, ad with increasing emphasis upon the social character of mind fc upon the mental character of society, a still further analogy r the interpretation of reality is provided, leading to the idea of reality as a community of selves.3

Bosanquet asserts that "we experience the Absolute better than we experience anything else. . . . We all of us experience the Albsolute, because the Absolute is in everything." "We experience it more fully than we experience anything else."4 The meaning of these statements, though to some extent familiar through the influence of religious teaching, are philosophically decidedly obscure. Experience is one of those terms which admit of endless dispute, and it is used here just as vaguely as it is used by Hume—that pet aversion of the partisans of the whole. But whatever it may mean, it vidently does not mean that the Absolute is known, for otherwise it is not clear why analogies should be used by Bosanquet and others to elucidate the nature of the wholeness of reality. The emplowment of analogies at least suggests that reality as a whole is not kndwn, and that information about its nature has to be elaborated on the basis of what is at most supposed to be an approximation. If the Absolute were experienced in the sense of being consciously apprehended or intuited, an investigation of its nature could be carried on directly, and the results of such investigation would enable the kind of whole to be determined. There would be no use of a nalogy to accomplish this purpose. That the information attainable regarding the nature of reality as a whole is only analogical applears in the vague and indefinite characterization which is finally

p. 1030sanquet, Logic, vol. i. p. 4. A. E. Taylor, Elements of Metaphysics,

See Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the State, especially ch. vii.

Faylor, op. cit., Bk. IV, ch. iii, p. 4.
Sosanquet, Individuality and Value, p. 27.

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

given of the Absolute. Readers are continually led on ever neare to the Absolute, but are in the end left just short of grasping i nature in spite of the promises held out. From the point of view knowledge, and hence presumably of philosophy, if the latter is reasoned view of the universe, the philosophy of the whole is failure and gives way to what is at best a faith. Doubt is justifiable cast upon the conception of philosophy as a study of reality as whole.

If the philosophy of the whole fails to achieve what it give promise of being able to do, it at any rate performs the very great service of directing attention to the need of critical analysis an careful definition of terms. One main cause of its failure—if not the only cause—is just this neglect of careful examination of its fund mental categories. There is a good deal in the statement of th philosophy which suggests that whole and unity are frequent confused; but above all the source of confusion is to be found in lack of clearness as to what unity is. In the consideration of the nature of reality as a whole the initial task is to elucidate the meaning or meanings of unity. It is very important to grasp tl fact that nothing much has been said when something-whether thing, a machine, an organism, a society, or a mind—is declared be a unity. Statements such as that "reality is one throughout," that "reality is a unity," or that it has a "pervading unity,"2 phrases such as "vital or living unity," "logical unity," or "systema unity," merely manifest the dangerous tendency of philosophy indulge in meaningless generalities.

It is possible to detect in the frequent use of the term unity highly questionable, in fact it can be said a completely erroneo assumption. It is that the wholeness of any kind of whole lies in the presence of only one quality or one kind of relation which serves define the whole in question. This assumption appears in the doctrothat ultimate reality must be "a systematic experience of which components are likewise experiences." The constituents of whole are held to be of the same kind as the whole itself. A sime assumption appears in the conception of logical unity or log system. Mind is interpreted as a logical system, and reality is in preted in terms of mind as logical system. What is more likely be true is that different types of wholes are to be distinguis from each other by the presence in each of some type or type relations which are not to be found in the others, and which the fore serve to define the type. But it must not be supposed that

[•] This is the effect which Bradley's Appearance and Reality and Taylor's Elements of Metaphysics (ch. ii) in particular produce on me.

² Bosanquet, Logic, vol. ii. pp. 207-8, 210. Cf. Individuality and Ip. 19. 3 Taylor, op. cit.,

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relation, which is peculiar to a certain whole and serves to define it, is the sole relation that constitutes its unity.

It is erroneous to suppose that the constituents of a whole must be alike in character to the whole itself. There is no whole with which man is acquainted and which is capable of investigation that gives support to any such supposition. There is no requirement hat a machine be made up of machines, far less of similar machines; hat an organism be made up of organisms, far less of similar organisms; that a mind be made up of minds; or that a heap of tones should be itself a stone. It is erroneous to assume that a whole must needs have any such simplicity of character. Bound up with this is the equally erroneous belief that there is any simple traightforward thing answering to the term unity, whether logical inity, vital unity, organic unity, conscious unity, mental unity, or ven unity of purpose. That in which any such unity consists is exceedingly complex; and the term unity, when used in reference to reality as a whole, signifies something still more complex, probably o complex that it is questionable whether the nature of the unity an be grasped at all. Unity is attainable through the presence of ifferent kinds of relations existing between the parts or contituents. Unity is not itself a relation in addition to and distinct om other relations. Logical unity is not a unique kind of relation, ut an expression for certain properties of relations. The same oplies to vital unity. "Living unity" as a fact in nature is a product a vast and complicated set of relationships between various kinds factors.

This criticism, it may be well to remark before passing on, sumes that the question about the meaning of unity resolves self into a question concerning, first, the constituents of a whole, id, secondly, the relations between these. Much in the philosophy der consideration gives the impression that unity is conceived as nsisting in an all-pervasive "stuff," somewhat analogous to oxygen, sich is all-pervasive in the atmosphere, or to electricity, which is ning to be thought of as all-pervasive and as the primary matter the universe. The oneness of reality would then have to be conved as a oneness of material. The idea of oneness as being a atter of relation is distinct from this, though here again the oneness the universe may be conceived as consisting in a oneness of ^{hr}ation. It is the fact of these two possible meanings of oneness ^{Cl}t is one reason for the obscurity and vagueness in the use of the equ unity. But there is still a third possible interpretation of by, namely, as a complex of different relations. This is the unity. bich Bosanquet's doctrine of the concrete universal and his discsion of uniformity really intend to assert; but on the other 1.4. his insistence on mind as the clue to the nature of reality, and

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

his assertion that the Absolute is present in every part, actually imply that the oneness of reality is oneness of character, and hence involves adherence to the idea of uniformity which he wishes to exclude.

The unity of a whole, as appears in the case of all wholes with which man is acquainted, lies in relations. The more complex the whole, the more diverse and complex are the relations. In illustration of this, several types of wholes that are generally considered in theories of reality as a whole may be examined. The first and simplest is a collection or aggregate. A collection is frequently distinguished from a machine, and both from an organism, and all from a social whole. Such wholes seem obviously different, and it would be folly to deny what seems so obvious. But the main question is: Wherein does the distinction lie, or what are the factors which make them distinct? What primarily defines a collection is the type of relation existing between the units. This of course applies to any whole. The distinctive relation in the case of a collection is expressed by "and" or "plus." Hence such a whole is spoken of as the sum of its parts—a description which is frequently bu erroneously applied to a machine. Whether anything more is require to express the nature of a whole, such as a collection, is a control versial matter. Must there be a spatial relation—one of contiguity or any spatial limit at all? A precious stone in England, a secon in America, a third in Africa, and so on, would not constitute collection; but the same spread on a table in a room or even sever: rooms in a museum would do so. The difficulty is that the items of a collection may be sent to several distant parts of the country of of the world, and yet the collection is still held to exist. This might seem to give support to the view that the wholeness of a collection is due to human purpose and purposive activity. On the other hand, a collection or aggregate may be effected by purely natur forces—such as a collection of pebbles on a beach, of various articl at the mouth of a river, or of plants in the corner of a garde Hence the definition of a collection need not depend on how t collection was made, nor does it depend on how any purposi being views the units. The reason why the items of a collection se to various distant places continue to be regarded as a collection that their dispersal is known not to be permanent, as would be case if they were offered for sale, but to be a purely tempora affair, a momentary interruption in their existence as a collection

The basis on which a whole, such as a collection, is to be defined is thus primarily the kind of relation between the constitution

¹ Taylor, op. cit., pp. 95-98. Bosanquet, Philosophical Theory of the Sp. 175. See also Giddings, Principles of Sociology, p. 420, for consideratic various wholes.

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factors. When therefore it is said that an aggregate "has no unitary character of its own which reveals itself in and through the benaviour of its elements," the statement may be a truism, or doubtful or ambiguous. It may be a truism in that it amounts merely to saying that an aggregate is a kind of whole that has not the character of another kind of whole. It may be doubtful in that the character of an aggregate is revealed by the behaviour of its units, for its tharacter as an aggregate is discovered by the behaviour of its units. It may be ambiguous, for it is not clear what is demanded by the idea of unitary character.

A machine is an instance of another type of whole. It is said to have "a determinate single character as a whole which manifests tself in the structure of the various parts." 2 Statements such as hese are frequent with the partisans of the whole, and they seek o emphasize a feature that assumes increasing importance as an pproach is made to other wholes like an organism, a society, and eality. The parts composing a whole like a machine can exist pefore the whole and may exist apart from the whole. Yet it is a hearer approach to a true "systematic unity" than is an aggregate. Now, it is of course the case that a machine is not merely the sum If its parts; there may be the parts, but to get the machine the arts must be "assembled." "Assembling" means bringing the parts nto definitely specifiable relations to each other, and that process the construction of the machine. The set of relations which haracterize a machine and which are expressed in the physical rinciples embodied in its construction is not coincident with the elations which characterize an aggregate, nor does the former ecessarily displace the latter. A machine has still the character of eing an aggregate, but it has also some additional character. Thus wo wholes are not necessarily exclusive. The more complex whole ay be at the same time the less complex. This would ultimately aply that reality as a whole may be a collection, a machine, and any other things besides. It is necessary to guard against disssing the nature of reality on the assumption that if reality has i.e feature it cannot have any other, or that its defining relation pans the exclusion of every other type of relation. When a table asserted to be brown, it is not meant that it is only brown and ths no other additional qualities. The table is all its qualities; raether it is merely the aggregate of these qualities or whether ciere is some additional type of relation characteristic of it, as is eqant when it is said that it is a unity of these qualities, is a specific alestion to be considered. The question is not answered by simply bierting that it is a unity of these qualities. The problem of reality can whole can be viewed as being analogous.

¹ Taylor, op. cit., p. 96.

² Ibid., op. cit., p. 96.

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An organism is another instance of a whole, and much controversy has arisen as to whether an organism is an instance of a type of whole distinct from that of which a machine is an instance or from any other type. A machine is sometimes regarded as being an instance of a "mechanical whole," and an organism an instance of an "organic whole." The primary question is one concerning the actual principles constitutive of the nature of these two types, and until this question is definitely settled it is futile to argue about whether an existing whole is to be labelled one kind or the other When it is declared, as it is by some, that an organism is a machine, it is not necessarily being asserted that an organism is only an engine, even though a very complex and delicate machine. What may be meant is that organisms, so far as they have been investigated, have yielded to principles and laws that actually constitute, or are derived from those constituting, the body of the physica sciences, and that still further investigation will probably show that an organism is still further amenable to principles that are the same as, or that are derivable from, those of the physical sciences, or that will come to be principles of the physical sciences. Whether this means much or not is irrelevant at the moment. The "mechani cal view" has been modified on account of the development of the physical sciences themselves. So far as the controversy about mechanism was conducted on the assumption that the mechanica view meant the reduction of organisms to a specific and limited se of principles called mechanical, science itself has put the controversy out of date. The principles of engines may differ so much that there are different types of engines. The mechanical view, if it is to be a all tenable, must be resolved into a highly abstract and genera contention that organisms are capable of analytic investigation, and that such analysis will reveal the presence of laws or principles What the character of these laws will be, or what the factors enterin into their formulation will be, remains undetermined. The error of the older mechanical views lay in asserting or supposing that thes factors were the factors entering into mechanical laws. At the mo it could be said of mechanism that it was claiming to use know phenomena and known explanations as an analogy in order investigate the unknown and mysterious organic phenomena.

Frequently an attempt is made to distinguish between an organis and a machine on the ground of a difference in their origin a mode of development. An organism, it is said, is not made b grows. The development of an organism is at the same time t generation of its members. How much importance is to be attach to this point? As a matter of fact the distinction is difficult to dra and if adhered to might necessitate the rearrangement of the gradi of the various types of wholes. It is true that organisms reprodu

their kind, while no machine is so far capable of doing so, though machines may produce simpler and different machines. On the other hand, an organism develops in the sense that its organs simultaneously or successively appear. But this general characterization will apply to a machine. That the parts of a machine exist before the whole, while that is not true of an organism, is a contention valid only if the term "parts" is arbitrarily interpreted. In the case of a machine, men are pictured fashioning the parts at each stage and fitting them to their position in the machine as it comes through the successive departments. There are clear stages, and there are agents. In the case of organisms there is not the same clear knowledge, although biology speaks of stages, and there may be agents of growth, though they are not fully known. If the distinction is adhered to, then whether a social whole is to be regarded as a nechanical whole or not will largely depend on theories regarding the mode of social growth. Some theories suggest that the mode is such that a social whole can hardly be differentiated from what is called a mechanical whole.

So far as investigation goes, organisms differ very widely in character—so much so that the phrase "organic unity" has no clear meaning. The unity of the higher organisms is not a simple affair, but a matter of a very complex set of relationships which are expressed in the mechanical, dynamical, and chemical principles at east, in terms of which vital processes are described and explained. There is the alimentary system with the physical processes of chewing and swallowing, and the chemical processes involved in mastication and digestion. There is the respiratory system involving the physical properties and action of the lungs, and the chemical processes connected with the substances inhaled and exhaled. There the circulatory system with the processes connected with valves, ressure of fluid, contraction and distension, and so on. There is nuscular contraction, action in accordance with the principles of wers, and so forth. These are merely some of the things to be ticed. All these are themselves again linked together. The set of lationships is thus exceedingly complex. The phrase "organic nity" accordingly appears as a term signifying this very complited fact of diverse relationships. It does not signify any specific flation, nor does it signify the source of organic activity. An organic prole is hence not to be opposed to a machine or to a collection. It ca machine, or for that matter a number of machines; it is also a election; but it may be admitted that in addition it has features nich no machine so far constructed possesses, or at any rate sich have not been reduced to any principles of the physical ences.

A social whole is generally regarded as a higher type of whole.

At one time a social whole was interpreted in terms of the organic analogy. But contemporary thought tends to insist that a social whole is more than an organism. The preceding argument is in harmony with this contention, but interprets it as meaning that a social whole does not thereby necessarily cease being a collection and also a machine. This additional character is due to the presence of factors and relationships which are not found in the constitution of organic wholes, machines, and collections. What is distinctive of a social whole is not merely "organization," 2 for so far as meaning, if not usage, is concerned, that term can be applied intelligibly to organisms and to machines, but the kind of organization involved, and the kind raises a question about the nature of the units and of the relationships between them, but primarily of the latter.

The case of a social whole, as was seen also in the case of organisms, provides another clear instance of the tendency to think that any whole must have and can have only one kind of relation determining its constitution, and that this is what its unity means. In the cases of a social whole this relation is frequently spoken of as a "conscious" relation" or a "conscious unity." Such a term may mean either a relation which is consciousness itself or else a relation of which there is consciousness. In the former case consciousness would be the relation which is characteristic of a social whole. In the latter case consciousness would be merely a conditioning factor, without which there would be no social whole. It is this latter meaning that is applicable to a social whole. There is not one sole relation of which consciousness is necessary. There is a host of relations which lie at the basis of a social whole and serve to constitute its unity. A distinction requires to be drawn between the relations and the consciousness of them. There may be a relation between a mar and a motor-car, although the man may not be conscious of it, while consciousness of it may mean the difference between life and death

A social whole is in a high degree conditioned by consciousnessso much so that it may be said that where the members are no conscious they do not constitute a social whole. But though it h' this importance, it would be a fallacy to conclude that the oth things, namely, the relationships, and that in which the relationship are found, are not also requisite. On the other hand, in the light biological and certain psychological studies, it is possible to ho that there may be consciousness in some form although no soci whole exists. What is distinctive of a social whole is the dete mination of conduct by way of consciousness of certain relation and such consciousness appears as moral and social maxims, law rights, and obligations. These maxims, laws, and so on can be ma an object of study; but an historical, as well as an analytic, inves

² As Giddings, ibid., contends 1 E.g. Giddings, op. cit., p. 420.

THE CONCEPTION OF REALITY AS A WHOLE and eGangotri

gation into their foundations will show that consciousness in the form of knowledge, or at least of belief concerning some non-social facts, plays an important part in their formulation. A great mass of social usages, rules, and institutions are due to a subtle transformation of non-social facts into social fact by the human mind—rather by a or by some human minds in the first instance.

A considerable amount of recent investigation 2 shows that the doctrine of the social whole, supported by, and taken as a clue to the nature of metaphysical reality by, the partisans of the whole has not a clear field. It suggests that their views of a social whole rest, not on careful and detailed investigation of social wholes, but that they embody their own metaphysics. Any help to be derived from the use of an analogy is thus frustrated. The sense in which a social whole develops requires very careful elucidation; and even if development is admitted to occur, the facts may show that a social whole grows, not by an inner propulsion leading to the unfolding of some inner social reality, but by the grafting of ideas and of institutions based on ideas that frequently come from outside ources. Social growth takes place through the gradual modification of existing usages and structures under the influence of new ideas or beliefs, or through the adoption of such and their incorporation it the life of the group. In fact the rôle played by consciousness is arcely to be distinguished from the part it plays in relation to

richiaking and developing of machines. Bosanquet asserts that in the case of a social whole the whole is present "in every part, not merely for the inference of the observer, but, in some degree, for the part itself, through the action of consciousness."3 It cannot be literally meant that the whole is present in the part, nor is the meaning of the statement clarified by the phrase "in some degree." Statements to the effect that the "whole s present, though not equally, in the part, and the part is present n the whole," 4 do suggest that the conception of the whole requires ome elucidation. How is the whole to be understood if it is such lat it is present in every part, yet is present in different degrees ; lifferent parts, which are higher or lower according to the degree? rigat seems to be the case is that confusion has occurred between whole and consciousness of that whole. Applied to social life, the tatement that the "whole is present in every part" means that or For this reason we should not accept Graham Wallas's view (The Great ciciety, p. 374): "New social arrangements to meet the needs of a new evironment cannot be invented for the mass of mankind by a few professed inkers, but must be the result of innumerable experiments in which as

1.1 Taylor, op. cit., p. 101.

any individuals as possible have freely taken part."
b: Especially the work of Professor Elliott Smith and W. J. Perry.

ci Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 175. Cf. Taylor, op. cit., p. 100.

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each part is conscious of the whole, and becomes intelligible. But though intelligible, it may not be true of a social whole. And even of it were true of a social whole, it may not help in the interpretational of the nature of reality as a whole, for all the parts of reality may not be conscious. It is at this point that the confusion between a whole and consciousness of a whole becomes very misleading.

The fact that consciousness is present leads very frequently to'e the assertion that the relations characteristic of a social whole aren "psychical relations." 2 This involves the questionable assumption of that because there is consciousness of something there is nothings, but the psychical. There may be psychical relations, but everything o of which there is consciousness need not be and is not psychical 1; Kinship is a factor that plays a part in some social wholes, anc)f consciousness of that factor, probably in conjunction with a consciousness of some other factors which give some special significance3, to kinship, leads to its becoming a social bond and to the formulationy of rules expressing rights and obligations. Attention to actual cases ga such as this serves to give definiteness to the idea of unity. Whaten the individual citizen is conscious of is not the whole. In a complexist social system no person can ever claim to know the whole, and ita is for him something so vague and indefinite that he can never he determine his conduct in accordance with it. What the average citizen does is to act in accordance with the accepted social codten expressed as rules and maxims. What the informed citizen doe tout to formulate one or more principles as the foundations on whichty the social system is reared, and in any specific case of action tof deduce from them the correct thing to do. Social theory has the" express task of formulating the principles which are fundamentalal in the sense that they are the premises from which the specific16 rules regulating the working of the social system are deduced. Its task is analogous to that of, say, geometry, which formulates then principles of a circle or of an ellipse, and which in any case where an arc of a circle or an ellipse is given enables the circle or ellipse to be completed.

The problem of social theory accordingly becomes much mode definite. It is no longer a question about the relation of whole an part in the abstract. Any such abstract discussion results in vaguand confused terminology. It fails to make clear what relations are being asserted. For instance, it is asserted that "an aggregate han o unitary character of its own which reveals itself in and through the behaviour of its own elements," or that "a whole of parts had a determinate single character as a whole, which manifests itself

¹ That this is meant is suggested by Bosanquet's further remarks.

² E.g. Giddings, op. cit., p. 420. Cf. Taylor, op. cit., p. 97. "The unity in tonscious one."

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structure of the various parts"; or again, that "because the bers form a single system, just as there can be nothing in the mirience of any member which is not contained in the experience such is the whole, so, on the other side, there can be nothing in n whole which does not in some way affect the experience of y member." I Sometimes other expressions are used, such as it the whole is present in every part or that the nature of the le determines the nature of the parts.2 All such statements are mpts to define the nature of a whole, or rather of a true whole, 1 as reality is held to be by defining the relation between whole part. But they are simply confusing. They assert relations that very different from each other. The relation in one case is essed by the term "manifesting itself in," in another case by terms "containing" and "contained in," and again by the term tect." It is also sometimes expressed by the term "presence in," I sometimes by the word "determine." The terms "affect" and etermine" suggest the idea of causality. But the causal relation by no means identical with the relation "containing" or "being ntained in"; while something may causally affect another, and nifest itself in it or be present in it only by way of its effect. Nor the nature of the whole, and of the relation between it and the its, clarified by the statement that "the whole is for its members well as the members for the whole." 3 The phrase "is for" does not yide a solution; it states a problem as to that relation between e and part which renders the state of affairs expressed by "is bossible.

st frequently the conception of ultimate reality seems to be ed to a peculiarly simple form. The relation which is generally ted to hold between whole and part is that of "containing." whole is an all-embracing experience." "Reality is a systematic ience of which the components are likewise experiences." 4 relation "containing" is ambiguous. Points may be spoken of eing contained in a line, while in another sense a line is coned in or is a component of a larger line. Even apart from this iguity such a relation would be only one kind of relation; it not necessarily imply that what is contained is of the same acter as the container; and it is questionable whether it gives thing more than a collection instead of that unity which the bry craves for. Hence further efforts are made to supply the ciency. "Reality is a subject which is the unity of subordinate ects." 5 The term subordinate is no less ambiguous than the

Caylor, op. cit., pp. 96-97.
Cibid., p. 104. "It is the nature of the whole which determines the .cter of each of its constituents."

1., p. 97.

4 Ibid., op. cit., pp. 97-98.

5 Ibid., p. 98.

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others used. Mammals is a subordinate group of animals, an But individual citizen is subordinate to a governing authority even c group may be said to be contained in the other, but the citiztional not contained in the governing authority. The last resort may n describe the relations between whole and part as being of an "n a a mate character," as being "indissoluble," or as being "d on social relations." 3

Evidently the consideration of various wholes does not pro are n fruitful analogies for the interpretation of reality as a whole. tionof the analogy of a social whole is inadequate. The relation betaing3, the parts and the whole is unique, and no adequate conceptiging o it can be framed. 4 Also "we must be prepared to entertaincal"; possibility . . . that the individuals composing the Absoluteanc)f into a number of groups, each consisting of members which ondirect social relations of some kind with each other, but not nce3, members of other groups." 5 The reason for this is that these groonyl may be of types so alien to each other that no direct communicaties ga not even of an elementary kind, is possible. Two remarks on tater seem justified. The first is that, if so, some members of the Absolation are different in kind from each other. Yet the components of ita Absolute have been asserted to be experiences and the Absoluteon be one Experience. Reality has been asserted to be exclusive. composed of psychical facts. 6 All existence has been declared total ultimately mental.7 The components should not therefore be distiout If they are, the assertions turn out to be false. The second senicaty is that if there are groups in the Absolute so alien to each obn tof to have no direct communication, that is presumably relations: then of an elementary kind, the Absolute is not after all a unity:ntala has been held, but a collection made up of separate and decific10 groups. There may be a greater unity in the parts than in the . Its's itself.

The result of the theory seems thus to be peculiarly unher. If factory. The character of the whole seems incapable of descripps? Yet that ought not to be the case if the whole is present in the part. If such a statement means anything at all, it should mean which, the arc being given, can be constructed, that the anagur of any part of reality will reveal the *unity* which pervades all rearrish to should mean that the relation found to exist in the part is a relation that runs through the whole. But the analogies usen to be not the unity of the whole. The theory suffers from not knot have the same that the relation. The unity of the part is not the unity of the whole. The theory suffers from not knot have

7 Ibid., p. 100. Cf. p. 103.

² Taylor, p. 100. ² Ibid., p. 23. ³ Ibid., p. di ⁴ Ibid., op. cit., pp. 100, 350–352. ⁵ Ibid., p. 349. ⁶ Ibid., p. 11

HE CONGENETAL ONLY OF SAME FOLL MAY CHEST A ANTICE TO LOCAL THE CONGRESS OF THE CONGRES OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE CONGRESS OF THE

xactly it wants because it has not first examined the conception. It has really been in search of some all-pervasive mover in virtue of which it could be shown that reality is a sucand a whole of a definite kind. But it has failed to find any ncel-pervasive character. It has failed to show that reality has may general character.

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lal THE PLACE OF GOD IN BERKELEL' PHILOSOPHY m

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J. D. MABBOTT, B.LITT., M.A.

n Bekkeley is commonly regarded as an idealist whose synt saved from subjectivism only by the advent of a God more veg, ex machina than the God of any other philosopher. I hope to o that this accusation rests on a misunderstanding of his central 1; a misunderstanding which gives God a place both inconsister of his main premisses and useless in his system. I hope also to a by quotation the real Berkeley, whose theory of God's Ince3 nature is directly supported by argument and consistent ionyl premisses, and makes (with his account of self) a system it is less than a completely coherent philosophy, is more partial episcopal assumption.

I shall first show how the usual conception of Berke olex is arose. Locke had shown that our ideas of colour, taste of secondary qualities depend on the percipient, but he little primary qualities (shape, size, solidity, etc.) reside in the o as we perceive them. Berkeley applied Locke's argument out colour against shape and size, and showed that our ideanicaty latter qualities were also relative to the percipient. Thus all i to to depend on my perceiving them. This raises the obvious Ithen "You ask me whether the books are in the study now, when tall'a is there to see them?" "Upon shutting my eyes all the furr_ific 10 the room is reduced to nothing, and barely upon opening that Its's again created."2 Berkeley first suggests two inadequate so then "Whenever they [the books] are mentioned or discours'd of her imagin'd and thought on. Therefore you can at no time psis whether they exist or no, but by reason of that very questic to must necessarily exist."3 Not only perception but imaginator conception) also confers existence, and it is therefore impostant conceive something existing unconceived. He also suggested physical objects may have a hypothetical or potential exitars anticipating Mill's view that an object is a permanent possibha sensation. "The question whether the earth moves or no amoust b reality to no more than this, to wit, whether we have reason in

[All references are to the Oxford Edition of Berkeley's Works (Ed. C. Fraser, 4 vols., 1901) C. = Commonplace Book. P. = Principa i lu = Dialogues.]

¹ C. i. 15. ² P. § 45, i. 281. 3 C. i. 15. Cf. P. § 23. D. I, if h

PLACE OF GOD IN BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY

m what has been observed by astronomers, that if we were such and such circumstances, and such or such a position, nce both from the earth and sun, we should perceive the move among the choir of the planets." Neither of these ions confer any real permanence or stability on the world "The trees are in the park, i.e. whether I will or no, imagine anything about them or no. Let me but go thither my eyes by day, and I shall not avoid seeing them.' 2 If cipi, objects when perceived by no finite spirit must be istence by God's perceiving them. "Seeing that they . . . sistence distinct from being perceived by me, there must be Mind wherein they exist. As sure, therefore, as the sensible lly exists, so sure is there an infinite, omnipresent Spirit ins and supports it."3 This completes the orthodox account y's view of the status of physical objects. The esse of ideas the esse of spirit is percipere. "From what has been said it that there is no other Substance than Spirit, or that which 4 "The question between me and the Materialists is not ings have a real existence out of the mind of this or that whether they have an absolute existence, distinct from eived by God, and exterior to all minds."5 The esse of pjects is therefore their being perceived by God. It is clear heory will save Berkeley from subjectivism, and it is to tception that his editor, in defending him on the subjecge, constantly makes appeal.6 Yet it is a solution of the hich excludes much of his most valuable work and raises fulties than it solves.

crnative theory can best be approached through Berkeley's of power or activity. We usually speak as if conditions of bjects were due to the activity of other physical objects. L'ducing physical objects to ideas in the mind, Berkeley saw view of cause could not stand. If the esse of ideas is percipi, 's that there is nothing in them but what is perceived; but Inshall attend to his ideas, whether of sense or of reflexion, Derceive in them any power or activity."7 Therefore "the eting of an idea implies passivity or inertness in it."7 Somere wever, I know that I have created my own ideas. When ica ship, I am aware of the image but also of the activity's al Here perception differs from imagination; if I perceical have no such awareness of spiritual activity. "It is now recognition of my own ideas that denominates the 1, 432. it ng—that being the very essence of perception or.

i. 8, i. 290. ² C. i. 65. ³ D. II, i. 424; Berkeley's itali, ags are those J.I, i. 382, 418. § 7, i. 261.

50, n. 4, 258, n. 3, 259, n. 5, and passim.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STI

wherein perception consists." Since I am aware that I do hal my own ideas of perception, some other agent must product, n me. "I find I can excite ideas in my mind at pleasure. . . . Th, a and unmaking of ideas doth very properly denominate in active. . . . But, whatever powers I may have over my own :e I find the ideas actually perceived by Sense have not a lion - dence on my will."2 The agent which produces them ent matter, for "Doth not Matter, in the common current acce of, the word, signify an extended, solid, moveable, unthinking substance?"3 This was indeed the account of matter 11; Berkeley's day. Subsequent theories of atoms as centres o er if the replacement of the Indestructibility of Matter by the tion of Energy as the basic principle of physics, left later sces, way out of Berkeley's dilemma which was closed to hionyl poraries. Against them his argument was conclusive. Since see 82 affecting me when I perceive cannot be matter, and since atter be active, the cause must be spirit. "There is therefore lexist Will or Spirit that produces them." 4 The nature of this Sf ita deduced from its effects on me, from the character of research to sense. Its power is clear from the fact that, however I trace perceive things otherwise than as I do. "The ideas of Sent to strong, lively, and distinct than those of the Imagination out likewise a steadiness, order, and coherence, and are notinicaty random, as those which are the effects of human wills ofti, tore in a regular train or series—the admirable connexion wl I the H ciently testifies the wisdom and benevolence of its Authoratala be noted in passing that Berkeley uses no arguments fro reific10 to support his belief in the existence of God, nor does hd Its's religious experience. He holds, indeed, that we have no then intuition of God.6

From the argument so far several difficulties in the usu pset at once emerge. If mind is essentially active and perceiving et to passive the esse of mind cannot be percipere. At the one pllop in the Commonplace Book Berkeley says the esse of mind is in he has added later "or velle, i.e. agere." I am most mysigue perceiving but in willing or imagining. "This making or unitaris andeas doth very properly denominate the mind active." has senserit, and to suppose that He perceives would be to make up brealit, ive recipient of ideas impressed on Him by some more in the same and the suppose that the perceives would be to make up brealit, ive recipient of ideas impressed on Him by some more in the same and the suppose that the perceives would be to make up brealit, ive recipient of ideas impressed on Him by some more in the same and the same and

[All refer of God. "The Spirit—the active thing—that which is Fraser, 4 —is the Will alone." "Substance of a spirit is that, it is the Will alone." [All refer of God. "The Spirit—the active thing—that which is the Will alone." "Substance of a spirit is that, it is the Will alone." "Substance of a spirit is that, it is the Will alone."

= Dialogues.]

2 P. §§ 28, 29, i. 272-3.

3 D. II, i. 429.

4 P. § 30, i. 273.

6 C. i. 51. Cf. P.

8 P. § 28, i. 273.

9 C. i. 41.

LACE OF GOD IN BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY

Ils, operates." Nor can the esse of ideas be percipi. The own fancies is that they are imagined, created by me; of data that they are created in me by God. The esse of God's we find any reason to believe in them, which we shall not) that they were imagined by Him, and even this is made y Berkeley's view that imagination presupposes perception. Ing ideas is not the same thing with perception. A man may s when he only imagines. But then this imagination presperception."

re led to a new conception of God, and of His relation to world which our senses reveal. Its stability will now be regularity and orderliness of His activity, and not to His ly perceiving it. "Nothing without corresponds to our as but powers. Hence a direct and brief demonstration of powerful Being, distinct from us, on whom we depend."3 If nature are not modes of relation between God's ideas. les, or established methods, wherein the Mind we depend In us the ideas of Sense." 4 We learn that certain of our arly accompany others. This concomitance is due to "the and Wisdom of that Governing Spirit whose Will constiaws of nature."5 The situation is like that created by a lution." If I resolve to tidy up my papers regularly on ys, what exists permanently is a disposition of my will. ts only on Ember Days is the spatial pattern I call "tidy to the trees in the park are permanently represented only lve" of the will of God such that as occasion arises a spatial tern (my idea of the trees) appears regularly in my mind. cal world is thus really a complicated "good resolution" of vo further illustrations may be adduced to show how a tum may be regular and reliable, but not itself permanent. ly head into a brick wall, I see stars. The stars are not perthere; they are the regular product of the meeting of my steps with the permanent wall. So the table I perceive has ment shape or size; it is the regular product of the collision ayward activity with the permanent volition of God. Again, etic field is force in itself invisible, but such that when iron re introduced into it they form regular, visible patterns. The ion is obvious. We noticed above that one of Berkelev's ate solutions of his main problem was to allow the physical hypothetical or potential existence. This solution is now ossible for us by our having some reality from which, i. 432. ity is derived—the orderly volitional activity .i. 91.

i. 53. § 30, i. 273. ² C. i. 28. Cf. i. 52. 5 P. § 32, i. 274.

ings are those D.I, i. 382, 418.

23

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STI

"Bodies, etc., do exist even when not perceived—they being." hal

This complete and coherent theory is much more entity n regarded as Berkeley's main position than that previously a a It alone is consistent with his distinction between percep 'n imagination, with his view that spirit is essentially active, e his account of the relation between finite spirits and Gorn seems, indeed, to be no need whatever in such a system for of of God's ideas. Yet Berkeley appears to have believed in go, several references show, and as one of his special discus. 1500 illustrate. One of the earliest queries in the Commonplat 1713 "Ou: Whether succession of ideas in the Divine Intell.ei.)1 later answers this query in the negative, and is then face a problem of the meaning of the Creation. He solves it by s Sce3, while God's ideas have existed from eternity, Creationionyt when He made them perceptible to finite spirits. But if "ticses82 perceptible in the same manner and order as is described ir fater a further difficulty appears. The creation of sun and moo lexist have meant their becoming perceptible to man, who was cf ita days later. Berkeley ingeniously introduces the angels, "treethe other intelligences before man was created."4 Berkeley av reasons why we cannot dispense with God's ideas. Goe dten omniscient as well as omnipotent, for "to know everything, out is certainly a perfection."5 "There is in the Deity Undersnicaty well as Will. He is no blind agent, and in truth a blind tore contradiction."6 In the Third Dialogue Hylas suggests t the alone is sufficient to account for our sense-data without Gootalia ideas. Philonous replies, "A thing which hath no ideas in itscific" impart them to me."7 This does not seem obvious, especi. Its25 he goes on to allow8 that God, without having sense-data, cath n sense-data to me, and when we recall that all ideas are sensier are derived from them. "Ideas of Sense are the archetypes ps imagination, dreams, etc., are copies, images, of these."9 1 show that, despite these definite expressions of opinion, Berlo, W not make the Divine Ideas an essential part of his system, an there is good reason to doubt whether he believed in them at IL.

There are many reasons why he should not believe in them. Is is to be the relation between my ideas and God's? At this man have my idea of the table before me, and God has His. Sur! [b] raises all the difficulties of a correspondence theory agains? In

[All refer 1 accepting the view of Lorenz that p. 58 is Berkeley's di Letter to Percival, i. 353. 4 C. i. 42. Cf. D. III, 11 C. i. 51. 7 D. III, 18 9 C. i. 52. Cf. i. 28

ACE OF GOD IN BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY

ught so persistently. All that he says against Matter can to attack this new correspondence. "Qu. Did ever any y other things besides his own ideas, that he should comto these, and make these like unto them?" "Well, say apprehend or conceive what you say extension is like you not? If the latter, how know you they are alike? How mpare any things besides your own ideas?"2 God's ideas iless as Matter in Locke's theory. "Ask a man, I mean a er, why he supposes this vast structure, this compages of e shall be at a stand; he'll not have one word to say."3 , that they should suppose an innumerable multitude beings, which they acknowledge are not capable of proone effect in nature, and which therefore are made to no purpose, since God might have done everything as well m-this, I say, though we should allow it possible, must ry unaccountable and extravagant supposition."4 "How in you suppose that an All-perfect Spirit, on whose Will ave an absolute and immediate dependence, should need ent in His operations, or, not needing it, make use of it? ems to me you are obliged to own the use of a lifeless strument to be incompatible with the infinite perfection "The Will of an Omnipotent Spirit is no sooner exerted ited, without the application of means."6 In all these he objections are as valid against God's ideas—all ideas e.ive-as against Matter.

the reality our ideas represent is the world of God's ideas, principal claim for his theory must fall—his claim that fect theory of perception. "We must with the mob place in the senses." There are others who say the wall is not fire is not hot, etc. We Irishmen cannot attain to these "We see the house itself, the church itself; it being an idea ing more." What I perceive directly is the physical object, heories to the contrary are agnostic. "The reverse of the introduced Scepticism." Colour, figure, motion, extensile like, considered only as so many sensations in the perfectly known. . . . But, if they are looked on as notes or efferred to things or archetypes existing without the mind, then involved all in scepticism. We see only the appearances, and real qualities of things. . . . All this scepticism follows from posing a difference between things and ideas." It It follows no

^{61. 2} C. i. 82. 3 C. i. 16. 53, i. 287. Cf. D.II, i. 427. 5 D.II, i. 432. 0, 433. 7 C. i. 44, Cf. D.I, i. 383. 8 C. i. 91.

Do. Cf. D.III, i. 463, and especially i. 445. ... the real things are those P. \$1 see and feel." 10 C. i. 83. 11 P. \$87, i. 305-6. Cf. D.I, i. 382, 418.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL S'.
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less inevitably from supposing a difference between our God's.

A further reason why Berkeley might well have disperbelled belief in Divine Ideas is his reiterated assertion that ideas and passive, and the fact that God's ideas would have negative as son out of our idea of God, and put a power in its place reception to understand how on the intervention of the example of God, who is pure activity. If do not understand how or very any part (or like any part) of the essence or substance of (including an impassive, indivisible, pure, active being."

It may be suggested that Berkeley can avoid the correction difficulty and the scepticism it involves by identifying out to complete the correct to the suggested that Berkeley can avoid the correct to the suggested that Berkeley can avoid the correct to the suggested that Berkeley can avoid the correct to the suggested that Berkeley can avoid the correct tion that things, and exhibits them to our view in such a such that the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained." 5 This view is still open to the suggested as He Himself hath ordained. The ward of the suggested as He Himself hath ordained. The ward of the suggested as He Himself hath ordained. The ward of the suggested hath ordained was here to the suggested as the suggested hath ordained was here. The suggested hath ordained hath ordained was here to the suggested hath ordained hath ordai

For the reasons given above, it does not seem likely that so this system. It is true that he frequently mentions them, but now show that some of these expressions are suggestively stick to In one place 6 he discusses the view that "Matter, though participated by us, is nevertheless perceived by God, to whom occasion of exciting ideas in our minds." He remarks first test theory gives up the absolute independence of matter, and is the only intelligible one that I can pick from what is said of upoccasions," but he adds that "it seems too extravagant to delicate this extravaganza is identified by most him the said of upoccasions." Yet this extravaganza is identified by most him the said of upoccasions."

¹ E.g. i. 10, 13, 37, 41, 271, 429.

² This will be defended later. See Note at end.

⁴ D.II, i. 426. 5 D.III, i. 447.

⁶ P. § 70-75, sip. i lu

ACE OF GOB IN BERKELEY'S PHILOSOPHY

eianism. "The upshot of all is, that there are certain eas in the mind of God." "Whether there are such ideas of God I shall not dispute." "I shall not dispute"—not but in other places also, this is the best he can say for e Ideas which are supposed to be the keystone of his own lonous is prepared to "allow" Hylas that there may be igs perceived by the mind of God, which are to Him the producing ideas in us. Berkeley is consulted on this yery ev. Samuel Johnson, who aims here a more shrewd blow Bishop than his notorious namesake. In reply Berkeley as no objection against calling the Ideas in the Mind of ypes of ours." He is prepared to "allow" Divine Ideas by do not offend against his central doctrine that nothing lent of Mind. But the admission is not readily made, for ally foreign to his system.

hs to ask why he should have mentioned them at all. ons can be found. He probably came to them first; the metry of the crude theory sketched at the beginning of makes it an obvious first refuge for a sinking subjectivist. , such a development took place, it must have preceded all led works, for the Commonplace Book shows the mature plete. The only shred of evidence for this suggestion may found in the alteration of percipere to agere as the esse of ondly, theological considerations about omniscience would e addition of the Divine Ideas to his completed system. is much less alarming and revolutionary to think of the park existing when nobody perceives them, because they. eir friendly, familiar qualities, are perceived by God, than them as represented in God's mind by powers or volitions e them in character. Here is the real reason for the appearbd's ideas in the published works, and especially in the ialogues. In the Commonplace Book, Berkeley is uncom-

"Bodies taken for powers do exist when not perceived." 5 without corresponds to our primary ideas but powers." 6 solves "Not to mention the combinations of powers, but to nings—the effects themselves—do really exist, even when not perceived, but still with relation to perception." 7 And why? Ident to correct men's mistake without altering their lands makes truth glide into their souls insensibly."

said that Divine perception is after all a possible theory lite definitely asserted by Berkeley, a much more striking of his way of "humouring" his audience "in their own way

b, i. 300. ² D.II, i. 434. ³ Letter to Johnson, quoted, ii. 19. ⁵ C. i. 82. ⁶ C. i. 60.

p. Italics in last three quotations mine. 8 C. i. 71.

of talking" can be adduced. In the New Theory of Visio throughout as if tangible sense-data were independent leil, al cipient. The Commonplace Book shows that he had alrea that all sense-data were mind-dependent, so that this it! policy of gradualness. Not until the Principles does he aty bilia also. There is no question of development. The Ccep :e Book (1705-8) gives the material for his whole system e, technical term "notion"—the need of which is noted 23(y, of New Theory (1709), the Principles (1710), and the Dialog voz, show differences which are merely strategic. The Divine to of the physical world is no more part of the system than i'al'l; pendent reality of tangibilia. Both appear in the publishe sternt mitigate the jar which the undiluted theory would adrto. the plain man's system. The only difference between the tales that the reality of tangibilia (which is the more bluntly stit ony two) is incompatible with the whole system, while the en lies Divine Ideas conflicts only with parts of it, so that he care to treat their evictors. to treat their existence as an independently possible tenet, as the doctrine of the Trinity might be, but with as of the meeting with his philars and marketing might be. nection with his philosophy as it has. "N.B. To use utmo, ath not to give the least handle of offence to the Church or Chulteen Campbell Freeze and the Church of Chulteen Campbell Freeze and the Church of Chulteen Campbell Freeze and the Church of Church of

Campbell Fraser raises one point of difficulty for our ino the irrelevance of God's Ideas. The theory that our sense in but a "natural language" continually recurs in Berkeley's worsaicat editor explains the conception by saying "Sense-ideas are 11 to of the alphabet in that language of natural order which Go Ithela for the expression of His Ideas to us." 4 If this is correct, tier tall language requires the existence of God's Ideas; otherwise rrific of the language would be meaningless or express nothing. It Its certainly difficulties about Berkeley's language theory. Insight Theory of Vision the words of the language were visible of erio shapes, and they stood for the real or tangible objects. e oss tangibilia are overtly admitted to be mind-dependent astic of arises. If we say one type of sense-datum (visible) expresserat, w (tangible), we lose the distinction of status which we shoups: to separate a language from what it means. If, on the other st make the whole world of sense-data the language, and also exist God's Ideas as unknown and self-contradictory, what willib, guage express? Berkeley sometimes answers—the attribute 1010 "The steady consistent methods of nature may not unfitly in [! the Language of its Author whereby he discovers his attril i our view." 5 But in other places he says that sense-data s

C. i. 92.

² i. 2i, "improper . . . to make ourselves ideas, or thinking thin 3 C. i. 41. 4 i. 309, n. 2. 5 P. § 1

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ydata; "the proper objects of sight"—light and colours clanguage wonderfully adapted to suggest and exhibit to leces, figures, situations, and various qualities of tangible s words suggest the things signified by them." 1 Perhaps thndi might be arranged by distinguishing what words have they evince. If I say "There is the door," my words bation in space, but they evince anger. So God's wordspita—express or suggest other sense-data, but evince His aood will. Whatever our solution may be, there is never a n the whole of Berkeley's work that the "natural lanand a for God's ideas. This possibility is definitely rejected aphlet The Theory of Vision Vindicated and Explained, published in 1732, and which is interesting also as giving s learest statements of the view we have ventured to call serkeley." "The objects of sense . . . are called ideas. . . . Ideas of sense, the inference of reason is good to power. tt. But we may not infer that our ideas are like unto this nese, or Active Being. On the contrary, it seems evident a can be only like another idea, and that in our ideas . . . fring of power, causality, or agency included.... Whenever, he appellation of sensible object is used in a determined, sense, it is not applied to signify this absolutely existing use or power, but the ideas themselves produced thereby. are observed to be connected together are vulgarly conler the relation of cause and effect, whereas, in strict and truth, they are only related as sign to the thing signified."2 lso be objected that we have left "Siris" out of account. are many. If we exclude "Siris," Berkeley's system shows ment except the use of the word "notion" to cover our of spirits and some dissatisfaction with his attack on deas. In the "Siris" we find a new world. Its Platonic its toleration of forms and influences, its reverent agnostiependence on the Timæus and Proclus, are poles apart Berkeley of the other works. It is true that Divine Ideas tant in "Siris," but they are no more than those "Forms" which the misunderstandings of Albinus and his followers zed by the deceptive transliteration of the Greek word and transmuted into "Ideas in the Divine Mind." There is Berkeleian about them. To attempt to unite the hints and of "Siris" into some kind of dusky Christian Platonism, and regard the result as characteristic of Berkeley, would be like the Catholic faith the central belief of Voltaire on the of his reputed death-bed conversion. Catholicism and make as strange bed-fellows as "Siris" and Berkeley. Alciphro IV. 10, ii. 168. 2 Op. cit., §§ 12, 13, ii, 386.

27

If it is said that God must have some theoretical ac cannot be a blind agent—our answer is that this may weir but that all Berkeley's main tenets preclude it. His mist? was to limit theoretical activity to the passive receptifitie data and their imaginative reproduction, and thereby tity s experience impossible for God. But Berkeley without cep tions is not Berkeley, but Kant or (as in "Siris") Plat e, extended his so-called doctrine of notions from spirits with as he did, and from relations to universals, as he did nor have allowed God to have notions. "God knows or has ic ideas are not conveyed to him by sense as ours are." 1 i'al'l extension, to relations, is illegitimate, for relations are notions are of the active. Such extensions would take us/to Berkeleianism, though they might take us nearer truth. recall too much the methods of last century's Hegelians, they had to examine a philosopher, tended inevitably to " him the Hegelian position or to "develop" him until it Berkeley in the history of philosophy must always be th of 1705 to 1713, and that means a Berkeley to whom God is 101213 of ita Will and not Thought. itearh

Note.—There are certain considerations which suggest it ter ideas, if He has any, must be spatial. We might be tempntout that they are "unknown" 3 in character, but represented: spatial data, as are Kant's things-in-themselves. In illustration this we might quote the army system in which disciplina Ithe ships are represented in most languages by spatial terental corporals and bombardiers are "on the same level," and "alrrific are corporals. If a savage had this organization describedth Its would naturally suppose that an army meant a large pyr sith of men with a Field-Marshal sitting "at the top" and a thif er oppressed privates "at the bottom." The growing use of familiarized most people with this idea of representing tico with two variables (non-spatial in character) by means at, w plotted with the aid of two spatial axes. Why should not Gs: (themselves non-sparial, like the spiritual relationships wlst. an army) be represented to us by spatial sense-data (arise "transfer, degrade, sous-officier, High Command," etc.)?

The answer is that the two dimensions in an army are no convertible. You could explain to a savage movements 'dimension' taken separately; the ease with which a private become a corporal compared with the difficulty of his become a marks one "dimension," the simplicity of transferring

D. III, i. 458. ² Cf. Caird on Kant, or Bosanquet on U

³ P. § 75, quoted, p. 25.

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y to another contrasted with the difficulty of the transfer giment giving the other. But you could not combine the le measure; the distance between a Sergeant in the Sea-

Private of the Buffs is strictly immeasurable. In a there is such a "diagonal" distance. If X is three miles hd P is four miles west of X, then P is five miles northboth direction and distance being fully determinable. ontinuum whose three dimensions have a common unit and—here is the crucial point—it is the only continuum therefore if God's ideas are to have all the varieties of ch our ideas manifest, they must have a character which aplified only in space itself. Otherwise the derivative will relations than that from which it is derived. Thus our s by means of army organization, etc., all break down, is that the reality our spatial ideas represent must itself Here also, perhaps, we may find a reason for rejecting theory of the physical world, placing power in God, in he view that places power in spatial centres. But the main paper was to determine what Berkeley himself believed, find difficulties in his system.

BIOLOGICAL DEISM

JOSEPH NEEDHAM, M.A., PH.D.

I

God, Freedom, and Immortality are not accustomed by too natural science for any light on these dark places. i all, admitted that the scientific method operates with be stept tions which are far from binding on philosophers, and with have no very satisfactory metaphysical authority. In face, few protests by philosophers, scientific thinkers have of the only felt entitled to neglect the philosophical consequence theories, and have gone ahead in the investigation of the accepting only such hypotheses as explained the maxim of known facts, irrespective of their possible results on a fixed the sophical importance, some form of materialism, howevilted by the guised, usually results.

The modern tendency to regard philosophy as simply ann but or method of criticism of the propositions of the natural science to get rid of the problems of God, Freedom, and Imp. 11 to placing such subjects in the realm of the unspeakable. Ithe about which it is impossible to formulate any statement be logically sound. The result of philosophy, as Wittgensarrific is not a number of philosophical propositions, but rather the clarification of thoughts, the making propositions clear. Ans the as Schlick 2 has pointed out, entirely precludes the possibility end being any such thing as metaphysics, for the natural see as the only ontology we can have. "Most of the so-called meetic propositions are no propositions at all, but meaningless at put tions of words, and the rest are not metaphysical but sinds cealed scientific statements, the truth or falsehood of while story ascertained by the ordinary methods of experience and observing

Whether it would be advisable for the scientific world suspicious of these tendencies in philosophy may well too tioned. While it might be in a certain sense agreeable to him this old enemy, metaphysics, done to death in this way, he is the scientific world be suspicious.

L. Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, 4.112.

² M. Schlick, Proceedings of the Seventh International Philoric Congress, 1930.

in order to criticize the concepts and propositions of ce, some metaphysical foundation is not required. It is not my place as a biologist to enter upon the disease very interesting but very difficult problems in e purpose of this paper is rather to point to a certain tances in modern biology where biological speculation ears to be so constructed as to be readily fitted in to us of philosophers and even theologians about mand. And just as the scientific worker may legitimately if the arguments of those philosophers who deny the netaphysics, so the philosopher will probably be well use before he erects any speculative structure so made the the scientific theories in question. The advisability of warning will be more apparent when the cases have the

II

istance of a change in scientific outlook which might contemporary thought is concerned more with astrovith biology, except in so far as the earth as the home ganisms is the primary biological datum. Historians e never tired of pointing out the importance of the ich the Copernican revolution in astronomy had upon ption of the universe. Where before the earth had tre of the divine drama of the Incarnation, the centre universe, it became no more than the moon of a star. ery that the earth," as Inge 1 has put it, "instead of ptre of a finite universe, like a dish with a dish-cover a planet revolving round the sun, which itself is only ns of stars, tore into shreds the Christian map of the Il this is now a commonplace, but what is not so well is the fact that modern astronomy tends, in a certain turn to the pre-Copernican position, not of course as e earth to be the centre of the universe, but as concluding al bodies anything like the earth are extraordinarily d in space.

ist century it was common, accepting the view of the ontained in the paragraph taken from Inge above, to at every star in the heavens presented the closest analogy wn sun, and that each was possessed of a solar system in olved at any rate a certain number of planets resembling. The nineteenth-century biologist was thus invited to at the conditions on our earth which have made life tere almost infinitely repeated in an appallingly large

V. R. Inge, Science, Religion and Reality, 1925, p. 357.

number of other solar systems. But this opinion can re be held, for modern work in astronomy, which is sal the cosmological book of Jeans, finds planets such an be extremely rare. There is no need to repeat here the a conditions of temperature, pressure, moisture, et in requisite for the flourishing of biological systems; it e with which these seem to occur which is so interes n view, as Jeans puts it, which considered every point pt sky as a possible home for life, is quite foreign to models, for the very concept of life implies a considerable to duration in time, and there cannot be any such thin !! tures where atoms change their make-up millions out second, and no pair of atoms ever stay joined to know of no type of astronomical body in which the can be favourable to life except planets like our chy round a sun."

But planets only come into being when two stars te another close enough to induce a tidal action throwists arm of incandescent gas which can condense locally ta bodies. And the closeness of approach must not be lent star-diameters. "Calculation shows that even after a pe its life of millions of millions of years, the chance is er hundred thousand to one against its being a sun sunt planets." Far more common is the division of a star in At ing a binary system such as we see in fairly near stars, to and a-Centauri. And of course it goes without saying the which is to support life must describe an orbit with value definable limits around the star which gave it its originic where liquids freeze, such as Neptune, are just as usellts where liquids boil, such as Mercury. "All this suggeth an infinitesimally small corner of the universe can ber suited to form an abode of life. Primeval matter must's forming itself into radiation for millions of millions produce a minute quantity of the inert ash on which live Then by an almost incredible accident this ash, and i must be torn out of the sun which has produced it, are into a planet. Even then this residue of ash must not be too cold, or life will be impossible."

Thus the astronomical work of Copernicus stands? place in the scientific world-outlook; but what of the ph work with which he has always been credited? Would n almost be open, for any thinker with theological into wished to take it, to a re-establishment of that anthrough of things which, as we always thought, was the

J. Jeans, The Universe Around Us, p. 331.

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fall mediæval superstitions? From the point of view raditional scientific emphasis on the immensity of d the unimportant position of man, of living organle, within it, seemed to liberate the human spirit ccupation with the terrible responsibilities which heme of both Greek and Christian theology. But if so rare a thing in the universe, is there not a possinan responsibilities should again be taken seriously? mere academic question, for the scientific worker as the historical origins and conquests of what he not see unmoved the return of the practical conseprofound belief in the anthropocentric universe. He ge Santayana's r sapphics:—

if they have forgot us, and the shifting sands has buried deep our thousand cities, I superstition then will seize upon them; Protean error,

I fill their panting heart with sickly phantoms sudden blinding good and monstrous evil; ere will be miracles again, and torment, Dungeon, and fagot,—

til the patient earth, made dry and barren, ds all her herbage in a final winter, d the gods turn their eyes to some far distant Bright constellation.

III

nof responsibility leads on, by a natural transition, ins which surround the subject of scientific deterhe subjective conviction of free choice which man re also there are a good many indications that biois being led to a position in which it might have no offer to the requirements even of classical theology it.

important factor is something which would at first far removed from any of these considerations, namely living organisms. And we have to discuss, in the first the size of mammals or birds as wholes, but the sizes stituent parts. The progress of knowledge during this thysiology and biochemistry has given us a fairly clear general plan and constitution of the contents of a living ow that a tissue cell of one of the higher animals, a tance, which together with millions of other similar

G. Santayana, Poems, 1922, p. 77.

cells makes up the central nervous system, con can n membrane, its nucleus with the nuclear membranh is sn .c plasm. The older view which attributed an anatorsuch al network structure to the cytoplasm is now quite abere that, n the elaboration of techniques which permit us to, etr ; a living cell without any interference with it has shons; itp 'n speaking, no anatomical elements in the cytoplasmiteres, cytoplasm now to be a polyphasic colloidal system point can be pictured best by thinking of a homogeneoumode you chemical substance in water, in which there floatrable V.3. large globules of another chemical substance, imm think medium, and consisting of a very large number of moons of together (a colloidal aggregate). Within this globuled ttenf other globules existing in a similar dispersed conditich the again within them. From these facts several conour cces firstly, that the amount of surface in the living protor dously large relative to the mass of the whole systemstars less the main characteristic of the whole system is throwingte ordinarily heterogeneous; and thirdly, that the smallcally is be le ita parts of it are very small indeed.

Exactly how small such constituent parts can be iter a system to say definitely, but as we know with accessive of the atoms and molecules which enter into the un sustence of the atoms and molecules which enter into the un sustence is a gap between the largest chemical molecules anars, it is colloidal phases which exist in the living cell. Sing the calculate a relation between the rarest chemical unvith visible of the colloidal phases, in order to arrive at some ideoriginate each would contain. When these calculations are musely find that a given colloidal phase in the interior of the cell-ugger later contain only half a dozen of a given kind of molecules that few as only one.

The same conclusion emerges with even more forcions of considering a living cell in a tissue of one of the high lip organisms we consider the interior of one of the smalnd representation organisms, such as the bacteria, or the ultra-filtrable vit, and latter organisms are so small as to be invisible who becomic organisms are so small as to be invisible who becomic organisms are so small as to be invisible who become about one-tenth the size of an ordinary bacilluads same size as the colloidal aggregates of dissolved e phasmad with room for only about 300 protein molecules ld normal remembered that the proteins form much the greater painter of living material, it can be seen that in such a small orathrical

See A. E. Boycott, Proc. Roy. Soc. Med., 1928, the

² One μ is one-thousandth part of one millimetr.

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among those ern for very few indeed of the rarer molecules, such that there can pounds, and of the very rare molecules indeed, because we can the vitamines, it would appear that only one he is making ty thousands could, as it were, possess a copy. But the physical wy to go as far as the vitamines for this conclusion, statement abounical units of much simpler nature which may be conditions, and equally important. A recent calculation by Peters 1 now adopt ve hydrogen ion shows this. At room temperature, (Whether recenly one water molecule in 555,000,000 is dissociated is another quen and hydroxyl ions, but when this number of establishing 'is translated into terms of space, it is found to author far too th a side of some 0.25μ in length, i.e. much larger more in commiltrable virus organism, and about on the lower two must sha microscopic vision. This living being, then, would the profound ain at pH 7.0 (the common acidity of living cells) dependence oln ion.

least our mingaring of this somewhat technical discussion on the and, unlike Bwith which this paper is concerned? It is this, that nature of the (s and two of that and three of something else are not the busin ave to deal with conditions very different from -I am not my the well-known statistical laws of physics and but, whatever, orked out. What we are now facing is the behaviour

if it was in maticles and not of particles in the mass. ment of thou, at all familiar with theoretical physics will apprepoint for main of these biological facts upon the demonstration, more justice the statistical nature of the second law of thermorational syste regularity of microscopic phenomena, in which realist. It m for all intents and purposes complete and trustsystem is positity a statistical regularity, and we cannot ascribe on illusion; tarity to events in the ultra-microscopic field. On that we have illie, in an extremely interesting paper,2 has sought and their sta ological indeterminism from physical indeterminism. laid down by ilation that in the deepest recesses of living matter thing-in-itselses may, and probably do, occur is not a new one

But whate but Lillie's particular contribution was the realizathat we can in which the living organism is constructed to take as it is for individual fluctuations occurring in the colloidal more than vills. The living body is specialized in an extraordinary the idealist by hission. "The response to any stimulus," as Lillie Kantrel the transmission of an activating influence from the

to have mane f stimulation throughout the larger functional area of the term, rie response. In other words, the protoplasmic system

these involve, ances, i.e. ohi, Trans. Faraday Soc., 1930.

Edition Refui "Physical Indeterminism and Vital Action," Science, 1927, 3 F. G. Donnan, Journ. Gen. Physiol., 1926, 8. 685.

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is characterized by a highly developed power of clife, and even in this way it may be possible for an activity origina, was feeling his tion in a minute protoplasmic phase to spread combine realism system, not only of the cell in which it occurs, by

in close connection with it. And in this way the not confined to higher organism, for instance, though indisputable inceptions which long as we confine our attention and analysis to utable idealism, phenomena involved in it, might really containvorld as a systelement of individual action, of physical indeternoctrine that the not omit to give the often-quoted parallel of eccEthics, together where correct predictions can be made of the numa short note on acts such as suicide in a given population of individual.

acts such as suicide in a given population of indivisubjectively convinced of their personal freedom. F the world as a sense which could have a meaning for the philosoptioned in consumably involve the conscious choice of the free ag a short article or more alternative courses of action, and there sext mention and to seeing the physical side of this process in tof apperception. jump of an atom in one direction or the other. Only to comprehend are considered in very large numbers does predictionsing it. It may only when biological individuals are considerey in knowledge. numbers can predictions be made. "Just as submictiated unity; it says Lillie, "determine microscopic events (in biolon as a manifold behind or internal to the submicroscopic events r Kant implies a series of ultramicroscopic events reaching back in knowing or into the fleld where the known types of physical dher, unless the replaced by another type of determination, the ss the self that of which we do not know. Apparently this type enter into the bilities of a kind entirely different from those withat the object familiar from our experience of large-scale phery, since otherfield events occur which appear to be free, i.e. internto be known. externally determined, although as yet we can giparable from

account of the conditions of such determination." that because y absolutely; be realized in y exists as it the self is a

In thus considering the possibility of a recognizerefore could itself of an indeterminism at the basis of animal because knowing brought to the borders of consciousness, and in this at the self is interesting views have recently been put forward constituting. The relations between genetics and embryology have holds that for some years past, but the relations between genetic the self chology may be of even greater importance in the fu, in knowing

The successive generations of a biological group su constitute, when looked at genetically, a great intervis, a putting

together and a hied particles which determine the potentialities Kant often speak individual, are derived partly from the maternal the physical worom the paternal, and so go back in branching ordering these in ly. In the same way the particular gene-comwas the originate dists in the individual in question is not destined notion that know but will be split up and part united with a set whether we agree me individual of the opposite sex to form an if not itself a mordering process, depend on what combination of strands has entered as affecting the led of course by the environment which he has judgment, presule. What are the relations between the conscious, concepts into a cing, knowing self, that which can say "I," and in the coherence combination?

I think it is faluestion has recently been considered by Jennings. "coherence theor standing apart from the web, it will not appear and numerous in edifferent knots, since they are formed of different "synthesis," he "trands, should have different peculiarities, different coveries ever mout that the observer himself—his total possibility involves concept at without which the whole universe would be to the dynamic asp—that he himself should be tied in relations of data he even antile one of the millions of knots in the web of strands.

data he even ant le one of the millions of knots in the web of strands Whatever we down from the past—this to the observer appears for Kant this mplexing." The self is impelled to ask whether it otherwise it would as so much the product of the gene-combination, If we make anyirticular gene-combination had never existed it round, or Iron er have existed. It is easy, knowing as we do the and metallic topssible individuals which ever come to fruition, to Surely in so doing the chances are that the combination which produced of a system of fual self should ever have been made. One of the it must mean a abinations in man, i.e. one parent, produces during more, but it me oo germ-cells—the other considerably more, about involves category germ-cell has a different combination of between the di my one of the 300 billions might have fertilized any that necessary po, the chance that any one particular combination substance pers be formed would be one in some five millions of not a necessar ition to this, the chances against the union of either not be an objectnts in question have to be taken into account, and ordinary physicat their union, but also against their existence, since it would not be being in a precisely similar way. "The system of table; on the humanity has devised," as Jennings says, "would The argume to express the odds against the formation of the

The argume to express the odds against the formation of the legitimately be reaction of a given individual. If our conscious selves more importance occurrence of the exact combination of genes, which must be attachless, The Biological Basis of Human Nature, Faber & Faber, system.

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as a matter of fact produced us, the odds are Joly call observations against your existence or my existence." in so that, provided Of the millions of billions of germ-cells produact something quite

five come to maturity. What of the possible perso buishing between thus lost? If we regard the human personality asthjective and submost real of entities, having value possessed by Luine perceptions, many philosophers have done, what is to be saited on us according number of personalities whose existence was preligects we have the much as ours? The difficulties to which these facrinder similar confelt very acutely, it is interesting to note, in a physical object century. The discovery of mammalian eggs bynich we and other the end of the seventeenth century was practical vive follow Kant's with the discovery of mammalian spermatozoa Fxperiences; if we Leeuwenhoek. But throughout practically the whose is known by us, ing hundred years there were disputes as to which we rise to these was the origin of the embryo, although to us it s physical objects obvious to common sense that both were required. ur experiences as doubt that one of the most powerful reasons whi of his arguments acceptance of the spermatozoa as fundamental age, e realist. was the difficulty of reconciling such prodigality -in-itself behind nature with the doctrines of the soul which were tained by Kant, eighteenth century. In 1757 d'Aumonts argued that we can never be so prolific as to produce such millions of perience, as they malcules, each one with its soul, unnecessarily. phind the appearelaborated a hypothesis of a "world of the unborn w: but we could

tozoa could retire between each attempt to find a that the world to develop. But as time went on the facts proved ppearances, the the opponents of spermatozoa, and the picture of g ascribing it to know it to-day was generally received. It was easy ascribing it to logian to turn to scholastic examples, such as Duns there must be say that a soul was breathed into the body of the dev d to things-inwhen it had reached a stage of sufficient perfection world by the But in modern times these simple solutions of the pr e basis of data avail, and since we know that genetical influences a for supposing to physical characteristics, but include also, as far can only refer mental characteristics too, the problem again presents nust be due to

Some other alternative, consistent with the facts of perhaps be found, and Jennings suggests that we in our assumption that diversity of gene-combinates responsible for the origin of distinctness of selves. Can one and the same gene-combination gives rise to two

of philosophy and, at least

is we, human

a position to

R. de Graaf, De Mulierum Organis Generationi, Leyden, y the fact of A. von Leeuwenhoek, Phil. Trans. Roy. Soc., 1677, 12. 15 wledge at all.

³ M. d'Aumont, article "Generation" in Diderot's Enconow not only vol. 7.

4 J. Cooke, New Theory of Generation

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other objects but to itself; but howat we know as identical twins. In such cases the experience. This Itwo separate individuals at a very early period in know the real selfd subsequently the remarkable thing is, not that an inevitable conery like each other, not that there are differences mere appearance but that they are actually distinct selves, distinct we need not inproversely, by the use of suitable technique, two inclined to suppwould, if not interfered with, have gone on and prothing which raisrate individuals may be made to fuse into one and appearances, sin individual only. So far this has only been accomplace in the real's of marine invertebrates, but it seems that only distinction drawilties hinder its accomplishment in the case of man. self is too absolfused organism possess two selves, struggling with two aspects men the possession of consciousness, holding the field not to regard or combined in some way into one? Are the cases of appearance. From which have been studied in man possibly the result

of science; from periment performed for us by Nature?

and all science exists for these questions, but Jennings seriously conthis meant that bility that neither gene-combinations nor environinseparable from ately or together be found sufficient to account for this point, the d of personality. If so, it might be necessary to hold one hand, we mun self is an entity existing independently of genes study, and mustinations, and that it merely enters at times into to explain by caone of the knots formed by the living web. If one on the other hanbination or knot should not occur, it would enter to explain the faith another. Each of us might perhaps have existed there is anotherferent characteristics from those we have—as our as knower, and would indeed by different if we had lived under world and the tonments." Could biology envisage the possibility of a could not knowf selves? Could it regard the occurrence of two parcontrast is the ells, which might or might not unite, as having no the self: it enalue for the existence of selves, but merely furnishing sciences should to which for reasons unknown one of them might what is so esserrarily attached? The fact that these questions can now the self is subjiportant; it shows that biology has no doctrine of the self is the onlyvidence to offer at present concerning the relations even of the pes and gene-combinations. And the question is there-So it at once let as to whether philosophers and theologians might not physical presuept doctrines with which the biology of the nineteenth what were held have had nothing to do.

prove its trut which, though cannot be di

superficial fall low observed three instances of an apparently favourknown; and the existing in science itself towards a view of the world ded as foreign to that of science. The position of life

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as a whole on the earth and of man in particular s and more coherent much more unusual and rare than had before been penetration by biochemistry into the constitution de dogmatic should seems to reveal a state of affairs where individual acount of other states of oth of atoms, molecules, ions, etc., may amount to a off, or the spiritual minism. The consideration of the relation between only be known self and the mechanism of heredity shows that there thing for which gene-combinations and environment which gene-combinations and environment which treated a second treated and the second treated as a second treated as Among these three points there is much in commonly treated God faced with difficulties arising out of the problems of was ex hypothesi scientific thinkers were dealing with them in such a v niversal panacea co-operation with philosophers and theologians. Ra all discrepancies contiguity of theoretic structure, just as one build always say, structed street leaves a serrated edge of bricks for th s be explained by one to fit into.

This is the sense in which the (perhaps not vers and impossible title of this paper was intended. It is not at all incommittee with even these perplexities in science may tempt philosophers tings, and if so, to take them as of more than temporary significan int was convinced upon them a structure (in a certain sense apologi some, at any rate, of the positions that all religion shion was not to held. Deism, though not in the form which left its m eighteenth-century thought, has still its representation admitting among the theological Modernists, and the John ss in that way. Matthew Tindals of to-day are as desirous as ever ness fatal to the a predominant place for reason in religion. The p paper, however, is twofold: firstly, to describe three tipes hielesisches hielesisc interesting biological problems and the way in w! being treated; and secondly, to deprecate the possil lowing to the being used as philosophical or theological arguments. It lied in science, reason why the philosopher may be well advised to ticular phenothem is that their nature is essentially passing and trid ny phenomena, the principal reason why the theologian should ad explaining any caution in considering them is that even were they rie y; the Kantian they have little to do with that irrational alogical elei extbook would the most valuable contribution of religion to life. h it could not

That these dilemmas are transitory is surely at lea the same time In the case of the astronomical speculations about the act that phenoliving organisms in the universe, there may easily be at be in the least thought once more to the Copernican view. For althou, higher principle it seems unlikely that life as we know it could exist o was one of the an infinitesimal few of the bodies in the heavens, there igh he, I think for supposing that life in general is life as we know it. in the causal with which Henderson has made us familiar, name meant for him

L. J. Henderson, The Fitness of the Environment, Macmily

e components of the earth are as closely fitted to the discovery of living organisms as vice versa, can only be admitted occurred, i.e. finso that if the properties of things had been very phenomena; it di organisms with very different properties might well as clearly as any, being. Without going too far away from obvious science, we can no easy to conceive of a living matter based upon the in fact, that wat he tellurium or selenium compounds instead of on know why they bon compounds. And even among the organisms of cannot make the, which are composed primarily of the element of gible by the discre certain (as we suppose, very primitive) types which can give no ultirally different kind of metabolism from that which may hold good her creatures from the ordinary bacteria upwards, phenomenal, phyutotrophic bacteria, which obtain their energy by real explanation ganic materials such as iron and sulphur, or gases

Kant, howevene and carbon monoxide. These facts should induce reality at all, onlition of our ignorance concerning possible types of we cannot possi, those which we habitually call by that name, and to us. Nor would pen the possibility of the attachment of selves, for clue to the realindamentally different collocations of elements. ledge in the real of the transitory appears again in the discussions of something which al indeterminism in the minute phases of living matter. practical faith in hysics at the present time is one of very rapid change,

human freedom, degree to which it is possible to apply determinism there. Most philo The Heisenberg principle of indeterminacy, for inway of distinguisaccepted by some workers as quite ultimate and irreindeed, if Kant regarded by others as only of an interim nature, so have had to den it may again be possible to apply the deterministic a justified opinidividual particles and their motions. With regard to sphere of religination of particles in ultramicroscopic phases in living organ-But however fild seem that we have already in our possession the and religion it ws of their actions, namely, all those regularities which of science, but sms exhibit. A particle in such a phase may take, say, while not abacuurses: it may react or not react, diffuse or not diffuse, and in the real for cent. of cases it takes course A and not course B.

Kant drew amaining 10 per cent. of cases simply represent the he called constaberrant results which are always met with in the making which causality tific generalization, for it must be remembered that, as to have any er ointed out, the effects of the individual action in the latter are rath opic phase, being transmitted by the peculiarly irritable world will turnlying matter, are mirrored on a macroscopic scale by the or provable by f the animal or whichever of its parts is under examinaare not thereforehot of this discussion is that nothing "escapes" from of stimulating al laws which describe the behaviour of living organt what could never be included in them, namely, the with religion of are other vita Stephenson, Bacterial Metabolism, Longmans Green, 1930.

41

individual action and the corresponding impossibilities. In this way the principle of ultramicroscopic prontents affords a satisfactory picture to the biologous succeeds in accounting for the otherwise mysteric choice possessed by individual animals, including does not really make free choice any less mysterious sopher. Moreover, if it should become possible, by quantum theory or otherwise, to apply determinist to individual motions, then the scientific formulation move away from that of philosophy, and this may happen. For the regularities in quantum processed definite regularities, and no more to be infringed than of gross mechanics.

As for the deist theologian, it is to be feared th welcome the information that the essence of religion experience. Any such assertion must, of course, seen if it is unsupported by an elaboration of the theme, the place or the opportunity to embark upon it. Sho however, be under the impression that in order to acceptable to the scientific worker it is primaril necessary it rational, he may be assured that this is not the ca faction that can be got out of logical propositions within the confines of science itself, for the outcome which we call natural science is doubtless propositions and if we had to make a parallel we should have to outcome of the activity which we call religion is value and numinous rites. Deism is the attempt to scientific; an attempt which is foredoomed to failure said that this is the negation of all theology, it may that, after all, theologians are only philosophers who l interested in religion and spend their lives, like poets, speak what cannot be spoken. There is at present a ten scientific thinkers to treat certain problems in such leave room for traditional theological and philosophic or rather in such a way as to invite the expression of bo inclusive formula. It may be predicted that this will not run work, and that science and philosophy must go their avoiding all fusion as certain to lead to confusion. Bio one hand and Religion on the other are, some will say, in properties of our existence; but biological deism, which have not yet got actually with us, can never be more th stirring together of immiscible opposites.

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THE MESSAGE OF KANT

A. C. EWING, M.A., D.PHIL.

na wfortunate that the philosopher who, as would be ced, has had the greatest influence on modern thought strose style presents a particularly formidable barrier del, or indeed to any reader tackling him for the first of makes it all the more necessary that an effort should orthose who have read and studied his works to comest they take to be the essential parts of his message. rarticle is an attempt to fulfil a part of this function, a few of the leading ideas of Kant's Critique of Pure s leaving aside altogether his other writings. I hope lars will forgive me if in the attempt to make some as clear in a very small space to readers who have ed in the subject but are interested in philosophy I do justice to the complexity of his finer distinctions. better add that this article is simply an attempt to doctrine; it is not intended as an expression of my nd refrains from criticism.

ted with a problem which, although the formulation his own, arises continually in the history of philosophy to the most recent times. He called it the problem of thetic judgments: it is the question how inferences can their premises and yet give new knowledge not already the premises. The difficulty, expressed in colloquial how we can get out of the premises what is not already d if it is already in them, how inference can be anything repetition of what we already know. Kant's solution, is that the novelty of an inference must always depend sence of an empirical element, while pure thought can inate anything fresh but only analyse what is already sperience can always tell us of fresh qualities not thought us. This did not, however, dispose of the difficulty raised principles which, though they could be denied without ent self-contradiction, seemed to be both obviously true eary to science, and yet were a priori in character, telling t so-and-so had been observed to happen, but that everych could possibly happen, whether it had been already or not, must conform to them. Examples of such principles ed by the a priori judgments of mathematics, also by the

principle of causation, which is itself not provable vet on which the whole of science and all possible to the future seemed to depend. In dealing with the Kant developed a new method of proof which he ca cendental method. It consisted in showing that with such principles we could have no empirical knowledge experience whatever, and that therefore we must cl accepting them and taking the position of the ab Since absolute scepticism is an impossible alternative, the a proof of the truth of the principles. We cannot tak of refusing to make any assertion whatever, of acce as true; a man may be a sceptic to a certain extent, l go as far as that in his scepticism. Indeed, even if he not be a very formidable opponent, for, in order to ment, and therefore assertion, is necessary, and the abwould contradict himself the instant he spoke. All en ledge (the term "experience" used by Kant may be this purpose as synonymous with "empirical knowled poses a certain organization of what we perceive, supposes a priori principles or, as they are called in of Pure Reason, categories. especially it presupposes tl permanent element in the world, since change can on as against a permanent background (the category of that all physical events are determined by causes time, since otherwise there would be no unity in char cannot know a change even as a change without thin unity (the category of cause); and that all physical objesince otherwise there would be no unity of the world in unity, again, is a necessary condition of knowledge (til of reciprocity). Kant tried to show that we cannot events in time without presupposing these categories therefore the categories must be accepted if we are to knowledge at all.

Similarly, he argued that geometry was valid a p² external objects which we could know, because geometl from the nature of space, and we could not experience external objects except as they appeared to us in space claimed to have proved all the a priori principles which are to science by showing that they are involved in the could our "experience," or empirical knowledge, and it reference to the empirical which enabled them to give not ledge (i.e. be "synthetic" principles, as he called it). Dempirical reference, they were still a priori and universate they were based not on particular experiences but on of experience as such, and therefore must hold of all possil

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aeverything of which we could ever be aware in

ago I said that for Kant all judgments giving new st involve an empirical element; but this is only half prinis proof of the categories showed him likewise that wolve an a priori element also. For in none of them ake given sense-data; in all what is given is organized pplying certain principles. If we discarded all a priori a as substance and cause, we could think nothing at only think what has a certain form or unity. Knowganization of what is given, and we could not organize ss we went on the assumption that it must conform only reason for preferring one theory to another in be that it systematizes our experience better. Kant bably wrong as to the precise character of the a priori ivolved in science, e.g. it would now be generally t the principle of conservation of matter is at most generalization, and not, as Kant supposed, a fundaf thought provable a priori from the very nature of nd Kant, of course, does not anticipate Einstein in his the primary postulates of geometry and of the nature he surely is not wrong in insisting that some general ordering are implied in all judgments and all science. is all the more important now, when many thinkers, ing refuted his arguments, dismiss the conceptions of law as indefensible in philosophy and unnecessary for reject with scorn the whole idea of a rational, ordered iling to see that in so doing they are cutting away the on which they must sit if they are to have any science

culties involved in the application of these a priori to reality constitute the chief reason why Kant was ually called an "idealist." Knowledge involves the appliant laws of thought and our forms of perception to objects, cts are self-existent things quite independent of us, why cy conform to our laws of thought and our modes of? Is it not gross presumption to suppose that the laws e minds can dictate to reality what its nature should be? he only possible solution is to suppose that what we know ity but appearance. In that case there is no difficulty in

nowever, thought of causation in phenomena not as involving dynamic powers in the objects, but only as equivalent to succesing to certain laws which made prediction possible. His view fore escape most of the objections commonly urged against or "necessity" in the physical world.

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seeing why it should correspond to our laws of the forms of perception, for otherwise it could not be k enced by us, i.e. could not appear to us, and there exist at all, since in any case it only exists as an ap Since physical objects only exist for our experience. both their being perceived and their being though must conform to our modes of perception and ou thought. We cannot hope to know ultimate reality indisputably know our own experience, and that, a only thing that can concern us. So far from thinl admission destroys or impairs the validity of science that it is the only possible way of saving science against scepticism, for he thinks that if science pretends to objects existing independently of our experience it is and that it can only be saved by moderating its claims that it can give us knowledge only of appearances. all the judgments of science and of everyday life about world must be reinterpreted as statements not about teristics of physical objects as existing quite indepe but about what we in fact experience or should exp given conditions. A law of nature means for Kant 1 and-such an event must happen apart from our ex that we must always have a certain experience unc ditions. He does indeed admit "things-in-themselves" physical world is the mere appearance, but he holds absolutely unknowable, so it remains true of the pl and the objects of science that they are nothing ex experience of humanity. His case for "idealism" is s by certain contradictions which he claims to find in world, especially in connection with the problem of i his main reason is the one given above.

Whatever we think of the merits of this type of platheory, we must recognize its enormous importance in of thought. In one form or other it dominated the phathenineteenth century almost entirely, and now that movement seems to have succeeded in shaking itself it way of thought in philosophy, we find it recurring ever more than the succeeded in shaking itself it way of thought in philosophy, we find it recurring ever more than the succeeded in shaking itself it way of thought in philosophy, we find it recurring ever more than the succeeded in shaking itself it way of thought in philosophy, we find it recurring ever more than the succeeded in shaking itself it way of thought in philosophy, we find it recurring ever more than the succeeded in shaking itself it way of thought in philosophy.

If we retain the "thing-in-itself," the doctrine remains an all we cannot know anything about reality except in relation to the experience. The step from this to the assertion that there is right of relation to conscious experience seemed easy, though it maken difference to one's philosophy. The former type of view may I the agnostic and positivist writers of the last century, the late Kantian idealism, including Hegelianism, in the English thinker by Hegel, e.g. T. H. Green and Bosanquet, and in the follower and Gentile.

aged in physical science. When a scientist argues no such thing as absolute position in space or time nly observe an object relatively to our own position, Kantian assumption that what we can say about orld only has meaning if it can be interpreted as a w what we observe or would observe under given nany scientific writers when they discuss philosophy ws which are frankly "idealistic" in character. discoveries in science do really necessitate "idealism" stion, which this is not the place to discuss.) In dealism" Kant was anticipated by Berkeley,1 an often decried by thinkers who ultimately have much on with him than they are willing to admit, and the e the credit; but Kant's idealism was undoubtedly r. Unlike Berkeley, he emphasized not only the objects on mind but also the dependence of at s, as far as access ble to introspection, on objects; keley, he realized he importance and analysed the priori elements in our thought and knowledge. It is ss of this article to appraise or criticize "idealism" self prepared to accept the view I have expounded we may think of its truth, its great influence (even by respects an unfortunate influence) on the developht cannot be denied. It has provided the startingby philosophical systems which have at least done o our higher experiences and approached nearer to a m of metaphysics than has been the case with any ay of course be rejoined that perhaps no rational ssible, and any appearance of the opposite is founded out at least no one would be bold enough to maintain nothing to learn from the great idealist philosophers, rting-point is always in one form or other the principle Kant (though they quickly discarded the unknowable

ver view we take of the physical world, we may admit only arrive at conclusions about it by thinking of it our experience, though it may also hold a great deal that it holds for our experience. This fact seems to give oint of view at the very least a certain relative validity

diates indignantly the form of idealism which he thinks Berkeley tained, and while still calling himself an idealist in one sense actually gives various "refutations of idealism." But none of s the admission that we can know anything more than appeariects existing relatively to our experience, though the Second ation suggests a valuable form of realism within idealism.

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within realism; and Kant in the later part of his the second edition of the *Critique of Pure Reason* way towards a higher point of view which would and idealism.

But the value of the Critique of Pure Reason i' the introduction of idealism. The most influential of we owe to the work, apart from its somewhat distance perhaps Kant's view of knowledge and of the value unity, his double view of the self, and his conception of God must be founded primarily on with his doctrine of regulative ideas. I shall give each of these leading lines of thought.

First comes the conception of knowledge and of systematic unity. This point has already been me nection with the proof of the categories; but even like this would seem grossly defective if it did no explain the formidable term, transcendental unity As a matter of fact, its meaning is much less difficult than one would expect from Kant's way of expreperhaps best be understood as signifying self-identit The object of knowledge is never a mere undifferent is always a diversity, a manifold. But to know it eve we must think that manifold as a unity, and this f two things. First, it implies that the self is a unity qua knower, for we could not think A and B toget self that thought A were in some sense the same a thought B, or, in other words, unless A and B could same unity of consciousness. Secondly, it implies til of the knowledge itself constitutes a systematic unity wise it would not have the unity necessary for it Further, Kant thinks that these two unities are inse each other. He does not argue, like previous thinkers, the self is a unity in knowing it is therefore a unit on the contrary, he contends that its unity can only unifying the manifold given to it by the senses, only unifies this manifold. For he has only proved that unity by pointing to the fact of knowledge, and the not argue that the self had unity in other respects that objects (at least if we leave aside ethical grounds). The identical means for him that the self knows objects as a unity. Thus, while it is true that as an idealist Kal the unity of objects is due to the self, he also holds can only realize its unity, at least as far as we can tell, objects.

For Kant all knowing involves a "synthesis," that

olding together in thought of the object known. as though in knowing we actually manufactured ld out of a chaotic manifold of sensations by conformity with our a priori categories, and thus or of the, in my view, mistaken but very influential wing is best conceived as a kind of making. But with this view or not, we must admit that knowing, aking, always involves some kind of synthesizing, though it is perhaps not necessary to regard that object of knowledge. All knowing, every possible pposes or involves a bringing together of different ystem. From this to the view that truth consists of judgments in a system is not a long step, and ir to claim Kant as the founder of the so-called y" of truth, though he did not develop its important applications. Also, in developing his doctrine of the as the author of one of the most important disde in psychology, namely, that perception always on, at least at the human level. In bringing out ect of knowing as an active putting together of icipated the pragmatists.

know we know as part of an objective world, and eans that it has to be referred to a system, since do be incompatible with "the unity of experience." ordinary everyday judgment like, This table is is a metal, we are referring the qualities round objects. But what does this reference involve?

ng we are just making the quality referred a member acts of experience. For whatever "an object" means, it least a system of qualities and states; it may mean cans this at any rate. And the conception of a system ories which carry with them a necessary connection fferent members of the system. Kant would not hold connection was sufficient to make a thing one isting in time, but he would hold that if there were y connection between its successive states it would cat all. If, for instance, the successive states of an cal object like a table were not causally connected, a true to say that these were successive states of the contrary, we should have to say that the table was

at does not necessarily presuppose that all judgments can educed to subject-predicate form, and still holds if we attach in logic than Kant did to relations, for in any case relations ed to terms and the process of relating involves making a

49

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annihilated each moment and a new one created its place. If certain experiences which we usuall! of physical objects were not necessarily determined we choose to look, we must see so-and-so and no different, we should have no means of disting genuine perceptions and illusions or between ob jective, for the distinction presupposes that gen experiences of the objective, are, so to speak, force to general laws, so that in certain important resp same experience as any other human percipient u ditions. We can only arrive at the conception of at all by connecting different experiences of it wil people have at different times into a system; if idealism, we will say it is merely that system of e remain realists, we will say rather that, as far as it it is the system of states which respectively g experiences. Kant had in view his doctrine that are not anything independent of us, but only o systematized; but personally I think that most would, with only slight change, be valid also for the

But there still remains the unknown thing appearances, the belief in which was always re though rejected by his idealist successors. Kant only know things as they are in relation to our ex appear to us, but he held that there was a reality be ance. The nature of this reality we could not kno in a sense know that there was something there was not merely appearances. A great deal in the a whole of their order and system, he explained by the constructive activity of our minds; but besid must be something to be ordered, besides relations terms to be related, and this something be ascribe themselves. The mind is responsible for ordering its application of concepts, but it can only do so on the given in sensation, and, since we have no ground these to come from our mind or any other mind, we them to an unknowable x, the thing-in-itself. They i something, but what the nature of that something beings, are not and, Kant thinks, never can be in ascertain.

2. Kant's double view of the self. Any system must admit that the self can be both knower in a sense, object known. The second is proved introspection, the first by the occurrence of any known in the self should be able to

tself, that it should be at once subject and object ever inexplicable, we must accept it as a fact of ant does, but he holds that it is not possible to but only the self as it appears, this being indeed sequence of his view that everything in time was not reality. This involves him in difficulties which vestigate here, but undoubtedly Kant was too bse he could solve a problem by dismissing the ed the problem as a mere appearance. For even e they are not simply nothing, must have some world. And it would generally be agreed that the by Kant between the real self and the appearanceite to be tenable. But the self still possesses the tioned by Kant, though perhaps it would be better ne only as reality and degrade the other to mere one point of view it is to be treated as any object inother it is that for which in a sense all objects ists. Some philosophers have held, like Kant, that the whole objective world depended on or was the self as knower; but, whatever our views on stinction remains a highly important one. On the st regard the self as a legitimate object of scientific examine it frankly and fearlessly, not hesitating isal laws everything that can be so explained; but, d, we must recognize that it is impossible ultimately act of consciousness or knowledge in this way, that aspect of the self, namely, the aspect of the self that this aspect in a sense transcends the physical emporal process altogether, since otherwise the self what occurs at different times and places. This basis of the whole attitude of idealist philosophy to abled idealists, on the one hand, to insist that the d be allowed free play even when they investigate ntial and sacred to us as our own self, and that even ect to laws of causality; and, on the other, that the y key to an understanding of the ultimate nature hysical world, and, in fact, of Reality as a whole. ft psychology free to advance unencumbered by metappositions, and also safeguarded against naturalism I to be the spiritual interests of man. This does not h, but it was based on epistemological arguments they win far less ready assent to-day, certainly smissed lightly or adequately regarded as merely acies due to a confusion between knowing and object ough it need not be accepted, it must not be despised

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICA et

by a realist till he has worked out a richer all philosophy of mind than his opponents. But, econocerned, those who condemn such views as tong remember that he protested in the strongest interpretation as to the ultimate nature of the seb character of reality. The knowing self to Kant can in its effects, i.e. knowledge, not in its own nature.

This brings us to the third point, the conceptif ideas. The philosophers prior to Kant had commet as being an object of knowledge in the same senf entities conceived by science. Further, since God/l omnipotent, they were thereby provided with a for all intellectual difficulties, and indeed for between the facts and their pet theories: they crit God had willed it so, or, This phenomenon must g the intervention of God, since it was inexplical at according to the laws of nature. Anyone who ns of such great thinkers as Descartes and Leibniz will ! in finding examples of this practice in their wrth how must it have been abused by lesser men! Kang that to employ the conception of God in this fare solve a difficulty, but to say it was solved by somet to explain ignolum per ignotius, instead of strivines natural causes involved by patient investigation be ignorance honestly if we could not achieve success It was therefore a mere piece of intellectual lazife progress of real knowledge. As applied in philosoe a represented to Kant an extension of pure thoug'by where we could form no definite conceptions at asia total absence of material provided by experiencons were merely using terms without a meaning; as aribe it must always be futile, because to say that a paits menon is due to God is only saying what, if true of ath must be true of all, and is therefore no help in ad particular one. This point needs little emphasis to-dewe attitude has triumphed so far that no scientific ty ever explain phenomena, the natural cause of which find, by reference to the direct act of God, and at ir we are all coming to realize, as Kant did, that the f mena follow laws and have physical causes need no:m inconsistent with their being ultimately due to some ? altogether, which we may perhaps call God. Kant pioneers of the "descriptive" theory of science, thokno rightly, still emphasizes "necessity" as involved connection. The discovery of causes in the sciences

the laws according to which phenomena in fact ling what phenomena regularly followed other not mean an ultimate explanation, for he realized me that though we discover "laws of nature" in ver see why these laws should hold good. We know, is made of oxygen and hydrogen, but we do not should produce such a compound, and therefore presence and properties of water any more intellipovery that they do. Since, therefore, scientific laws nate explanation, it is quite possible that the laws universally among phenomena, and yet that the resical world may owe its existence to and find its in something quite different.

r, asserted that we can have no knowledge of y of appearances. Even our own selves, he had said, bly know as they really are, only as they appear d be admit that the appearances could give any ty whatever. But while he never admitted knowserse of anything beyond appearances, he admitted though not knowledge, was sufficient to justify a God and immortality, and similarly in regard to though his attitude is somewhat more positive sophers would not now agree with Kant's particular hing what we can know and what we cannot; and, and carried out his principles logically, he would y that we can either have knowledge or even hold n in regard to many points (quite outside the s controversy) where we must admit that we can. may be, Kant did a great service to thought owing that we must not treat God as a concept her as an ideal founded on our ethical experience, g his faith in the moral government of the world stence of the being to whom this ideal has reference. istinction between two kinds of principles, which utive and regulative respectively. The former, of is an example, we can prove as necessary if we are mpirical knowledge or ordered experience at all; the er of the nature of ideals as to what we hope the out to be. These "regulative ideas" are not proved us, at least in the strict sense of the term; but they re useless, for they still serve the valuable purpose and guiding us in research. The valid ideas connected re for Kant regulative, not constitutive, in character. ar from being the only regulative principles. There lly important unifying ideas connected not with

TOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICA act.

religion but with science. Thus the idea of the p ll, complete system in which everything follows fired principles must not be accepted as a self-eviden no all the same very useful, since it encourages us sent there is and suggests to us hypotheses that bri carb one law or one system of laws phenomena origine. quite separate principles. All these hypotheses more their conformity with experience; but in order to and it is not enough to experience or observe, we ment hypotheses on the basis of which to systematize that This is indeed the fatal difficulty which prevents a d from being a great scientific discoverer; his eyes Newton's, but he does not know, and probably, evence training, could not think of the right facts to obtit facts that are relevant, that are likely to prove \$ There are no rules available the mere application enable a man either to hit on new ideas or select to P observe; but such is the difficulty of achieving ri that we cannot afford to dispense with any helal these very general ideas, if not dogmatically assefal rather sought as ideals, will often help, and havenee the past, to put scientists on the track of the rigin the "regulative idea" mentioned by Kant of a contn of variations connecting the different species of account that time to all experience seemed so far apaazi) separate from each other, has later been confirm, so? of evolution; but it must have been present in oug'a as an unestablished but promising general idea be at & think of the hypothesis of evolution. The mechaience physical world is itself a regulative idea, accordias ars view, since it cannot be proved but provides a a par explanation. The scientist must not assert posite of as thing physical is to be accounted for mechanistics in 1 try to find mechanism wherever he can; mechanito-del universal, but to look for it everywhere is the online to out what there is of it. And Kant treats in a similar hid late that every part of a living organism must lat; fulfilling some biological purpose;2 to say that bothe f

r Kant holds that universal causality is a constitutive, not principle, but in the *Critique of Judgment*, where he deals ne specially, he treats mechanism not as synonymous with the being a special kind of causation. But in the *Critique of Line in the Critique of Line*

² I.e., for the benefit of the creature itself, not necessarilyces

creatures.

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regulative but not constitutive is his way of reconciling mechanism and teleology. The categories as constitutive principles give that measure of unity and rational system without which there could be no knowledge or ordered experience at all; the regulative principles (Kant commonly calls them "ideas of reason") stand for a higher degree of unity, system, and intelligibility which we cannot know, but may hope and, at least in some cases, even believe to be ultimately realized or realizable. But their utility lies not in any information they can give about the nature either of reality or of the phenomenal world, but in encouraging and helping us in the theoretical sphere to seek for more unity and intelligibility than we have yet found, and in the practical sphere to strive for the attainment of a supreme good that we under their inspiration treat as ultimately realizable. They represent not finished results to be accepted a priori, but a hope, a policy, an ideal.



ON DOING ONE'S BEST

PROFESSOR JOHN LAIRD

I

On page 157 of Bradley's *Ethical Studies* (the second edition) the following passage occurs: "There are few laws a breach of which (in obedience to a higher law) morality does not allow, and I believe there is none which is not to be broken in conceivable (imaginable) circumstances, though the necessity of deciding the question does not practically occur." And Bradley added the extremely significant footnote: "Except, of course, the universal law to do the best we can in the circumstances."

This footnote plainly contains the implication that there is one, and only one, moral obligation or imperative which is *never* overborne by a higher obligation or imperative. This is the obligation to do the best we can in any situation in which we may find ourselves; and the supreme imperative thus expressed is the ultimate moral

determinant of all responsible action.

There are many who consider this principle self-evident, and who draw the consequence that "right" and "good" are not, even relatively, independent (as some allege), but, contrariwise, that "good" (i.e. in its superlative "best") does in the last analysis determine "right" (i.e. what anyone ought to do). Moreover, I am confident that many who doubt the principle, or who find a doubt gradually instilling itself just because they doubt the consequence I have mentioned, are, at any rate, not prepared to deny that the principle, to say the least, is very plausible indeed.

There is, however, a snare in plausibilities, and those cautious persons who are prepared to affirm only that the principle is superficially evident or highly plausible are certainly justified in asking whether it is possible to make the principle itself a little more explicit. For it might be applied (might it not?) in a good many

different ways.

I propose, then, in this discussion to examine the *meaning* of Bradley's principle, without special reference to Bradley's ethical system or to any other. Furthermore, since the exegesis of the meaning of the principle is big enough (probably a good deal too big) for the space at my disposal, I shall leave the consequences of the principle to look after themselves. Even if the principle did not have the ultimate and quite crucial importance that Bradley (casually) claimed for it, it would, on any theory, be of considerable moment.

For a man who tries to do his best, or to "make the best of it," cannot, in general, be acting quite foolishly; and we all, very frequently, do make this endeavour.

II

In the first place, then, the principle clearly implies, prima facie, that we have an effective control over certain situations, and can decide between alternative courses of action, each of which might be our own act.

This is obviously a denial of fatalism, in the ordinary workaday sense of fatalism, which denies us the power of altering the course of events. Thus Dickens, in his despair, wrote: "It is not with me, a matter of will, or trial, or sufferance, or good humour, or making the best of it, or making the worst of it, any longer. It is all despairingly over. Have no lingering hope of me, or for me, in this association. A dismal failure has to be borne; and there an end." Fatalism, of course, need not be dismal. For one's lot might be supremely fortunate. But fatalism does deny the possibility of making the best of it, or of making the worst of it.

It seems worth while inquiring, however, whether the principle denies, not fatalism only, but every species of philosophical determinism. To be sure, we are frequently informed by very modish writers that philosophical determinism has become something of a bogy now that it is legitimate for scientists like Schrödinger to postulate the indeterminacy of molecular, or ultra-molecular, mites. It is no longer necessary to hold that "iron" necessity rules throughout nature except (shall we say?) in the privileged sphere of the human will. Indeed, some scientists appear to be beginning to suspect that the human mind, and with it the human will, is the *least* determined event in nature, since it is "orderly," and atoms exemplify "randomness."

Nevertheless, a good many people, not quite irrationally, find it strange to believe that anything whatsoever, or any feature of anything, even the least, can happen for no reason at all. Such persons cannot be content with Dr. Johnson's famous saying, "Sir, the will is free, and there's an end on't." They may even doubt whether it is legitimate to say, "Sirs, the will is free, and there's a beginning on't." Consequently, it seems reasonable to ask whether injunctions to "make the best of it" could have any meaning whatsoever if, in reality, every event in human nature were uniquely determined.

Clearly, on determinist principles, we might correctly say: "A good man (or the best of men) would do so-and-so in such-and-such a Forster's Life, vol. iii. p. 173.

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situation. A bad man (or a born devil) would do something quite different." Such statements say nothing whatsoever concerning the necessity or indeterminacy of good or bad action. They presuppose only that we can distinguish between good and bad action in the universe.

Again, instead of talking about good men and bad men in general, we might make our statements a good deal more pertinent to particular cases. For speaking as complete determinists we might legitimately say: "A man similar to you, and having similar antecedents, conceptions, capacities, etc., would do well if he acted in such-and-such a way in your situation, and would do ill if he acted in such-and-such another way."

It is easy to reply, of course, that similarity is not identity, and that very similar, but non-identical, beings may react very differently indeed to the same situation. But let us consider. Whether or not our actions are uniquely determined, neither we nor anybody else can know for certain how, or even that, they are determined. We know so little about ourselves, and other people know so little about us, that in regard to all our obscurer motives we cannot appear otherwise than as beings capable of several alternative courses of action. So far as our personal knowledge goes we are in a libertarian and not in a completely determinist situation.

Again, it is to be remembered that much of the discussion, at this point, is concerned with the efficacy of ideas (including ideas of right and wrong, good and bad) upon our actions, and of the extent to which we can be moved by commands, injunctions, advice, examples, fear of penalties, etc. On deterministic principles, however, there is no reason in the world why such injunctions and such motives should not influence us.

Therefore, according to determinism, it need not be useless to urge a man to act in *this* way and not to act in *that* way. Such exhortations might quite well be effective; and the man cannot say for certain, "I know I am not the sort of person who could act in *this* way," even if it were true in fact that there was only *one* thing he could do. Man is too much of a riddle to himself to have such knowledge.

I fear, however, that any injunction to "do the best one can" has (to use modern philosophical slang) a slightly Pickwickian flavour,

unless it can properly be enjoined in the libertarian's sense.

III

In the second place, it is manifestly necessary to give some account of the "good" and of the comparison of what is good in terms of Bradley's principle. For "best" is the superlative of which "good" 58

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is the positive, and "the best under the circumstances" is that which maximizes the good that is possible and minimizes the evil that

might come about.

Regarding what is "good" in the sense here intended, it seems essential to point out that although doing one's best, or attempting to do one's best, is here represented as the supreme and as an invariable moral duty, it does not follow that the good which is sought is any way intrinsically moral.

Some moralists consider this statement paradoxical or worse. They believe, to speak with sententious pseudo-simplicity, that "'tis only noble to be good." Or they are more Kantian than Kant (who held that there were other goods, viz., conditioned ones, besides the good will), and maintain that the *morally* good will is, or is the sole author of, *all* that is good. If we examine the question directly, and quite simply, however, we readily perceive that these contentions are mistaken.

Consider, for instance, such duties as self-culture or active beneficence. The first of these is the duty of cultivating one's talents, and plainly this duty must include much more than the mere cultivation of one's moral talents. A ship's officer who becomes as skilful a navigator as he can; a man of letters who becomes as expert in his craft as it is in him to become; a lover of beauty who gives himself to beauty with his whole soul-all these are making the best of themselves in some department of human culture. These attainments are not in any ordinary sense "moral," although the duty of endeavouring after them may be, and in many cases is, moral. What is more, the standards involved are not directly moral standards. It is æsthetics, for example, not ethics, that is the judge of beauty in art. Ethics has to accept æsthetic standards concerning what makes fine art fine; and it limits those standards at most in the sense that if what is lovely is also manifestly evil, such fleurs du mal should be banished from art.

Similarly in the instance of beneficence. It may well be a moral duty to strive for the comfort, health, and happiness of others, although these things in themselves, or rather in the recipients, need not be moral at all. There is nothing particularly moral in being free from tuberculosis, but it may well be a moral duty to diminish the chances of contracting tuberculosis by housing the people better. A parent is hardly doing his duty by his children if he does not give them the opportunity of fresh air and recreation in the country. Nevertheless their enjoyment, which he aims at, need not be moral at all. It may consist wholly in high spirits and in animal delight.

In short, the "best" according to Bradley's principle must be the best relatively to all possible goods, and in comparison with all possible evils, where "good" and "evil" are understood in the widest

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

sense possible, that is to say where values (as opposed to disvalues) of every species are included. Every value is admitted that might conceivably justify or tend to justify any man's action by bringing about a result that was worth anyone's while. There is no question of being concerned simply with virtue on the one hand and with sin on the other.

IV

It would seem, then, that in order to discover the best we can do we must theoretically be able to compare the entire range of goods and evils *inter se*. Is any such comparison authentically possible?

It is generally agreed nowadays, and, besides, it is pretty obvious of itself, that goods are much more diverse than pleasures, evils much more diverse than pains. A "moral arithmetic" in terms of algedonic (or pleasure-pain) units is in any case a proceeding that rests upon most dubious foundations. If, however, it is further conceded that such algedonic arithmetic neither is, nor bears any constant proportion to, the real overbalance of good and evil in most given cases, there is no point in debating these abstract questions concerning the arithmetic of pleasure-pain.

Can we, however, speak intelligibly of an overbalance of "good"

or of the maximization of good in relation to evil?

Such language suggests an arithmetic of value, and in that case we have to ask what the value-units are, and what the disvalue-units are. This question seems likely to gravel a good many of us. It is most plausibly attacked by some doctrine of "marginal" preferences, always assuming that the preferences in question are good preferences, not simply statistical statements (if we could get reliable ones) concerning men's actual inclinations at any given time. Even so, however, the procedure is pretty obviously arbitrary; and the short of the whole story is that an arithmetic of value is a science (or pseudo-science) with very shaky foundations.

Suppose, however, we renounce the dream of a well-grounded or convincing value-arithmetic. In that case we might still maintain that significant and important comparisons of value are possible throughout the realm of values, and that the untidy and ramblingly pluralistic character of our moral theory is not appreciably worse than the untidiness of any other moral theory except for the very few moral theories that profess (not at all convincingly) to employ

a single principle only.

This seems reasonable, or, at any rate, not unreasonable. Nevertheless it implies a belief in the general, if not even in the universal, comparability of all goods with one another and with all evils. And any such general comparability of goods and evils is strenuously disputed in many quarters.

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Consider, for instance, what an ascetic moralist would say—and asceticism in some form is always with us, whether the form be industrial, athletic, sexual, artistic, patriotic, or religious. A moderate ascetic need not deny that many things which are not the best (let us say the "innocent" pleasures of the body) have a certain subordinate value. They are better, other things being equal, than gloom and animal misery. Such subordinate goods, however, according to the ascetic, are in no respect comparable to the goods of the mind, or of other-worldliness, or of any other supreme excellence upon which the particular brand of asceticism is based. According to the ascetic, any attempt to conjecture how much of a lower good is equal, or nearly equal, to a particular quantity of a higher one is more than half-way to betraying the higher. Between the two a great gulf is fixed.

It must be confessed, therefore, that there are serious difficulties in this matter. For if the ascetic view were true, it would follow that no amount of suffering, let us say, could equal in disvalue a single passing suspicion of impurity; and that also is an extreme paradox.

Perhaps, however, the problem is simpler than it looks. For if, as commonly in asceticism, there are held to be only two classes of goods, viz., the pure goods which alone are greatly good, and the muddy and mixed goods whose value, even in an infinite degree, is never comparable to the value of the pure goods, it would follow that the best must always be reckoned in the currency of the pure good whenever the pure good is possible (since the lower in comparison with the higher does not count at all), and that, where the higher is not possible, the comparison is between lower and subordinate goods pretty closely akin. This, if it were true, would simplify the problem of discovering the best. And although the problem would be more complicated if there were more than two classes of comparable goods and evils, each such class being incomparable with any other class, although the classes form an ascending ladder, the best (and perhaps the worst) might not be beyond all conjecture—if only we knew where the rungs in the ladder were placed.

At the same time, it seems plain that there is a veritable thicket of minor, but still of very serious, difficulties in this affair, and I shall mention two of them:—

(a) Assuming that some sort of trustworthy balance (not necessarily an arithmetical balance) between possible goods and evils may be struck in a great many or in most situations, can we say, quite simply, that we ought to adopt the course that shows the greatest overbalance of good, or, in unfortunate situations, the smallest underbalance? The answer does not seem to be clear, for it might readily be contended that a smaller overbalance in which much good (even perhaps of the tamer sort) were mixed with very

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little evil (or with no evil at all) was better than a larger overbalance of good in which, despite the overbalance, there was also a great deal of foul and ugly evil. Even if the saints prevail, is a universe containing great saints and great sinners really better than one in which there is little serious vice, although, for the most part, only middling virtue? What truth, if any, is contained in the ingenious saying, Redemptio pessimi optima? It is possible, I concede, that the problem so stated contains some confusion regarding the reckoning of evil. There is a tendency to count the disvalue of evil twice over, once in the original reckoning, once again in horror at the extent of it even when it is overbalanced. But I do not think the question is easy to answer.

(b) Again, there is the problem of what Bentham called the "extent" of good and evil. Even if we adopted the simple and rather dubious principle of Benthamite democracy, viz., that each, unless for strong cause shown, is to count for one, and no one for more than one, we should still have to ask whether a slight and mediocre general welfare might not be preferable to a state of affairs in which a very few were supremely fortunate and the great majority in a neutral condition, even if the total overbalance of good were greater in the second case than in the first. Sydney Smith, if I remember him rightly, contended that the system of blanks and prizes in the emoluments of the Anglican clergy was better than the relatively confortable mediocrity of the incomes of dissenting ministers. Was there any substance in his contention? If not, why precisely was it wrong?

V

We have now discussed, or at any rate have indicated certain considerations that concern, the questions, firstly, whether there are moral alternatives in action, and secondly, what are the implications of the assessment of the values of such alternatives. But there is still much to interpret in Bradley's formula.

One possible meaning of "doing one's best," and, still more, of "making the best of it," would be an ethic of results. On this view an action is to be commended, morally speaking, if we adapt ourselves to our situation in such a way as to extract from the situation the

most advantageous outcome that is possible.

On this interpretation the formula, regarded as a principle of moral theory, is manifestly open to very serious objection. I will not say that wisdom after the event, although it is (comparatively) easy, is useless. For how can we form any forecast of the future except upon the basis of a knowledge of past results? And if our expectations, in the normal case, bear no intelligible relation to the actual outcome, what is the point of looking ahead at all? Again, I will not say,

62

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although it might be true, that the time-process is never closed, and consequently that what has had fortunate results up to the present may turn out to be a calamity in the end. No doubt, if our standards of value and our ascertainment of fact are hopelessly mistaken, it might be prudent to call no human actions successful until human history has ceased. The whole trend of what we call civilization may be a gigantic mistake, as future generations may come to see. On the other hand, if our standards of value and our information concerning fact have some health in them (and otherwise it seems meaningless to discuss the goodness of results or of anything else), we seem to have very good evidence both that a great deal in the past may reasonably be regarded as closed (having but an infinitesimal importance over what succeeded it), and that among these closed processes some were good and others bad.

What I mean is rather that if the "best" meant "the best results," there would be an insurmountable hiatus between the terms of this moral theory on the one hand, and the actual live situation of any moral agent on the other hand. All action is, in one sense, adventurous. We never can be quite sure concerning what will come of it. However prudent we may be, we always go out to meet an uncertain and, in part, a hazardous future. This is the situation of all action, including all moral action. For action is an adjustment before the event. Therefore, if we could judge a moral action only after the event, we should have to judge, not it, but something that came out of it. Our moral standards must apply to future-regarding actions with express reference to the necessary futurity of their intention. Accordingly the standard of actual results cannot be the sole, and is not likely to be the most important, standard of moral

action.

Thus it is customary to say that the "best" in the sense intended in Bradley's principle is "the best that can be foreseen and intended," or the best "according to our lights"—that is to say, what is probably or most likely to be best. The most promising action, no doubt, may turn out disastrously; but at the time of action it may really have been the most promising, and therefore the course that, according to our lights, we were justified in pursuing. This is a commonplace in the theory of probability, and there are even certain theories of probability according to which the case is stronger than I have suggested it to be. On this view of probability, to hold that a certain course of action is likely, although not certain, to be good is just to hold that the action is good in most cases, although in a smaller proportion of cases it is not good. Our trouble, according to this theory, is simply that we do not know whether the particular case belongs to the fortunate majority or to the unfortunate minority. I am not relying upon this theory of probability, however-it is

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

called the class-frequency theory—because it seems to me to be plainly inapplicable to future probabilities. If the class-frequency view were true, we should know in advance that the ratio between fortunate and unfortunate actions of a given class would continue to be the same ratio in the future as it was in the past; and although we may frequently have goodish grounds for suspecting something of the sort (and still more frequently have no good reason for doubting it), it seems preposterous to maintain that we ever, in strictness, know anything of the kind.

Granting, however, that the rule is that we should do what is probably best in our circumstances, it may still be asked what this

rule implies.

One thing that might be meant is that moral action should be directed towards what is probably best according to the best information in humanity's possession at the time of the action; and it is obvious that, if this were meant, the rule, in a great many instances at least, would be utterly impracticable. For what individual human being is possessed of the best of humanity's probable forecasts concerning all contingencies, and how, when prompt action is called for, could such an individual human being be expected to obtain this information? Again, morality intimately concerns the common man; and how can the common man (in general) be expected to possess the information?

Hence we are frequently informed either (1) that morality is concerned not with *all* probabilities, but only with the commonsense probabilities that everyone, not an idiot or a moron, must be expected to know, or (2) that everyone should do, not what is

probably best, but what seems to him probably best.

Neither of these views seems satisfactory. The first, we may agree, is reasonably congruent with the commoner lists of moral commandments. Everyone may be supposed to know that it is usually best not to steal, assassinate, libel, or slander. It seems a sufficient objection, however, that the problem of "making the best of it" is in no way restricted to such commandments and common-sense probabilities. The principle draws upon all the skill that anyone may have in the art of living, all assistance of friends, all frustration of knaves. In a thousand ways each of us, if he would make the best of his circumstances, must go beyond the common-sense rules. They are nothing like a complete guide to wise living.

On the other hand, how can we say that each man should do what seems probably best in his own eyes? If this were the whole truth, any opinion that anyone chose to form concerning probabilities, however perfunctory, visionary, or muddle-headed, would justify him in acting accordingly. And that, surely, is absurd. Even if, in the end, the moral man has to do the best he can according to his

ON DOING ONE BEST

lights, it is at least assumed that he should also do his best to make

his lights burn as clearly as possible.

In that case the rule would be that each should do what he believes to be probably best, provided that he has taken all reasonable pains to think out the relevant comparative probabilities. And this rule also would have to be interpreted with discretion. For young men have to act, and old men have sometimes to act in a hurry. Neither of them, therefore, may have had reasonable scope for thinking out the probabilities at all deeply. But more importantly the problem of the fanatic and of the conscientious objector would still remain. In other words, there would still be people who had given their minds in all seriousness to a certain problem of conduct and, in the end, differed crucially from their fellows, some of whom had also given their minds to it. In that case we commonly hold that the persons we call wrong-headed but honest fanatics are to be admired for doing what seems to them best, even if we are quite certain they are wrong. We admire them because we know that it is always hard to stick to a principle in the face of obloquy and derision, and because we believe such tenacity in an unpopular course to be of far greater moral worth (usually) than any easy swimming with the tide. It does not follow, however, that because we admire these people in certain important ways we therefore commend the whole of their action, or admit that they are right. On the contrary, we restrain them if we are convinced that their action is very mischievous. And if any such restraining action is justified upon our part, the manifest consequence is that we do not believe that everyone ought to do what seems to him probably best according to the best of his lights.

VI

As we shall see, these questions concerning belief raise further issues. Before dealing with these further issues, however, it seems necessary to refer to certain specific questions concerning the voluntaristic implications of "doing one's best."

In general, when we say that a man should do the best he can, the word "can" refers to his volitions. It is his will or his voluntary

actions that are meant.

Indeed, according to certain moralists, the point is so plain that it is declared to result from the very meaning of the words we employ. For what, it is asked, is an *action* except a voluntary deed? Or what is meant by "controlling a situation" except the voluntary control of it? Such language, we are told, manifestly refers to what a man may choose or consciously try to do when, to employ the vernacular, he is "up against it."

On the score of words, at least, these statements seem mistaken.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

An action, surely, is what a man does. It is the expression of his entire relevant agency; and unless it can be maintained that everything we ever do is, simply and solely, what we do voluntarily, it is clear that there may be a very palpable difference between our deeds (which in large part may even be unintended, although we are the authors of them), and either our voluntary deeds, or such part of our deeds as is voluntarily determined. Similar statements hold of "control." We may very well control a situation, in whole or in part, without knowing that we do so.

The crux of the argument at this point, therefore, concerns the human will. What, then, is the "will"?

Here the answer, I think, is very far from being clear. The human "will," while it is a convenient *name*, does not seem to designate an entirely unambiguous *fact*.

One thing that may be meant is express volition. When we consciously choose to initiate some action that we mean to perform we are said to "will" that action. The negative side of this is express conscious inhibition, that is to say, the express determination not to do something that we might very well have done had we not intentionally checked the impulse to do it.

A second, and much wider, sense of the term "will" refers not to what is intentionally chosen or consciously resolved upon, but to what is "voluntary." The term "voluntary" may also, perhaps, be understood in several different (if allied) senses, but, upon the whole, we may say that any action is voluntary if we could do it, or refrain from doing it, if we gave our minds to the matter. In this sense many of our voluntary actions need not be definitively willed. For we may be lazy or heedless, and so do many things that we would never have done had we considered them seriously, although we might quite well have considered them seriously if we had given a thought to the matter.

A third sense of "will" sometimes employed is wider than either of the foregoing. The "will," in this sense, expresses our whole activity, the marshalling of all our conscious forces. No doubt, in general, when we employ the word in this sense we usually convey at least an oblique reference to the supremacy of the intentional or voluntary marshalling of our psychic powers. This is the normal interpretation of what we call a settled determination. A strong-willed man, in ordinary language, is a determined man who sticks to his chosen resolutions in spite of difficulties, just as, contrariwise, an invertebrate man is one who forgets or abandons his intentional resolutions. Even so, however, conscious choice is only intermittent in any such settled determination, and the settled disposition that is referred to really is, for the most part, only a disposition, that is to say, it is not steadily and persistently before the mind, although, on

occasion, it is consciously reverted to. And it may be doubted whether, in all cases, we *could* revert to it in any significant sense, and so, despite certain differences, include it in the class of voluntary but not expressly willed actions (*i.e.* in our second class, although, for the whole of it, not in the first). In the largest sense, however, it seems clear that our "will" may be interpreted as a settled tendency, trend, or disposition, largely unconscious (or more than half opaque to introspection).

We have to allow, then, that the "will" is a somewhat ambiguous faculty; and consequently that references to it, however clear they may seem, permit of much that involves investigation. What has now to be shown is that these ambiguities and alternative possi-

bilities have a substantial bearing upon "doing one's best."

Let us, then, consider the question in some of its more general and better-known aspects with special reference to the moral sphere.

The doctrine that "ought implies can" is beloved of all good

Kantians, and is very relevant indeed to our present subject.

It is doubtful, in the first place, whether this principle can be said to be self-evident. At any rate, it has been denied in very influential quarters. A debere ad posse, Luther said, non valet consequentia. And most Christian theologians, indeed all of them who are not Pelagians, are compelled, at some point, to say the same thing. The moral law, they somewhere concede (or, like Paul and Augustine and Luther, they joyfully declare), commands us to do what, of ourselves, we cannot do; and therefore divine grace must be given us. Gabe, not Aufgabe, is the beginning and the end, although it is not always the middle, of such ethical doctrines.

Here, no doubt, there is much to be said. The fundamental contrast is between what the "old" or "natural" man cannot do, and what the "new" or "spiritual" man is enabled to do, although not of his own natural power; and it may well be contended that the terms of the contrast are fantastic, or at least dogma-ridden. May not the "natural" man, so-called, be only a theological abstraction, or an historical legend in a redemption-myth? Again, why should ethics destroy itself upon the razor-edge of theology? For theological reasons it is necessary to deny that a man can lay hold on spirituality of his own initiative (for Pelagianism is a heresy), although, for fear of quietism, fatalism, and the like, it is also imprudent to lay exclusive emphasis upon the way in which divine grace elects and lays hold upon its passive recipients. Why not, in a free ethic, abolish all these perplexities and argue only about what a man can do, not about what a "natural" man can do, or an "unregenerate" man before acceptance of the New Covenant?

Here, whatever the correct answer may be, it seems evident that Kant's answer was not correct. For Kant's principle is, in effect,

PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES IOURNAL OF

that no one ought to do what the rational part of him cannot effect through its pure rational agency, or, in other words, what he cannot effect by mere rational volition. And the rational will is not the whole man. The self-evidence of the principle that "ought implies can," therefore (if indeed it is somehow self-evident), does not imply its self-evidence in the form in which Kant expressed it.

Kant's paradoxical conclusions are notorious. He inferred that only "practical" love, and not, as he quaintly said, "pathological" love (i.e. emotional tender affection), could be commanded, and therefore that the Scripture must have meant that we ought to be beneficent to our neighbour, and could not have meant that we ought to feel sympathy or affection for our neighbour. For, said he, our emotions cannot be commanded by express rational volition; and therefore there is no sense in saying that we ought to feel the pure and tender ones.

The same argument would apply to what Kant should, in consistency, have called "pathological" purity of heart, or to "pathological" chastity. For these conditions of the soul cannot be summoned by express resolution. All that is immediately and expressly volitional is the inhibition of certain actions; and Kant expressly repudiated any more indirect and more subtle sense in which we might be said to have semi-voluntary control even over these emotions and states of the soul. Accordingly, it does not require much penetration to see that Kant's principle, as he interprets it, is thoroughly unscriptural.

That, perhaps, is no objection. I am not saying that Kant's doctrine is wrong because it is utterly and flagrantly unscriptural. I am only saving that, on the merits of this question, there is surely a great deal to be said for the Scriptural ethic (according to which many of the finer virtues are in large measure non-voluntary), and a great deal to be said against the forensic, Kantian view according to which nothing non-voluntary legitimately pertains to strict ethics at all. Are we bound to say that what the Scripture enjoins is nonsensical unless it is a condition of soul that we can attain by summary volition? To me at least it seems plain that the Scripture may be right, and that Kant is very likely to be wrong, in this important particular; and I mentioned the subject of free-will at the beginning of this paper with a certain proleptic intention.

In short, what a man does and becomes is not the same thing as what he does and becomes by express volition. It is also not the same thing as what he does or becomes through his "will" in either of the two other senses of the "will" that were discussed above (unless, indeed, the third sense is taken with so much latitude as to mean nothing at all significant).

Therefore, the best that a man can do need not coincide with the best he can do voluntarily or volitionally; and Bradley's principle

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must be interpreted in a sense wider than the voluntary or volitional if it is true. If a man is likely to do better without trying than by trying, then he should not try. And ethics is impoverishing itself wrongfully if it imposes upon itself the very difficult restriction of confining its attention wholly to what can be shown to be purely a matter of "will."

VII

Any voluntary choice is determined by the agent's beliefs. Accordingly, if the maxim "ought implies can" is interpreted voluntaristically, it must be taken to imply that no one ought to do what he believes he cannot do. And this proposition is not at all obvious. It is true, no doubt, that it is psychologically absurd for any agent to will, or deliberately to choose, to do what he believes to be flatly impossible in his own case. We do not, in this fashion, voluntarily undertake what we are convinced is impossible. But what if our beliefs are mistaken? Might it not then be our duty to do what in fact we can do although we believe we cannot, or to avoid doing what in fact we cannot do, although we falsely believe we can do it?

These same considerations apply to doing one's (voluntary) best; and although they have been discussed, in part, in Section V of the present article, there are very good reasons for a further examination of this question. Let me quote from Dickens once again: "Seeing only is believing," he said, "very often isn't that; and even Being

the thing falls a long way short of believing it."1

In general, writers on ethics appear to assume that we always know what we are and what we can do, and no doubt it is a fair assumption that most grown-up people do, in a rough way, know what they can usually do in regard to common actions in the commoner affairs of life. It does not follow, however, that most people know what harm they can do in affairs of delicacy, or that they are anywhere near to being infallible judges of what are affairs of delicacy. This is especially true in the case of social relationships—the sphere, after all, of the greater part of morals. Anyone who perceives the supreme difficulty of what is called "tact," and the way in which all human relationships are liable to an infinity of misunderstandings, can readily see what is meant by the difficulty. In the religion of the Manichees gentleness was the supreme virtue. Does anyone know, in all or in most human relationships, how to be gentle without being soft? And if he does not know, how can he tell what harm he may do with the rough and incautious edge of his tongue, or by his deficiency in imaginative sympathy? The hardest thing we can say about people, very often, is that they meant well, that is to say, that their beliefs concerning what they were doing were amiable but misjudging.

1 Op. cit., vol. ii. p. 5.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

Another mistake that is frequently made is to the effect that if we err in this particular, we err, principally or always, on the side of overestimating our own capacities. This, if it were true, would be serious enough. The hardness and over-confidence of youth is natural to that fortunate condition; and we are all young in some respects until we are dead. For all of us the undertaking of a prolonged course of action may seem easy in the beginning, but who among us can gauge his tenacity in advance? Indeed, it may be argued with some plausibility that a certain degree of over-confidence is a necessity of the business of living. It is part of life's illusion that we nearly always expect better luck next time. Yet to say these things is in itself to admit that there are notable differences between our genuine capacities and our beliefs concerning our capacities.

As I have indicated, however, it is a mistake to suppose that any source of error which exists in this affair is one-sided. Diffidence and a sincere underestimate of our own capacities are perhaps not less frequent than over-confidence. They are certainly common enough. A lack of ambition, it is true, may sometimes be due to a preference—very often a wise preference even when it is juvenile—for a quiet life. But it may also be due to a definite underrating of our own capacities, or to a mistaken belief that other people can do better than we. It may seem a quaint piece of ethics to complain of a lack of push owing to an honest mistake concerning the amount of pushfulness that is in us; but the point is certainly relevant to the problem of making the best, or of making the most, of our circumstances. The ethics of vocation conflict with the ethics of humility; but the appearance of this conflict is no new thing.

Moreover, it seems very doubtful whether most of us are able, by taking thought, to form a correct voluntary estimate of our own capacities. To do so, we should have to be self-critical and yet not too self-critical; and the mean between these is not easy to find. Sometimes it takes a war, or the profound change of religious conversion, to show us what stuff we are made of; and it may always be argued that these profoundly disturbing events have changed us radically, with the consequence that, after them, we are new creatures made of a different stuff from our former selves.

VIII

The purpose of the present article has been to explore the meaning—or, rather, to be more accurate as well as more modest, to explore some of the salient implications—of the general injunction to do one's best in one's circumstances. As we have seen, it is a disputable matter whether this principle is, as Bradley suggested, the supreme principle of moral duty; and the present discussion (I

ON DOING ONE'S BEST

hope) has been free from any attempt to settle that major and perennial problem in moral theory. On the other hand, there can be no doubt whatsoever that the principle itself is very important for what we call prudence, good sense, wise living, and sane endeavour.

Accordingly, the discovery, if it be a discovery, and not, rather, a truism, that any concise formula like Bradley's may be developed along different lines, and is not entirely free from ambiguity, does not in any way detract from the importance of the principle, and should not be supposed to do so. Difficulties and even perplexities are bound to arise in any general statement which attempts to deal, with some precision, with an intricate subject. The important thing is to be able to face such difficulties with open eyes. The stupid course is to slur them over.

There appears to be a prevalent opinion that ethics, or at any rate the foundations of that subject, cannot really be very intricate, or require any great subtlety in their theory. In view of the complexity of human relationships, this prevalent opinion seems very odd indeed. Nevertheless, if the opinion be correct, and ethics is really a simple subject, we ought of course to rejoice. In that case, since the implications of doing one's best cannot be simple, it follows that the principle of doing one's best is only partially included in ethics if it is included at all. Such a view would work havoc with most of the traditional discussions of prudence, benevolence, and many other virtues. I am not suggesting that this consequence is, in itself, difficult to accept; but I am also not asserting that it should be accepted.

RIGHT AND GOOD:

ACTION SUB RATIONE BONI

PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH

T

"ALL men desire the good." This doctrine, which lay at the root of the ethics and also of a great part of the metaphysics of Greek and mediæval thinkers, is either a truism or a paradox, according to the interpretation we place upon it. Its meaning is far from obvious; it veils a multitude of implications and has given rise to a swarm of misconceptions. It has been assumed that all desire is sub ratione boni; nay more, the good has been defined as the object of universal desire, as "that at which all things aim." The view that desire is conditioned by prior apprehension of the good has provoked the rejoinder that desires precede consciousness of their end, that cognition is the result of, or at least concomitant with, the conative process which reveals it. Again, it may be asked whether the good desired is necessarily my own good, so that its attainment may be construed as self-realization; and, if so, whether it is private to myself or a common good which can be shared with others. Is heere one absolute Good, knowable by man, to which all other goods are relative? Is it possible to pass beyond what we opine and believe to be good, so as to know and desire what is "really" good?

Some at least of these problems must be touched on here.

(i) To the point first mentioned we have a clear answer. It has been the main object of these papers to show that action sub ratione boni is not the sole type of rational action, that reason directs man to will the right as well as the good, and that right and good are distinct notions. The proposition "All men desire the good" cannot be converted simplicites to mean that the good is the object of all desire. In moral action, we desire and will the right for its own sake; and, if we call such action "good," it is from the standpoint not of the agent but of the spectator. Both moral action and action sub ratione boni have practical value, but the values are specifically distinct.

A simple and definite term is needed to distinguish the theory of action sub ratione boni from Ethics, the theory of moral action. Aretaics, which is used by John Grote for the science of virtue as distinct from duty, is too narrow for our purpose; virtuous action being only one form of action sub ratione boni. Unless its meaning be unnaturally stretched, it excludes the pursuit of truth and beauty. Eudæmonics is the best term I can think of,

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That the Greeks and those who followed them failed to grasp the distinction was due to their one-sided, though praiseworthy, exaggeration of the claims of the theoretic life. They could not conceive an act as rational, unless a reason could be given for it other than the act itself. Such a reason could only be the end or good for the sake of which the act was done. Hence they were unable to give an adequate explanation of the admitted fact of moral evil. Vice was necessarily interpreted as ignorance, as defect in theoretical apprehension of good. Since all desire was of good, it was impossible for a man voluntarily, i.e. with his eyes open to the light, to choose the bad. Now of action sub ratione boni this is manifestly true. Choice of evil is choice of a really lesser good, which through lack of insight appears the greater, in preference to a really greater good. No one wills the bad knowing it to be bad. The bad indeed is non-existent, being mere privation of good; and therefore it cannot, as such, be cognized or willed. But men do habitually will the wrong, knowing it to be wrong. Immorality is not ignorance but rebellion against the moral law. Its source lies not in lack of knowledge, but in lack of self-control, in the overmastering of right desire by evil passion. The blinding influence of passion may obscure the vision of the good, but the voice of duty sounds above the tumult, and, when we disobey its dictate, we know that what we do is wrong. Indeed, the power of evil in the soul is even more directly practical than the concurrent desire to do the right. "I know not how it is," wrote St. Augustine, "but an object of desire becomes more seductive when it is forbidden." St. Paul's record of his own experience is here decisive. "The good that I would, I do not; the evil that I would not, that I do." The Epistle to the Romans is conclusive refutation of the theory which reduces moral evil to mere privation and denies the existence of any desire other than the desire of good.2

so long as $\varepsilon i \delta a \iota \mu o \nu l a$ is freed from association either with $\eta \delta o \nu \dot{\eta}$ (pleasure) or with (felicity) self-realization as the ultimate Good. The difficulty arises from the fact that the distinction between the two types of action was never clearly grasped before Kant.

¹ See the discussion on his youthful robbing of the pear-tree, *Conf.* ii. 4 ff. The sin here was sheer rebellion; there was no advantage desired or gained in the act. Hence this seemingly trivial incident becomes significant for Augustine of the essential nature of sin as sin, and accordingly receives

lengthy treatment in the Confessions.

² Rom. vii. 19. The "good" here is the law of righteousness, rebellion against which is provoked by the opposing (positive) "law of sin." The context shows that St. Paul is thinking of something very different from action sub ratione boni or from evil as defect of good. On the religious (as distinct from the moral) plane, the conflict is overcome and evil loses its positive reality; see Rom. viii, esp. 31 ff. But such a solution lies outside the scope of ethics. Reference will be made to it in the concluding article.

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(ii) Confining attention to action sub ratione boni, we ask next whether cognition of the end necessarily, as the Greeks supposed, precedes the desire. The scholastic philosophers, and notably St. Thomas Aquinas, discussed the psychology of this position with rare subtlety of analysis. The will, they held, selects freely among practical judgments formed and reflected upon by the intellect, judgments as to the relative goodness or badness of alternative courses of action. This doctrine, that practical judgments of the intellect precede volitional choice, has been directly opposed by Croce, who insists that, so far from being antecedent, they are always consequent upon volition. I first choose and then pronounce the object I have chosen to be good. The question at issue as to which comes first, the cognition chick or the conative egg, can be answered by a discrimination. It is obvious that in their origin desires precede the consciousness of the ends in which they find satisfaction. The baby's first hunger is prior to the baby's first meal. As Professor Alexander has argued, it is the conative process which discloses to cognition the nature of the object it blindly seeks. But on the plane of rational conduct, with which alone we are here concerned, it is surely otherwise. Here the chick precedes and conditions the egg. Two qualifications are however necessary. Apprehension of the desired good may vary almost indefinitely in clearness and precision, from the relatively determinate forecast of a tour on the Continent or a measure to be introduced in Parliament to the relatively schematic and indeterminate aspiration for the promotion of social welfare or scientific research or the Kingdom of God. Indeed, as Croce has pointed out, indetermination inevitably haunts our consciousness of the future; action is always, though in varying measure, in the dark. Secondly, while in studying rational action it is the moment of clear insight which naturally arrests attention, there may be implicit in the desire more than the desiring subject has explicitly before the mind. Men can desire better than they know. Of this the great mediæval thinkers were well aware. They held-and we shall return to their view presently—that desire for the absolute Good is implicit in man's nature, conditioning, dimly as he may be conscious of it, every step in his pursuit of relative and finite goods.

(iii) The Good cannot be defined in terms of desire as "that at which all things aim." Even if it should prove that the absolute Good were the goal of all desire for all creation "travailing together in pain" towards it "until now," this fact, for all its significance, could not be what constitutes its goodness. It would be at most a

¹ Croce: Philosophy of the Practical (E.T.), Part I. Sect. I. c. 3; cf. also Alexander: Space, Time, and Deity, vol. ii. pp. 118 ff. 31 ff.

² On the whole question of the definition of good as "object of desire or interest" and the dependence of good on "desire," see Ross: The Right and the Good, chap. iv, pp. 80 ff.

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property, not the essence, of the good. On the more modest level of thought befitting the student of ethics, we cannot say that to be desired or to satisfy desire entitles a thing to be called good. There are bad desires, and, if they are satisfied, the fact of their satisfaction makes bad worse. Can we say, then, that good means not simply what is desired or what satisfies, but what is ideally desirable, the end in which all desires find harmonious satisfaction? Is not this palpably to argue in a circle? What is ideally desirable means what it is good to desire, and the desires thus harmoniously satisfied are just the desires which are good.2 Evil desires are excluded ex hypothesi, as is also the moral desire, the desire to do what is right, which, as we have shown, is irreducible to desire of good. Nor can the goodness of that which satisfies lie in the mere fact of satisfaction. If it did, the good would be private to its possessor, and would lose all claim to objectivity, i.e. it would not be good at all. This ambiguity between the desire for an objective good and the desire for the possession of it is admirably elucidated by Descartes in a letter to the Princess Elizabeth: "Il y a de la différence," he writes, "entre la béatitude, le souverain bien, et la dernière fin ou le but auquel doivent tendre nos actions: car la béatitude n'est pas le souverain bien; mais elle le présuppose, et elle est le contentement ou la satisfaction d'esprit qui vient de ce qu'on la possède. Mais, par la fin de nos actions, on peut entendre l'un et l'autre; car le souverain bien est sans doute la chose que nous nous devons proposer pour but en toutes nos actions, et le contentement d'esprit qui en revient, étant l'attrait qui fait que nous le recherchons, est aussi en bon droit nommé notre fin."3 In the possession of the good desire is quieted in enjoyment, praxis in theôria; but the fruition lies in the vision of a goodness which is independent of its relation to the enjoying subject. The good is not good because it satisfies; it satisfies because it is the good.

(iv) We are brought here to the problem of the objectivity of the good. Good, like right, is a predicate expressive of a practical ideal or standard of conduct. A thing is judged good by an act of reason, and the judgment claims universal validity. Hence the idea of a good which is merely private to the individual desiring it is, for all

If it be objected that the bad desire is desire for a lesser good, it remains true that the fact of the illusion by which the lesser good appears the greater is itself evil.

² Not "what ought to be desired," for this would make goodness dependent

on rightness.

3 Letter of August 18, 1645, Adam and Tannery, iv. 275 (quoted by Gilson in his Commentaire on Descartes' Discourse, p. 255). Cf. Aquinas, Sum. Th. I^a—II^{ae}, 2. 7. ad. Resp, "beatitudo est aliquid animæ; sed id in quo consistit beatitudo, est aliquid extra animam." Of course Descartes accepts the traditional doctrine that all action is sub ratione boni (see letter to Mersenne, A. and T. I. 366).

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its frequency in popular and even in philosophical discourse, a contradiction in terms. It is with goodness as with truth. We can speak with meaning of private pleasure, private interest, private advantage, as of private tastes or personal opinions; but never of private truth or private good. Hence desire of good does not imply of necessity, as Professor Prichard and even Bradley take it to imply. desire of good for self.2 Action sub ratione boni cannot therefore be brought under the rubric of self-realization. That the self is in effect realized, in varying measure, in the life directed towards the good is no proof that this realization enters into the end desired. The good I strive for may be one in which I can have no share, as when I aim at the welfare of my family or my country after, or even through, my death. Nor need the desire of ultimate good imply participation by the self in its attainment. The final goal may even be conceived as precluding any such determinate experience, as the sheer negation of consciousness and individuality. Western thought, it is true, finds such a conception theoretically paradoxical and practically repellent. For Christian mystics, as well as for monistic philosophers like Spinoza, the ideal is a state of positive beatitude, in which individuality, far from being annulled, attains its full perfection in union with God. But the East has travelled on a different path; and the mind of Indian thinkers has ever been haunted by the conviction that individuality, and even otherness, bears the mark of evil, and that its survival, however it be transfigured, would cast an intolerable blemish on the state of ideal consummation. Certain Buddhist schools, for example, have interpreted nirvāna as not merely cessation of individual existence, but as total nullity of being (śūnyatā).3 A similar, if less extreme, view of the state of emancipation (moksa) is found among the Vedantist teachers. In face of the fact that such conceptions have been cherished by many of the profoundest Eastern thinkers, we cannot, on the score of our inability to appreciate their value, rule them out of account in our inquiry into the good. Another corollary which follows from the objectivity of the standard of goodness is that desire for pleasure

1 See Moore: Principia Ethica, § 59.

² For self, that is to say, as well as for others. Of course every desire is the desire of the individual who desires, but this is a trivial statement. The

question is what the desire is for.

³ Cf. Questions of King Milinda, iii. 5. ro: "The Blessed One passed away by that kind of passing away in which no root remains for the formation of another individual. The Blessed One has come to an end, and it cannot be pointed out of him that he is here or there." For the Mādhyamaka school of Buddhists, nirvāna is neither a positive state of being nor a negative state of non-being; even the knowledge that phenomena have ceased to appear is absent; bondage, liberation, and Buddha himself are phenomenal. Parallels might also be found in Persian Sufism.

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cannot be reckoned as desire for good. Pleasure is private to the subject who experiences it. Desire for the general pleasure, be it noted, is no more desire for pleasure than the desire that our country should possess riches is covetousness or the desire of wealth.

(v) The judgment "this is good" moves to action, when the apprehended good is within our power to attain. But can its claim to objectivity be sustained? How can we be assured that what we judge to be good is real, and not merely apparent, good? The same problem confronts us as in the case of "right." Our judgments are manifestly fallible; are we not doomed, in our quest for what is really good, to be for ever deluded by the semblance? The answer will be the same as in the case of "right"; the form of the good can be realized only in and through particular goods, each and all of which fall short of the perfection which is throughout the goal of our endeavour. These two things at least are clear: (a) that the ideal form is no subjective fantasy; and (b) that only by holding it steadily before our eyes as a standard is it possible to bring the relative and finite goods into being by our will. Just as particular concrete duties are willed as expressions of duty universal, so particular concrete goods are willed as expressions of universal good. This implication of volition sub ratione boni has been set forth, in reasoning unsurpassed for clarity and cogency, in the writings of St. Thomas Aquinas. In this sense, all that a man desires—when he desires, be it understood, sub ratione boni-he desires on account of the ultimate end. There is in man, as a rational being, a natural desire which can only find satisfaction in an infinite and perfect good. Here, again, the impulse of the intellect towards truth affords a parallel. The human mind is driven onwards, by a natural craving, from finite truth to finite truth; nor can it rest, so long as the remotest fragment of the universe remains veiled to its comprehension. Though each advancing step in the path of knowledge brings with it a more poignant realization of what lies beyond, though "leagues beyond those leagues, there is more sea," the advance has been conditioned by the unquenchable faith of reason in a truth that is absolute and complete. So, too, the artist's desire to create beauty is inspired by the vision, clouded and partial, of beauty absolute, a beauty that leaves nothing to be desired of it. In these specific forms of the life sub ratione boni, and in others—in the love that seeks its own consummation (amare amabam) or in the desire of religion for union with God in love and worship-the apparent goods cease to be merely apparent and become real, when informed by the desire of reason for absolute good.

The truth of this implication will be evident, if we follow the method pursued in our discussion of the moral consciousness and indicate the logical stages in the development of the consciousness of good. In action sub ratione boni, the good is theoretically apprehended prior to the action, for which it provides the efficient motive; and the action is willed for the sake of fruition or rest in the good, as its final cause. Thus the distinction between speculative and practical activities is irrelevant for our present purpose; both alike fall under the head of action for the good. The pursuit of knowledge calls volition into play as much as does the pursuit of moral goodness or of virtue; truth, beauty, and goodness of character are all, in their several ways, judged good, and as such are capable of stimulating and satisfying desire. We shall, therefore, refer to man's intellectual or æsthetic activities among our illustrations of the life sub ratione boni.

(i) In our survey of moral action, we noted that the situation of fact habitually provokes to efforts after adjustment, unattended by any consciousness of moral obligation. Such actions are called right or wrong, in a wider and non-moral usage of those terms, with reference to a standard of mere practical efficiency. Similarly, on the line of action sub ratione boni, a form of action can be distinguished which is logically prior to the consciousness of good. Man's environment presents objects which tally with his natural impulses by holding out to them the promise of satisfaction. The dominant feature in these experiences is not effort under external compulsion, but spontaneity of desire. "The world," in Ancient Pistol's phrase, "is mine oyster"; it clamours to be explored, revealing itself as alluring and delightful, not as a stern taskmaster, but as a kindly friend. The interest aroused is theoretical as well as practical; curiosity is excited, and a child finds pleasure in following the movements of a cat or in watching "the wheels go round." The current craving to see the pictures is but a crude instance of the speculative desire, which, on a higher level, bears fruit in scientific or historical research. This difference of levels is all-important. Plato gave classical expression to it when, in the fifth book of the Republic, he discriminated, among lovers of theôria or contemplation, between those whose interest was exclusively limited to the spectacle of sensible events—the lovers of sights and sounds—and the philosopher, who rises from theôria of the ever-changing sensuous show to that of eternal and intelligible truth. He, and he alone, is a lover of the good. But the levels are not discontinuous; the interest of reason springs, as Plato also pointed out, from that of sense.2 So, though the pleasant is not, quâ pleasant, good; yet what gives subjective satisfaction has potentiality of objectivity and goodness, and may

¹ Rep., 475D—480A.

² Rep., 523A—525E.

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therefore be regarded as on the line towards good. The moment of transition is indicated by the use of reason as "the slave of the passions," as in Rational Hedonism, where pleasures are measured one against the other, and the means to their attainment are determined by rational calculation. Another example of reasoned egoism is the theory of life put forward by Callicles in Plato's Gorgias, a a theory common to every age of developed civilization, which advocates self-assertion and the enslavement of society to the will of the strong. When, however, as in Plato's picture of the timocratic state, the power aimed at is the public power of the community, national aggrandizement and glory, as also when the object of desire is the general happiness, the passage has already been effected

to the recognition of an objective, though finite, good.2

(ii) As duty can only be willed by willing particular duties, so good can only be desired as embodied in particular goods. And as no particular duty or series of particular duties can fulfil the requirements of duty, so no particular good or series of goods can fulfil the requirements of goodness. No finite good, taken in its finitude, can justify the claim to be the good. Just in so far as they make this claim and are desired as absolute ends, they are bound in the course of life to reveal their inadequacy alike to theoretical analysis and to practical experience. The concept of good, like that of right, transcends finite expression. A distinction must here be drawn, among such specific goods, between (a) those which are not merely incomplete as failing to cover the whole field of goodness, but are further bound down by limitation to a finite set of spatio-temporal happenings; and (b) those which, though free from this last-mentioned restriction, yet stand side by side with other forms of goodness. Examples of the former type are the economic prosperity or power of a given social group, be it family or tribe or nation, or even humanity at large.3 The ideal of Utilitarianism, or, as it is better termed, Universalistic Hedonism, falls obviously under this head. Such goods as these are easily proved to be defective in the course of experience; they are indefinitely variable and transitory, and what satisfies the needs of one race or generation fails to satisfy the next. Goods of the second type have a stronger title to be regarded as ultimate; for, though they are still bounded by one another, they are each in

1 Rep., 547B-548C.

3 On the concept of "humanity," see Bradley—Ethical Studies, pp. 205, 231-2, 343-45. Bradley distinguishes its relevance for religion from its relevance

(or irrelevance) for morality.

² There is no suggestion here that self-assertion is temporally prior to social co-operation. The point is that conscious reflection, on the part of an intrinsically social being, begins with self-assertive revolt against social restraints. This truth is implicit in the Jahvist's version of the story of the Fall in *Genesis* iii, as Hegel realized (*Logic*, E. T. Wallace, pp. 54-57).

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

suo genere infinite. Such are knowledge, beauty, moral perfection, love of our fellows, and, if we include religious good, God and the reciprocal love of God and man.2 Each of these goods is infinite. in that it provokes and responds to a desire for a specific perfection, which no finite achievement can fully satisfy. Yet each is a distinct form of goodness, exclusive of the rest. Each, again, can be desired under limitations which, when thought out, are found to contradict the nature of the good in question. Consider the desire of the intellect for truth. The fact of its implicit infinitude, in that it of necessity persists unsatisfied with any attainment short of the possession of the final truth of all that is, was selected by Aquinas as the foundationstone of his argument to the need of revelation and immortality as conditions of the possibility of its satisfaction. Yet the summum bonum cannot be contracted within the bounds even of final truth. Such contraction would prove defective to the intellect itself. It seems to be a paradox of the intellect, that it cannot rest satisfied in what satisfies the intellect alone. It demands that beauty, moral perfection, and love should be synthesized with truth in the ideal of perfect goodness. Of the possibility of such a synthesis we shall have something to say in the concluding paper of this series. Our immediate point is that truth is normally pursued in actual human experience without the explicit awareness of its infinitude. The specialist, intent on a particular inquiry, will often affirm principles, say, of materialism or physical determinism, which have a restricted or purely methodological application, as though they were laws holding of all experience. So, again, the search for truth may be subordinated to finite practical ends such as the promotion of an industry or the interests of national defence. The like is true of the artist, when he imposes rigid canons, e.g. of dramatic unity, on the expression of the ideal of beauty, which evidence their incompatibility with the ideal by provoking other artists to overthrow them. The love of our fellows, seeking particular means of expression for a good that in its universality defies restriction to any finite states of character or groups of persons, suffers unnatural contraction when devotion is confined to a single individual or family or class (égoisme à deux, à trois, etc., and the idealization of class-consciousness). Finally, in religious history, polytheism and monolatry prevail long before the recognition of God's infinity, and still persist in men's religious

On religious experience, see the next paper. I hold that the religious life can be distinguished alike from the moral life and from the life sub ratione boni, though it presents close affinities with the latter.

80

¹ On the use of the term "infinite" I follow Bradley—*Ethical Studies*, pp. 74-78. I am well aware that mathematicians refuse to admit the term in any sense save that in which it is defined in mathematics. But I can appeal to a noble array of philosophers in declining to submit to this restriction.

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thought and worship beneath a veil of avowed monotheism. It is hard for the human spirit, in its secular striving for the good, to

shake off the trammels of the finite.

(iii) That finite goods fail to satisfy is a truism, voiced all along the ages not only by saints and mystics but by the man in the street. "Il n'y pas d'âme tant soit peu noble," wrote Descartes in the Preface to his Principles, "qui demeure si fort attachée aux objets des sens, qu'elle ne s'en détourne quelquefois pour souhaiter quelque autre plus grand bien, nonobstant qu'elle ignore souvent en quoi il consiste. Ceux que la fortune favorise le plus, qui ont abondance de santé, d'honneurs, de richesses, ne sont pas plus exempts de ce désir que les autres; au contraire, je me persuade que ce sont eux qui soupirent avec le plus d'ardeur après un autre bien, plus souverain que ceux qu'ils possèdent." A generation later Spinoza told, in his unfinished treatise on logical method, how early in life he had weighed the goods in which the generality of men seek happiness-pleasure, riches, honour-and had found them wanting; and how love of an object that is infinite and eternal (amor erga rem infinitam et æternam) alone could bring enduring and complete felicity. "To find or to be able to find a thing here is to prove that it cannot be the good."2 Parted in all else by a chasm, the mind and heart of East and West are here at one. "All that is clung to falls short," said the Buddha; and he declared, as the second "noble truth" of his doctrine, that the origin of suffering lay in "the craving thirst that causes the renewal of becomings, that is accompanied by sensuous delights, and seeks satisfaction, now here, now there." It fell to the philosophers to display the logic of this transition from the pursuit of finite goods to that of a good which is transcendent, by unfolding the implications both of the good as an objective reality and of the desire of the good inherent in man's rational nature. The former path was followed by Spinoza in his Ethics, the latter by Plato in the fifth book of the Republic.3 He shows there, by analysis of the principle of desire or love, that the hall-mark of all love, irrespective of its specific type of object, is universality. Whatever is desired with single-minded direction is desired in its entirety. In the case of all finite objects, such desire entails self-contradiction. One object alone can be loved wholeheartedly without breach of harmony, the essential Form of Good, the one all-inclusive Good from which fragmentary and finite goods draw their goodness by participation, and apart from which their value is appearance, not reality.

¹ Tractatus de Intellectus Emendatione, ad init.

² Karl Barth, The Word of God and the Word of Man (E.T.). pp. 137-8; 3 Rep., 474C-475C. cf. pp. 138-9.

III

Action for the good, like moral action, is thus seen to imply an absolute standard; in the one case an absolute Good, in the other an absolute Right. Whether the standard be an other-worldly reality. transcendent in relation to the world of spatio-temporal experience. as Plato and Plotinus held; or whether it be, in Kant's phrase, a "regulative idea" for our knowledge of the world we live in, the idea of that world in its totality as an immanent Absolute, it is not for Ethics to decide. The issue can only be determined, if at all, on the terrain of metaphysics or (and) of religion. But, on the borderline that parts ethics from these wider fields of inquiry, the problem arises in the form of an antinomy. We have noted this already in the case of the ideal of Right. In the case of Good, the absolute Good, which is the prius of all finite goods and the source of their relative worth, is nowhere realizable within human experience. In the light of the perfect standard, the kingdoms of the world and the glory of them suffer remorseless condemnation. But if the Good be merely an ideal, how can it be practical? To be practical, it must be both realizable and real. Men are not moved to action by desire of a perfection which is either unattainable or a fiction of the imagination. Consider, for example, the good under the form of truth. Not a step could have been taken on the path of knowledge, save for purely practical purposes, but for the unquenchable faith of the intellect in a truth that is wholly and completely true, and is knowable by the human mind. Yet the goal is palpably unattainable, by reason of the finitude alike of the actual knowing subject and of the actual objects known. The knower apprehends by discursive and inferential processes, which, though they are illuminated at every turn by intuition, preclude immediate intellectual vision of the truth; and the world he strives to know, including his own self, comes to him as an unfinished and fragmentary series of particular occurrences, which defy reduction to a unitary and coherent system. So, in human affection, the ideal of perfect union with our kind is but imperfectly realizable through the love of a few by each, and of these few with varying grades of intensity. At best, individual divergencies and contrasts remain unsynthesized into a real identity of differents. We are thus both infinite and finite, potentially infinite and actually finite; finite but too manifestly, as limiting and limited by persons and things that are related to us externally and make us what we are by the external relationships; infinite, in that we are

See Professor A. E. Taylor, Knowing and Believing (Presidential Address to Aristotelian Society, 1928), esp. pp. 19 ff.; and my article on Logic and Faith (Journ. of Phil. Studies, October 1926).

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conscious of our infinitude and transcend it ideally in cognition and desire. It is only through this consciousness on the side of the subject that we can conceive in idea, as the ultimate ground of rationality in the object, an Absolute which is either transcendent of the spatiotemporal world or that world itself as a self-explanatory system. How this ideal can be unrealized and yet real is a problem which Ethics asks and cannot answer. Its consideration raises metaphysical questions of almost insuperable difficulty, touching the reality of evil and the relation between fact and value, the actual and the ideal; questions that lie beyond the scope of these papers.2 Enough has been said to show that the science of Ethics, even when taken in its widest extension to cover not only moral action but action directed to the good, is not self-contained or final, but, like all other departmental inquiries, gives rise to problems that require a systematic philosophy of experience for their solution.

Waiving this larger issue of the antinomy, there remain two or three matters on which something must be said before we close.

Whave to consider how, within the field of conduct, the two types or moal action and action for the good, which have been sharply distinuished in the abstract, intermingle with one another in the concre life of man. Again-and here we touch the border-line betwee ethics and another enquiry—we must ask how far religious experience can be subsumed under one or other of the aforementioned tyes of action, and, if it be found to be distinct, how far these types of action enter into and modify religion. Reference must also be made to a problem which has been pressing on us throughout the whole preeding discussion, that of the plurality of values. Are the distinctions of Right and Good, and of the several forms of Good (truth, beauty, love, etc.), irreducible and ultimate? Reason surely rebels against such a severance. Where, if anywhere, are we to look for a princile of synthesis?

(To be concluded.)

NOTE.

This article was written before the appearance of Dr. Ross' book entitled The Right and the Good (Clarendon Press). I would refer the

¹ See Bradley, Ethica. ¹ Studies, pp. 74 ff.
² The Good must be real, yet evil is a positive fact; and, over and above positive evils, defect of good is everywhere to be found in the world of finite experience. For ethics the ideal value remains unrealized, an ideal over against fact. This se'verance of fact and value is overcome in different ways, both by religion and by metaphysics. But for moral experience, and also for action sub vatione boni, the severance presents an unsolved and insoluble antinomy. See Et'hical Studies, "Concluding Remarks," esp. pp. 313, 322, 326.

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reader to his admirably lucid analysis of the various meanings of "good" in chap. iii of that work, and especially to his discussion and definition of what is "intrinsically good" as "that which is good apart from any of the results it produces" (p. 68). I agree with him (a) in holding goodness to be a "consequential quality" of the object which is good, and not a relation either between constituents of the object or between the object and the mind which apprehends it (chap. iv); (b) in holding that the objects qualified as intrinsically good are states of mind (chap. v). The metaphysical and religious problems of an Absolute Good and of God as good lie outside Dr. Ross' inquiry. The most serious difference between us is on the all-important question of the inclusion of motive in the content of duty; his exclusion of motive (pp. 4-6) carries with it far-reaching consequences, e.g. the distinction of "right" from "morally good" acts (p. 156), and the denial of intrinsic value to "right" acts (pp. 132-133). My own view on this question has been stated in an earlier article (No. 19, Tuly 1930).

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

There are at least six works of the very first rank which no review of recent philosophy in France, or in Europe, should neglect to notice. Such are the important lectures given at the Collège de France by Professor Edouard Le Roy, who occupies the chair vacated by Bergson on his retirement, and the three volumes of studies on Cournot and Renouvier by MM. Milhaud and Hamelin, posthumously published. To these I intend to devote separate articles in future numbers of the *Journal*. And, apart from these, there is indeed no lack of careful and stimulating work.

I

M. JEAN WAHL has attracted much attention by his last book on Distress of the Spirit in the Philosophy of Hegel, 1 a study of the formation of Hegelianism from an unfamiliar angle. M. Wahl is persuaded that a purely 'intellectualist' exposition of Hegel is like the play of Hamlet with the Prince left out. Hegel's philosophy, he says, "cannot be reduced to a few logical formulæ. Or rather, these formulæ cover over something that is not of purely logical origin. The Dialectic, before being a method, is an experience by which Hegel passes from one idea to another." And it is a specifically religious experience—"behind the philosopher we find the theologian, behind the rationalist the romantic." This experience, intensest in Hegel's early manhood, is the real origin of his philosophy. But it is not, as M. Wahl's whole book attempts to show, the 'origin" in the merely psychological sense—of that which directed Hegel's interest and efforts to the study of speculative metaphysics. It is "the origin" in a profounder sense, one in which the metaphysical conclusions Hegel reached in maturity must themselves be turned back upon, used to interpret and evaluate, the very experience which is at once their historical source and the essential material they have to exhibit as harmonious and rational. Concerning what is the proper business of philosophy, M. Wahl would presumably fall into line with writers like Professor A. E. Taylor, when they say that it is "to express a whole personality." Now the experience, the interpretation of it, and the "whole personality" in the present case, though those of the historical Hegel, are yet not of particular biographical import alone. The experience vécue is, of course, particular and biographical, but the content of that experience, what is so richly significant in it, reaches beyond the particular limitations of occasion, state, and person. The outcome of Hegel's philosophy was "to remove, in the non-temporal whole in which rationality and reality are finally united, whatever is discordant and tragic in the world of concrete experience." Now the "experience" in question is essentially one of contradictions. Hegel is incessantly confronted with antinomies and antitheses, and arrives by a struggle, which is "an echo of the universal labour of the negative," at a synthesis of those contradictions. In this "biographical" struggle of Hegel we have 'writ small,' the long history of human experience, the alternation of endeavour with despair. In this way Hegel raises to the

I J. WAHL: Le Malheur de la Conscience dans la Philosophie de Hegel. Paris: Les Editions Rieder. 1929. Pp. 268. 40 fr.

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

level of an historical description of all human experience, next to the level of a metaphysical principle, the distress of separation and reflection on its antitheses, on the one hand, and the need for harmony and the idea of the Notion, on the other. "The conception which marks the introduction of apologetic theology into the history which itself becomes a logic, is that of spiritual distress." This "division within the soul itself" in its separation from God, an experience primarily Christian, has a cosmic significance. Figuratively, it is described as "the Universe becoming aware of itself." Distress of spirit in man, repulsing the harmonizing efforts of reason, is symptomatic of disequilibrium or "distress" at the heart of Being itself.

Hegelian philosophy is first and foremost a Meditation. This meditation, starting from the fact of spiritual suffering, facilitates by conscious effort a transcendence from all involved in that initial experience. But the internal contradiction, the "perpetual irony," of all thinking (viz., that every affirmation of spirit entails a contrary affirmation) serves to point the direction that thought should take "so as to fill up the blank that separates reason taken as reality from reason taken as spirit." The validity of a notion is to be established only en s'approfondissant, and it can s'approfondir only en englobant son contraire. The progressive movement of spirit is not then one of opposition or of incessant oscillation, but a movement of cyclical synthesis "enriched by all the intermediate stages from its starting-point." Without spiritual distress there is no movement or life, and even when surmounted, it cannot be denied or suppressed in some changeless reality. The reality for which Hegel is seeking is not the undifferentiated 'One' of antiquity; his philosophy is to be that of "a romantic classicism," or "a classical romanticism," for he is trying "to make arise out of the deepest distress of spirit its highest happiness," and this happiness is possible only in a movement which has eternally surmounted distress. La conscience malheureuse, "that simple negativity of spirit which becomes self-conscious," compels us to pursue a path that leads into deeper and deeper distress. Progressively wider become the "divisions" between self, the world and God, and these "separations" are objectively manifested throughout the whole history of human experience and thought-Stoicism, Judaïsm, Primitive Christianity, Mediæval Christianity, eighteenth-century Subjectivism, are milestones in that history. "Philosophy" is thus philosophy of the history of spiritual struggle, inspired by it, explanatory of it, liberating the human soul from it through the happiness born of it. M. Wahl is a skilful writer and able to throw into fine relief the literary richness of his theme. True, we do not find in his book the method or the cosmology of Hegel dissected, clarified, and meticulously reassembed with McTaggart's skill, but then it is not M. Wahl's purpose to do this. As an account of where the "accent" should properly fall in Hegelianism, we may feel M. Wahl unconvincing, but that he succeeds in presenting the most illuminating parallels between the development of the metaphysic or articulation of the Notion, on the one side, and the interpretation of "History" in Hegel's sense, on the other, is beyond question.

A metaphysical study of a very different cast is that of Dr. Régis Jolivet of Lyons, on the necessity of the conception of substance for metaphysics. His book is historical and critical, but "historical" here does not indicate a mere meander through the writings of past metaphysicians. Dr. Jolivet does not lose his reader in a morass of citations, but adroitly guides him straight to

r Régis Jolivet: La Notion de Substance: Essat historique et critique sur le Développement des doctrines d'Aristote à nos jours. Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie. Paris: Reque chesne. 1929. Pp. 335. 50 fr.

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the high places and strategical points. His fairness and sympathy with "empiricism" and with philosophies denying ontological status to "substance," enable him to state their implications in the fullest and strongest manner, which is, for him, precisely to show up their insufficiency and weakness. Limiting his review to those systems which brought new solutions to difficulties arising from the notion of substance, Dr. Jolivet tries to show how substance is ineluctably presupposed in them all, and that the attempts of some of them to elude it account for the final impotence of empiricism, and the insurmountable objections to certain forms of idealism. This thesis he tries to support, positively by Aristotle, St. Thomas, Suarez, Descartes, and Leibniz; negatively, by Hume, Kant, and less directly by Lachelier and Hamelin. The discussion of Cartesianism is pleasingly free from any Kantian 'twist,' and the first half is particularly good, though the criticism Dr. Jolivet uses in the second half 'to support his view that Descartes' doctrine of substance compromises the possibility of a thoroughgoing realist interpretation of it' seems to me untenable. (It is startling, too, to find in so good a discussion the suggestion that by "clear and distinct conception" Descartes means "an image that is definite" !- p. 140). The Cartesian Cogito and Bergson's durée concrète alike presuppose at the outset a realism which neither is in the end able to justify, because, according to M. Jolivet, of empiricist prejudices. A more thoroughgoing realist interpretation of substance is to be worked out by starting from Aristotle (his account in itself is inadequate, since it eventually leaves the material individual unintelligible), correcting him by St. Thomas, and developing the revised version along Leibniz's lines. The author shows well how Thomas reinforces Aristotle's "realism" of substances by a realist theory about our knowledge of them. Intelligible and sensible factors in the object of knowledge are distinguishable but not separate factors in the concrete thing-they are co-implicant factors in it. Since the intelligible is immanent in the sensible, the sensible is already "rational"; and since the sensible is immanent in the intelligible, the intelligible concrete is sensible. In his concluding chapter Dr. Jolivet maintains, endorsing Maine de Biran, that the divergences and errors of metaphysical systems result from their all having exceeded the limits warranted by primitive fact through either illegitimate abstraction or insufficient analysis. Metaphysics must therefore return to primitive facts and ascertain their character. These, Dr. Jolivet decides, are two: the first, fully brought to light by Descartes, is the existence of a substantival self; the second, that phenomena and substances are unseparated in the concrete, and jointly constitute the 'existence' presented in awareness. As interconnected, "obeying" definite laws, phenomena are objective, independent of minds, and hence already syntheses that are far more than "pure appearances." And substance, since it is intrinsic to its phenomenon, is not a "pure absolute," and therefore can be directly apprehended in sense-perception. Dr. Jolivet has certainly produced a careful, thoughtful, and suggestive book, which, to say the least, contains the essentials of a sufficient answer to Phenomenalism.

The Société Belge de Philosophie has recently made its début in print with the publication of two Archives, both of logical interest. Professor Dupréel investigates the notion of Necessity. Philosophers who have tried to make clear or justify the traditional view that "necessary truths" are recognized as such "intuitively" have been able to elucidate it only in terms of the impos-

r E. Dupréel: De la Nécéssité. Archives de la Société de Philosophie Fascicule, r., Bruxelles: Stevens. 1928. Pp. 40. 5 fr.

TOURNAL OF PHILOS OPHICAL TUDIES

sibility, or inconceivability or absurdity of its contradictory. Confronted with the contradictory, we cannot see how to avoid affirming the "necessary" proposition, and "it is the idea that this latitude is refused us that the word necessity expresses." He next seems to take this as implying that "the foundation of all necessity is an act of intuition," and infers that if "an absolute value" is to be accorded to necessity, "it must be founded in an operation sui generis." The situation in which a necessary proposition is seen to be necessary (viz., in which we see that "the latitude" of asserting and accepting the contradictory "is refused us") really involves a brief argument (one passing from the proposition in question to its denial) in which we experience the impossibility of admitting the denial. This "petit raisonnement," by application of the principle of contradiction, closes with an intuition of the absurdity of the contradictory. It cannot, however, justify the view that necessity is "absolute," for the argument, by invoking the principle of contradiction, is circular. The first part of the paper concludes that there is not, as supposed in the classical types of rationalism, any "fixed point of departure" from necessary truths. The very fact that "necessary truths" appear to us as necessary is, Professor Dupréel thinks, a sign that they express not our knowledge, but our ignorance -a sign that "we do not know of which judgments the necessary truth is a synthesis, and under what conditions it is true." The remainder of the article is devoted to indicating the changes the author supposes his conclusion requires in our conceptions of the nature of thought and mind. Here he appears to follow the lead of M. Goblot, maintaining that thought is essentially "construction": raisonner, c'est construire, though what "justification" of necessity, if any, is proposed in the end is not very clear.

In the second of these Archives, MM. Barzin and Errera examine the recent attack of M. L. E. J. Brouwer, the Dutch mathematician, upon the validity of the principle of excluded middle. M. Brouwer regarding it uncertain, attempted to reconstruct the foundations of mathematics in such a way as to avoid assuming its validity. In this article the authors claim to have found "in the very foundations of his construction" a formal contradiction. Their argument, which contains replies to objectors, supporters of M. Brouwer, is too long and technical to reproduce here. It contains an interesting discussion of implication, and of the character of primary principles in formal

logic.

Dr. Pierre Brunet's last book on the mathematician and physicist Maupertuis² deals with the same period, though not the same persons, as his former work, The Dutch Physicists and the Experimental Method in France in the Eighteenth Century, and that of his two forthcoming volumes, The Introduction of Newton's Theories into France. Of the present work, the second volume, dealing with Maupertuis's scientific work, is the more important, and the first half of it considerably more valuable than the second. It is surprising to find a whole "Deuxième Partie" devoted to "Maupertuis the Philosopher," and Dr. Brunet's three long chapters on his epistemology, his discussions about "matter and thought," and "natural theology and the moral problem," show that one's previous ignorance of Maupertuis's performances in these directions argues no grave defect in one. Dr. Brunet might well have compressed this material into a single chapter (were he, for completeness' sake,

¹ M. Barzin and A. Errera: Sur le Principe du tiers exclu. Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie. Fascicule 2. Bruxelles: Stevens. 1929. Pp. 26. 3 fr.

² P. Brunet: Mauperiuis, Étude Biographique: Maupertuis, l'Œuvre et sa place dans la Pensée scientifique et philosophique du xviiie siècle. Paris: Blanchard. 1929. Vol. I, pp. 203; Vol. II, pp. 487. 75 fr. the two vols.

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intent on dealing with it at all), for Maupertuis's philosophical ideas have little intrinsic merit, and seem to have exercised no influence, except possibly on the *philosophes du salon* of his own day. The six chapters in the first part on Maupertuis's contribution to pure mathematics, astronomy, and mechanics are, however, of a different order. They are most informative and clear and give the work its real value, which appears considerable.

II

Two-thirds of Professor Bréhier's excellent History of Philosophy is now completed. This year the third fascicule ("The Middle Ages and Renaissance") of Volume I, covering from the fifth to the sixteenth century, and the first fascicule ("The Seventeenth Century") of Volume II, have appeared. These volumes promise and deserve to become the standard general history of philosophy in the French Universities. They tell their story simply and lucidly, guide the reader to essentials, and enter into enough detail to give a clear impression of the greater figures without losing the sense of continuity and development. There is appended at the end of every chapter a most full bibliography of the relevant opera magna, principal monographs, commentaries, and authoritative articles. The third fascicule, beginning with an account of orthodoxy and heresies in the fourth and fifth centuries, contains a good discussion of the relation between Reason and Faith. The third chapter brings us into the pensée ardente et variée, tumultueuse et confuse of the twelfth century, in which the author distinguishes four movements which find expression through the theologians (who work towards the unification of the Christian tradition), the Platonist school of Chartres (the "Humanists"), the mystics, and the naturalist-pantheistic thinkers. The next chapter surveys Oriental philosophy (more particularly the Arabians, Avicenna and Averroës; and Maïmonides), and so prepares the way for the great thirteenth century (ch.v), in which the unification of the Christian tradition is now accomplished. It is, however, a unity that is "willed for social and political reasons, rather than intellectual ones." Dr. Bréhier's two score pages on St. Thomas is a most admirable résumé. The Angelic Doctor's "system" presupposes two great syntheses which he accepts "ready-made"—a theological synthesis of revealed truths (worked out by the theologians of the 'Sentences' in the twelfth century), on the one hand, and a synthesis of truths accessible to reason (Aristotelianism), on the other. There is no way of joining these two syntheses. Reason can be applied to vérités de foi-not, however, to demonstrate them, only to infer what consequences they imply when taken as premises. Next follows a clear account of Thomas's epistemology, his proofs of God's existence, and his Christianized Aristotelianism; then, after sections on the Averroism of Siger de Brabant, the Oxford school, Roger Bacon, and Lulle, we reach the fourteenth century (ch. vi), the epoch of Nominalism. Diverging elements in the thought of the Thomist period find expression in Duns Scotus, a thinker of real originality whose ideas cannot be fitted into the framework of scholastic doctrine so far developed. His main theses—the actual existence of matter, individuation by form, the priority of will—at once emphasize his departure from Thomism, define his position, and isolate him from the previous century. Thomistic Aristotelianism now loses in prestige, "philosophical speculation unfolds autonomously and freely." With the Renaissance (ch. vii)

¹ E. Bréhier: Histoire de la Philosophie. Tome Premier, Fascicule III: Moyen Âge et Renaissance. Pp. 523-791. 20 fr.

E. Brehner: Histoire de la Philosophie. Tome Premier (first three fascicules): L'Antiquité et la Moyen Âge, Paris: Félix Alcan. 1930. Pp. 791. 55 fr.

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four currents can again be discerned. First, theocentricism gives way to a vigorous but more or less vague "naturalism." Christian tradition, however, still dominates the efforts of the Platonic humanists, ever intent on finding in Platonism a philosophical synthesis that supports Christianity. Secondly, the Averroïsts of Padua, continuing the work of Siger de Brabant, find in Aristotle a naturalist who denies providence and the soul's immortality, and affirm a rigorous determinism. Thirdly, there are the strict "men of science," who take for their model neither Plato nor Aristotle, but Archimedes-"he who first had been able to connect mathematics with experience." "Archimedes, wholly ignored in the Middle Ages, reaches in a single stroke a state of science far more advanced than anything that the prevailing tradition could teach." Fourthly, there are the moralists who, like the scientists, trying to discover Nature independently of its origin or end, propose to elaborate a positive description of man's nature freed from reference to any supernatural destiny. So the seventh chapter, which illustrates these four tendencies in their concrete setting, brings us to the dawn of the seventeenth century, the inception and rise of Cartesianism and the mechanistic hypothesis in science.

Professor Bréhier's other fascicule¹ reads even more attractively. After a chapter on the conceptions of human nature and of external nature at the beginning of the century, and a further one devoted to Francis Bacon and his "experimental philosophy," we come to a remarkably succinct and ample résumé of Descartes's philosophy, an estimate of the Cartesian movement and outline sketches of the chief Cartesians. Malebranche is allotted a chapter apart, so too are Pascal and Hobbes. The longer chapters devoted to Spinoza and Leibniz, though they can hardly be said to present these difficult systems adequately, are probably as detailed as could be without losing trace of historical continuity. A chapter of twenty pages on Locke and a briefer one on Bayle and Fontenelle prepare the reader for the fifth fascicule on the Eighteenth Century, which the publishers now announce. Professor Bréhier's four fascicules are as entertaining as they are informative. Nothing breaks, the continuity of the account. Far from being a 'cram-book,' the work has the qualities of a scholarly, readable, and ample, though not-overburdened, history, without a trace of parti pris. And its accounts of lesser thinkers and 'tributary' movements is quite sufficient to help those who are not "specialists" in the history of philosophy to survey the whole story synoptically, fill in the gaps in their knowledge, and deepen their historical understanding of the whole.

Since the eighties, the standard treatise in France on the History of Philosophy has been the admirable volume of Paul Janet and Gabriel Séailles. This is not a "history" in the usual sense—in which Professor Bréhier's is—but a history of "Problems and Schools." Separate problems are taken up, and the differences in treatment and solution they have successively received is traced down from the "beginnings" to the first half of last century. These "single problems" (e.g., "Sensation and External Perception," "Theories of Reason," "Universals," "Induction," "Matter and Mind," "The Problem of a Future Life"—in all twenty-six) are classified under the headings Psychology, Ethics, Logic, Metaphysics, and Theodicy, and form the first and major part (900 pages) of the work. The second part covers "historical philosophy," arranged in "schools." Evidently certain limitations and defects are inherent and insurmountable in such a treatment, but the "plain, historical method" also

E. Bréhier: Histoire de la Philosophie. Tome II, La Philosophie Moderne. Fascicule I, Le Dix-Septième Siècle. Paris: Félix Alcan. 1929. Pp. 314. 20 fr.

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has its own peculiar difficulties too. And each method of presentation has no less its own peculiar advantages, 'Janet and Séailles' and 'Bréhier,' in fact,

usefully supplement each other.

Five Professors of Philosophy have now collaborated to bring 'Janet and Séailles' down to date, though still retaining its original cadres, by tracing the history of certain isolated problems. The difficulties of producing such a Supplement that should be full enough to be comprehensible yet brief enough to remain an appendix, must have been formidable. In the main, however, the result is successful. Dr. Dorolle manages to compress into two chapters ("Development of Deductive Logic" and "Induction") something of the results of Russell and Couturat, and of Lalande, Nicod and Keynes. The former chapter is a brief, clear statement of the origins of logistic, logical ideography, propositional functions and logical constants; while the second discusses important definitions of induction (Lachelier, Hamelin, Lalande), distinguishes logical from philosophical problems connected with it, and considers analyses of experimental procedure and the theory of inductive probability (Nicod, Keynes). These chapters occupy together only twenty-two pages! Professor REY, restricting himself to the Mind-Body problem, discusses mechanism and dynamism, and outlines certain large issues raised by Mach, Poincaré, the pragmatists, and, in particular, Bergson. Dr. TISSERAND, whose chapter on "Pluralism and Truth" precedes Professor Rey's, seems unduly absorbed in Pragmatism, and apart from this does not stir far beyond Renouvier and Cournot. There is no trace of a word of importance having been uttered on his subject by, say, anyone at Cambridge. Dr. PARODI, in his chapter on "The Moral Problem," seems unduly generous to minor men. Seven out of twenty-two pages seems an excessive allowance to Neitzsche. Dr. Dugas alone is able to bring to date all the problems treated in the corresponding division of the main work. His eleven chapters contain some excellent points about Gestalt psychology, Durkheim's theory that reason is a "social product," the views of James, Bergson, and Brunschvicg on both reason and memory, experimental work on the latter, and a section on what is of psychological interest in phonetics and semantics.—While the several divisions are unequal in merit, the whole "Supplement" is certainly a good and useful publication, a worthy continuation of a renowned treatise.

Four additions have recently been made to the series of "pocket" volumes—the Collection Armand Colin, two on Philosophy and two on Psychology. Dr. A. RIVAUD, late Professor at Poitiers, now of the Sorbonne, whose fine work on "The Problem of Becoming and the Notion of Matter in Greek Philosophy" raised him to the rank of an authority, has contributed a most readable outline of the "Main Currents in the Thought of Antiquity," perfectly suited for introducing the larger treatises. Dr. A. Cresson, of the Lycée Condorcet, outlines in "The Philosophical Systems" in plain, untechnical French the chief problems that have arisen, and the answers that have been returned to them, under the headings of "Dogmatisms," "Agnosticisms," and "Philosophies of Belief."

10 fr. 50; stitched, 9 fr.

3 A. Cresson: Les Systèmes philosophiques. Paris: Colin. 1929. Pp. 220. Bound, 10 fr. 50;

stitched, 9 fr.

¹ MM. PARODI, TISSERAND, DUGAS, DOROLLE, REY: Histoire de la Philosophie: Les Problèmes et les Écoles. Supplement: Période Contemporaine. Paris: Delagrave. Pp. 240. 15 fr. JANET ET SÉAILLES: Histoire de la Philosophie; Les Problèmes et les Écoles, avec Supplément. 14th édn. Paris: Delagrave. 55 fr.

² A. RIVAUD: Les grands courants de la Pensée Antique. Paris: Colin. 1929. Pp. 220. Bound,

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Professor C. BLONDEL, 1 of Strasbourg, returns again to his theme that collective psychology is logically prior to individual psychology, attempts to define the object of the former, and determine its position in the whole field of psychology and indicate its working hypotheses. Professor Wallon of the Institut de Psychologie, in his "Principles of Applied Psychology,"2 gives as detailed an account of the psychology of work, aptitudes and the method of tests, professional selection and orientation, and the psychical motives and consequences of activity, as is often found in larger and expensive books.

Professor M. Foucault has come to the aid of candidates for the baccalauréat, the entrance examination to the University in France, with a delightful little book of "First Lessons in Experimental Psychology." 3 Like all M. Foucault writes, these "Lessons" are of the utmost lucidity and directness. In seven chapters the ground of elementary psychology is resumed. Sensory experience, imagery and associations, mental work, intelligence testing, and voluntary movements are all subjects of simplified experiments, methods of measurement being introduced where possible. This splendid little work is equipped with its own "laboratory material" in the form of coloured leaves for experiments on vision, columns of words for those on imagery and association, and columns of numbers for those on the law of exercise and on mental fatigue. How could the candidate for the "bachot" be helped more?

Lastly, Dr. Henri Piéron, the distinguished Professor of the Collège de France, has had the happy thought of making his lectures on "Mental Development and Intelligence," delivered at the University of Barcelona, accessible to a wider circle of readers.4 He begins by showing how mental development is dominated by biological and social conditions, and that the level of intellectual expression depends in great part on the intellectual material each civilization has furnished to the individual. He brings out clearly the confusion that has arisen in the use of intelligence tests between the determination of the levels of mental development successively attained with increasing age by every normal subject, and the measure of the intelligence proper to each individual. Were there an exact correspondence between them, the intellectual quotient would be invariable for each individual, but, in fact, it tends to vary through successive ages. The last lecture on problems of evaluation of intelligence, and the need of an analytical estimate, is most suggestive. We ought in the future to be able to define more exactly in what intelligence consists, to discover whether it consists of a group of entirely distinct aptitudes, or of some sort of central power which can be applied to special aptitudes. It would be an inestimable benefit for students of psychology to have these brilliant lectures translated into an English as clear-cut as Professor Piéron's French.

The following are the courses of public lectures in philosophy announced to be delivered in Paris at either the Collège de France or the Sorbonne: In PHILOSOPHY: Professor Lalande, Nature and Method of the Moral Sciences; Professor Brunschvicg, Philosophy and Metaphysics; Professor A. Rey, Philosophical History of the Sciences at the Culmination of Hellenic Civilization; Professor E. Gilson, The Mysticism of St. Bernard de Clairvaux; and Researches into the Doctrines of the Early Middle Ages; Professor Basch, Æsthetic Sym-

¹ C. BLONDEL: Introduction à la Psychologie collective. Paris: Colin. 1928. Pp. 206. Bound,

¹⁰ fr. 50; stitched, 9 fr.

² H. Wallon: Principles de Psychologie appliquée. Paris: Colin. 1930. Pp. 224. Bound. 12 fr.; stitched, 10 fr. 50.

³ M. FOUCAULT: Premières Leçons de Psychologie expérimentale, à l'usage des candidats au Baccalaureat. Paris: Delagrave. 1930. Pp. 94. 12 fr.
4 H. Pieron: Le Développement mental et l'Intelligence. Paris: Alcan. 1929. Pp. xii + 96,

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bolism and Sympathy, and Classical Æsthetic in Germany from Herder to Kant; Professor Fauconnet, Sociological Problems; Professor Robin, Problems in the History of Ancient Philosophy; Professor Masson-Oursel, Explanation of the Yoga-Sútras; Professor Rivaud, Philosophy of Maine de Biran; Professor Le Roy, The Primitive Forms of Intelligence, and Disciplines and Criteria of Intuitive Thought; Professor Bayet, Moral Ideas in the Christian Churches during the First Centuries.—In Psychology: Professor Delacroix, Intelligence; Dr. Wallon, Origins of Character in the Child, and Development of the Feeling of Personality; Professor Dumas, Pathological Psychology; Professor Piéron, Auditive Perceptions and Theories of Hearing.

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

Summary: This survey deals with publications arranged under the heads of Neo-scholasticism, Phenomenology, and Scientific Philosophy, three of the main currents in contemporary German philosophy. Under the first head is Philosophia Perennis, an international collection of essays by sixty-eight Catholic philosophers. Under the second head are Edmund Husserl's Formal and Transcendental Logic and Roman Ingarden's essay On the Place of Epistemology in Philosophy. Under the third head is Erkenntnis, a new journal which expresses the views of such philosophers as Carnap, Dubislav, Reichenbach, Schlick, and Waismann.

I. NEO-SCHOLASTICISM

It is a German custom to honour eminent philosophers before they are dead. The philosopher's sixtieth or seventieth birthday provides the occasion, and a collection of essays by those who share his outlook usually forms the honour. The two volumes of Philosophia Perennis' commemorate the sixtieth birthday of Joseph Geyser, the distinguished Munich neo-scholastic; and the gift and the recipient are worthy of each other. Printed and bound in an exceptionally pleasing and praiseworthy manner, these stately volumes are also a credit to their publishers, one of whom has studied under Geyser. Nor do their contents belie their appearance. The book is composed of sixtyeight essays from Catholic philosophers in sixteen different countries, together with an introduction by the editor, FRITZ-JOACHIM VON RINTELEN, of Munich, and a full list of Geyser's published works. This survey will deal with some of the essays written in German. But the names of Gemelli, Gilson, Maréchal, and Sertillanges, to mention only a few, indicate how much valuable material there is in other languages as well. Only three of the essays are directly on Geyser. The others are on various aspects of philosophia perennis, which is taken to be either Aristotelian scholasticism or the elements common to different philosophical systems. The first volume contains essays on different philosophical periods from the Greek to our own, and many eminent authorities write on the patristic and scholastic periods. The second volume contains essays on different philosophical problems, classified according to the branch of philosophy to which they belong, and it is at the end of this volume that the three essays on Geyser occur. Max Ettlinger, formerly of Munich, writes on Geyser's psychology; Kurt Huber, of Munich, on his logic and epistemology;

¹ Philosophia perennis: Aufsätze zu ihrer Vergangenheit und Gegenwart. Two volumes. Regensburg: Josef Habbel. 1929. Pp. xviii + 1244. RM. 37.

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and Ludwig Baur, of Breslau, on his metaphysics. All three accounts, though brief, are comprehensive and lucid.

It is not surprising that Geyser has become conspicuous in controversy, for the idealism and intuitionism which he has attacked have luxuriantly flourished around him. It is through controversy that he has reached his own position. He is an Aristotelian scholastic because he believes that Aristotelian scholasticism contains more truth than any other historical system. He thinks, however, that neo-scholasticism should aim not so much at interpreting as at developing the past. Huber points out that, as a realist, Geyser emphasizes, with Aristotle, the receptive character of cognition, though he believes that cognition is active as well. Cognitive activity, while not affecting that on which cognition is directed, does affect the content of cognitive acts. Truth, according to Geyser, consists in the correspondence between what is thought and objective facts. And logic must study objective facts, since laws of thought thus depend on laws of being. In opposition to Husserl, Geyser denies the reality of an independent world of ideal objects. In opposition to Bauch, he denies the reality of objective judgments. Anything that is must be a particular, and all essences and universals are in particulars. He emphatically asserts that the empirical self is a particular, and attacks all attempts to construct it out of a set of mental events. Geyser's disagreements with the idealists are legion—his repudiation of the transcendental self and his insistence on the contingency of every particular are further examples. But his position is not wholly dissimilar from Husserl's. Both philosophers are anxious to keep logic distinct from psychology, and to emphasize the importance of the intuition of essences (Wesensschau), though Geyser believes that intuition includes abstraction, while Husserl regards these two mental processes as fundamentally different. Nevertheless Geyser has vigorously supported proof in the great controversy about intuition and proof among German Catholic philosophers. He is opposed to all attempts, like that of Scheler, to base knowledge of the existence of God on intuition through feeling. In his view, the existence of God can be proved. God alone provides the ultimate explanatory principle of the world. God alone could have brought about the existing correspondence between our knowledge and objective facts.

Only four other essays, two in each volume, can be mentioned here. In the first volume the essay of ARTUR SCHNEIDER, of Cologne, on "The Logical Relativism of Hans Leisegang" deals with some of those attempts to divide philosophical systems into types which have recently been so popular in Germany. The first of these attempts was made by Trendelenberg, but that of his pupil, Dilthey, has attracted special attention. Dilthey, as the result of an empirical study, believes that there are three constantly recurring types of philosophy: Materialistic Positivism (e.g., Epicurus, Hobbes, and Comte); Objective Idealism (e.g., Spinoza and Hegel); and the Idealism of Freedom (e.g., Plato and Kant). He also believes that the differences between types of philosophy are ultimately based on differences in temperament between philosophers. And since these temperamental differences will persist, variety in philosophy will persist. Karl Groos and Hans Leisegang have also contributed to 'typology'. The latter, in his Denkformen, holds that different types of philosophy are due to different types of logical thought—to different logics. Like Dilthey, he ends with a relativist view, believing that every philosophical system must be judged solely by the laws of the particular logic to which it is related. Schneider is opposed to all such relativism. In

¹ Surveyed in this Journal, vol. v. pp. 108-9.

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his view, the proper function of typology is to help us to discover the true philosophical system by clearly classifying our knowledge of past systems.

FRANZ SAWICKI, of Poland, brings the historical essays to a close with a discussion of the philosophy of history as part of philosophia perennis. His aim is to state certain fundamental doctrines which are common to many different philosophies of history and extend far beyond Aristotelian scholasticism. He admits that they are not common to all philosophies of history, but he claims that they are common to all that give "a reasonable explanation of historical development." Philosophia perennis asserts, according to Sawicki, that the development of mankind exhibits a purpose analogous to that of the individual; that the end to be achieved by mankind is the realization of values, the highest of which are religion and morality; and that personal activity and divine reason have an important influence on the course of events. Opposed to philosophia perennis are: first, all theories which regard historical development as meaningless—which relegate the theory of purpose to "the museum of human errors"; secondly, all theories which admit merely some negative purpose, such as the removal of pain by the renunciation of the will to live; thirdly, all theories which regard individual activity as ineffective. In his brief discussion of the grounds on which philosophia perennis rests, Sawicki argues that only if God exists can historical develop-

ment be purposive.

In the second volume DIETRICH VON HILDEBRAND, of Munich, writes on his conception of 'the objective good for the individual.' He distinguishes between three ethical concepts: what is good in itself, what is objectively good for the individual, and what satisfies the individual. A successful investment is merely satisfying. Moral improvement is objectively good for the improving person. It is also good in itself. These examples show, not only that the three ethical concepts are different, but also that they are not mutually exclusive. Moral improvement, we see, is both objectively good for the improving person and good in itself. Similarly, health is normally good for the healthy person as well as good in itself. And certain states of affairs—as in the case of travel, professional success, or friendship—may both satisfy and be objectively good for the person concerned. Nevertheless, the three ethical concepts are different, in spite of the fact that they sometimes coincide. Hildebrand specially emphasizes the distinction between what is objectively good for the individual and what satisfies him. The true 'interest' of the individual is not always that which satisfies him. Illness may be objectively good for a person, while revenge or cocaine may satisfy him. What is good for the individual must not be confused with what is good as a means. What is good as a means is good only in the sense that it leads to something which is good in itself. What is objectively good for the individual involves a new and independent ethical category. Hildebrand believes that the recognition of this category reveals many new ethical problems and throws fresh light on many old problems. His essay makes many suggestions, and applies his doctrine, in some detail, to the conflict between egoism and altruism. This conflict, he says, cannot present a problem for ethics, if we confine ourselves to the two categories of the merely satisfying and the intrinsically good. If the individual ought simply to produce something good in itself, it is ethically irrelevant whether the good produced is his or another's. Only when we admit that moral action must aim at producing, not merely what is intrinsically good, but also what is objectively good for the persons concerned—only then does the conflict between egoism and altruism become ethically important. Hildebrand pursues the question why there should be an ethical difference between producing something good for

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oneself and producing something good for another person. Why, he quaintly asks, is it of no moral value to procure a tasty dish for oneself, meritorious to procure it for another, and still more meritorious to give away one's own share? He answers that in procuring what is good for another we are aiming at his well-being, whereas in procuring what is good for ourselves we are often aiming merely at satisfaction. But he admits that the ethical distinction between egoism and altruism is small in connection with goods whose

power to satisfy is small. A. ROHNER, of Freiburg in Switzerland, condemns those modern philosophers who begin with problems of the self and end with some form of idealism. In his view, metaphysics arises from the question, What is reality? and its basic task is to discover the fundamental nature of reality. Problems connected with the human spirit or God should come at the end, not at the beginning. He thinks that Scheler's philosophical work is of special interest as an attempt to base a realistic metaphysic on an examination of the self. He briefly contrasts Scheler's position with that of Saint Thomas Aquinas. Saint Thomas Aquinas clearly realized that the basic metaphysical problem concerned the nature of reality, and he made the classic statement that everything that is consists of a whole composed of essence and existence, the nature of the whole determining their relative proportions. This view, according to Rohner, regulated all Saint Thomas Aquinas's further distinctions, as, for example, between infinite and finite reality and between substantial and accidental reality; and it led to his doctrine that in God alone are essence and existence identical. Thus Saint Thomas Aquinas's whole metaphysical structure is based on his solution of the problem of reality. Scheler, on the other hand, begins with the nature of spirit. In God, spirit is the perfection of knowledge and value, and, although itself devoid of force, is combined with 'urge,' which is conceived as blind energy. Scheler regards spirit and urge as respectively essence and existence. In God they are unified; in man they are distinct, and there is tension between them. The function of spirit is to sublimate urge, and spirit comes into existence only in opposition to the material world. Spiritual activity involves three kinds of awareness: awareness of the world, awareness of the self, and awareness of God. Awareness of God is fundamental, and, in conjunction with the other two kinds of awareness, gives rise to religion and metaphysics. Rohner disagrees with Scheler's attempt to base metaphysics on awareness of God, with his attribution of blind energy to God, with his treatment of the relation between essence and existence, and with his theory of sublimation.

II. PHENOMENOLOGY

EDMUND HUSSERL'S Formal and Transcendental Logic¹ will be most appreciated by those who already know something about his philosophy. It assumes that its readers are familiar both with the special theories and with the special vocabulary which Husserl and his followers have developed. Nevertheless, even a novice, if he be prepared to read the book with patience and care, should not fail to grasp the fundamental points of phenomenology.

Husserl is dissatisfied with the present relations between science and logic. The sciences, according to him, regard themselves as independent of logic and uncritically employ methods whose sole justification is that they are useful in practice. They rise above the naivety of the plain man only to become engulfed in "a naivety of a higher order." A genuine science, on the

¹ Formale und transzendentale Logik: Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunst. Halle Saale): Max Niemeyer, 1929. Pp. xi + 298. M. 14.

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other hand, must be based on an a priori investigation both of the nature of possible knowledge and of the methods by which such knowledge may be acquired. And this investigation belongs to logic, whose function is to discover the essential nature of valid scientific inquiry and thus to provide a norm with which every actual science must comply. In this book, as elsewhere, Husserl emphasizes the importance of the a priori, and gives it a prominent

place in phenomenology.

Husserl holds that the existence and nature of every object depend on conscious acts of the transcendental self. He does not hold that all objects are mental states; on the contrary, he explicitly rejects this view. But he does believe that all objects are constructed by consciousness. Consciousness is essentially intentional, and it constructs its objects in a series of cognitive acts. No object is constructed by a single conscious act. A physical object, for example, is constructed by a series of perceptual experiences. Indeed, it is the awareness of some objective constituent persisting unchanged through a series of mental states that justifies our distinguishing objects from experiences. The conscious acts which construct objects are acts of the transcendental self. The empirical self is as much an object as a toothbrush; and, like all other objects, it depends, for its existence and nature, on the conscious activity of the transcendental self. But, although all objects, including empirical selves, are mind-dependent, they are of two distinct kinds. There are existent objects and ideal objects. Any particular person or thing is an existent object. Propositions, essences, and all the objects dealt with by logic are ideal objects. Ideal objects are as real as existent objects, and we know them with as much certainty as we know existent objects. But the two kinds of objects are different, and, though the evidence for both is ultimately direct (the object is "itself given"), they are known in different ways. The conscious acts that construct and reveal ideal objects are different in nature from those that construct and reveal existent objects.

Formal logic, according to Husserl, must deal with logical objects (propositions, etc.), not with logical experiences. It is concerned with what is logically thought, not with how it is thought. Two things about formal logic are of great importance. (i) The objective elements in logic may be ordered on three different planes, corresponding to three different ways of judging. First, there is the theory of propositional forms—logical grammar—a system of propositional forms constructed without reference to their compatibility or truth. Secondly, there is the logic of compatibility, a system of propositions constructed by reference to their compatibility. Thirdly, there is the logic of truth, a system of propositions constructed by reference to their truth. These three systems constitute formal Apophantik. (ii) Formal Apophantik is related to formal ontology—the system which deductively connects the completely general concept of 'being' or 'something' (Etwas überhaupt) with its modifications, such as 'property,' 'relation,' and 'fact.' Formal Apophantik deals with what is thought to be, formal ontology with what is. The correlation between the two is complete, and together they make up formal logic.

Transcendental logic is not concerned with the objective elements in logic. It deals with the conscious acts by which these objects are constructed and known. Every investigation of objects, whether they be existent or ideal, must be based on an a priori investigation of the conscious acts which construct them. Hence transcendental logic is a necessary study of the conscious acts which construct logical objects. It is necessary because it alone makes possible a complete understanding of logical objects. And it guarantees the validity of the positive sciences as well as of formal logic. Its own validity is guaranteed by its forming part of transcendental phenomenology—that

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investigation of the transcendental self's constructive acts which is its own

guarantee.

Husserl's attitude to Psychologismus is thus made plain. Formal logic deals with logical objects and must exclude all psychological considerations. Transcendental logic deals with those conscious acts of the transcendental self which construct logical objects. Psychologismus is doubly wrong. Like "bad idealism," it identifies objects with mental states. And it imports into logic an empirical investigation of the empirical self, whereas what is required is an a priori investigation of the transcendental self.

The small book On the Place of Epistemology in Philosophy, by ROMAN INGARDEN, of Lemberg in Poland, consists of one of three articles which set forth Ingarden's views on epistemology. He distinguishes between pure and applied epistemology. In true phenomenological manner he regards the former as an a priori science concerned with the essential nature of possible knowledge, whereas the latter is concerned with actual knowledge. Epistemology may seem perilously similar to psychology, on the one hand, and to the natural sciences, on the other; for, being concerned with knowledge, it must deal both with the subject and the object of knowledge. But, says Ingarden, it is concerned neither with actual subjects nor with actual objects. It considers subjects and objects only in so far as they are essential to knowledge. The psycho-physical subjects of psychology are not essential to knowledge, nor are the different existing objects with which the different natural sciences deal. Epistemology is really much more similar to phenomenology and the various ontologies. Phenomenology analyses the essential nature of conscious acts and epistemology the essential nature of cognitive acts. The ontologies inquire into the essential nature of different classes of objects, and epistemology into the conditions which valid knowledge of these objects must fulfil. Nevertheless, Ingarden stresses the point that, though related to phenomenology and the ontologies, epistemology is in no way logically subordinate to them. In his concluding section Ingarden urges that, while epistemology provides the sciences with tests of truth, it cannot provide them with data.

III. SCIENTIFIC PHILOSOPHY

Very different both from phenomenology and from neo-scholasticism is the scientific philosophy expounded in Erkenntnis,2 a journal which continues the Annalen der Philosophie, and is edited by RUDOLF CARNAP, of Vienna, and HANS REICHENBACH, of Berlin. The outlook of this new journal is revealed by Reichenbach's statement, in his introduction to the first number, that philosophy must be based on empirical research in natural and mental science. And this outlook is made even more distinctive by most of the contributors to the first four numbers. Their articles present the view that philosophy has no special subject-matter; that it formulates no new propositions; that it analyses the propositions formulated by the special sciences; and that it is a method of clarification, not a science. According to the writers in Erkenntnis, philosophers who believe that philosophy does possess a special subject-matter are bound to ask nonsensical questions and to give nonsensical replies, because they talk about nothing. Scientific philo-

1 Über die Stellung der Erkenntnistheorie im System der Philosophie. Halle (Saale): Max

Niemeyer. 1926. Pp. 36. M. 1.50.

² Erkenninis, vol. i, nos. 1-4, zugleich Annalen der Philosophie, vol. ix, nos. 1-4. Leipzig: Felix Meiner. Annual subscription, RM. 20. About six numbers are to be published, not necessarily separately, every year.

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sophy is firmly established in both Vienna and Berlin. The Ernst Mach Association in Vienna and the Society for Empirical Research in Berlin are both devoted to its promotion, and *Erkenntnis* is their journal. In 1929 these two societies arranged a congress in Prague for the discussion of the epistemology of the exact sciences. The second, third, and fourth numbers of *Erkenntnis* contain a full report of this congress together with valuable lists of each speaker's published works. It is interesting to note that, while most German philosophers never refer to any of their English contemporaries, the scientific philosophers do refer, and with great respect, to Russell, Whitehead, and Ramsey. Their chief authority, of course, is Wittgenstein.

In the first number of Erkenntnis, Moritz Schlick and Rudolf Carnap, the central figures of the Viennese group, set forth the distinctive view of philosophy outlined above. Schlick's article closely resembles the paper he read at the recent Oxford congress. He believes that philosophy has changed its direction, and that the sterile conflict of different philosophical systems is ended. The new view of philosophy as a clarifying process, not a science, will lead to the solution of all philosophical problems. This note of hopefulness is struck again and again by different contributors. The existing confusion in philosophy is due, they say, merely to the asking of nonsensical questions. We are now able to see what questions can be asked; and, if a question can be asked, it can be answered. Schlick thinks that, though not itself a science, philosophy should be honoured as the queen of sciences. It gives the ultimate explanation of scientific propositions, and is thus the alpha and omega of scientific knowledge. Carnap describes the new logic that must be applied to scientific propositions and concepts. He believes that it has entirely superseded the old logic, and points out that it is essentially symbolic, that it recognizes relational propositions (with important results especially for mathematics and physics), that its propositions are all equally ultimate, and that they are all tautologous. His contribution to the attack on past philosophies is based on the tautologous character of logical propositions and on the mere difference of verbal form between any deduced proposition and the propositions from which it is deduced. Philosophers mistakenly thought both that they could base existential propositions on logical propositions and that they could reach knowledge of objects not given in experience—as, for example, the Absolute—from knowledge of objects that are given in experience. At the end of his article Carnap outlines his view that all concepts, to whatever science they belong, are ultimately derived from immediate experience. We can construct a genealogical tree in which every concept has its place. Similarly, every scientific proposition is reducible to a proposition about the immediately given. Thus, ultimately, there are, not many sciences, but one.

Another contribution to the first number is Reichenbach's article on "The Philosophical Significance of Modern Physics." Modern physics has shown, he maintains, that the so-called a priori, physical categories apply only to objects of medium size—to objects in the world of everyday experience—not to exceptionally large or small objects, like the solar system or electrons. In the world of everyday experience space is at least approximately Euclidean, and events are ordered by laws that are almost strictly causal. But the space of the solar system is not Euclidean, and causal laws do not apply to electrons. This discovery that the old, fundamental concepts of natural science apply only to objects of medium size constitutes the Copernican revolution of our time. How, he asks, are we to reconcile the world of physics with the everyday world? The difference between the two worlds is enormous. The concrete things of the everyday world can be

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grasped and seen, and they are regulated by simple, easily ascertainable laws. The world of physics is a world of moving atoms in which there is no light, no colour, no sound. But if we regard such a world as incomprehensible, it is simply because we are blinded by custom. We are so familiar with the categories of the everyday world that we treat them as universally necessary. Nevertheless it is possible to know the newly discovered categories by intuition. We can form an intuitive picture of concrete things in Riemannian space, ordered, not by causal laws, but merely by laws of probability. Moreover, the everyday world does, in certain important respects, resemble the world of physics, and an increasing recognition of these similarities is very desirable. Both worlds have the same ultimate criterion of knowledgesuccess in prediction. And the elimination of anthropomorphism which physics has achieved is gradually taking place in our ordinary life. Unwillingness to hold fast to beliefs merely because they are comforting is now a characteristic not only of science but also of our thinking in the everyday world.

The discussion of probability and causality occupied a prominent place at the congress at Prague. Considerable interest was aroused by the paper of FRIEDRICH WAISMANN, of Vienna, on "The Logical Analysis of Probability." Waismann attacks the theory, popular among participants in the congress, that probability is analysable into relative frequency. On this theory, if I say that the probability of a dice's turning up 2 is one-sixth, I mean merely that, given a sufficient number of throws, 2 will occur, on the average, once in every six throws. Waismann states two objections to this analysis. First, it implies that relative frequency is ultimate—that there is no sense in asking why a certain relative frequency occurs. It does not, and cannot, attempt to explain the fact that, if the dice is 'correct,' the probability of throwing 2 is one-sixth, and if it is loaded, the probability changes. And this position is untenable. Secondly, whereas observation discloses only finite series, the statistical theory of probability must, in order to be useful to physics, treat its series as infinite, mathematical series. And this procedure is fallacious, because a mathematical series is essentially law-determined, while a purely statistical series is essentially lawless. Advocates of the statistical theory would answer, says Waismann, that the required infinite series are merely ideal limits like geometrical constructions, and that such idealisation is as legitimate in the theory of probability as in geometry. But this Waismann, founding himself on Wittgenstein, denies. Ideal limits are not reached by refinement of the actual; they are given in advance. Geometrical laws, for example, provide a syntax in which actual spatial situations may be described. Where—as in the statistical theory of probability-no system of presuppositions can be provided, there is no sense in speaking of idealization. Not being an ideal limit, a relative frequency cannot support the mathematical calculation which the statistical theory of probability seeks to base upon it.

Having made these objections, Waismann suggests another analysis of probability. This centres in the logical relation—the 'logical nearness'—of propositions. A proposition never refers to a single fact, but always to a region of facts. The smaller the region of facts referred to, the more precise and determinate is the proposition. One proposition follows from another if its region of facts contains that of the other. Two propositions contradict each other if their regions are wholly separate. Usually the different factual regions of different propositions overlap. The region of facts to which a proposition refers can be measured. If p and q are two propositions whose

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regions of facts can be measured, the probability of q in relation to p is the ratio formed by dividing the region common to both propositions by the region of p. This conception of probability, Waismann believes, is not open to the charge of subjectivity, for it entirely depends on the logical relation of propositions.

HELEN KNIGHT.

NEW BOOKS

Process and Reality. By A. N. WHITEHEAD, Sc.D., LL.D., F.R.S., Fellow of Trinity College in the University of Cambridge and Professor of Philosophy in Harvard University (Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of Edinburgh during the Session 1927–28). (Cambridge, at the University Press. 1929. Pp. xxiii + 509. Price 18s.)

Though prophecy is always rash, it is tempting to prophesy that the publication of this book will mark one of the turning-points of the history of philosophy. It is not that it is free of faults. In places it is obscure with an obscurity the great Kant himself can hardly have exceeded. For this reason, if for no other, it will provide a fruitful soil for the cultivation of Ph.D. theses. The terminology used is more of a stumbling-block than an aid to understanding. After these strictures, and after adding that I am far from prophesying that Professor Whitehead's system is necessarily the philosophy of the future, let me attempt to justify the rash prophecy of the first sentence. I shall not do more than indicate certain main lines in his reasoning, as far as I understand it, and contrast it with traditional views. Let us begin with the traditional views.

Towards the end of the nineteenth century it appeared to the rash prophets of that generation that, broadly speaking, all the possible metaphysical systems had already been devised, and that the task for future thinkers was to develop special topics along the lines of one or other of the great systems, and with a very large measure of fundamental agreement. But during the present century there has been a great change. Philosophy, to adapt a well-known phrase, has struck her tents, and is once more upon the march.

What, for convenience, I shall call Seventeenth-Century Philosophy began with Descartes, and ended roughly with the end of the nineteenth century. On the purely philosophical side the work of Bergson marks the beginning of the end, as that of Planck and Einstein on the scientific. Descartes and the other pioneers, though they considered they were leading a revolt against the Schoolmen, carried with them only too faithfully one part of the scholastic philosophy, namely, the logic. It was assumed implicitly that there was something ultimate and elementary about the subject-predicate form of proposition. The universe therefore must be composed of substances and their attributes. This theory was never questioned by the founders of physics, Galileo, Descartes, and Newton, and was therefore worked into the "classical" treatment of Space, Time, Matter, and Motion. It is not until the present time that this fundamental framework of logic, ontology, and cosmology has been examined and criticized, although, as Professor Whitehead points out, there has been all along an undercurrent of ideas incompatible with it.

As has been said, Bergson delivered the first important attack on the philosophical side, but his work was purely negative, because he considered that the defects of seventeenth-century philosophy were inherent in the reasoning faculty of the human mind. On the scientific side criticism might have come from various sources long before it did, but for the tendency to let sleeping dogs lie. It is worth noticing that all the fundamental entities of classical physics were treated as substances, or as somehow based on

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substance, with the exception of Entropy, which for this reason was looked on with suspicion, or surrounded with mystery. At any rate it is only during the last few years that the old physics of substance has clearly begun to disintegrate, and the new physics that is gradually appearing before our eyes, whatever final form it takes, will be a theory of events and not of substances.

Professor Alexander has been the first to frame a complete system of philosophy consonant with the new movements in scientific theory. Professor Whitehead's system involves a more radical and conspicuous departure from traditional ways of thought. To say that he has stepped farther is not to say that he has stepped the right distance or in the right direction, but

the step once made cannot be ignored.

Professor Whitehead in his exposition refers to ideas he finds expressed by Descartes, Locke, and Hume which are in accord with his own views, though inconsistent with the general trend of thought of seventeenth-century philosophy. But one can make things clearer by going back farther still to the predecessors of Aristotle; not that we can burden these thinkers with the problems of our own time, but that their simple questions may stand symbolically for our more complex ones. Plato (or Socrates) was faced with the task of reconciling two trains of thought, both apparently inevitable and incompatible. The Eleatics pointed out that Being, that which is, must be one, immovable and changeless, otherwise it would partake of Becoming and Not-being. Heraclitus, on the other hand, pointed to the world we experience as a universal flux, where there is only becoming and perishing, and nothing stays or really is. The famous Platonic (or Socratic) theory of Forms was the first attempt at a solution. The theory assumed, however, that the flux of becoming was somehow less actual or real than the Forms which are. Thus Plato, and with him nearly all his successors, have come down heavily on the Eleatic side of the fence. In fact, the flux has not been considered quite respectable. The first and most essential fact about Professor Whitehead's philosophy is that for him the Forms are pure potentials, and it is the flux that is actual. Although all things are perpetually becoming and perishing, nevertheless in their transience they actually are, and nothing else that does not become and perish ever is.

Plato's main difficulty was to find any connection between the Forms and the flux they were supposed to define. The doctrine of substance and attribute appeared to get over the difficulty. The forms are attributes, and the substances to which they are attributed are something unchanging in the midst of change to which they can adhere. The doctrine of substance is by now deeply imbedded in thought and language, so that Professor Whitehead's attempt to expound a philosophy in which substance plays

no part is inherently difficult.

Let us examine the significance of substance, starting from the consideration of any complete finite event-speaking a sentence, hearing a Symphony played, the whole life history of a man or a star. The term event is here used in the widest possible sense to include any process whatsoever, simple or complex. For simplicity let us take the shortest event. A sentence has a beginning and an end, and occupies a duration of time. Before it began, and as it began there were circumstances relevant to its genesis. It was perhaps the answer to a question. When it is finished it is (we hope) relevant to the genesis of other events; it is a causal factor. Thus if the questioner (Mr. Smith) asked the way to the Railway Station, and I told him correctly, what I said was a part cause of his getting there; though by the time he gets to the station, and indeed long before, my speech is no more, having

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become "part and parcel of the dreadful past." But because I said "turn to the right," and not "turn to the left," the condition of the universe for ever after is slightly different; my speech has attained what Professor Whitehead calls "objective immortality." Now nobody calls a spoken sentence a substance, though it is a subject of attributes, and not itself an attribute, and is as we have seen a permanent causal factor. That is because of the prejudice against things that only last a short time. Mr. Smith and I are dignified with the name of substances because with luck we last for several years. When I say Mr. Smith is a substance, I am arguing from the fact that I have had certain experiences in which there was from time to time some sort of repetition of pattern which I recognized, and to the common features of the group I attach the name Smith. These common features, however, are all platonic forms or attributes, whereas I suppose that there is an individual and a substance, Smith, to which they are attributed. Though the substance is never seen without the attributes, in fact is only known by them, it is a sort of string on which they are strung like beads, and which holds them together. What we perceive of Smith is at any given moment a cross-section of the events that go to make him up. By comparing different cross-sections, we find not only a certain similarity, but a certain causal continuity. It is this that leads to the idea of a sort of string on which the cross-sections are threaded. But the cross-sections are not actually there as such; they are merely abstractions made from my particular point of view from the spatio-temporal volume of events that constitutes Mr. Smith's life, or the society of events, if you prefer the phrase. No string is needed. The apparent need for string is to hold together what has been arbitrarily pulled apart in my analysis of the situations as seen from my particular point of view. What is attractive about the string is that it is in some sense a non-temporal entity, and therefore appears to be a suitable substrate for the forms or attributes which are also non-temporal.

Elements of stability and order in the world are undoubtedly important, as witness the superior interest of matter compared with empty space. But this has led to a belief as persistent as it is groundless that mere perpetuity is important and valuable. The doctrine of substance has been a great support to this belief by providing something in the midst of the flux of events, which was at any rate potentially eternal, and yet not a mere Form. It was with reluctance that anything labelled a substance was allowed to be perishable. The mainstay of both Materialism and Idealism has been the notion that matter or mind respectively were eternal substances. A great part of the theory of physics has been directed towards finding entities guaranteed perpetual, and it is only lately the quest has been given up as

hopeless.

What is novel about Professor Whitehead's philosophy is not his abandonment of substance for events, but his treatment of them. Large scale events according to him are systems of atomic events, and these, which are called "actual entities" or "actual occasions," along with their relations are the constituents of the universe; the actual constituents that is to say, for the Forms are only potentials. Every actual occasion is related to every other actual occasion in the universe, if only negatively by absence of relevence, and all relations are internal. Thus an actual occasion A is generated from its prehensions of occasions B, C, D, etc., where these prehensions are positive. Where the prehensions, as of R, S, T, are negative, that implies that R, S, and T are not relevant to the becoming of A. Apart from these prehensions A is nothing; that is, there is nothing there beforehand. However, A is not merely a passive recipient, for other actual occasions, its successors,

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prehend it in turn, and are generated from their prehensions. The process of prehension is conceived as causal and as analogous to the experience of a conscious being. The actual occasions are monads, but are unlike the monads of Leibniz in that they are not substances, but events, and their relations are causal and constitutive. The universe considered as the sum of all actual occasions is therefore a unitary and compact system.

Each actual occasion grows out of its prehensions of its predecessors, and in its turn perishes in being prehended by its successors. The principle of creativity or novelty in the world arises from the fact that each occasion is a novel entity, and is able to hand on something new to its successors; something that is that was not present in the predecessors as such, but is the result of its unique existence. From this also follows the objective

immortality of actual occasions which was mentioned above.

An intelligent and coherent conversation, in which each thing said follows naturally from the last utterance, and leads naturally to the next, seems the best illustration of a set of actual occasions and their relations. This would be a linear series only. Imagine a conversation in which all the speakers speak at once, and yet each listens to the others and answers what they say, and that would be a more complete illustration. For Professor Whitehead, as "both for Plato and Aristotle, the process of the actual world has been conceived as a real incoming of forms into real potentiality, issuing into that togetherness which is an actual thing. Also, for the Timæus, the creation of the world is the incoming of a type of order establishing a cosmic epoch. It is not the beginning of matter of fact, but the incoming of a certain type of social order." For him also God is the principle of determination which provides the ground why the "incoming forms" are these we find and not others. But God appears not only as the principle of determination, but also as an event; as the conductor of the orchestra as well as the score that is being played. The possibilities and difficulties in Professor Whitehead's theory of God cannot here be discussed further.

There are a number of other points that can only be mentioned. As there cannot be a duration less than the duration of one actual occasion, durations must be atomic. The Space-Time continuum therefore is in no sense primitively given, but is a construction from the relations of actual occasions. What is actual is atomic, continuity is potential. Part IV of the book is devoted to the development of the theory of the system of Space and Time required by physics. This is in part a re-statement of the theory of the author's Principles of Natural Knowledge. There is one important point to notice. In the course of the argument straight lines are defined without appealing to any process of measurement. If the result is correct, that is, if there are no illegitimate implicit assumptions, and if the entities defined have the properties required, it is one of great importance and interest. a decision we must wait for the scrutiny of the experts.

The actual occasions are microscopic entities. The entities with which we are more familiar, electrons, atoms, stones, and men, are all societies of actual occasions of varying degrees of complexity and stability, and aiming at varying types of order. Professor Whitehead rejects the traditional body and mind dualism. The mind possesses no characters that are not to be found in embryonic form in the components of the body. What is peculiar about mind is the special organization of the society that is its body, and the high grade of activities that are thereby rendered possible. What is peculiar about the atoms of matter is the great stability of the society that constitutes them, but their stability is a reiterated pattern

of becoming, not mere featureless being.

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The theory of perception, which he has previously expounded to some extent in his book, Symbolism, is remarkably interesting. There are, he considers, two modes of perception, that of "presentational immediacy" which the philosophers have always discussed, and that of "causal efficacy" which they have either ignored or explained away. Memory is the most obvious example of perception in the mode of causal efficacy. This mode of perception as far as it can be described in a sentence is the effect of past events, particularly those of the percipient's own body, on his present mental processes. A plant grows when the sun shines on it, whereby we infer that it perceives the sun in the mode of causal efficacy. A man also sees, and what he sees symbolizes for him the causal factors in his environment where are the sun and the objects he sees, and in his body where are the organs by means of which he sees and feels and moves. The perceptions in the mode of causal efficacy are vague and uncontrollable; the others are controllable, capable of precision, and vivid, hence their importance as symbols for perception in the other mode.

I have dealt (inadequately and at excessive length) with certain aspects of Professor Whitehead's book which seem to me specially important, and that rather by way of exposition than criticism. Indeed, pertinent criticism of so far-reaching a speculative effort is no easy matter, and can only proceed from a thorough understanding, in the absence of which merely to point out verbal inconsistencies is futile. In any case verbal consistency is one

of the lesser philosophical virtues.

In conclusion, I would make a comment of a personal nature. There is much in Professor Whitehead's philosophy that appeals strongly to a physiologist. It can hardly be doubted that at least a part cause of this has been his migration to Harvard at a critical period in his philosophical development, and his association there with Professor L. J. Henderson.

A. D. RITCHIE.

Essays on the Natural Origin of the Mind. By C. A. STRONG. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1930. Pp. vii+304. Price 12s.)

In these essays Mr. Strong develops the theory of cognition which (in a form he now regards as imperfect) was set forth in his earlier books, The Origin of Consciousness (1918) and A Theory of Knowledge (1923). He may also be said to attempt a vindication, with considerable alterations, of the substantial part of the thesis of his Why the Mind has a Body (1903). Such persistence concerning a single (although widely ramifying) problem is rare even among the more dogged sort of philosophers, and when it is conjoined, as in the present instance, with a very unusual range of exact knowledge in psychology, science, and metaphysics, as well as with outstanding acuteness, conspicuous ability, and an altogether admirable philosophical style, the result, almost certainly, is an event of genuine importance in the philosophical world. At any rate, it would be a very churlish person who would attempt to deny the signal merits of the present volume. While the title of the book suggests a collection of relatively disconnected essays, the substance of it gives the lie to the title. So far from being desultory, the argument is more closely knit than in most philosophical treatises, and is, in effect, an impressive, orderly, balanced, and thoroughly well-pondered attempt to present the salient features of an important metaphysic.

"The rock on which evolutionary psychology rests," we read on page 273, is the fact that consciousness arises by natural processes, and that a world in

106

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every sense dark, a purely material world, cannot naturally produce the light of consciousness." This statement, perhaps, serves as well as any other to indicate the general scope of the book. The story of mental evolution is not even begun. What is attempted is an analysis of the conditions under which such an evolution is possible. And what is maintained, speaking roughly, is to the following effect: Assuming, as we may assume, that the physical world is composed of "energy" instead of the old-fashioned "matter," there is no absurdity in the view that all energy may have an inner or sentient side, in short, that it may be soul-dust, and a "psychical flux," as well as a passage of physical events. This is not to say, however, that all energy is "conscious," for "consciousness" is a thoroughly ambiguous term connoting (and muddling) the function of "awareness" and the condition of sentience. Sentient soul-dust need not be aware of anything, not even of itself; but if, in certain instances, $\varepsilon.g.$, when there is a developed nervous system, a certain concretion of souldust (Mr. Strong prefers to use C. S. Peirce's term "synechism") becomes capable of performing the function of awareness, the cognition arises naturally or non-miraculously. The question therefore is: How can the function of awareness be generated from sentient energy?

Awareness (including knowledge-about as well as knowledge by acquaintance) is capable of a very intricate development. On the principle, however, that if the pence are cared for, the pounds will look after themselves—a rather simple-minded principle, one must admit, even from the point of view of the Treasury—we may expect to reach the core of the question, Mr. Strong says, if we concentrate our attention upon the simpler forms of cognition viz., perception (as far as possible "pure" or un-apperceptive) and introspection.

Consider, then, perception. I take Mr. Strong to mean that perception is a "natural" process if (a) the soul is a part of nature which (b) is capable of exercising the function of awareness. On the first point (as I apprehend) his view is that physical nature is spatio-temporal and atomic. If the dust in the soul-dust, therefore, is spatio-temporal and atomic, the soul is a part of nature. And Mr. Strong holds that it is. His main problem, therefore, is the manner in which the function of awareness may be acquired by this synechism of spatio-temporal, but sentient, atoms.

Awareness, we are told, is a unitary act of a soul-pattern pluralistically constituted, but several moments in the unitary act can be distinguished by analysis. Indeed, there are three ingredients of perception (p. 92). viz., intuition, intent, and animal faith; and the act of perception is "self-transcendent, a passage not in space and time to the thing intended" (p. 243). "It is, to use a metaphor, a leap of the intellect, a self-transcending arrival at the

object without passage through space or time" (p. 234).

How can this be? Mr. Strong's answer is that perception is a development from sentience by simplification and projection. A part of the soul is simplified into a sign (cf. the theory of Bradley's Logic, although Mr. Strong does not mention Bradley) or abbreviated into a phantasm. Such phantasmal signs (or sense-data) are said to "report" the characters of physical things in perception, but in themselves to be a modification of sentience, although quite distinct from unmodified, signless sentience. And this is the moment of "intuition" in perception. It is not, however, the moment of "intent" which (in correct perception) is the way in which we are "transported" to the object itself. And the factor which explains intent (as well as the singleness of the activity of awareness in any given operation) is action. We accommodate ourselves in a unitary way and direct our activities towards real things in real space (unless we misperceive them, and even then towards something real).

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According to Mr. Strong, the prime error of most theories of perception is to suppose that the reference or intent of perception is towards these phantasms or sense-data. This error, he says, entails one or other of the two great historical fallacies in the philosophy of this subject, viz., phenomenalism (or the view that reality is made up of sensible appearances), and representationism (or the desperate expedient of attempting to give phenomena a transcendent reference contrary to their character and ex hypothesi entirely unverifiable). Both these errors must be fought. Phantasms are not what we know in perception, not what we intend in it, not what we apprehend in it. They are but parts of our sentience employed as signs; and the signs signify physical things (in the instance of perception) often truly, although sometimes falsely (and always in part falsely, since colour, e.g., is phantasmal and never physical).

While Mr. Strong's statement of his theory is admirably clear, the theory itself is very complicated, and even if I have avoided gross error in this very sketchy account of the theory, it is likely that my omissions have robbed it of much that is necessary for its full intelligibility. Accepting this risk, however, I have to say that I find myself very perplexed. On page 32 it is stated that these phantasms or sense-data, "which really are in the self, cause something to appear outside the self," and on page 36 we are told that "when a portion of sentience, consisting of a multitude of fine parts, prompts to an act, it is simplified and projected, and gives rise to a sense-datum whose characters may coincide (but never do coincide more than partially) with those of the external thing. Such coincidence is possible because the sense-datum is a mere phantasm[!]. If and so far as there is coincidence, the external thing has become an object of awareness. The illusion which caused something sensible to appear as outside the body has brought to light a thing really existing there. An illumination from the body has fallen on this thing, showing it in some respects as it

really is."

I find these statements very confusing. As Mr. Strong himself admits (in other places), they are decidedly metaphorical. For the place and space of these phantasms is either purely phantasmal and unreal, or else within the head (so far as I know Mr. Strong never distinguishes, as I submit he should distinguish, between the phantasmal and the real head). I confess, indeed, that this inveterate trick of the phantasms of appearing to be where they are not seems to me to be not at all "natural," and I shall return to what Mr. Strong has to say on the point. It further appears to me that his theory is a species of representationism. It is not indeed "representative perception of the usual sort" (i.e., it is not the theory that we cannot directly apprehend anything except simulacra, and have somehow to guess or conjecture physical objects [by faith?] from them). But it does seem to be another species of representationism, for does it not assert that something in ourselves stands for and reports something not in ourselves? The "illumination from the body" never leaves the body. Its reports occur within the body. It cannot really "fall" on anything outside the body. What, then, can the phantasms do but represent? What is the use of the phantasms if they don't represent? Again, when Mr. Strong speaks of "coincidence," what he means is that the characters of the phantasms are the characters of the real thing. We correctly ascribe (in true perception) certain characters of our own sentience to outside things. Our own sentience, however, is existentially distinct from these outside things, because it and they are in different places. Therefore, at the best, there can only be correspondence of two different things of which (up to a point) the same universals hold. So far as I can see, Mr. Strong's theory requires him to say (and, I think, he does say) two things that to me seem clearly to be false, viz., that perception is a species of predication, and that phantasms are universals

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(although they may be used to signify particulars). And why, O why, if Mr. Strong holds that we may *know* external things in perception, should he also hold that "animal faith" is one of the essential ingredients in perception? If there is sight, where is the need for faith?

But let me return to what I suggested was the unnatural trick of the phantasms in appearing where they are not. Mr. Strong says that the phantasms "which really are in the self cause something to appear outside the self because they move us to react as if there were something there" (p. 32 and passim). Why? If I move my head to look at an object in front of me, I never suppose that my head parts company from my body and wanders off as a sort of vanguard of action; I never suppose that any bit of my head does so; and I am subject to no illusions of this sort. Why, then, should a bit of my sentience (which is literally part of my brain) always appear to do this although it really doesn't? Mr. Strong's theory appears to be that my phantasmal head doesn't generate this illusion, but that my real head, or a bit of it, invariably does. I cannot see anything "natural," or even reasonable, in such a view. Again, the "action" in question (as is admitted) may be only the accommodating of one's eyes in vision. The "reports" in this case are given by kinæsthetic phantasms (which don't appear to be outside the body, although they are directed towards and in that sense "intend" what is outside the body). Therefore (1) phantasms needn't appear to be outside the body, and yet (2) might have all the unity of intent that appears to be required by "action."

I find that I have dwelt so long upon perception (although I have dealt only with a few aspects of Mr. Strong's theory of that subject) that I have no space for many other equally important parts of his theory, e.g., his account of introspection (where introjection takes the place of projection, but where the "internal" sense is otherwise properly regarded as similar to the "external"), his fuller account of the soul and of the soul-body and mind-body relationships, or his illuminating account of his differences from, and his agreements with, William James, in his concluding chapter. Perhaps, however, I may be pardoned if I refer very briefly to some of the things he says about our knowledge

On page 209 Mr. Strong congratulates himself heartily upon having shown that "the absolute distinctness in nature of past, present, and future does not necessitate for their apprehension a similar distinctness of ultimate powers of the mind," and on page 215 he says that "the power of looking back is real, but it is not magical, since it depends on a present response called forth by

present sensations."

So far as I know, nobody ever denied that, when we remember, we remember now, and if any philosophers ever held that, when we remember, we can go back to the past, and become our former selves, they were quite certainly wrong. What, then, is the "magic" that is complained of? On page 206 it appears to be "an ultimate power of the mind to view the past and the future." Therefore, I suppose, we have, according to Mr. Strong, either a power of "looking back" to the past without "viewing" it, or else a power of "looking back" and "viewing" it, which is nevertheless not "ultimate." The alternative is possibly interesting, but (I should say) quite certainly perplexing. When Mr. Strong, however, proceeds to argue (as I understand him to do) that there is no relevant difference between our expectation of the future and our memory of the past except the different adjustment of our bodies with respect to action, it appears to me that he is denying something very real indeed, and that his reference to action isn't nearly so satisfactory as he thinks it is. Let me mention one point only. From the standpoint of action the past is, so to say, dismissed, although it may teach us, we think, what to do if there are

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signs of a recurrence of what formerly happened. Incidentally this implies that expectation itself depends principally, if not entirely, upon memory. But let us pass that particular point. Surely the past, to our knowledge, is a great deal more than something dismissed. There is an order in it, and a considerable power of discerning, without any special reference to future action, what was dismissed before something else was dismissed. The fact of being over and done with is nothing like the whole of what is implied in memory. From the standpoint of action the reverse seems the case. The man who had to defend himself for making a proposal of marriage within a week of his first wife's death stated, quite correctly, that she was as dead as she ever would be. This simple consideration, however, scarcely seems a sufficient account of what is at least the strong *prima facie* distinction between our acquaintance with the past and our mere conjectures concerning the future.

JOHN LAIRD.

A Modern Introduction to Logic. By L. Susan Stebbing, M.A., Reader in Philosophy in the University of London. (London: Methuen & Co., Ltd. 1930. Pp. xviii. + 505. Price 15s.)

The publication of Miss Stebbing's Modern Introduction to Logic is an important event. Here for the first time the general reader has an opportunity of studying recent developments of logical theory without being compelled to make his way through a mass of books and of articles scattered through the journals. These developments have been mainly due, in this country, to Mr. Russell, Professors Whitehead and Moore, Mr. Johnson and Dr. Broad, all associated with Cambridge; so that we can say that Miss Stebbing has done for Cambridge thought what Mr. Joseph's Introduction to Logic did for Oxford thought. And we may venture to hope that her book will have as wide a public as Mr. Joseph's has had and deservedly continues to have. A thorough understanding of these two volumes should form the indispensable discipline of thought for the student who desires to cope adequately with the developments of modern philosophy. For many years I have regarded Mr. Joseph's book not only as the best introduction to Logic, but as the best introduction to Philosophy, that existed in English, both for the serious general reader and for the University student; with the reservation that Mr. Joseph left unrepresented just that whole school of thought whose views Miss Stebbing expounds in this book. Whoever reads the two, will now have ample material for carrying on the debate with himself on fundamental problems which is the essential activity of philosophising.

The books falls into three parts. The first part deals with the analysis of propositions, and is concerned largely with the nature of symbols, and with the exploration of propositional forms and of their formal properties and interrelations. An account of the Aristotelian logic is here included. As Miss Stebbing says, "Some knowledge of Aristotle's logical doctrines ought to form part of the equipment of an educated man. These doctrines and the terminology in which they are expressed have entered so deeply into the structure of Western thought and language that an understanding of them is necessary for the proper appreciation of much great literature as well as of Western philosophy. Certainly the student who intends to read philosophy would be seriously hampered in his understanding of the great metaphysical systems were he completely ignorant of Aristotelian logic." The modern developments of logic are thus seen as a further and more adequate analysis of the problems dealt with in the Aristotelian logic. Miss Stebbing goes on: "It has not been my

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intention to take the student very far into mathematical logic, but only to enable him to realize that the principles of symbolic logic are not peculiar to a special kind of study, but are principles exemplified in everyday reflective thinking no less than in mathematical deductions. I have not sought to write an *Introduction to symbolic logic*: my purpose has been to emphasize the connexion between Aristotelian logic and symbolic logic."

The second part deals with the problems traditionally grouped under the general head of induction, and connected with the nature and methods of scientific inquiry. What is meant by a "science," a "cause," a "hypothesis,' a "theory"; how causes are sought for in the experimental sciences; how far the historical sciences can discover causes; such are some of the major questions discussed, and on which Miss Stebbing has many wise things to say, expressed with a clarity and precision that continually compel admiration. The general reader is likely to turn to this part of the book first, and I am quite ready to encourage him to do so; the greater part of it can be understood without a study of Part I, although Part I will gradually familiarize him with considerations and distinctions which he will meet in Part II under more complicated conditions. In this part some account is given of the general nature of statistical investigation, and of the theory of probability.

Part III completes the study by a treatment of the theory of definition, of abstraction and generalization, and of the characteristics of logical thinking; with a final chapter devoted to a sketch of the historical development of

logic.

The general usefulness of the book is increased by an admirable index, by a select bibliography of books and papers, and by a note indicating those portions of the book which are specially adapted for a first reading.

In a book which involves symbols, a few misprints are to be expected on a first reading, however carefully the proof correcting may have been done. But I have noticed only two (p. 134, l. 13, and p. 143, l. 14), which the reader will be able to correct for himself, and one, which I mention because it may cause some difficulty. This occurs on p. 185, where in the definition of the logical product of two classes the last phrase should read: "and including every class included in each," and in the definition of the logical sum of two classes the last phrase should read, "and included in every class including each."

The book as a whole is a wonderful achievement of clear thinking, wide scholarship, and adequate expression.

L. J. Russell.

Immanuel Kant's Critique of Pure Reason. Translated by Norman Kemp Smith, Professor of Logic and Metaphysics in the University of Edinburgh. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1929. Pp. xiii + 681. Price 25s. net.)

Kant's greatest work has certainly had to abide its time for an adequate version of it to appear in the English language. The Kritik der reinen Vernunft was first published in 1781. Within the course of twelve years or so its contents were being expounded in all the leading universities of Germany. Kiesewetter in Berlin, Born and Heydenreich in Leipzig, Jakob in Halle, Reinhold in Jena, Buhle in Göttingen, Tennemann in Marburg, and many others, were making it the basis of their philosophical teaching, while theologians such as Tieftrunk and Stäudlin were applying its principles to Christian doctrine and morality. In over three hundred publications its tenets had either been inculcated or criticized. Young men were flocking to Königsberg to sit at the feet of the renowned author. Yet at that time Paley's Moral Philosophy, Bentham's

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Principles of Morals and Legislation, the Works of Thomas Reid, and Dugald Stewart's Lectures, furnished the philosophical nutriment of English students, and in our universities the Critical system was hardly so much as known by name. It is true that in 1795 an enthusiast, F. A. Nitzsch, made an effort to introduce the Kantian philosophy into England, and gave a course of lectures in London, but they seem to have occasioned more amusement than enlightenment. Then in 1798 Dr. A. F. M. Willich published two volumes of Kant's Essays and Treatises, containing very defective translations of the shorter writings and of the Metaphysic of Morals, and these again naturally failed to produce any impression. It was not until 1838, more than fifty years after its appearance, and thirty-four years after Kant's death, that a translation of the Critique of Pure Reason was published, when James Mill's Analysis of the Phenomena of the Human Mind was the latest novelty in the field of philosophy. The translation was that of J. Haywood. It was an unsatisfactory performance. Mr. Haywood's acquaintance with the German language was obviously far from extensive, and his philosophical equipment was quite unequal to the task he had undertaken. Seventeen years later, in 1855, there appeared the translation which has since been widely used of Professor J. M. D. Meiklejohn. It was a decided improvement upon Haywood's, and made by a man who had at least attempted to grasp the main principles of the Critical philosophy. But Meiklejohn was hampered by an insufficient knowledge of German idiom and of its use of adverbs and particles, and he repeatedly comes to grief in his effort to express the meaning of Kant's complicated sentences.

About the middle of the last century German speculation began to attract attention in this country. In 1865, the year in which J. S. Mill's Examination of Hamilton's Philosophy appeared, Hutchison Stirling's Secret of Hegel broke the ground. It was followed in 1874 by T. H. Green's massive Introduction to Hume, in 1877 by Edward Caird's stimulating Critical Account of the Philosophy of Kant, in 1879 by Robert Adamson's masterly little volume on Kant, and by numerous other works both of exposition and of criticism. So that by the time of the centenary in 1881 of the first publication of the Critique there were in England many earnest and strenuous students of the Kantian system. In that year Hutchison Stirling's Textbook to Kant and Max Müller's Translation of the Critique saw the light. The former contained a translation, based on the second edition of 1787, of the Introduction, the Æsthetic, and a large part of the Analytic. So far as it went, this translation, although somewhat free and unconventional, was admirable, the work of a scholar and thinker whose knowledge of German idiom was no less thorough than his insight into the subtleties of Kant's reflexion. Max Müller's Translation of the whole of the Critique was based unfortunately upon the first edition, although translations of the rewritten portions of the second edition were added in supplements. Max Müller had, of course, an intimate knowledge of the German language, and he was also an elegant writer of English. But despite his enthusiasm for Kant and the Critique, his grasp of the fundamental principles of the Kantian philosophy was in no sense profound, and he was far from being able to reproduce in his own thought the thoughts of his author. In consequence, his translation abounds with inaccuracies, and some of its paragraphs are simply unintelligible. It is true the appalling blunder of prefixing Noiré's sketch of all previous philosophy, which reads, as Adamson put it, like history in a fever, and produces an impression of whirling confusion, was remedied in the subsequent one-volume edition of 1897. Yet, even so, the work left much to be desired as the English version of a philosophical classic that more than any other has influenced the trend of modern culture.

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Since the centenary wellnigh another half-century has gone by; and at length we are able to welcome the appearance of a really scholarly and effective translation of the great Critique. Professor Kemp Smith took up the task after having fully equipped himself for it. He had been engaged for years upon a minute and exhaustive study of the text of the Critique, and he had made himself familiar with the immense literature—expository, critical, and controversial-which has gathered round it. The first fruits of his labour were given to the world in the valuable Commentary published in 1918 (of which a second edition was issued in 1923), now an indispensable volume in the library of every student of the Critical philosophy. The present translation was, he tells us, begun in 1913, when he was completing the Commentary; but for several reasons had to be laid aside, and it was not until 1927 that he found leisure to revise what he had done and to continue it. Meanwhile, Raymund Schmidt's important revised text of the two editions of the Kritik, together with the apparatus criticus which he provided, had appeared in 1926, and thereby Professor Kemp Smith's labours were materially lightened. The translation follows the text of the second edition, the form in which Kant himself determined that his work should finally go down to posterity. Except in two cases, translations of the varying or omitted passages of the first edition are given at the foot of the pages. The exceptions are the two long sections which were completely recast in the second edition—those headed The Transcendental Deduction of the Categories and The Paralogisms of Pure Reason. The two versions are, in these cases, given in the main text, that of the second edition following immediately upon that of the first. This arrangement is clearly the best that could have been adopted. As is pointed out in the translator's Preface, the first edition versions are here requisite for an adequate understanding of those which were substituted for them, and it is now possible for the student conveniently to work at them in conjunction with one another. He will also find it extremely helpful to have throughout the original pagings of both the first and second editions given on the margins.

To have compared with the German text all the pages of Professor Kemp Smith's translation is more than I can, at present, claim to have done. But I have compared a good many of the specially crucial sections, and in every instance I have been impressed by the unerring penetration and dexterity which have guided the translator in turning Kant's sentences into clear and lucid English. Undoubtedly Kant's German makes difficult reading, although I incline to believe that the difficulty has not seldom been exaggerated. Leaving out of account the abstruseness of much of the subject-matter itself, so large an amount is frequently crowded into a single sentence, that not only has undue use to be made of parentheses, but particles, pronouns, and genders have to be dragged into requisition in order to mark the connexions between the parts of the sentence. A translator is bound to split up the more involved and complex sentences into simpler sentences; and Professor Kemp Smith has been singularly skilful in accomplishing this without doing violence to either the sequence of thought or the shades of meaning of the original. As an example, reference may be made to the long sentence occupying the last half of the page A 371, where, in discussing the fourth Paralogism, Kant contrasts empirical realism with what he calls transcendental realism. Max Müller, too, broke this sentence up into shorter ones, but in such a way that the trend of Kant's reasoning was entirely lost, whereas Professor Kemp Smith admirably contrives to preserve it.

"A good translator of Kant," Adamson once wrote, "must be at the same time a good interpreter of Kant." Professor Kemp Smith has amply estab-

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lished his competence in the latter capacity. But Adamson went on to say that, while translation with intelligence is impossible unless the precise significance of each sentence, with its bearing on the whole of which it forms part, is clear to the mind of the translator, interpretation must never be allowed to take the place of translation. I have found no instance in which Professor Kemp Smith has infringed the rule thus laid down. In his Commentary he sometimes propounded views of Kant's actual doctrine from which other Kantian students would dissent. For example, I have elsewhere contended that in the more important passages in which the notion of 'transcendental object' is developed this notion is not identified, as Professor Kemp Smith took it to be, with the notion of 'thing in itself,' but is rather contrasted with it. Nevertheless, I have no objection whatsoever to raise to his translation of the relevant sections (A 104-110 and 250-251). It seems to me perfectly faithful and accurate, and not in the slightest degree twisted in favour of a

particular interpretation.

In regard to the rendering of Kant's technical terms, Professor Kemp Smith will be prepared to find that opinions differ. Personally, I regret that he has adhered to the term 'representation' as the equivalent of the term Vorstellung. It is true that Kant himself equates Vorstellung with the Latin repræsentatio; but then the Latin term does not carry with it the implications of its English substitute. It is true, also, that there is in English the corresponding verb 'to represent' by which vorstellen can then be consistently translated; but the verb occurs comparatively seldom in the Kritik, and for it in any case a suitable rendering would have been forthcoming. On the other hand, the term Vorstellung signified for Kant almost exactly what the term 'idea' signified for Locke ("whatsoever is the object of the understanding when a man thinks"), and I cannot help feeling that this would have been the more appropriate word to use, in which case a capital letter would have been sufficient to differentiate the Ideen of the Dialectic (a device which Professor Kemp Smith himself adopted in the Commentary). Otherwise, the term 'presentation' would, it seems to me, have been preferable. Again, I do not like the phrase 'modes of knowledge' as the translation of the plural Erkenntnisse. How does a 'mode of knowledge,' eine Erkenntnis (A 19, B 33), differ from a 'kind of knowledge,' Art von Erkenntnis (B 21)? In some passages, doubtless, it does not differ (see, for instance, A 56, B 80), but in others it does; and, in either case, the word 'mode' appears to me apt to mislead. Often, I think, the plural, Erkenntnisse, may quite well be translated by 'knowledge,' in the singular (as, for instance, in B 109); and in more places than one Professor Kemp Smith does thus translate it (e.g. B 137). And where that is not . possible, probably the least objectionable word to use would be 'cognitions.'

But upon points such as these there is not likely to be agreement. There will, however, be agreement in describing the translation as, on the whole, a striking and unqualified success. Our stubborn speech lends itself not readily to conveying the subtleties of philosophical thought, although, I believe, there are few, if any, shades of meaning it is incapable of expressing. Yet it has its own ways of expressing them, and its ways are not the ways of the German tongue. Professor Kemp Smith has recognized this, and has not attempted to render literally the innumerable particles which in the original serve a purpose no literal translation of them could serve. It is a great achievement to have given us an English version of the Critique which does not read like a translation. The translator has already contributed much to our philosophical literature, but no contribution could well be more acceptable than this conscientious and trustworthy presentation of Kant's classical work. He is to be

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heartily congratulated on the completion of what must have been a laborious and delicate task, and he has earned the sincere gratitude of every English student of the Critical philosophy.

G. DAWES HICKS.

Coleridge as Philosopher. By John H. Muirhead, M.A., LL.D. (London: Allen & Unwin Ltd.; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1930. Pp. 287. Price 12s. 6d.)

This book, the latest addition to the Library of Philosophy, will be warmly welcomed alike by students of philosophy and lovers of Coleridge. The task which Professor Muirhead has undertaken is to show, first, that Coleridge as a philosopher has retained stronger claims to originality of thought than are generally conceded to him; and, secondly, that his actual written work comes much nearer, both in range and coherence, to a complete body of doctrine than is usually supposed. And that Professor Muirhead has in both instances sustained his contention no reader of this admirable exposition is likely to deny.

There are various reasons why for so long a period Coleridge's philosophy has lain under a cloud. To many who know him primarily as a poet he has seemed, at a crucial moment in his spiritual pilgrimage, to have taken the wrong turning; and those who have followed his further progress have been discouraged by many seeming aberrations, and by his failure to provide them with more than partial glimpses of the goal. Others, again, have judged his theories in the light of his actual conduct of life, and have either been repelled by the apparent discrepancies or have rejected his philosophy as a mere device for the comfort of his soul. Finally, the disclosures of Ferrier and others about the middle of last century as to the extent of his verbal borrowings from the German philosophers, especially from Schelling, have served more than any other cause to discredit him as a teacher whose work would repay study.

On all these counts, as Professor Muirhead shows, Coleridge has been superficially and therefore unjustly judged. That the philosopher in him stifled the poet is not for one moment borne out by the facts. Coleridge was from the first a philosopher, in the sense that he was an ardent and indefatigable seeker after ultimate truth; and it is questionable whether it was not natural to his genius to seek and present that truth directly rather than symbolically, by way of the speculative rather than the imaginative reason. His mind, as Wordsworth said of him even at Cambridge, was one "debarred from nature's living images" by its "self-created sustenance"; and the poems of his brief period of intense creative energy owe their greatness to other qualities than power of presenting the concrete world sub specie æternitatis. And if, as Professor Muirhead reminds us, it was the circumstances of his life and the tyranny of the "fatal drug" which, by robbing him of his inward joy, deadened his imaginative powers, it is doubtful whether those powers, even if they had been kept alive, would have served him as the instrument of the divine vision. It was in Wordsworth, after all, that Coleridge himself saw the true type of the philosophic poet.

With the charges of plagiarism, of lack of originality and of real speculative power, Professor Muirhead does not deal specifically in detail; but his whole book is a refutation of them. By a thorough and judicious study of all the unpublished material, including the numerous marginal notes, he has supplemented the knowledge gained from the published works and shown us that Coleridge's system, if lacking in finality and coherent exposition, had never-

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theless been conceived as a whole and actually to a large extent worked out; and that, however much he may have been indebted to the German thinkers for stimulation and guidance, he challenged and discarded their ideas wherever they failed to satisfy his spiritual demands. The contention of Ferrier that "in every instance where we meet with remarks more than usually profound, bearing upon the higher metaphysics, it is Schelling and not Coleridge whom we are reading," is disproved time and again by the marginal comments on Schelling's writings. To say this is not, of course, to excuse Coleridge for his habit or method of verbatim borrowing.

Coleridge is further cleared in this book of the aspersion that his philosophy was designed merely to comfort his soul, or to square with the dogmas of orthodox Christianity. "Speculative truth," says Professor Muirhead, "was ever his absorbing interest"; and if his final views were coloured by his personal temperament and aspirations, and by the teaching of his experience, is not this largely true of every philosophical system since the world began? Nor is it very consistent in the same critics to accuse him of depending too much upon the thoughts of others, and of betraying too great

a subjectivity in his outlook.

The chief value of Professor Muirhead's book, however, does not lie in the refutation of false or exaggerated charges (important as this is), but in his exposition and evaluation of Coleridge's philosophic doctrine. Tracing this with rare insight and sympathy through all departments of philosophic thought, he shows how in each of them Coleridge sought for a revelation of first principles, and found this revelation in the idea of an Absolute that is conceived as a Personal Will. This doctrine, as we should expect, finds its culminating expression in Coleridge's philosophy of religion, for as Coleridge himself puts it, in religion he saw "the flower and crowning blossom of the plant." Nothing is more interesting, and nothing perhaps more vital, in Coleridge's whole teaching than his development of the conception of personality as something which, so far from being dependent on barriers and limitations, is strengthened just in proportion as it breaks these down, and which therefore is not merely compatible with, but essential to the union of the finite and infinite. This idea underlies his explanation of religious, of moral, and of æsthetic experience. On the last-named subject Coleridge has been less explicit than on the former two, and the abrupt termination of the disquisition in the Biographia Literaria has been interpreted by his critics with varying degrees of sympathy. Whatever its cause may have been, no reader of Professor Muirhead's work will be inclined to accept an earlier critic's suggestion that "Coleridge had to stop because his original (in this case Schelling) did not help him out." If the argument was dropped, it was because Coleridge was at this time beginning to part company with Schelling, and to feel that he must work out his salvation alone; and because, as he himself stated later, "it contains the fragments of the truth, but is not fully thought out." Had he revised it later in the light of his fuller vision, he would no doubt have treated the imaginative activity as another manifestation of the finite personal will in its endeavour to transcend its limitations and realize its unity with the Infinite.

In his final chapter Professor Muirhead has given his considered estimate of the import of Coleridge's philosophic teaching. We are shown that Coleridge may in many ways be justly regarded as the interpreter of his age to itself; and that while his ideas were, for various reasons, looked on coldly by the succeeding generations of thinkers, they have in later times reasserted themselves, and are reproduced in much that is most characteristic

of modern thought.

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It would, however, be wholly wrong to regard Professor Muirhead's exposition as no more than an apologia. He shows himself as impartial in blame as in praise, and lays his finger with unerring insight upon the joints in Coleridge's philosophic armour. In the end, if this stimulative study leaves us with a heightened sense of regret that Coleridge did not do full justice to his wonderful intellectual gifts, we are compensated by a fuller realization of his power of self-conquest and of the high value of his actual achievement.

J. Shawcross

Studies in Philosophy and Psychology. By G. F. Stout, M.A., LL.D., D.Litt. (London, Macmillan and Co. 1930. Pp. xiii + 408. Price, 15s.)

All admirers and friends of Professor Stout, which is as much as to say, all English-speaking people who care for good philosophy and good psychology, will be heartily glad to see these essays, most of which will have been already familiar to them, collected into a permanent volume. It would not be altogether proper in a personal friend and a very recent colleague of the distinguished author to attempt much criticism of the volume; still less to enter into controversy on the issues it raises. Even were it proper, I should not propose to do so, and this for several reasons. Professor Stout has a way of packing so much into an essay that it would be hard to discuss any of his problems as they ought to be discussed without writing a series of disquisitions of equal length with his own. Moreover, if I may say so without forgetting my own remarks before the ink is dry on them, his anxiety to reach finality in his views, and his consequent desire to incorporate in his own position all that is true in those of his antagonists do not make for ready and rapid comprehension. It would be hard to controvert any of the positions taken up in those of these essays which, in view of their date, may be presumed to be still maintained by the writer, without an uneasy feeling that the reply might be that one's objection had already been considered and its point, so far as it has one, already allowed for in the text itself. And finally, it is clear, I think, from the Preface that on what is, after all, the central topic of the most important essays, the nature of the external world and the relation of the knowing subject to it, Professor Stout's views are not yet fully disclosed, even in the latest written of these papers. The volume, read in the chronological order of its parts, reveals, as the Preface explains, a steady development from a generally Leibnizian philosophy to one of a different type. But it is hard to gather much more about the character of the newer doctrine than is told in the Preface itself, viz. that it has no place for a knowing subject which is not the embodied self, and that it insists that matter and mind are, though inseparable, "essentially and ultimately distinct." On the face of it, this looks like a change from Leibnizianism to something like Spinozism, but probably we must be content to wait a little longer for the appearance of Professor Stout's long-expected Gifford Lectures before it is safe to assume that one has really understood his final doctrine. In the Preface itself a tantalizing anticipation of the fuller disclosure is made when we are told that the "sensible appearance" of an external object is not, as Professor Stout used to maintain some while ago, mental; it is material, though not physical. No light is thrown in the context on the precise nature of the distinction here drawn between the material and the physical, and I do not think there is anything in any of the essays which explains the dictum. We must therefore continue to wait and hope. When the Giffords do appear, one may hope to have fuller light on the reasons which have led Professor Stout to dissatisfaction with the general

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standpoint of Ward, which perhaps still appeals to others, as I confess it does to me. At present I do not feel able to follow except in the vaguest way the argument which is supposed to compel us to give up altogether "Ward's conception of a pure ego as a single principle." I try, indeed, to put together what is said in the essay on Ward as a Psychologist with the utterances of that on Fundamental Points in Theory of Knowledge, where I find that the "unity of the self" is apparently accounted for by the unity and identity of the (total) object it knows. But I do not feel my difficulties wholly removed. Thus I read that the self which asks a question and the self which answers it are identical "inasmuch as the question asked is identified with the question answered." I think to myself, probably foolishly enough, of the case where B furnishes the answer to a question propounded by A, and I am puzzled. I conceive I may be told that I must think of the whole question asked by A of his ultimate object (the Universe), and that this is no less than A's total attitude to life, which, no doubt, is never the same with B's. Once more, I do not see that the unity of A as a "continuant self" has been explained by bringing in the unity of the Universe. Of course, I admit that if there were not a universe which has a unity, we should all promptly go mad and lose our unity of selfhood. The unity of the subject and that of the object, as it seems to me, imply one another: they are, if you like to say so, two sides of the same great fact. But I still do not see how the one side can be derived from the other, and am driven to suspect that after all I have misunderstood Professor

Stout's doctrine. I find myself equally uncertain about the manful attempt made in the essay last named to deal with a problem which has always been very prominent in Professor Stout's writing, that of the perception of the external world. Professor Stout is there attempting to give a definite answer to the question whether or not his own view identifies "presentations," or sensa, with qualities of physical bodies. As it is put in the words of a correspondent, when one looks at a yellow inkstand, does one, according to Professor Stout, see the yellow which is a quality of the brass inkstand, or are there two yellows, one which is a permanent quality of the inkstand, and another which is a "momentary psychical fact"? It is made sufficiently clear that in intention Professor Stout means to repudiate any doctrine of "representative perception." He means to say that we actually see the yellow which is a quality of the inkstand. But it is equally clear that he means also to say that there is a "presentationyellow" which is not identical with the "quality yellow," and apparently also that this yellow is seen. (He would not, I think, be content to say that, like the sensible species of Thomism, the presentation is something not itself seen, by the instrumentality of which the object-yellow is seen.) Now this position leads to what is stated as a dilemma. If the two yellows are quite distinct, we never see the yellow of the inkstand at all, and this statement is absurd. But if there is just one yellow, it is argued, we must say that, since the presentation-yellow differs with illumination, physical condition of the beholder, and so on, the inkstand has an indefinite multiplicity of shades of colour, and this is absurd too. Professor Stout then proceeds to give his own solution of the question, which is briefly that what any percipient sees at any moment is the "presentation-yellow," but the "presentation-yellow" as conditioned. The various "presentation-yellows" all seen as conditioned by all the different observers, or by the same observer under different conditions, somehow make up the quality-yellow of the inkstand.

I cannot help wondering whether the correspondent found the answer completely satisfactory. I have an uneasy feeling that it is an attempt to combine the advantages of a representative theory with the advantages of a

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theory of direct non-representative perception in one statement, and that it is not wholly a success. If it really is absurd to say that the inkstand really has a whole series of shades of colours—and I am not sure that it is—is the absurdity removed when one says that "the single objective yellow looks different according to the varying circumstances under which it is perceived?" If one is determined to have a non-representative theory of perception, and I think the determination sound, may one not have to be ready to pay a higher price for it than Professor Stout apparently wishes to give?

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Philosophy of a Biologist. By SIR LEONARD HILL, F.R.S. (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1930. Pp. viii + 88. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This little book is an expansion of Sir Leonard Hill's article in a recent number of the Journal of Philosophical Studies. It states a thesis and a summary of the relevant facts of physics and biology on which the thesis is based. These results are stated so clearly and simply that one does wish that the author would expand them into a large volume dealing with the recent advances of physiology. After all, it is the physiology of the medical schools that always has been, and is, at the growing point of biological investigation. and its results are far less familiar to the laymen than are those of physics. And, obviously, physiological results are just as essential as physical ones in

any attempt to construct a natural-philosophy.

The thesis is stated in a few sentences. Science gives us the conception of an eternal, infinite, and unknowable power, and this conception is equivalent to our purest notions of God, that is, our notions when stripped of all superstition and dogma. The mystery of this conception of universal power is equally great whether we study it in stars and atoms, chemical reactions, or in the cerebral physiology of the higher animals. There is body and soul in the animal, but the soul, being sustained by the body, perishes when somatic death occurs. Yet the power behind body and soul is itself imperishable, though its manifestations are fugitive. There is immortality, which is impersonal; on the other hand, what we call consciousness, personality, character, and temperament, all end with bodily death. It may appear that something transcends the body and may be communicated to the offspring "by heredity," but this is only because the individual animal body has two components a somatic and a germinal one. The offspring is, of course, simply the development of the germinal component. Such a notion of personal mortality is probably held by most biologists; it is very difficult to see what other interpretation can be given to physiological results. It does not, of course, preclude some notion of impersonal immortality. There is evolution on the inorganic side: evolution of matter, of stars, of chemical elements. There is organic evolution. Evolution, wherever it occurs, is a manifestation of the universal power.

It is only on the physical side that one ventures to criticize the philosophy. If the "power behind the sun" is God, and if it is that power, or energy, which we study as physicists, then there is a twilight of the Gods. If the power that sustains the universe is that energy that physicists study, then the universe is not self-sufficient. If there is physical or inorganic evolution, it differs in

sign, or direction, from organic evolution.

It is only in the simplest physical-chemical systems that we can accurately study what we call power. In some complex of laboratory materials reactions proceed and come to an end. What we call "chemical affinity" only implies

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

the degradation of energy, and a chemical reaction goes on until the available energy represented by the reagents falls to its minimal value in the physical conditions. When the reaction has ceased, so much available energy has become degraded or dissipated: there has been made "an indelible imprint on the progress of events somewhere or other in the universe considered as a whole," for in the universe, as we know it, the degradation of available energy, which is the price that is paid for all physical happenings, cannot be undone. Power, then, which is available energy, we take it, is not eternal. The universe is not self-sufficient, and everything that happens in it inevitably robs it of power. It is true that energy is conserved, but only in its unavailable form as chaotic radiation of low frequency. The universe, as its available energy degrades, loses power and passes from its anterior cosmic state towards ultimate chaos. It should be noted that energy-changes can accurately be traced only in very simple systems; still, all that we know of stars, atoms, and living organisms is consistent with the belief that what happens there is essentially the same as happens in our simple, experimental systems.

There is inorganic evolution—in a way. Nebulæ evolve into stellar galaxies, stars evolve so that planetary systems originate, the lithosphere of our earth has evolved. But this result we can trace from such processes. The statistical probability of the parts of the inorganic evolving system increases, and the entropy, which is proportional to the logarithm of the probability, increases. This is not the case when an organic system of things evolves, for the statistical improbability of the arrangements and distributions of the things becomes greater in the course of the evolutionary process and entropy locally decreases. Therefore organic evolution displays a direction of processes that is the

opposite of that of inorganic evolution.

We were often told, in the older books, that somewhere in the universe the second law of thermodynamics (the entropy-increase law) must be evaded, otherwise maximal entropy must have been already attained and universal happening must have ceased. Millikan and Lodge now suggest that somewhere in interstellar space scattered star radiation reconstitutes atoms by the action on it of very high-frequency radiation. This is as if the universe, in running down, also winds itself up, and doubtless there is inconsistency in the notions; there is really no support for them in the present confusion of cosmic physics.

Yet there is nothing inconceivable in a reversal of the entropy-law: Boltzmann actually suggested this in his conception of entropic and dysentropic phases in the universe, but was so repelled by the incredible statistical improbability of the reversal that he gave up the problem; all the same, the incredible improbability came from the extension of the gas-laws to the universe. But let us suppose that somehow or other the progress of things in the universe may reverse itself, then a run-down chaos may "reorganize" itself, with an unthinkably great blaze of power, as a new cosmos. What the "reversal" means we have, of course, no idea. It may be "the Finger of God stirring up the ether," or simply that reversal which Boltzmann found to be physically conceivable but only incredibly improbable.

JAS. JOHNSTONE.

A Pragmatist Theory of Truth and Reality. By Samuel S. S. Browne, B.Litt., (U.S.A.: Princeton University Press. 1930. Pp. 93. Price 9s.)

This Essay, which appears to have originated as a B.Litt. thesis in the University of Oxford, may be recommended as a sound and careful, if 120

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somewhat elementary, study of the relation between the pragmatist conceptions of truth and reality. It is written in clear and lucid language, and endeavours conscientiously to state the current objections to Pragmatism as well as the case in favour of it. In the end Mr. Browne distinguishes between the pragmatist treatment of truth and of reality as follows (p. 93): "To be is to have been constructed epistemologically and thus made into an entity or substance. To be real is to be an entity of which the epistemological construction is of service in the satisfaction of a need or the solution of a problem." But I think he should have added that the "truth" and the "reality" so reached are in both cases only claims to truth and reality, and that the pragmatic verification of such claims is the unending concern of all the sciences. An earlier passage also, on p. 29, might be bettered. Mr. Browne declares. truly enough, that "truth and falsity are not qualities of verbal sentences or propositions"; but he goes on to say that "the only sort of entity which can properly be said to be true or false is an idea or conception." Now "idea" is a notoriously ambiguous word, and the psychology of "conception" is very disputable, and is not considered by him. So one does not know whether he means to deny the doctrine that truth and falsity are strictly qualities of judgments alone, and that their application to "conceptions" and "propositions" is a regrettable lapse into laxity, or whether he has merely overlooked the possibility of this interpretation. He can undoubtedly appeal to James in support of his terminology; but James was always willing to accept the language of his opponents and avowedly entertained too low an opinion of (intellectualist) "logic" to trouble to correct it.

F. C. S. SCHILLER.

Eidetic Imagery and Typological Methods of Investigation, By E. R. Jaensch. Translated by Oscar Oeser, D.Phil. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1930. pp. 136. Price 7s. 6d. net.)

This volume is obviously a translation, and, both for that reason and because of a certain patchiness in the method of presentation of its material. is not altogether easy to read. The book consists of three parts, the third being an addition to the original Eidetik specially written by Professor Jaensch for the present English edition. This deals with recent developments of eidetic theory with reference to the general psychology of the senses and to 'typology,' or the grouping of individuals into more or less clearly defined types of personality. The second part is a four-page chapter in which the dual method of 'naturalism' and 'humanism' is defended as appropriate in psychological investigation. Experimental work is necessary, but treatment of the individual as a whole cannot be dispensed with. There is also a short appendix in which the development of perception and the bases of our conception of reality are discussed. Here also some of the arguments against attributing general importance to the eidetic theory are met. The most important part, however, is the first, in which the occurrence of eidetic imagery is discussed and far reaching consequences inferred from it. After describing the phenomena of eidetic or quasi-perceptual images, as experiences intermediate between actual sensations and memory images, Jaensch elaborates the methods by which these phenomena may be investigated and proceeds to distinguish types of persons according to characteristic differences in the eidetic images themselves. Thus, while some eidetic images approximate to after-sensations. others are more like memory images. Pure types, however, are rarely found.

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most individuals exhibiting an 'amalgam' of the two. Jaensch claims that the phenomena are observable in most, if not indeed in all, children before puberty, and considers their occurrence to be an indication of a phase of development through which they normally pass. This phase can be helped or hindered by the kind of school teaching they get. The several types are further related to degrees of mental integration as well as to well-known clinical syndromes. Thus there is the 'T,' or tetanoid, type, and the 'B', or Basedowoid, type. The importance of this division into types lies, not so much in the mere distinction of the imagery, as in the relation of the different kinds of eidetic images to totally different types of mind and even of somatic characteristics. The Btype often indicates an artistic temperament, a slightly enlarged thyroid gland, an intense reaction to mental stimuli, particularly in the sympathetic nervous system; whereas the T-type is more reponsive to environmental stimuli than to inner ones. Though related to the syndromes of disease, however, the symptoms are held to be merely normal physiological characteristics of a certain stage of youthful development, in which integration is secured between the higher mental processes involved in perception and the sensations which are incorporated into percepts. In this view, instead of percepts being formed by the association of sensations, they are held to be originally very like memory-images; and the sensations themselves are regarded as being the ideal, though never attained, end-point of the cognitional process. The inference is to a strong nativistic element in perception; and, indeed, the claim is made that the doctrines of Kant in this respect "receive an empirical foundation through our researches." But the application of the extended eidetic theory is not only to philosophy, though we are taught that a man's philosophy also is determined by his type. It extends in a practical way to education and to medicine as well. Clearly, if integration between higher and lower mental processes is secured by the cultivation of eidetic processes, and if this can be helped or hindered by methods of teaching, that method should be adopted which best secures integration. In this connection Jaensch discusses the different kinds of education in Germany. "Pedagogical experiment leads us along the same lines; for it has been shown in exhaustive statistical surveys . . . that the eidetic phase and the whole mental structure accompanying it, in particular the perceptual structure peculiar to it, are preserved longer in children who are educated by methods adapted to the mentality of youth." The method indicated is that of the object lesson. Likewise, in pronounced cases of the T-type calcium treatment may be indicated. "The characteristics of this type of personality, including the eidetic phenomena peculiar to it, are susceptible to feeding with calcium . . .," by which their eidetic images may be diminished or extinguished. Jaensch stresses throughout the fact that, with the exception of over-emphasized cases, the T-type is a normal youthful type, the characteristics of which usually diminish later. But the possibility of altering types by drugs is interesting. Apart from the description of types, the methods by which eidetic images may be studied, and considerations of the import of the theory with respect to philosophical issues, the section is largely taken up with justification of the method of working from a few extreme examples to the normal population which lies between them and incorporates in a measure the features of both.

F. AVELING.

Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi. Fasc. X. Questiones Supra Libros Prima Philosophae Aristotelis (Metaphysica I, II, V-X). Nunc primum edidit Robert Steele, collaborante Ferdinand M. Delorme, O.F.M. (Oxford: Clarendon Press; London: Humphrey Milford. 1930. Pp. xxxii, 360. Price 28s. net.)

The devotion of Mr. Steele and his collaborator, Fr. Delorme, to Roger Bacon is altogether beyond praise. The sheer labour of wading through a minutely written, and very careless, MS. of these lengthy and far from exhilirating dialectical exercises on Aristotle's Metaphysica (itself not the most entrancing of works) and transcribing the whole for the press is a task as worthy of a Hercules as the cleaning of the Augean stables, and likely to be more thankless. I have myself read the whole of these pages slowly and attentively, but I do not feel I can conscientiously recommend anyone to follow the example unless he is much more deeply interested than I am myself in the minute matters of thirteenth-century logic. The Roger Bacon who appeals to the imagination as so picturesque a figure, both in his lights and in his shadows, is not to be found in these discourses, delivered as a youthful Master of Arts to students in the University of Paris. There is nothing here about scientia experimentalis, nothing about the primitive revelation of science to the patriarchs, nothing about the necessity to learn how to confound Antichrist by marvels which leave his own in the shade. Either Brother Roger in these early days had developed none of his most characteristic positions, or if he had, he felt that they must be be kept out of his course. So far as I can discover—but I am no expert in the subject—the philosophical standpoint of these lectures is just that common to most Augustinian exponents of Aristotle in the thirteenth century. (It is, of course, not Thomistic: the presence of "matter" in all created beings is insisted upon, and apparently also the plurality of substantial forms, if I apprehend the writer's drift in some places.) There is, of course, no connected argument. The lectures merely raise one dialectical point, suggested by the Aristotelian text, after another, discuss it pro and contra, and lay down a solution.

A word as to the printed text supplied by the editors. One would be very loath to utter any light disparagement of the devoted labour the text represents. And I am glad to see that they have appended to it a very long series of notes in which some of the worse errors of the very careless scribe are corrected. But it is unfortunate that a great many more are left, apparently because they have never been discovered. And I think it clear that the reason they have not been discovered is that the text has never been read through carefully by anyone sufficiently acquainted with the subject-matter. Hence much has gone unnoticed which either will not yield a sense at all, or yields a sense shown by the context to be impossible. The editors clearly have not regarded it as the whole of their business to print what a scribe set down, right or wrong, or they would not have made the scores of emendations they have very properly made. But they have not carried out the business of emendation in many places where it is absolutely necessary, and where the emendation to be introduced is rendered certain by the context. Since it is not likely that there will ever be another edition of Roger's inedita, it becomes necessary to warn a reader that he would be far from safe in relying on any passage as correctly representing Roger, merely because it stands in his work

as published by the University of Oxford.

I ought, of course, to offer proof of this statement, and accordingly I append a very few examples out of many I have noted, taking them very much at random, and without any desire to judge the whole work by its weakest places.

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P. 6, ll. 1–2. The printed text has here: movetur ad accipiendum melins pomum, tamen sine omni labore superius arguit, which is meaningless. In the appended note we are told to emend thus, movetur...pomum; tamen "sine omni labore" superius "arguit," which is not intelligible either. The real correction is, movetur ad accipiendum melins pomum, tamen sine omni labore ut superius arguitur. "The boy is impelled to take the better apple, but without any trouble, as is argued above."

P. 26, l. 20. Omne increatum est possibile, infinite supponere. The notes merely remove the comma after possibile, still leaving the words without sense. Read, as the context requires, est possibile infinitum supponere. "Any-

thing uncreated may be supposed to be infinite."

P. 50, ll. 5-6. Non autem a malo habet aliquam ordinationem, quia, primo, non ordinatur ad aliquid. This again is senseless, and the true reading is manifest, quia *privatio* non ordinatur ad aliquid. (And "evil," it is meant,

is a privation.)

P. 61, ll. 33-34 (in a discussion of the question whether the ordered universe, was preceded by a "chaos"). Omnem privationem natus est habitus precedere, ergo cum res sunt separate, multe fuerunt. The reasoning shows that multe is a mere error for miste. (Separation is a privation of mixture, and therefore presupposes it. Ergo, since things are now separated, they were formerly mixed.)

P. 110, l. 27. Formas naturales, tam artificiales quam substantiales. How could there be an "artificial natural form"? Read, of course, accidentales

"natural forms, both accidental and substantial."

P. 117, l. 2. Tamen secundum quod ens participant ibi unitas analogie. The corrigenda instruct us here to "correct" unitas to unitatem. But, in point of fact, the MS. is here perfectly correct, and the editors have misunderstood both the sense and the grammar, which is "in so far as they partake of being, there is a unity of analogy in that case (ibi)." Apparently the editors want to render "so far as they are being, they partake in that case of unity of analogy." This involves the very improper expression "to partake of unity of analogy," and would also require secundum quod ens to be changed to secundum quod entia.

P. 120, ll. 37-38. Sciens nichil preter substantiam et accidens et creatorem est. The actual quotation from the de ortu scientiarum, here alluded to, is given by the editors in their note. Yet they have not seen that Bacon is citing verbally, and that the nonsense which stands in their text must be corrected by writing, with the author cited, scias for sciens, and esse for est.

I have taken these examples of wrong editing just as they came to my hand in turning over the pages, without any attempt at selection. That there are many more, which I could have found quite as easily, surely justifies me in holding that, with all the industry that has been spent on deciphering the MS., the work of Roger Bacon has not been presented to readers in such a text as should be aimed at by the University of Oxford.

A. E. TAYLOR.

The Problem of God. By Edgar Sheffield Brightman. (New York: The Abingdon Press. 1930. Pp. 209. Price \$2.)

This first volume under review recognizes that for the thought of to-day the doctrine of God is a problem. The volume consists of six lectures forming a continuous argument, and a single lecture which takes up a special problem of the relation of God and man. It is written popularly, but shows wide

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knowledge, keen insight, and a fine spirit of tolerance. The first chapter describes the present situation of Contemporary Doubt, and offers proofs from many quarters of the rejection of the belief in God. The second then discusses the Substitutes for God which are being offered, and subjects them to a searching but always sympathetic criticism. The changes in the conception of God resulting from the intellectual development of our own time are presented in the two following chapters under two complementary aspects. There has been an enlargement of the conception, the writer describes it as The Expansion of God (Chapter III); there has been an elimination of certain ideas about God; he speaks of it as The Contraction of God (Chapter IV). The problem posed by the expansion is this: "Can the idea of God take up into itself all the new knowledge of science, the new insights of religion, and the new conceptions of philosophy without becoming so all-inclusive as to be meaningless?" (p. 85). This danger is averted by the argument of the next chapter on the Contraction. "A known God must be contracted within the limits of our reason" (p. 105). The author's own conception is offered in the fifth chapter on The Resultant Idea of God. He gives a longer and a shorter definition. The shorter runs: "God is a Person supremely conscious, supremely valuable, and supremely creative, yet limited both by the free choices of

other persons, and by restrictions within His own nature" (p. 113).

Confining our attention to the question of the limitation of God, we may concede that God limited His freedom in creating free persons capable of opposing His will. "If we find God a problem," says the author, "it is not impossible that He also finds us a problem" (p. 125). Turning, however, to the world, we are confronted with the fact: "There is evidence of design in nature; there is also evidence of frustration of design and of delay in its achievement" (p. 126). Rejecting both the traditional solution of the problem and the dualistic, the author propounds his own solution: "It is due to factors within God Himself, which are eternal aspects of His nature, but not products of His will or choice" (p. 127). Evolution, he maintains, proves a finite God. Another evidence he finds in the nature of consciousness; but here he seems to assume too close a resemblance between human and divine personality. As our freedom is limited by past choices and present environment, as will depends for its range of choice on nature, as the active factors are balanced by passive, so it is with God. "God appears to be a spirit in difficulty" (p. 135). From Hegel a third evidence is sought, i.e., that God's "goodness is not merely an abstract quality, but the constant victory of constant effort" (p. 136). Religious experience offers a fourth argument. God "is indeed love, but a suffering love that redeems through a Cross" (p. 137). The conclusion of the argument runs as follows: "The advance of modern thought has compelled us to modify our faith either in God's character or in His omnipotence. We believe that it is far more reasonable to deny the absolute omnipotence of the power manifesting itself in the world than to deny its goodness. On our view, God is perfect in will, but not in achievement; perfect in power to derive good from all situations, but not in power to determine in detail what these situations will be" (p. 137). Agreeing with the writer that man's freedom limits God's, that in making a world of a certain kind other possibilities were ruled out, that God has Himself a definite nature, which excludes the possibility of action contrary to it, I cannot accept the author's, to my mind, too facile solution of the problem, the gravity of which I fully realize. I cannot believe that in God's own nature there is the negation or the limitation of this perfection, that He would have created a world which He has not the resources to redeem,

JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL TUDIES

that the way of sacrificial love is proof of weakness, or limitation of power. The religious consciousness seems to me to demand a God perfect in power as well as goodness. "Now we know in part, and see as in a mirror darkly"; and so we may acknowledge that the full solution lies beyond our present ken. Further, as God has not yet fulfilled His purpose, how can we solve in our interpretation a problem which has not yet been solved in reality? I would dissent from the writer's main thesis, while gladly acknowledging the ability and the reverence with which he has advanced it.

The sixth chapter seeks to prove "our right to assert the reality of a personal God" in a thoroughly up-to-date apologetics. The last chapter expands the theme of a suffering love of God, in the argument that God's share in human suffering does not degrade, but enhances the divine dignity. It is an interesting, well-arranged, well-argued, and well-expressed volume, and may he heartily commended as a candid and courageous, informed and intelligent endeavour to solve the greatest of all problems—the problem of God.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

God in Christian Thought and Experience. By W. R. MATTHEWS, M.A., D.D. (Library of Constructive Theology.) (London: Nisbet & Co. 1930. Pp. xix + 283. Price 10s. 6d.)

Ritschl's statement that the field in which theology and philosophy meet is the doctrine of God is illustrated by the title of the volume to be here reviewed. The series to which the volume belongs, The Library of Constructive Theology, seeks "to lay stress upon the value and validity of religious experience"; but this is the only volume in the series the title of which makes reference to "religious thought" as well. It is impossible, as the author recognizes, to deal with the subject of God without this wider reference; and throughout the volume account is taken of the bearing of contemporary philosophy on the theological formulation of the religious belief in God. The starting-point, however, is religious experience, not exclusively Christian, as the first chapter deals with Man's Experience of God in religion generally, which is described as the recognition of and co-operation with "The Beyond that is akin," and is defended as "an anthropomorphic interpretation of reality." The second chapter, which deals with The Development of the Conception of God, shows that "anthropomorphism is the line of progress," until the development is consummated in God in Christ Jesus. The third and fourth chapters then discuss The Christian Experience of God. In these what may be described as a "liberal evangelical" theology is presented. The conclusion is reached that the New Testament does contain suggestions towards a doctrine of the Trinity. The fifth chapter, on The Theological Conception of God, offers a candid and effective criticism of the dogmatic development, and offers as a "reason for the partial failure of traditional theology, not a lack of intellectual power or religious experience on the part of the theologians, but rather the inadequacy of the intellectual tools which were available. Philosophy, as they were acquainted with it, was incapable of fulfilling the task which they imposed upon it" (p. 110).

In the remaining seven chapters the author seeks "to approach the eternal problem of God from the standpoint" of our own time, "in view of changed philosophical presuppositions and enlarged knowledge." In the sixth chapter, entitled *Transition*, "the present stage of intellectual development is surveyed," and "the converging tendencies of different schools of philosophy"

126

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are interpreted as resulting in the displacement of static by dynamic categories, and as involving a challenge of theistic thought: "Is not the process (of the world) itself the sole reality?" (p. 131). This is the challenge the author seeks to meet. Chapter VII offers an argument for Transcendence. Assuming the evolution of the Universe from stage to stage, each transcending the one preceding, the consummation is found in God. "The ladder of being by which we ascend through the orders from matter to spirit leads, in the conviction of religion, to the supreme Being, who is the Transcendent One, beyond all orders of being, but at the same time the One, whose presence with every order and level gives them their existence and constitutes them into orders, and into an order." Here the author insists on the value of the doctrine of Creation, "The Creator transcends all creatures . . . as the active Will in which they take their origin" (p. 136). Chapter VIII then seeks to show that the Creator, so transcending, is the living and personal God. While it is admitted that not all religions unequivocally witness to the personality of God, yet "the Christian faith and the Christian experience are alike involved in the assertion that in the divine Life is the perfection of personality, so that it is manifested in the Incarnation through the life of a perfect human Person" (p. 163). The difficulties of this assertion are fully recognized. After a discussion on the nature of personality as active subject, not passive substance, reasons for and objections to "believing that God is personal" are dealt with. "Possibly the Godhead," the author says, "is best described as 'supra-personal,' but impersonal categories are not admissible." What is essential is "to justify and clarify the Christian experience of personal relationship with God" (p. 179). Chapter IX, on The Holy Trinity, shows how in that Christian experience this doctrine has its roots, and any influence from pagan religion is denied. The "economic" Trinity is rejected; a trinitarian constitution of human personality is expounded as an analogy of the divine Trinity; but another is found also in the conception of society as tending towards personal unity; and the author asserts his conviction that these analogies converge.

Having thus reached the Christian conception of God, the author in successive chapters discusses three problems. What is involved in Creation; how the evil in the world can be reconciled with the belief in God as love; and the way in which God, though eternal, is related to Time, so that it has a relative reality for Him, and He is carrying on the providential order of the World. I find myself in almost entire agreement with the theological and the philosophical conclusions of the whole volume. The treatment of all the varied topics is masterly; there is adequate knowledge and competent judgment. The claim of religions, specially Christian experience, to be fully taken into acount is maintained; and yet the need to justify that experience intellectually is recognized. The volume can be most cordially commended even to readers whose interest is dominantly philosophical, for not only does the author recognize the claim of philosophy to be heard on this subject, but may it not be urged that the Christian experience is a datum no philosophy can afford to ignore?

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

The Nature of Living Matter. By Professor L. Hogben. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1930. Pp. ix + 316. Price 15s. net.)

Professor Hogben's book has a much wider scope than its title suggests. It contains a connected discussion of controverted biological questions: the

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conceptions of vitalism and mechanism; the weight of teleology in biological speculation; the possibility of a completely objective study of animal behaviour; the possibility of neglecting consciousness in our descriptions of the public activities of even man himself; atomistic heredity and the application of experimental methods to the problems of eugenics; the biological conception of adaptation; the methodology of evolutionary hypotheses; and, most interesting of all, the author's own concepts of publicity and privacy in relation to investigation, to religion, education, humanism, reality, and the "holism" of General Smuts. The book begins by being polemical, but as it proceeds it becomes soundly critical and constructive. It has strong interest for all who are engaged in philosophical studies, and while it may repel some readers, it may not be neglected by them. Professor Hogben tells us that he did not intend to write such a book until he was sixty years of age. This would have been a great pity, for he is a young man who is already well known as a brilliant and successful investigator. Besides, he can always do

it again.

There is reference, all through the book, to the controversy, mechanism v. vitalism, but it is not the cruder animism of the past, nor the equally crude materialism (though that was and is a potent conception in physiological discovery); it is not these views that Professor Hogben discusses. Of late years what used to be called "vitalism" has become "organicism," "holism," "organic purpose," and "emergence." Holism implies that there is something in the completeness of a physico-chemical system that was not in the parts of the system. Thus the kidneys, or heart of an animal may be excised from the body (which thereupon dies), and may be made, in suitable conditions, to continue to function. It is not, however, a viable system, capable of independent existence and reproduction, as is the body from whence it was taken. But the parts of the isolated organ (that is, its cells) can be made to remain viable, to continue to exist and reproduce in suitable artificial culture media. Emergence means that at new and raised, or more complex levels, properties appear in a physico-chemical system that were not in the parts of the system. But wherever such a complex system is sufficiently well known, we describe it by equations which do not contain any terms that were not in the equations that described the parts of the system. Thus the conceptions of holism and emergence do not appear to be clear ones. The notions of purpose and teleology, which are now so common in biological speculation, must also be rejected on grounds that we shall note presently. Mechanism and vitalism, like nominalism and realism, empiricism and transcendentalism, etc., represent what Professor Hogben regards as a fundamental incompatibility among thinkers. He does not discuss whether or not the antithesis is in "things themselves," in the cosmic and ethical process of Huxley, or in the entropic and dysentropic universal phases of Boltzmann. From his point of view the antithesis is between the conceptions of "publicity" and "privacy." It is in the treatment of these notions that the extraordinary interest of the book inheres.

Necessary to this treatment is that of animal behaviour, considered objectively. This is, of course, an old affair, but the work of Pavlof on "Conditioned Reflexes" has added enormously to the validity of the method. Pavlof's book is tiresome reading, and it appears that those who can expound it have much difficulty in showing exactly how it, in Professor Hogben's words, "mechanizes consciousness." But this is the essence of the work: if we bring food into proximity with the nose and eyes of a dog the animal salivates, and we call the reaction an unconditioned or absolute reflex, which is essential to the working of the dog-mechanism. If, just before, or simultaneously with the presentation of food, an organ-pipe is sounded, and if this is

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done repeatedly, there is established a conditioned reflex, so that the dog will salivate even if food is not presented. The conditioned stimulus may be a note on the organ, a bell, a flash of light, a shape made out of cardboard, etc .- its physical nature does not matter. What matters is the time relation of indifferent and absolute stimuli. A neuro-muscular-glandular mechanism becomes set up-a rearrangement of elements in the activities of the dog. But obviously such a concatenation of elements may not occur, and we ask what is it that determines it? Plainly it is that the efficiency of the dog-mechanism increases, or there is organic tendency (not what is often called "purpose"). Again, the small boy on whom food was pressed protested that he was "fed-up," and that, though he could chew, he couldn't swallow. We replace that statement by this one: chewing is the stimulus for the swallowing movements of the œsophagus, as a rule, but when the stomach is full of food a further quantity would be detrimental. Therefore the chewing stimulus does not, in this case, lead to a swallowing-reflex because the efficiency of the boymechanism would be decreased. Again, we are forced back on the concept of organic tendency—the concatenation of reflexes does not occur.

Such descriptions of dog and boy activities are "pedantic," and are made with difficulty (and with a certain lack of humour). But they avoid all reference to "will," memory, voluntary activity, or introspection on the part of the investigator. It should be possible to extend the method of explanation to human behaviour, even to human social behaviour; but our author does not labour in that effort. It may be that experimental research will enable us to

make the extension: Professor Hogben hopes so.

Why? Why is it desirable to "undermine consciousness" as an agent in human behaviour? Why is it desirable to make introspective psychology, memory, and voluntary bodily functioning unnecessary concepts for biological and sociological investigations? It is not that these are academic proclivities that have had certain implications in the past. It isn't that the author is necessarily prejudiced in favour of mechanistic hypothesis; he is by training and temperament very level and judicial. It is because in this way he leads

up to his antithesis of publicity v. privacy.

There is a public (not an external) world and there are many private worlds. There is an "ethically neutral" world which is the same for all men and women. This scientific neutrality can be illustrated from successful physical results. When you and I observe an event, our time and space measurements are not quite the same. Then we apply the Lorenz-transformations, and I state my results in terms of yours, and vice versa. The relations between our two sets of data are then the same for both of us-they are public data. This publicity of statement with regard to biological and social descriptions, etc., is what we ought to try to obtain. There is, of course, a private world for each of us, and we mustn't try to make it a public affair. Myself, I'd seek to shatter the world and then remould it nearer to the heart's desire; but the records of history have too much of that in them. The Jerusalem that we would rebuild should be the city of all men. My private world has prejudices, obsessions, acquisitiveness, lust, etc.; so has yours, in a rather different way, and it is undesirable and ineffective to introduce these privacies into the public world of science or of human affairs. And by cultivation of the objective method of science we may avoid so spoiling things. (But not in this civilization, because of its momentum of individualism, Professor Hogben doubts.)

So the objective study of human behaviour along the lines suggested by Pavlof may enable us to dispense with the moral philosopher. Indeed, the author suggests, this has largely happened. Science has scored heavily in

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giving us such things as aviation, broadcasting, and twilight sleep; moral philosophy offers us truth, beauty, and the good life. So far the gifts of science have been material ones, but need that restriction continue? That the study of behaviour, in its widest sense, may introduce ethical neutrality into politics, statesmanship, and government is an amazingly attractive proposition.

Still, of course, for every man and woman there is a private world, a hortus inclusus, in which there is enjoyment that is quite apart from ethical publicity. Certainly there is consciousness which private behaviour cannot undermine, and we believe, each of us, that there is voluntary activity. Surely, on reflection, Professor Hogben will agree that there is also a private physiology, and

that introspection is a valid though private activity.

I only refer here to the author's penetrating criticisms of evolutionary hypotheses, of Darwinian selectionism, and his discussions of the biological conception of adaptation: these are matters for the zoologists rather than general readers. Nor do I more than note the very clear discussion of the results of the "Mendelian Renaissance," or of the genetical work of Thomas Hunt Morgan; it is to be hoped that Professor Hogben does not overrate the importance of all this for biological theory as well as for social reorganization. It is important to refer to his discussion of the basis of Eugenicsthat basis must be vastly more experimental work than has yet been even contemplated. It was high time that someone pricked the body of Eugenism and (as Lord John Fisher said in another connection) let out the sawdust! Enough has been said to indicate the healthily provocative and comprehensive nature of the work. More than any book published for a very long time does it amplify the scope and interest of biology-both for biologists and nonbiological readers. It is most clearly written, so that there is little doubt as to what the author means. It is written in the light of such a personal knowledge of biological researches and their results as to compel one to think again, and more closely, about those parts of the author's conclusions with which he is, at first, inclined to disagree.

JAS. JOHNSTONE.

The Mental Development of the Child. By Karl Bühler. (International Library of Psychology and Philosophy.) (Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1930. Pp. xi + 170. Price 8s. 6d.)

This is the translation of the author's Abriss der geistigen Entwicklung des Kindes, which appeared in 1919. It brings together a fair amount of material on the early development of the child, and it has separate chapters on the development of perception, memory, imagination, drawing, thinking, and social behaviour. The translation is poor, but it does not make reading a difficulty. It has references, mainly to German publications, at the end of

each chapter.

Child psychology has suffered so much from the lack of even moderately adequate textbooks that the university and training college lecturer will probably give a fairly warm welcome to this translation for the sake of the beginning student. It is, however, a question whether the student will gain as much from the collection of facts as he will lose by the fallacious theories implied or put forward. Bühler takes the "stratification" view of mind and thinks of development as a series of stages. For instance, intellect, he holds, first manifested itself in his child between the tenth and twelfth month. His reason for choosing this age is that the child then first succeeded in some simple experiments, e.g., pulling a biscuit towards it with a string. Bühler does not say why he considers that these actions involved intellect in a way that

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no previous action of this child had. They obviously involved using something as a tool, but it is incredible that a normal child had shown no such tendency previously. In any case, however, it is not the particular age to which the crisis is assigned that is of importance, but the implication that such activities are due to a distinct mechanism which begins to function at a set date. Such a view goes counter to the whole trend of modern psychology and is in conflict with the facts established by careful study of children.

Koffka in his reference to Bühler's discussion of animal intelligence notes his tendency to revert to obsolete theories, even to theories that he himself has discarded. The whole of this book on child psychology suggests new wine in old bottles. It is not a portrayal of development but a history of miraculous

appearances.

V. HAZLITT.

Intellectual Growth in Young Children. By Susan Isaacs. (London: Routledge & Sons Ltd. 1930. Pp. xi + 370. Price 12s. 6d.)

This is the first volume of a series of three which is being written by the author on the subject of child psychology. The titles of the other two are Social Development in the Child and Individual Histories. The present volume is the most important contribution to the subject of children's thinking that has appeared. It has several related but quite distinct aspects:—

- (1) An account of the educational experiment carried out at the Malting House School, with detailed records of the children's behaviour and conversations.
- (2) A theoretical analysis of the factors determining children's intellectual development with evidence drawn from the records.
- (3) A thesis by the author's husband on the subject of children's "why" questions.

It is difficult within the limits of a review to do justice to all these different aspects.

To educationists and to many of the general public the most challenging part of Mrs. Isaacs' book will be the account of the educational experiment. The aims as set out, "to stimulate active inquiry of the children themselves, rather than to teach them . . . and to bring within their immediate experience every range of fact to which their interest reaches out," would probably be acclaimed as their aims by the majority of present-day educators, but it is doubtful if many of them would recognize as essential to the fulfilment of these aims the degree of freedom, and the transcendence of prejudice and convention in the pursuit of knowledge described by Mrs. Isaacs. During the three years of the school's existence with which the book deals there were children from ten to twenty in number ranging in age from two years and seven months to ten years and five months. They were given an environment in which they could carry on most of the ordinary adult activities that interest children, and in which they were encouraged to solve for themselves the problems that arose. The work on their problems involved experimentation of the kind that would lay the foundations of work in physics, chemistry, botany, zoology, and physiology. The children's physiological interests were particularly marked, and in satisfying them dissections were carried out and anatomical diagrams and a human skeleton were used. There is no doubt that this will arouse a

I Growth of Mind, Koffka, p. 206.

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great deal of criticism and antagonism amongst those who hear about it and who do not read the book. It is unlikely that any one who reads it, particularly pp. 160-170, with a mind open to conviction will remain hostile to the procedure even if he would be afraid to follow it in his own practice with children

of three and four years.

The other outstanding feature of the school was the avoidance of the establishment in the children of verbal habits for which they had no background of experience or conviction. They were to learn by being and doing, rather than by talking, and they were to formulate from their own need to express facts and relations which they came to grasp, not as the result of hearing other people generalize. An example may be taken from the field of conduct. They were not told to be kind either to one another or to animals, but they were prevented if on any occasion they tried to hurt what could not protect itself. The staff relied upon their own treatment of the children as persons and the general atmosphere of comradeship to develop in the children through practice

such habits of social conduct as are denoted by the word "kind."

Section III of the book, which deals with Discovery, Reasoning, and Thought, contains a discussion as to the nature of the child's intellectual development. In relation to this there is a criticism of Piaget's view that mental development can only take place pari passu with certain more or less clearly defined stages which he seems to regard as independent of experience and as depending in their turn on biological maturation. Mrs. Isaacs gives ample evidence from her records to show that, contrary to Piaget's assertions, children well under five years of age are interested in the relations between things in the physical world, and anxious to understand their connections. Piaget claims that the child is ego-centric and non-social to such a degree that his thinking can go on along pre-logical lines without his being forced to a consciousness of the contradictions that it involves. Mrs. Isaacs very cogently remarks that physical reality itself will force upon the child the consciousness of such contradictions, and still further she challenges, as at least exaggerated, Piaget's view of the non-sociality of young children. She very seldom found even her youngest pupils indulging in monologues directed to no one in particular when they were in the company of other children, but on the contrary she reports direct social talk with the very youngest. She says that she does not question the fact that very young children soliloquize aloud more than older children. "But since the same children at the same time showed also plenty of true social behaviour, in appropriate situations, it would seem to be a matter of a continuous process of socialization rather than one of hard and fast stages of development marked by crises of change." Again she says: "It is not that one kind of structure gives place to another; it is rather that there is a progressive penetration of feeling and phantasy by experience, a progressive ordering by relational thought of the child's responses to the world. And this ordering begins at least within the first year of life and expresses itself clearly in non-ego centric thought by, say, the fourth or fifth years" . . . "the young child is no more a psychotic than he is a savage. At no point of his mental history is he either of these, any more than he is ever a worm or a fish in the womb."2

Contemporaneously with the appearance of Mrs. Isaacs' book an article by Huang appeared in the *Psychologische Forschung* on children's thinking. Using the clinical method, but choosing problems nearer to the child's interests than did Piaget, Huang collected data which led him to take exactly the same view of children's thinking and of the relation between adult and childish thinking as does Mrs. Isaacs. Thus he says that the children's physical concepts

¹ P. 88.

² Pp. 107-8.

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were of a simple variety, "but not psychological, finalistic, magical, moral animistic, artificialistic, or mystic."

Just as Mrs. Isaacs emphasizes the continuity of mind in temporal development, so she emphasizes continuity in relation to its different forms of activity. She shows that in the play of the child phantasy, thought, and reasoning give place the one to the other and back again momentarily. Her records show that even a very young child indulging in phantasy has the double intent of an actor; he may show no confusion of his two worlds of phantasy and reality. Further, his phantasy may lead him to investigation of reality and to objectively determined thought with regard to it.

It seems strange that while Mrs. Isaacs emphasizes the disinterestedness of much of the child's search after knowledge, and attacks Piaget's view of the young child's ego-centricity, she seems to doubt the existence of such disinterestedness at the earliest stages. She says: "Much of the child's earliest interest in physical objects is certainly derivative, and draws its impetus from early infantile wishes and fears in relation to the parents. As I suggested in an earlier passage, the first value which the physical world has for the child is as a canvas upon which to project his personal wishes and anxieties, and his first form of interest in it is one of dramatic representation." Observation of the young infant's laborious experimentation, which can easily be observed from the second month, and is probably present from birth, convinces the reviewer that, as Nathan Isaacs says, there is disinterested concern for knowledge from the beginning of the child's life.

Mr. Isaacs' thesis is an extremely interesting piece of work on the subject of "why" questions. He holds that a consideration of children's "why" questions affords evidence that the child is "actively interested in his knowledge as such and directly concerned with the question whether it is (a) correct, (b) sufficient, (c) clear and unambiguous." In support of this view he takes one group of "why" questions, viz. those arising out of a sudden clash between past experience and any present event. He says: ". . . the point about the type of experience to which I am referring is that it is not merely a stimulus or release; it presents a specific problem. It demands specific thought directed to the problem." The young child's knowledge is unlikely to be sufficient to enable him to resolve the difficulty, but he soon finds that the word "why" addressed to an adult may serve as a key to undo the lock. The clash "stimulates the child to a genuine interest in the revision, extension, and reorganization of his knowledge."

By means of a large number of examples of children's "why" questions, Mr. Isaacs supports his thesis that the epistemic interest is genuinely present, and that within the realm of his own knowledge and experience the child can reason as well as the adult. He quotes several instances of the child's dissatisfaction with inadequate reasons and his persistence in trying to find a reason that will bring the given phenomenon into harmony with the rest of his knowledge or enable him to put his system of knowledge on a surer basis. In many of the illustrations the adult's ability to explain is sorely taxed by the child's ruthless logic.

The outstanding characteristics of this book as a whole are that:—

(a) The data upon which its arguments are based were collected from children thinking and acting spontaneously, not in response to questions set by adults.

¹ Psychologische Forschung, Band 14, p. 177. ² P. 101. 3 P. 295.

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(b) The incidents are given in the setting of the child's life.

(c) The writers, in presenting their material, are more concerned to show what children's thinking is really like than to compare it with adult thinking or to uphold by means of it any pre-conceived theory of mental development.

For all these reasons it will doubtless become one of the few classics in child psychology.

V. HAZLITT.

History of Japanese Religion, with Special Reference to the Social and Moral Life of the Nation. By Masaharu Anesaki, D.Litt., LL.D., Professor at Tokyo Imperial University. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1930. Pp. xxii + 423. Price 21s.

The eminent Professor of the Chair of the Science of Religion, known as teacher no less in the U.S.A. than in Japan, has here undertaken a formidable task, the achieving of which has been done under reverses and hindrances which would have paralysed the will in other men. Much of his MS. was destroyed in the great earthquake of 1923; the reconstructing of the destroyed University Library fell on his shoulders. But it was a wise American who wrote, "The one serious and formidable thing in nature is will"; and verily this man has borne him out. In a little over 400 pages, and with an excellent well-spaced type—here he has been luckier than some—he has given us a purview of religious Japan from a prehistoric limit to the present day.

I say religious Japan, rather than "of religion in Japan," for the "special reference" in his sub-title is not merely incidental. Almost the title might have been: The social and moral life of the Japanese, with special reference to their religions. It is this fullness of matter which packs the book from A to Z, makes it intensely interesting, makes it, in so far as the author's combination of piety and scholarly disinterestedness sees the true, of value to the student of history in any land, but makes it difficult to appraise in a brief review.

The English shows no trace of foreign pen-craft, the style is lucid and alive throughout, and if there is not an absence of the scholar's too frequent habit of writing a running supplementary treatise in footnotes, it is indulged in with refreshing reticence. The chief service rendered to the reader is the historical conspectus of epochs, of eminent names associated with each of them, and what they stood for, either as men or as women of either a New Word, or a renascent word in religious mandate, and further, the waxing or waning in those epochs of the great cults which have counted and still count in Japan: Shinto, Confucianism, Buddhism, Kirishitan (Christian), together with the way in which they have or, again, have not blended in such moral codes as Bushido, in Samurai ideals, in the systems we hear of called Zen (curious evolution from the old Indian Dhyana, or Musing), Tendai, Shinren, Nichiren, and others.

We are far in these pages from, say, the religious atmosphere of India. With very few exceptions we hear little about the Man: "the defective being yearning after perfection" (p. 399), and by that yearning becoming the More in his long Way towards the Most, who he in his nature potentially is. The being, the man, is of course here, but he is shown mightily concerned to bring his fellow-man along—a concern essential to his own permanent advance. And the part played herein by this and that woman helper, over-

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looked till now even in Japan itself, will deeply interest women readers. Most significant, perhaps, in what we here read of this ever-strenuous people is the modern feeling-out after a New Word, a feeling we might expect with a plurality of great cults looming large. Syncretic New Words have come among them and have waned; not of such is the positive and abiding new mandate of That, Who, to adapt scripture, may in these latter days again speak unto us.

C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS.

Whewell's Philosophy of Induction. By Marion Rush Stoll. (Lancaster, Pa, Lancaster Press, Ic. 1929. Pp. iv + 125.)

A hundred years ago Herschel published his Preliminary Discourse on the Study of Natural Philosophy, and thereby stimulated considerable interest in the history, philosophy, and logic of science. In 1837 his friend Whewell published his History of the Inductive Sciences, which was followed, in 1840. by his Philosophy of the Inductive Sciences. In these volumes, and in others intimately connected with them, Whewell laid the foundations of important new departments of study, for which he has not received all the credit due to him. The history of science had to wait nearly a century before another Cambridge scientist (Dr. Dampier-Whetham) took up the torch to carry it a stage farther, and the study of that subject in British universities has barely made a beginning. Whewell was more successful in rousing an interest in the philosophy of science and in scientific method. But for Whewell and Herschel the Logic of John Stuart Mill (1849) would never have been written; and Mill's account of the logic of induction gave a great impetus to the study of methodology. Whewell's work in this field was almost entirely eclipsed by Mill's treatise. This was mainly due to the fact that Mill's empiricism harmonized better with the spirit of the nineteenth century than did the apriorism of Whewell. This is true of England, at all events. The same is true of the naturalism of Mill as compared with the supernaturalism of Whewell. Nevertheless there is much in Whewell's writings on the philosophy of science that deserves more attention than it is wont to receive. Miss Stoll's little book is a welcome contribution to this subject. It gives a concise and clear account of Whewell's position, its strength and its weaknesses, and it does not altogether ignore more recent contributions to the main problems. As the conflict between empiricism and apriorism, and between naturalism and super-naturalism, promises to become somewhat lively again, Miss Stoll's little book should make a special appeal to some readers.

A. Wolf.

The Psychology of Intelligence and Will. By H. G. WYATT. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co., Ltd. 1930. Pp. viii + 273. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

This addition to the International Library of Psychology, Philosophy, and Scientific Method deals with that important—some would say that most important—aspect of human nature which has so strangely been neglected by most contemporary psychologists, namely, the relation of Intelligence to will and the nature of the will itself. Reasons for this curious neglect are not

difficult to discover, though excuses for it carry little weight. It is not enough to claim that, as a natural science, psychology is concerned with laws and mechanisms, and therefore must eschew consideration of whatever seems to escape mechanical law, or explain it away as an illusion. Science is not prejudiced merely to discover laws; its aim is to discover truth in whatever form it may be found. Nor is it enough to plead that experimental psychology has become so departmentalized that psychologists have no time to give to deeper problems of their subject, or are so preoccupied with cognitive process that the investigation of will and conation is scamped. As a matter of fact, many psychologists have investigated orectic problems, and are still busy extending their researches. Nevertheless, as Mr. Wyatt says, professional psychologythe psychology of text-books and manuals—is singularly unhelpful in its treatment of the will and in relating will-process to intelligence. Viewing the matter from the standpoint of education, the author is interested not only in the imparting of information, but also in the training of intelligence, the regulation of passion, and the development and strengthening of the will. He complains that books on educational psychology have been of little service to him in providing a helpful theory of intelligence and volition, and adds with some justice that books on general psychology are in this respect no better. "There is much measuring of intelligence, but few attempts to fathom it, and will is apt to be disposed of by treating it as something else." The first part of Mr. Wyatt's book consists of a critical examination of five leading conceptions of intelligence, including those of the stimulus-response, the Gestalt and the Noegenetic schools. Rejecting the explanation of behaviour given by stimulus-response psychology as inadequate, and stressing the insufficiency of the Gestalt analysis, he develops his own view that intelligence is a psychological faculty which is characterized by the function of apprehending true or useful relations. It is innate, susceptible of individual differences, and, while manifesting itself at all levels of evolution, reaches its highest development in man. The conception of intelligence as the capacity of relational thinking leads Mr. Wyatt to examine Spearman's doctrine of general mental ability as exemplified in three different and irreducible processes in which all knowledge originates. These are (1) the apprehension of experience, (2) the discovery of relations between items of knowledge, and (3) the construction (eduction) of correlated items. Though his own view is closer to that of Spearman than to the others, the author believes that one principle only, and not three, is necessary to explain thought and behaviour. He reduces the first principle to the second by saying that "to cognize an experience is to relate it. Our very first act of knowing is contrast." Similarly, he reduces the third principle to the second by saying that in correlate eduction the relating capacity is the mental capacity involved; "the appearance of the correlative experience is its automatic outcome." The question at issue between Mr. Wyatt and Spearman is not a logical but a psychological one. A second point at issue is that of the relevance of the relation which is apprehended to some object or end intended by the person apprehending it. As stated, Spearman's second principle, to which the first and third are reduced by Mr. Wyatt, reads: "the mentally presenting of any two or more characters (simple or complex) tends to evoke immediately a knowing of-not "the", as quoted by Mr. Wyatt, but-relation between them. In Spearman's later volume, The Abilities of Man, the formula reads: "any relations that essentially hold between them." Mr. Wyatt believes, not that this constitutes intelligence, but that the power of apprehending pertinent relations does. But surely he is not quarrelling with Spearman here, except in so far as he has omitted to take

the quantitative principles into account. He writes: "for purpose of logical treatment Spearman has deliberately left the conative aspect as far as possible out." Undoubtedly, when stating a purely qualitative principle. But this principle must be taken together with the others, and in this connection more especially with that of conation. Two considerations are in place here. First, the pertinence of a relation to an end or goal is itself a relation; and to discover relations is a mark of intelligence. Secondly, though with characteristic caution Spearman states the law of conation with regard to intensity of cognition only, this obviously includes what is called change in direction as well as the enhancing of any character, or relation, required. If one relation is seen not to be 'pertinent' to an end, some other may be educed, or recalled, by the operation of the conative law. There would seem to be less disagreement between 'relational thinking' and 'noegenetic process' than appears on the surface.

The second part of Mr. Wyatt's volume contains two chapters on "Intelligence and Instinct" and "Intelligence the Master of Instinct." Here the two main points are argued that, while intelligence is "the servant and assistant of instinct, both in the preliminary stage where perception is incomplete, and in the intermediate stage of endeavour to satisfy the impulse," it is also the master of instinct in that it creates its own ideals, sets up its own authority, and bends instincts to its uses; because it can universalize the

principles underlying conduct.

Part three deals specifically with the will as characterized by initiative and links it up with intelligence. The level of will depends upon the intelligence level. In general, the characteristic of living beings is the immanence of their activity; and this is manifested in the three stages of reflex action, instinctive or impulsive behaviour, and pure self-activity or true initiative, which is the highest form of volition. Truly volitional behaviour is thus action in accord with intelligence, and in so far free; and when this supreme form of initiative is in opposition to a lower form, the self may control or inhibit impulse, and act in accordance with reason. The will, accordingly, depends essentially upon intelligence. In its highest form it is impossible without cognitive originality. Intelligence, likewise, though creative, is impotent without volition; for it may present ideal principles of conduct, not imposed from without but strictly self-determined, and yet no conduct patterned upon them may ensue. Both intelligence and will, accordingly, are regarded as originative or initiative, the one of cognitive items, the other of actions. And both are forms of self-activity. Mr. Wyatt is contending for a view of human personality, or psychological personalism, which of recent years has been attracting many adherents. He relies, however, mainly upon the experiences of everyday life in support of his contentions, and criticizes much of the experimental work that has been carried out upon will-processes on the ground that life-situations are crucially different from laboratory-situations. There is no reason to criticize his criticisms, except to point out that controlled situations, which may be repeated again and again, allow us to reconstruct what actually is experienced when one resolves or wills, and to analyse with some degree of confidence the various elements which come together in a willact. Is it not important, for instance, to obtain a valid distinction between volition and conation, or to show by instrumental controls as well as introspection that the feeling of effort is not essentially the same thing as the experience of willing? Is not the identification of willing with self-activity, as distinct from the feelings of bodily strains and muscular contractions, a gain, when it is made, not in the haphazard way of casual introspection, but with

OF PHILOSOPHICAL IOURNAL

all the precautions of experimental procedure? And, with regard to his criticisms that professional experimental psychologists have pet "isms" at stake, and that some of them "empower" abstractions, is this a failing peculiar to experimental psychologists? Mr. Wyatt's criterion that the final court of appeal in these matters is our own personal experience is none the less valid; and personal experience, both in the more exact experimental conditions and in casual introspections, as a matter of fact support his thesis. The author might, however, have made more of the available experimental results than he has done. He might have cited the works of Webb and Lankes as establishing a general will-factor, especially in support of his own conclusion that truly volitional behaviour is in accord with intelligence, and exhibits itself as consistency with or adherence to self-conceived and self-determined principle. For Webb has proved that will-qualities and profound intelligence correlate positively; and Lankes has shown that the self, in the case of persons accustomed to act on principle, can modify even its own physiological tendencies, such as that of perseveration or the opposite. A fortiori one might argue control of instinctive impulses.

The value of The Psychology of Intelligence and Will lies not merely in the analyses of volitional consciousness and the definite relation of will-process in its highest form of free initiative to the capacity of relational thinking in its most creative aspect, but in the reasoned challenge which it makes to all forms of mechanistic psychology. It is a pity that the volume should be disfigured by a number of misprints, some of a misleading character. "Monthly", for instance, appears twice within six lines for "Monograph"; and, still worse,

"educative" does duty for "eductive."

F. AVELING.

The Social Contract of the Universe. By C. G. Stone, M.A. (London: Methuen & Co. Pp. vii+118. Price 6s. net.)

The idea that much of importance can be proved by pure metaphysics is not very general in these days. Fortunately, however, there are some who still uphold it impenitently, and are prepared to give an answer to what Mr. Stone takes to be the question of metaphysics, viz., "What must there be, or what cannot there be, if there is to be reality at all?" (p. 37). In short, Mr. Stone, at the lowest rating, deserves a medal for gallantry; and he is also to be commended in the highest terms for the austerity, simplicity, and conciseness of his style. It is sometimes complained of Cambridge philosophers to-day that they pursue simplicities so resolutely as to become wholly unintelligible; and therefore it is a pleasure to record that the same type of complaint may now be levelled against certain Oxonians.

It is, of course, a different question whether the attempt has succeeded. Personally, I am of opinion that it has not. The crucial introductory "proof" that "from the certainty that there is something" we can validly reach "action and infinity, each in a certain way" (p. 2), seems to me to fail because (a) it assumes "necessary production a priori" in a sense which Hume showed to be a petitio in his Treatise I, iii, Sect. 3, and (b) because it rests upon an imperfect logic. Mr. Stone appears to hold that nothing can be just what it is because, if it were, it would be disconnected with everything else; and I refuse to accept any logic which implies that because I am neither more nor less than "just" what I am, I am therefore bound to deny that I am my father's son. (Incidentally, if Mr. Stone's "proof" could be accepted, he would show,

not, as he thinks, that everything is definitely infinite, but that everything is indefinitely finite.)

If I am right in this criticism, I could not give the book a higher recommendation than the very important species of praise than is implied in Mr. Stone's pages 84 sq. But, of course, I may very well be wrong. And I hope that a great many readers, all indeed who enjoy a thoroughly abstract argument, will read Mr. Stone for themselves. Even if they do not agree with him, they will find a tonic quality in his pages; and his conclusion (very well indicated by his title) is even exciting.

I have to remark (1) that the concluding chapters are somewhat less austere than the earlier ones—this is as it should be—and (2) that, despite the general excellence of the style of the book, there appear to be lapses in this particular. I have read the following sentence on page 84 several times: "We can reason in metaphysics about value, because reality is made to be good, but not merely good, and there is what action as one must or cannot will as good", and I find the sentence atrocious. Its successor (which begins "And we can 'prove' what action as one agent must will as good") seems to me to be no better.

JOHN LAIRD.

Estatification. By His Honour Judge H. C. Dowdall, K.C. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, Humphrey Milford. 1930. Pp. 40. Price 2s. 6d. net.)

This Presidential Address by Judge Dowdall to the Society of Public Teachers of Law in England and Wales is concerned with a psychological analysis of the "legal and political problem of corporate unity," and is based on what seems to the learned Judge to be two "self-evident" propositions:—

r. "The fundamental problem for a general theory of law is a problem of corporate life and action prior to that particular form of corporate life and action which imposes sanctions.

2. The general problem of corporate life and action is a problem of

analytical psychology."

"Estatification" is a word evolved by the author from the following pedigree. "Status" he regards as a type of position, which a man may hold in the eye of the law. Anyone who has a "status" is technically called a "person," e.g. citizenship and citizen. An "estate" is a number of actual concrete interests taken as a whole, and there is no ordinary word, the author says, for a legally recognized type of interest. "Statification" he proposes as a term appropriate to describe any scheme whereby people and their interests are made into an articulate whole in terms of type as is done by law. What makes an "estate," that is to say its structure, is what the author says he means by an "estatification."

Taking what is known as a corporate body, its integration, the author contends, is not an incorporation of persons in the sense in which the word person is ordinarily used to signify a human being, but is an integration of interests, and, as he sees it, the points of social integration lie in the interests that bind men together in the various societies to which they belong. As a member of a society, a man's interest therein is all that is relevant, and anyone else may take his place provided he has the relevant interest and efficiency. In the case of a society, it is the articulation of interests which integrates men to the extent that they are integrated at all. This is the centre and pivot, he says, of the notion of "estatification" as contrasted with "incorporation." "Estatification" imposes a certain permanence in the articulated structure. It is with interests that articulate in accordance with a standing type, especially a legally recognized type that "estatification" is concerned.

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The final conclusion to which the author at last leads his readers is that all corporate unity is derived, not from an incorporation of persons, but from an "estatifying" of their interests. If the proposition so expressed in this unfamiliar phraseology, and arrived at after a somewhat involved argument, means that it is generally some common interest which unites a body of persons together into a coherent group and evokes a unity of purpose and of action, there will not be much difference of opinion with the author of the Address.

L. L. M.

Received also:-

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A. C. UNDERWOOD, M.A., D.D. Contemporary Thought of India. London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1930. Pp. 235. 5s.

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W. C. D. DAMPIER-WHETHAM, M.A., F.R.S., A History of Science and its Relations with Philosophy and Religion. (Second edition.) London: Cambridge University Press. 1930. Pp. xxi + 514. 18s.

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C. LLOYD MORGAN, D.Sc., F.R.S., The Animal Mind. London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1930. Pp. ix + 275. 12s. 6d.

C. SPEARMAN, Ph.D., Hon. LL.D., F.R.S. Creative Mind. (Contemporary Library of Psychology.) London: Nisbet & Co.; Cambridge at the University Press. 1930. Pp. xii + 153. 5s.

W. D. Ross, M.A., LL.D. The Right and the Good. Oxford at the Clarendon

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KYUNG DURK HAR. Social Laws: A Study of the Validity of Sociological Generalizations. Chapel Hill. University of N. Caroline Press. 1930.

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HARALD HÖFFDING. Jean Jacques Rousseau and His Philosophy. Tr. by L. E. A. Saidla and William Richards. New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford: Oxford University Press. 1930. Pp. xxiv + 165. \$2; 9s.

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E. Dupréel. Le Renoncement. (Archives de la Société Belge de Philosophie.) Brussels: J. Perebooms. 1930. Pp 36. Fr. 4.50.

THE INSTITUTE AT HOME: ANNUAL MEETING

THE Fifth Ordinary General Meeting of the Institute was held at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, on Monday, September 29, 1930.

Professor J. H. Muirhead, M.A., LL.D. (Chairman of the Council), gave the

following address:-

"Ladies and Gentlemen,—Nothing can feel itself at home in the world without 'a local habitation and a name.' The Institute of Philosophical Studies has had a name for the last five years, but hitherto it has been dependent on charity for its local habitation. It is most grateful to the Electrical Federation for its generous hospitality during these years, but it has always felt (as guests, however welcome, are apt to feel) that it was on its good behaviour in the Federation's palatial offices, and philosophical simplicity was somewhat overawed by its gilded officials. Here, if not perhaps 'at ease in our own inn,' we are at any rate like St. Paul at our own charges 'in our own hired house,' and I wish to begin by referring to the appropriateness to our work of the quarters in which, by the kindness of the Trustees of the Williams' Library, we now find ourselves.

"University Hall was founded in Gordon Square in 1848 in commemoration of the Dissenters' Chapels Act of 1844, which was rightly regarded as a landmark in the history of civil and religious freedom described at the time by the Committee appointed for the foundation as ensuring 'to us and to future generations a full Protestant liberty of private judgment unfettered by the accident of an ancestral creed and protected from all inquisitorial inter-

ference.'

"It was designed in the first instance as a residence for students at University College whose parents were in sympathy with 'the great principle of unlimited religious liberty'; but also as a centre for the teaching of 'theology, mental and moral philosophy, and other branches of knowledge either not at all or not fully taught at University College.' With these objects it was placed under a succession of Principals whose names were sufficient to establish its reputation as a centre of advanced thought: Francis W. Newman, Arthur Hugh Clough, Richard Holt Hutton of the Spectator, William B. Carpenter the Physiologist, Henry Morley, the Professor of English Literature in University College. With these deserves to be mentioned as its most ardent supporter and chief benefactor, Henry Crabb Robinson, who in his Diaries describes the opening meting on October 16th, almost precisely eighty years ago, when Richard Martineau gave the address to 'some dozen ladies and eight or ten young men'—an audience, he complains, that would have been much larger if proper notice had been given as of a public event.

"It was in commemoration of Crabb Robinson and the group of famous men and women whom he knew at home and abroad, including Goethe, Schiller, Wordsworth, Coleridge, and Charles Lamb, that the interesting frescoes on the

walls were designed.

"In 1882 Manchester New College, under the principalship of James Martineau, was transferred to this building. In the later 'eighties I was myself for some time a student in the College, and the Hall in which we now are seems

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to be peopled with the presence of vanished leaders of thought in those days who came to the fortnightly debates that were held in it: Martineau, Stopford Brooke, Philip Wicksteed, Estlin Carpenter, William Clarke, and other well-known Fabians and economists.

"On the departure of Manchester New College to Oxford the premises were taken over by the Trustees of the Dr. Williams' Charity, which had been

founded with similar objects some two hundred years before.

"I mention these facts to show that in finding a home here the Institute of Philosophical Studies enters not only a building but a great tradition of free and untrammelled thought upon the subjects that most profoundly interest the human mind. The need is greater and more widely felt than ever. The Universities in London and elsewhere have recognized it to a fuller extent than in the days when the Hall was founded; but they necessarily leave much of the field untouched. There are many who didn't take philosophy while they were at College, but have since been taken by it; there are many who took it, but desire to take more of it under freer conditions; besides these there is a growing number of men and women who have received their training in the school of life, and have been led to philosophy by the necessity of finding a deeper answer to its problems than general literature or their own unguided thought can supply. We believe that the opportunities that are here offered by the Institute only require to be better known to be more widely appreciated, and Mr. Garcke, to whom we owe so much in obtaining this home for it, will speak on what is proposed in this respect. I will conclude by saying one or two things for myself in expansion of what I have written in the short Foreword to the Fifth Annual Report.

"In the first place, I would repeat what I there said of my conviction that the thing we here propose to do can't be done in a corner by a few academically trained persons. They need the help of those I have already referred to as coming with the wider and more forcible training of life. We invite these not only to receive but to give. In doing so we place ourselves on a frankly democratic basis. To my mind democracy in its essence is as far from the rule of mass opinion as from any kind of dictatorship, whether of the fascist or of the proletarian type. It consists in no material but in a spiritual power: first in the power to see that it takes all sorts to make a world—sorts not determined merely by external conditions, but also by inner gifts and forms of experience; and secondly, in the humility to recognize the value of the contributions of others remote from ourselves in mental outlook and the circumstances of their lives. Even apparent failures may have much that is positive to teach, and John Bradford's 'There but for the grace of God go I' is only a half-truth, if we let them go at that and do not try to discover something of the wisdom locked in their failing hearts.

"For the world that all sorts and conditions make (and this is my second point) is a world of souls. Underneath material needs are needs of the soul. I mentioned (after Green) three of these in my Foreword: the need 'to be free to understand to enjoy.' This Hall is dedicated to the first of these as the condition of the others. We enter into that freedom and seek to use it in the interest of the second: the need to understand. But we do so with no intention of separating this from the other two, but in order to use it to attain a higher level of freedom and a truer enjoyment. Freedom has its laws and enjoyment has its conditions, which call for the disciplined intelligence that

we may make no mistake about them.

"Philosophy (and this is my third point) is an intellectual discipline devoted to the understanding of other forms of experience, logical, moral, political,

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æsthetic, religious. There are some who would confine it to that; but they forget that philosophy, though dealing with theory, is itself a form of experience and an enjoyment comparable to the highest. We live, I have said, in a world of souls, and souls live in a world that takes them beyond the visible to an invisible with which they seek to enter into communion. This they do, some in one way, some in another, through devotion to art, science, ordinary everyday duty, religion. 'In various manners,' as F. H. Bradley put it, 'we find something higher which both supports and humbles, both chastises and transports us.' Philosophy does not take the place of any of these. Yet to some it is the main way of coming into touch with the unseen world and with what is higher than themselves.

"It is because these rooms offer a better opportunity than we have hitherto enjoyed of following this quest in common, perhaps of forming some sort of real society of seekers, that their acquisition forms an important step in the

history of the Institute."

A resolution for the adoption of the Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended March 31, 1930, proposed by the Chairman and seconded by Mr. E. Garcke, was put to the meeting and carried unanimously The proceedings then terminated.

CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of the Journal of Philosophical Studies.

DEAR SIR.

One must not expect to be allowed to bandy arguments with a reviewer, and in the general tenor of Mr. M. Kaye's notice of my book, *The Fallacies of Fatalism*, there is nothing to be complained of. On two points, however, he has, doubtless

through a misunderstanding, seriously misrepresented my position.

Firstly, I do not hold that an entity is, in respect of its essential nucleus, "self-caused" and "self-sufficient" and "impervious to external influences." If any entity deserved these descriptions, that could be nothing less than the universe itself. The physical entities of which I chiefly treat in the first part of my book are molar bodies such as appear on the earth's surface. Each of these I hold to be in part, but only in part, the cause of itself. The existing fragment of rock is not merely an effect of the disintegrating factors which caused it to separate from the cliff. The living and developing embryo is not merely an effect of the conjunction of sperm and germ cells and of the maternal nourishment subsequently supplied to it.

Molar entities are not only pervious to external influences. The higher they stand in the scale of physical evolution, the more pervious they become. The relatively impervious pebble remains itself for ages. The short-lived organism depends for its survival on adaptation to environment, and an important part of this adaptation, in the higher animals, consists of their reactions to sense-perceptual stimuli. The highest known type of "self-determination," in human persons, depends upon conceptual knowledge opening up a wider terrestrial environment than is ever apparent to the senses—an environment which includes many other individuals and organized human groups, the influences of and reactions to which are or may be

subject to moral valuations.

Secondly, as to "chains of causation"—i.e. serial sets of events in which each consequent has a causal antecedent. The reviewer, in accordance with his misunderstanding already alluded to, supposes me to hold that "the chain of causation within a physical entity may exist independently of other chains of causation. In fact my book does not discuss such internal chains of causation, and I should agree to the statement in question only if taken in a relative sense. There may be a continuity of ultra-microscopic oscillations which appears as the cohesion and gravity of an individual pebble; while the complex continuing life of an individual organism seems to involve a network of chains of causation in harmonious cooperation. In both these cases there is a relative, but not more than a relative, independence of external agencies. In fact, however, it is not internal, but external, "chains of causation" which I discuss in Sections 22-23 of my book. These are conceived to depend on the successive interactions of separate entities with one another, such interactions occurring locally, here or there, on the earth's surface. Whatever laws of causation there may be, every sequence of cause and effect is a strictly particular or circumstantial fact.

While, according to the law of gravity, bodies, whether near together or far apart, attract one another in the way that the law describes, the other forms of causation, physical, chemical, and biological, are not thus proportionate to distance. They depend upon the actual local contact or the close proximity of the bodies interacting, and when bodies which might interact are separated by a sufficient (it may be a very small) space interval, no interaction takes place. As I put it on page 35, "all terrestrial physical causation depends upon some collocation of entities which interact with one another in their natural ways, because of their having come into

contact or into such proximity as causes them to interact."

[&]quot; "A miss is as good as a mile."

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JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

Of the chains of causally connected events which are simultaneously occurring at all parts of the earth's surface, a vast number must be practically independent of one another. Most events and series of events, whether of physical, biological, or social import, which are now happening in Bristol, are quite independent of those happening in Southampton or any other English or foreign town. Even within a very limited area causal sequences may be independent of one another. Most of the persons and vehicles passing one another in a crowded street are bent on different, or at least disconnected, errands, and do not affect one another by the fact of passing. Here, however, the fact of proximity does make possible both street accidents and personal meetings of dramatic import; whereas bodies, and their interactions in series of events, when occurring sufficiently far apart, can have no practical effect upon one another.

It is in the constant casual meeting of chains of causation of diverse local origin—
a meeting which is, of course, caused, but not caused according to any uniform law—
that, I believe, a real physical contingency resides. Physical reality is compact of
"accidents," although it is only to a few of the more startling ones that the name is

popularly given.

Yours sincerely, CHARLES E. HOOPER.

Southampton, October 8, 1930.

INSTITUTE NOTES

OBITUARY NOTICE

We regret to announce that Mr. Emile Garcke, the first Treasurer of the Institute, and one who took a prominent part in its foundation, died at his residence, near Maidenhead, on November 14th, at the age of 74. During the first six years of the Institute's life Mr. Garcke has been a generous supporter, having made himself responsible on many occasions for annual deficits. His loss will be deeply lamented by all members of the Institute.

Lent Term begins on January 13th and ends on March 25th. The following courses of lectures will be given during the Lent Term:—

"Modern Ethical Problems," a course of six lectures by Professor J. L. Stocks, D.S.O., M.A., on Fridays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1, beginning January 16th, 1931. The lectures are free to members of the Institute. For non-members the fee for the course is 12s. 6d.

"Some Philosophical Aspects of Modern Industrial Society," a course of six lectures by Professor P. Sargent Florence, M.A., Ph.D., on Tuesdays at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1, beginning January 20th, 1931. The lectures are free to members. For non-members the fee for the course is 12s. 6d.

"Biology and Social Life," three lectures by Professor Julian Huxley, M.A., on Tuesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.I, beginning March 3rd, 1931. The lectures are free to members of the Institute. For non-members the fee for the set is 6s. 3d.

The full syllabus of the Session can be obtained on application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1.

WIRELESS "TALKS" ON PHILOSOPHY

Six talks entitled "To Philosophize is to Civilize—The Place of Reflection in Man's Cultural Achievement," by Professor A. E. Heath, at 8-8.30 p.m., January 6th, 13th, 20th, 27th, February 3rd, 10th. Daventry 5XX.

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* By the Memorandum of Association, a member of Council on accepting lectureships with fees *ipso facto* ceases to be a member of the Council or Governing Body, and shall only be eligible for re-election after he shall have ceased to hold such office. This provision applies to those original members of Council whose names appear in the syllabus as lecturers for the Session 30-31.

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PURPOSE IN EVOLUTION

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AGE after age, and often from the depths of human nature, the question has arisen whether there is some transcendental Purpose in the making of the world. Is there some recondite meaning in it all, and if so, can we get any glimpse of what it is? More especially, is it legitimate to say that Nature is Nature for a Purpose? Was there a Purpose, or something dimly analogous to a Purpose, in the origination of the process of Evolution? Is Evolution permeated by or immediately controlled by Purpose? Or does it simply express a purpose which determined its direction from the first? We know a little about the tactics of Evolution, but is there a strategy? If not, why are we always groping after it?

It is evident enough that Science as such never asks whether there is a purpose in Evolution. That is not its métier, nor is the question answerable by its methods. The question is philosophical or religious. Science asks What, whence, how, and whither, but never the deeper "Why?" Yet it is possible that Science may make contributions which help us towards a synoptic or philosophical answer, if we are inclined to the search.

But while Science does not inquire into ultimate Purpose, it is perhaps useful to delay a little to notice that the general idea of purpose is legitimate in scientific inquiry, and cannot be dispensed with. We may avoid the word, but we cannot do without the idea. I shall be content with one illustration—from Ecology, where the issue is clearest.

PURPOSE AS A FACTOR IN EVERYDAY LIFE

Of many a human day's work it is impossible to give a scientific description without taking account of the man's purpose. There is a forward looking, often warmed with emotion, that leads him to adjust his actions towards an end in the future. The purpose is a vera causa with hands and feet. An omniscient chemist might make a ledger of all the oxidations and reductions, hydrations and dehydrations, fermentations, and adsorptions that bring a lecturer to a particular platform; and an omniscient physiologist might tell of all the nerve-impulses and muscle-contractions, sensory stimuli and conditioned reflexes, and so on and so forth, that were concerned in the translocation; yet, after all, the appearance of the lecturer cannot be accounted for unless his purpose be recognized. In many human activities there is actually operative purpose—often conceptual, sometimes perceptual, often habitual, sometimes only a flash; but some sort of purpose there is.

Similarly with many activities among higher animals, we cannot make sense of them scientifically unless we admit an operative perceptual purpose. Even though it be only a mental picture coloured by desire, it counts. The chimpanzee whittles a stick with its teeth till it is slender enough to fit into the hollow of a bamboo rod, making out of two sticks one long enough to reach the desired fruit outside the cage. A dog goes off for a mile along the highway to reach a spot where it was baulked of a rabbit yesterday. The beavers spend weeks of co-operative industry in cutting a canal which is of little use until it is finished. Among higher animals there is perceptual purpose, and it counts. There is purposeful behaviour, comparable to our own, though much simpler.

When we pass to predominantly instinctive animals, our description becomes less convincing, but that is partly because we have not as yet enough of information, though partly because man finds instinct foreign to his experience. Some worker-bees resting in the hive are roused by the nectar dance in which a successful incomer, indulges on the honeycomb; they crowd around her, get the olfactory clue of, say, clover, and off they go on the search. Some tailor-ants take their grubs in their mouths and dab them like animated gumbottles against leaves held close together, so that these are firmly fastened with the silken threads which the larvæ produce. A Queensland spider hangs itself on a thread from a twig, and makes a short lasso with a viscid globule at the end, which it throws dexterously on a passing moth, afterwards drawn in and sucked. There are hundreds of such cases, requiring, of course, very careful discussion, but my point at present is simply that they are more than suggestive of a low grade of half-automatized purposiveness. The terminology will

come right by and by, but is there not in many cases, until the automatization goes very far, something of the nature of a consciously bent bow of endeavour, some instinctive purposiveness, though we may not dare say purposefulness. Even when the racial automatization has gone very far, as it often does, we must not forget the long period during which the creature was testing its inborn inspirations, and playing its hand of hereditary cards. May we not say that there is a good case for believing in instinctive purposiveness?

Some of my biological friends, for whose investigations I have due respect, even when I think their conclusions are erroneous, maintain that the word purpose does not belong to the scientific dictionary. I agree as regards transcendent purpose, which is obviously beyond Science, but I profoundly disagree as regards great stretches of animal behaviour, of which I cannot make sense without the hypothesis that some subjective or psychical activity, analogous to our purposing, operates as a real factor. If this be granted for higher animals, the difficulty is to know where to stop; and here one should be patient. What is one to make of an individual starfish that tackles a small sea-urchin with one arm after another, and disarms it by wrenching off the snapping-blades or pedicellariæ, the result being that the aggressor can protrude its elastic stomach over its victim. And yet the starfish has not a single nerve-centre in its body, only strands and networks of nerve-cells. Purposeful, no; purposive, yes.

Passing to still simpler organisms, we need the concept of purpose less; but can we do without it altogether? Take the careful account Jennings gives of an amœba pursuing a smaller amœba, overtaking it, engulfing it, losing it, turning on its course, capturing it again, losing it again-and there the story stops. We must be careful, Spinoza said, not to be too sure of what the body as body may not do; and most of us shrink from giving the tendril-bearing Bryony or the insect-catching Fly-trap credit for "purpose" even in inverted commas. On the other hand, there is much to be said for a temperate pan-psychism. If we were on the mud of the pond and minified a thousand times, while an amœba magnified a thousand times drew near with its eerie tank-like movement, it is not likely that we should act on the hypothesis that it had no purpose.

Thus we reach the idea, obvious but often ignored, that insurgent organisms share in their own evolution, not in the sense of working towards a racial ideal, for man alone is fit for that, but in the sense of endeavouring to make the most of things and to express themselves in obedience to the universal urge of life—the urge for more, more food, more room, more light, more love, more life. Life in

evolution is interpenetrated with Purpose!

THE TELEOLOGICAL IDEA IN PHYSIOLOGY AND EMBRYOLOGY

So far, then, I have ventured without argument to state the impression left by many happy years as a field-naturalist, that the concept of immediately operative purpose is indispensable. It is often conceptual purpose in man, perceptual in higher animals; it may be instinctive or merely organismal purposiveness; but some sort of purposing there is.

Now before we pass to our larger theme it may be useful to indicate that it is very difficult in physiology and in embryology to dispense with some form of the teleological idea. That is to say, the description is inadequate without reference to an end or outcome.

Turn for a minute or two, and very simply, to physiology. On a holiday we watch a crofter cultivating his fields and perhaps gathering a sparse harvest from the sea. What he does is self-contained and reasonable in itself. But on our way home we watch a busy operator in a shunting-room, doing nothing hour after hour but attending to signals and pulling levers. His activities are not intelligible except as part of an organization, and as making towards certain results, not always very immediate. So in some simple animals and simple corners of animals we may study activities, self-contained and selfjustifying like the crofter's, but most animal activities are incomprehensible except as contributory to the whole life of the integrate of which they form a part. Physiology requires to be teleological in this wide sense, that the working of the parts, like those of a machine, cannot be understood unless they are considered in relation to one another and in relation to the whole. This is soon supplemented by dynamical or chemico-physical, or by distinctively physiological formulations; and it may be that the story is not completed without recognizing psychical factors as well—the esprit de corps. How many kinds of formulations are necessary is a question for discussionone, two, or three-but my present point is that the physiologist, even if mechanist, must start with recognizing the organism as teleological.

Another study in which the teleological idea seems indispensable, not as an operative factor, but as part of the story, is development. One can never forget watching the development of a translucent embryo, witnessing in the course of a day a long series of movements and differentiations. One focusses on the problem all one knows—about cell-divisions, laws of cell-arrangement, mutual pressures, metabolic gradients, liberations of the latent action of regulators and organizers; one thinks of the egg-cell rich in initiatives dating from a distant past, and one works with the idea of a succession of liberating stimuli from within and from without, and so on and so forth. But can we leave out of our description the fact that the

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development looks as if it were purposive, as when it moves circuitously towards a result, or when it builds up an organ only to break it down again, or when it stops, de-differentiates, and begins again. Without raising the question whether there is not always a psycho-biosis as well as a bio-psychosis, we are simply asking the embryologist whether he can dispense with teleological description. It was von Baer who said: "the whole course of development is nevertheless ruled and guided by the essential nature of the future organism"—a fact, he added, which may be demonstrated by observation. Those who are fond of the risky machine analogy in physiology must admit that it does not become easier in embryology, for the embryo-machine makes itself as it goes on, often takes itself in part or whole to bits and begins again, and often lays down before it finishes with itself a stock of little machines for the next season's sales.

ADAPTATIONS

Romanes, who was a shrewd naturalist, once said that "wherever you tap Organic Nature it seems to flow with purpose." As he was a sound Darwinian, it is likely that he mentally italicized "seems to"; but he was alluding to a fact—the abundance of adaptations in organisms. As Weismann said, When you take away all the adaptations from a whale, there is not much left. All complex organisms are bundles of fitnesses, and it is worth re-reading Darwin's account of the numerous mutual adaptations of bee and orchis, partly to realize afresh what an eloquent fact adaptation is, and partly to notice that Darwin found it a little difficult not to talk like Paley. From the widespread fitnesses and their extraordinary nicety, Paley inferred the direct action of a Divine Artificer—an uncouthly materialistic picture. But the edge was taken off Paley's argument when Darwin showed that it was possible, in terms of variability, heredity, and selection, to give a naturalistic account of the way in which the orchis and the bee had come to be so well suited to one another. It remains possible, however, to think of a Creative Purpose that so endowed the primitive irreducibles that they included for all their descendants the capacity of evolving fitnesses. This wider concept of Creative Design is expressed in the words that Charles Kingsley put into Dame Nature's mouth, as she sat so puzzlingly at leisure: "You see I make things make themselves." Thus did the genius of the Creator save the evolving world from the shackles of determinism, and yet secure the climax in the first act of the drama.

Those who point out that the thousand and one adaptations are marvellous, and cannot have arisen by chance, are repeating Darwin's own words; but to use the word "chance" nowadays in its popular sense in this connection is a verbal fallacy. There is very little

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fortuity in variation, and almost none in Natural Selection, which sifts those saying Shibboleth from those saying Sibboleth.

Does Organic Evolution Express a Purpose?

We turn now to the philosophical question—if we only knew how to put it—Are there aspects of evolution that suggest an initial purpose? Has the whole been thought out and endowed in reference to an end? Is evolution the realization of a Creator's thought, or will, or imagination, or purpose? Of course, all our words are necessarily but adumbrations when we are thinking of "the mind that was in the beginning, without which there was nothing made that was made." Not absolutely beyond us, however, for that mind "was life, and the life was the light of men."

It does not seem to be even thinkable to try to prove scientifically that there must have been a plan in the Institution of the Order of Nature. That would be the fallacy of transcendent inference, with a conclusion far too big for the premisses; and in any case, it is not what Science is after. My mood is to be more patient and to care little what words are used so long as we do not lose the Open Secret that there is behind all Evolution a Supreme Reality, of whose Spirit it is an expression. Un dieu défini, c'est un dieu fini—like the Divine Artificer. But age after age Science has helped man to a finer vision of Him in whom we live and move and have our being; and Science with its newest and grandest world may be able to help us even now with contributions of fact and formulation towards the answering of our philosophical or religious question: Is there a Purpose in Evolution?

Science submits numerous data which are eloquent when considered together. Attention has often been drawn to the orderliness of Nature, that we live in a Cosmos. The concept of "a fortuitous concourse of atoms" has been given burial at last. The fortuitous dwindles as Science grows. Yet while you admire the orderliness of Nature, it may be asked whether there could ever have been disorder in anything that lasted. So perhaps a better way of stating what is rather a consideration than an argument is just that Nature becomes increasingly intelligible, making scientific description more and more possible, extensively and intensively; and the fact of Science—of Science that would not have been if the Earth had been beclouded—is difficult to think round without assuming that in the beginning was Mind. As Aristotle used to say, there can be nothing in the end of a process which was not also present in kind in the beginning.

To much of the orderliness of Nature, what can we say except that the order is what must be. Similarly I am a little afraid of enthu-

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siastic arguments, including my own, from the practical omnipresence of beauty in Animate Nature. This is a big fact, but in the majority of cases, the beauty, defined as that which evokes the æsthetic emotion, has an *inevitable* objective basis. There is no alternative in many cases, for the beauty depends on the ripple-marks of orderly growth, or the by-products of orderly metabolism, or the outcome of strenuous eurhythmic movement. The larger fact to my mind is that the process of organic evolution should have been such that it evolved with singular patience, so to speak, a type of being who found in the qualities of natural objects, not only a delight, but an inspiration.

What often happens is that the beauty of living things becomes meat and drink to us. It sometimes fills our cup so generously that, straining at the end of our emotional reach, we become religious, overwhelmed by the sacredness of the testament of beauty. The beauty of the world, especially of Animate Nature, is included in the well-thought-out plan; but we see this most clearly after we have drawn the conclusion to which it points. When we impatiently seize upon some puzzling conclusion of our temporary balance-sheets, e.g. that all the physical universe is like a clock running down, which would be more dispiriting if it were less leisurely, we are probably suffering, oftener than not, from insufficient data. As an authority, unembarrassed by opinion, said the other day, "Gain of entropy always means loss of information and nothing more."

We have to face a practical dilemma. On the one hand there is the risk of shutting our eyes to obvious rays of light, like orderliness and beauty, and on the other there is the risk of trying to press too big a conclusion out of the premisses. The order of Nature is doubtless greater than our greatest thought of it, yet there follows too facilely the mis-inference that it is all being purposefully kept in order now. The Divine Artificer has been exchanged for a Divine Bureaucrat. The beauty of Nature is greater than we have yet discovered, yet there follows too facilely the mis-inference that the Creator paints the lily and adorns the rose. The Divine Artificer has been exchanged for a Divine Decorator. This won't do, for our vision of God, which Science has its share in refining, cannot be out of harmony with a naturalistic description of the world, that is to say with describing outcomes as the natural and necessary resultants, emergents if you like, of the verifiable operative factors resident in the material. It seems to me inconceivable that Science should ever go back from this ideal of naturalistic description; but that does not in the least imply that we need refrain from idealistic, transcendental, mystical, or religious interpretation—the only kind of interpretation there is.

We turn now, beyond orderliness and beauty, to some other

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aspects of Evolution which suggest a Purpose in the unthinkable Beginning.

THE UNIQUENESS OF THE EARTH

I am not competent to grapple with the thought that flits through our minds that our earth is extraordinarily unique. We are not sure that there is any place except the earth where there could be protoplasmic forms of life such as we know, and we need not delay over hypothetical forms of life which we cannot imagine. All the organisms we know require water in fluid form, and that restricts life to a narrow range of low temperature. Nine-tenths of the matter in the universe is at temperatures in comparison with which 1000° C. would be relatively cool. We do not know of many planets altogether, though there may be more than we know of; and while it is indeed difficult to believe that conscious life is restricted to the earth, we do not know of any other possible homes, unless Venus and Mars are possible.

PREPARATIONS IN THE INORGANIC WORLD

Preparation for prospective results is not a scientific concept, except in the doings of organisms, intelligent animals in particular, as when marmots store for the winter. Yet Professor L. J. Henderson in his Fitness of the Environment has indicated many features in the Inorganic World which look like preparations for organisms. At a certain time there came to be—given the antecedents there had to be—abundant supplies of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen near the surface of the earth, and these are the fittest elements for originating diverse and durable chemical systems, including organisms. At a certain time there came to be—given the antecedents there had to be—a meteorological cycle of water, and in half a dozen ways this opened the doors to life.

We must recall the fallacy of inferring Providence from the thoughtful way in which great rivers flow past large towns; and it has been said that if there had not been abundant availability of carbon, hydrogen, and oxygen, and of liquid water, there might have been alternative organisms well prepared for by alternative environments. But we cannot imagine any alternative forms of life. So we may agree with Henderson that the primeval environment is "only fully intelligible, even when mechanically explained, as a preparation for the evolutionary process"—as, in short, teleological.

PREPARATIONS IN ORGANIC EVOLUTION

I have admitted that the idea of "preparation" is not scientific except when we are dealing with cases like a bird preparing a nest 160

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or a meal. Yet there is much in Organic Evolution that suggests pre-arrangements making subsequent steps of progress secure. It is salutary to be again reminded of the noble rivers running past the big towns, but there is more in it than that. The green plants make the breathable air; they make food enough to support themselves and the animal world; the continuance of life is almost unthinkable without bacteria; the welter of Plankton organisms makes fishes possible and fishermen too; perhaps the emergence of Amphibians, leading on to higher forms, was made possible by an almost unique property of water, that of having its maximum density a little above the freezing-point; and so on at length.

We are not saying that Plankton organisms evolved in order that there might be a Billingsgate; we are simply referring to the fact that the multitudinousness of the minute crustaceans in the sea, depending on the still greater multitudinousness of Infusorians and Diatoms, ensured the success of higher forms of life. Broad foundations were laid which made a lofty superstructure possible. There is a Systema Naturæ; and it looks as if the whole of Evolution had been well thought out, as we say fumblingly. In other words, we ask whether naturalistic description and teleological interpretation are not complementary ways of looking at Nature. No doubt, if the first floor of the great edifice grew from the ground floor, and if the ground floor grew out of the foundations, and if there are automatic ways of preventing the superstructure from becoming top-heavy, and so on, there is no need for an intervening master of works; but as we dwell on this evolutionary idea, we come to have a very high respect for the foundation-stones.

CIRCUITOUSNESS IN EVOLUTION

Those who are in a hurry have sometimes said that if the nisus or urge of Organic Evolution was initiated with a Purpose, oriented towards a distant goal, namely Man, it should have been more direct in its working-out, whereas it is remarkable in its circuitousness. Working towards an end! yet spending a million years in fashioning a feather; working towards an end! yet filling the stage for millions of years with types and even races that have left not more than fossils behind. Yet it may be that this was part of the fine strategy! Millions of years of tentatives, but the outcome a stable, reliable, balanced Systema Naturæ, a fulcrum on which Man can move the world. Struggles, and failures too, for millions of years, but with the result that the endeavour after well-being becomes a habit. Delays, eddies, retrogressions, blind alleys, and worse, yet evolution is on the whole integrative. Delay matters little if it meant that the door of choice was kept open. Though automatization is one of Nature's

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methods, the process is more markedly a story of emancipationsas Lotze said, "an onward-advancing melody." Russell quotes from Von Baer's essay on "Nature's most general law in development and evolution," the conclusion that the ultimate law of all creative processes is "the progressive victory of spirit over matter." There must be, one cannot help thinking, some evolutionary urge or nisus, élan, or impulse, rather subtler than has been yet analysed into either mechanical or chemical or biological terms. I mean nothing mystical, but something more than tendencies to aggregate, to colloidify, to incorporate, to grow, to multiply, and so on, with all the involved catalysts, hormones, and organizers-I mean a psychical urge, the subjective side of endeavour. In any case, we see, with Emerson, the worm mounting through all the spires of form, striving to be man; and in man's nearer pedigree, through tentative men, beginning with the Chinese Sinanthropus, quaintly called the Man of Sin, we see a zigzagness as striking as the persistence.

PROGRESSIVE EVOLUTION

Evolution is sometimes backwards and sometimes in an eddyneither suggestive of purpose. But on the whole, evolution discloses progressive differentiation and integration, the emergence of types with greater fullness and freedom, an increasing dominance of the mental aspect, a growing freedom of mind. There are successive syntheses that make things new-such as atom, molecule, micella, cell, multicellular organism, cerebrate animal, intelligent animal, man, society. There are successive emergences, as Lloyd Morgan calls them, more than merely additive resultants. There is what Smuts calls, not very euphoniously, a hierarchy of wholes. The larger steps, such as living organism, intelligent animal, rational man, human society, imply that the evolutionary urge takes a new form, it is raised to a higher power, and that we thus need new descriptive formulæ. Whenever, for instance, there is a genuine human society, a description in terms of individual units is inadequate; the social heritage inter alia has to be taken account of. So it is, we believe, with many of the larger steps in evolution. Even water changed the whole world. From the teleological point of view, then, evolution may be described as a series of progressive syntheses, which allow of novel expressions of the richness inherent in reality.

Conservatism in Evolution

Not to be overlooked, and with an interesting teleological suggestiveness, is what may be called the conservatism of evolution. We have just been speaking of new departures, but there is also a 162

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tenacious holding fast of that which is good, even though the strands may enter into the fashioning of a quite novel fabric. Hæmoglobin, the valuable oxygen-capturing pigment of the blood, makes its first appearance in the Nemertines, unsegmented worms of low degree. Many higher animals are without it, but it was too good to lose; it is conserved along some lineage or other, till it comes to its own in Vertebrates. The two most important pigments are chlorophyll and hæmoglobin, the former doubtless with priority. Is it not significant that their molecules should show a remarkable resemblance in each having four pyrrol rings united by a single metallic atom, magnesium for chlorophyll, iron for hæmoglobin? The primitive mode of locomotion called amœboid appears very early; we see it still in our phagocytes, in many a young egg-cell, and in the growing end of a nerve-fibre as it feels its way out from the brain or spinal cord of the Vertebrate embryo. There is a remarkable conservation of gains: the entail is not readily broken. Man is not only the Crown of Creation, he is also in some ways its Epitome. He is musical-partly because amphibians croaked 300,000,000 years ago; he is a painterpartly because chamæleonic reptiles thrilled to colour; he is gentle -partly because mammals gave milk to their tender young.

We think of Evolution too unimaginatively. We do not, for instance, sufficiently realize the teleological interest of great trends that are, as it were, anticipatory of man's higher values—the true, he beautiful, and the good. For there are prolonged pre-human rends in favour of nimble wits, clear-headedness, and facing the icts; also trends in favour of beauty and its appreciation; also rends in favour of the primary virtues like courage and affection. T. H. Huxley notwithstanding, we discern a momentum in animal evolution which is in a line with man's most progressive movements. What hope there is for man in what Julian Huxley has told us of the way in which some bird-mates engender psychical attractions which raise physical fondness to affection, and last when the honey-

moon is no more than a memory, if that.

MAN—THE PRESENT CLIMAX OF CREATION

What is at present the climax of evolution? Is it not represented by a civilized community of healthy-bodied, healthy-minded, kindly, good-looking people, with a noble social heritage which they use and enjoy, living industrious, prosperous, joyous lives, which are increasingly satisfactions in themselves, with a growing embodiment of the true, the beautiful, and the good, and with successors also healthy, wealthy, and wise? Can we say that the original purpose of the institution of the Order of Nature was to lead on to this and to what reasonably lies beyond? For there is no warrant for supposing

that Evolution will soon stop. Is the climax fine enough to give some confidence in answering the question, which many brush aside as unanswerable: Was there a purpose in Evolution? Charles Darwin thought so when he was writing the *Origin of Species*, when he said that he deserved to be called a theist; but gradually this conclusion weakened, and he said that he must be content to remain an Agnostic, deeply doubtful of man's ability to draw general conclusions on the subject. His cousin Francis Galton was almost equally immune to metaphysical speculation, but he seems to have believed in a recondite purpose in the Universe. As his biographer says: "Increased vigour of mind and body appeared to him the aim of the power which we seem to discern working obscurely, and as if with difficulty, behind the apparently blind forces of Nature."

The object of my discussion has been to ask whether this apparent blindness of Nature's workings in the realm of organisms is not largely a bogey. It is grotesque to call Organic Evolution "a chapter of accidents." The fortuitous has shrivelled before increased knowledge; there is much definiteness in organic variation; and Natural Selection is discriminate sifting in reference to an already established Systema Naturæ. We have also noted a number of features that are in harmony with the trans-scientific idea that the Order of Nature was originally endowed in a way that we should call in human affairs well thought out. There seems to be a steady, though inconceivably slow, advance of life from monad to man, and man-e even now—is no anti-climax. Of course, one is thinking of man as a, social being, man with his science and art, ethics and religion, all al, be included as outcomes of the original institution of the Order cls Nature, not of course in any wooden portmanteauish way, but in 'S way that secures organismal freedom in more or less degree through out. And if man be pictured as one of the ends of the sublimely patient process, or as an instalment of one of the ends, an end that crowns the work, it is not illegitimate to look backwards, just as biologically minded Birds might on their Reptilian ancestors. The whole process of evolution has been such that it has had as its highest outcome a human society at its best. We have become accustomed to consider Man in the light of evolution, solidary with the rest of creation, but do we often enough try to envisage evolution in the light of Man-of Man at his best?

If, for various reasons which do not concern us just now, we are theists, we do not doubt the purposefulness of Evolution. That is part of what "believing in God" means. But our present study has kept to what is called the Natural Theology point of view, and our question has been: Is the idea of purpose congruent with the scientific facts? nay more: Do the scientific facts in any way suggest the interpretation that Nature expresses a purpose? Our 164

Digitized by Arya Sangai Foundation Chennai and eGangotri EVOLUTION

answer has been in the affirmative, and since the scientifically known system of Nature, being largely unconscious, cannot be credited with a purpose, we are led to think of a Creator's Purpose.

Soon, however, further difficulties arise. Has there been detailed guidance and control throughout? or was the whole outcome, including its freedom to evolve the new, implied in the unthinkable creative Origination of the Order of Nature?

The theory that there has been purposeful guidance throughout the ages has to face great difficulties. It suggests imperfections in the original irreducibles if subsequent spiritual influxes, as Alfred Russel Wallace called them, have been from time to time necessary to help things and organisms over difficult stiles. Moreover, the insinuation of operative transcendental factors is apt to mean a relapse in both religious and scientific development. As Dean Inge puts it: "Only a cosmos which seems to be sufficient to itself can be conceived of as having been created by God."

The other theory is that the purpose and urge were potentially expressed in the beginning, in the creative institution of the original Order of Nature, as a garden's beauty in its sown seeds. As Paul Janet says: "That which is precisely most worthy of God is to have made a Nature which creates itself." A divine purpose may have been realized in the world-process by endowing the original irreducibles with the capacity of progressively working out their destiny in a relatively free way, so that the evolution has from time to time a quality of creativity. It would be altogether unfair to this theory to charge it with the crudity of picturing a world launched into space in independence of the Creator. That ex hypothesi is one of the things God could not do; but in regard to His abiding relation with His creation I am not inclined to speak, though one has, of course, one's

For I must end by saying that if there is a purposefulness behind Evolution, and if man is an instalment of one of the purposes, it may be our most urgent and practical duty to try to discern more of the great evolutionary trends so that we may assist in the fulfilment of more of the purpose. We must study the tactics, so that we may share more fully in the realization of the strategy.

SCIENCE, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

PROFESSOR GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

Contacts between Italian and English thought of late years have been both frequent and effective. One need only recall the English interest in Croce's philosophy and the popularity of works by the English idealists in Italy. But the post-Bradleian philosophy as a whole—modern English realism, as we may call it, for the sake of a name—is little known in Italy, and this is a serious omission; for with this movement English thought reverts to its traditional orientation towards the problems of natural science, while Italian philosophy, following its own tradition, continues to concentrate, with increasing definiteness, upon those of history.

This is a parting of the ways whose importance for the future of European speculation is very great. The present divergence is rooted in a profound opposition between two types of mentality. Theory of science and theory of history are the two great alternatives which have presented themselves in the past, and still present themselves to-day, to European thought. On the one hand, the Kantian-Newtonian type of mind, persisting, in spite of all differences, in all those mental tendencies which have been grafted upon the stock of natural science; on the other, the type of mind characteristic of the Romantic movement, holding firmly to the course of historical events. Between these two, modern speculation is rent by a great gulf. The former enjoys a traditional right of primogeniture, ever since the Greeks dismissed becoming as incapable of being the object of scientific knowledge and degraded history to a merely empirical level. For Kant, the universality and necessity which are the hallmark of scientific thought were conceived on the Greek model, and were therefore inapplicable to the unique, non-recurring narratives of history. But the great advance of historical studies in the nineteenth century, due to the Romantic movement and the development of methodical scholarship, brought to light the scientific value of history and offered philosophers the opportunity of conceiving a universality of a different kind from that of scientific law: an intensive universality, so to speak, concentrated within the individual itself, and a necessity consisting of a system of connexions that constitutes the armature of history. Availing themselves of this new opening, the schools of Dilthey and Windelband in Germany and of Croce in Italy ended by reversing the traditional relation between natural science and history, and ascribing to the latter the primacy hitherto claimed by the former.

SCIENCE, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

The question which now confronts philosophers is this: Are we in reality faced by an irreconcilable opposition? Does the conception of reality sub specie historiæ imply the total exclusion and negation of the alternative conception, and vice versa? Or is the reciprocal negation a partial and dialectical one? Do the two points of view, opposed though they are, imply and supplement each other?

As a matter of fact, it may be observed that, in spite of the separation between the two types of mind already noticed, cross-references from one kind of thought to the other are common, and are becoming commoner. Half a century ago scientific thought tended to entrench itself in a rigidly mechanical view of things and to repudiate all becoming, all development; to-day, to use Bergson's words, it "takes time seriously," and even asserts an "advance in nature," and assumes that the ultimate elements of which the world is made are arranged, not in an immovable space, like the atoms of older science, but in a mobile space-time, like Whitehead's point-events.

Still more recently, in an article on "Art and Science," published in the Journal of Philosophical Studies (July 1930, pp. 331–352), Professor Alexander emphasized the importance of the historical elements which enter into the construction of any scientific theory. Taking his stand on the Comtian classification of the sciences, he pointed out that, as we pass from the most general and abstract sciences, like mathematics and mechanics, to the more individualized and complex sciences, like biology and sociology, the proportion of historical elements increases. "The biological sciences . . . are more like history and less like mathematics, and there is consequently less artifice in them than in physics." And by "artifice" Alexander means to describe the special peculiarity of the scientific mind, the construction of schemata and laws superimposed on the course of historical events.

But this symbiosis of history and science must not lead us to confuse the two. They are quite distinct, and we must hold to the distinction if we wish to understand the significance of their interaction. Thus in the same article Alexander writes: "As the biological sciences grow and become more scientific, that is approach to the ideal of the physical sciences, not only does generalization enter, but measurement; and again, introducing experiment, they become physiological and admit of the statement of laws." Science and history, that is, though combined in a single complex whole, remain distinct. "Darwinism," continues Alexander, "illustrates excellently both these aspects. . . . It is an immense historical comprehension, and indeed it strikes the note of the historical method in science"; but, on the other hand, "besides being a great historical synthesis,

M

PHILOSOPHY

[it] offers in the notion of natural selection a physical law regulating

the historical procession."

These relations and distinctions seem to me to deserve more methodical investigation and illustration. As long as we confine ourselves to analysing cases in which ready-made wholes of scientific thought contain elements of each kind, it is difficult to get beyond partial and fragmentary results. Starting from the Comtian hierarchy of the sciences, itself a classical example of naturalistic thinking and the constructions which it creates, we can do no more than evaluate, in each grade of the hierarchy, the quantity of scientific and historical matter forming its ingredients; we can never put our finger on the thing which, from the point of view of philosophical inquiry, is much more important—the actual way in which thought moves, in history and science respectively. All that the classification of the sciences can tell us is that, in proportion as the scientific or constructive element increases, the historical or individual element dwindles, as Alexander's example of the biological sciences suggests; but this is itself a fact that needs to be explained by studying from within the actual procedure of thought which fixes the inverse proportion of these elements. The investigation here proposed, in short, deals not with the finished products of intellectual work, but with the mental categories that preside respectively over scientific and historical research.

The great example of this kind of inquiry is the Critique of Pure Reason; but, dominated as it is by the classical prejudice against the scientific value of history, Kant's analysis confines itself to the categories which preside over natural science. But the studies of Dilthey and Croce have given us illuminating contributions towards a Critique of Historical Reason, and have broadened our mental horizon by rescuing history from its degradation to a merely empirical level, the level of a bare collection of facts, to which it had been reduced by the "philologism" of succeeding generations after the golden age of "historicism" in the Romantic movement. The abovementioned writers have relieved us of the task of showing that history is not inferior to natural science in scientific value, even if its scientific value is of a special kind; that its distinguishing characteristic is not fact as something merely recorded, but fact as something thought, something brought within the universal relations of thought; that the realm of history is not restricted to some particular province of the knowable, marked off by external and objective signs from the province of natural science, but is coextensive with the knowable in its entirety; and that there is, therefore, a way of looking at the universe sub specie historiæ, that is, from the point of view of becoming and development, just as there is a way of looking at the same universe from the point of view of the constructions of natural science.

SCIENCE, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

But what are the respective characteristics that distinguish these two points of view? How do the categories of scientific thought and those of historical thought differ? Between the *Critique of Pure Reason*, as a theory of natural science, and the Critique of Historical Reason there is, as yet, no adequate reciprocal understanding, precisely because these two points of view have been examined separately, each being taken in turn as excluding the other. What is needed is for philosophical inquiry to place them both on the same plane, and to undertake a comparative study of the mental categories presiding over their respective operations. Only so can we hope to arrive at a conclusion valid for both alike. This is the type of study which, in however summary an outline, we here propose to undertake.

Starting from the conclusions of the Kantian Critique, in order to avoid preliminary explanations, we may consider the two elementary forms of space and time as the two fundamental "frames" of cosmic being and cosmic becoming respectively, and as the two directions of consciousness along which natural science and historical science are to develop by means of the contributions supplied by mental categories of a higher order. Being in space, in an immovable geometrical "frame," quantitative, measurable, is the first condition of any naturalistic construction; becoming in time, with an irreversible order of succession, is the starting-point of all historical comprehension. Doubtless the whole of science is not contained in spatial schemata, nor the whole of history in temporal; these schemata are the poorest and emptiest determinations of their respective realms, yet they serve to indicate the decisive orientations of mental activity in the two, like arrows marking the direction of a movement.

The data of science, then, that is, the elements upon which subsequent elaboration is superimposed by scientific thought, are intuitions in space, which already carry within themselves, as in embryo, the characters of homogeneity and differentiation which are the basis of all scientific constructions. The data of history are events experienced in time, carrying with them a tendency towards internal organization, simply because the moments of time are inside each other and not outside each other like the parts of space.

This primary distinction may seem to be contradicted by the recent philosophical ideas that have grown up round the conception of relativity, which deny the rigid distinction between space and time and assert the necessity for a union of the two, a four-dimensional space-time continuum, constructed as a more comprehensive "frame" at once of cosmic being and of cosmic becoming. But we must remark, by way of preface, that this comprehensive point of view belongs neither to science nor to history as such, but to philo-

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sophy, as the attempt to reach a higher synthetic vision of reality as a whole; this may be seen, for example, in the systems of Alexander and Whitehead. If now we leave this philosophical region of thought and descend to that of natural science, even in the form given to it by the work of Einstein, we find that the predominant sense of the term direction is the spatial sense, because in naturalistic constructions the time-element is regarded as a function of space; here there is no question of an experienced and internalized time, but of trajectories externalized in space, spatial relics (so to speak) of time. Bergson's conclusions on this matter seem to me absolutely convincing: the work of science tends to neutralize time, and to resolve successions into simultaneities, movements into stationary trajectories, l'évolution into l'évolué (becoming into that which has become). The scientific theory of relativity, as has been clearly shown not only by Bergson but by Meyerson, Cassirer, and others, is no exception to this rule. Whitehead's "events," however valuable in a philosophical construction, can never replace the material atom for the purposes of physics, because of the insuperable tendency of science to think in terms of space and things. Even the ingenious attempts on the part of the relativists to reduce simultaneities to successions serve only, within the field of science, to dislodge the special problem of science from one place and to make it reappear elsewhere, as the problem of reducing these new successions into a more comprehensive simultaneity. What can be the meaning of the determined attempt, made by the theory of relativity, to neutralize the points of view of different observers, unless it means that temporal differences existing only from subjective and one-sided points of view must be neutralized in a single and simultaneous vision of the physical world?

Natural science does certainly present us with a union of space and time, but only in the sense that it offers us an interpretation of time in terms of space, working along a line which is orientated in the direction of space. A similar and opposite process may be observed, working along the temporal line which symbolizes the movement of historical thought. In other words, when we place ourselves at the point of view of temporal becoming, we find ourselves interpreting space in terms of time. Consciousness perceives or constructs the parts of space successively, experiences them according to the temporal laws of consciousness itself. Now, in any activity, the advance of spatialization depends on the progressive irradiation of the activity itself. This process becomes especially clear and conspicuous in the higher manifestations of that form of thought which works along time as its fundamental direction, historical thought. Here the spatial world, which in this context is commonly called geographical, appears and unfolds itself to our view as a function

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SCIENCE, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

of the activity of historical agents. No doubt history in its turn depends on constant geographical factors, but only in the same way in which any spiritual activity depends on natural conditions, while at the same time it affirms its superiority to these conditions, its "emergence" at a higher level. In the last resort this proves a reciprocal relation between space and time, in spite of the bifurcation between these two directions of thought to which we have called attention; for this bifurcation, far from making it impossible for each to depend upon the other for its own completion, actually makes this necessary. Without the process of temporal becoming, the process of spatialization would stop, for want of experimental data to arrange. Without spatialization, time would be a mere dispersion, an ephemeral lapse, not a vital acquiring and possessing. Here we can see the significance of the modern philosophical theories of space-time, which replace the rigid mutual separation of space and time by a complementary and to some extent reciprocal relation between two processes. Thus, even at this elementary and almost sensuous phase in the development of the theoretic spirit, we find a forecast or premonition of the relations which the higher mental categories will establish between science and history.

In this further study of the categories of historical and scientific thought, Kant's Analytic of Pure Reason can give us substantial help. But Kant drew up his list of categories with too exclusive a regard to the procedure of natural science; it must be revised and broadened if it is to do justice to the wider horizon of a theoretic

spirit including historical as well as scientific knowledge.

Let us consider the categories in their most elementary significance as the fundamental predicates of our judgments, or, to borrow an expression from Herbert of Cherbury, the principal questions which the mind asks of the objects which it perceives by the senses. When anything presents itself to us in space or is experienced by us in time, we ask ourselves: (1) whether it exists, (2) what it is, (3) why it exists, (4) what it is worth. The that, the what, the why, the value (or, modality, substance, causality, value) are the principal articulations through which the unifying and synthesizing activity of our thought works.

Now, within each of these four divisions we find a reflexion and confirmation of that dual nature of mental activity which we first found revealed in the distinction between space and time. Both science and history use causal categories, modal categories, and so forth, but they use them in different ways, so that the same categorial functions are specified (or rather, as we shall see, polarized) according to the direction taken by consciousness in each case.

(1) In the order of modality, scientific judgments are expressed in the hypothetical form, that is, according to the category of possibility: if a certain condition occurs, a certain consequence will follow. In historical judgments, on the contrary, the modal predicate is that of simple being, factual reality: history states what, as a matter of fact, happened. The necessity of scientific judgments depends on this hypothetical character; it is not a necessity in the antecedent, but a conditional necessity in the consequent. The necessity of historical judgments is simply another name for the contingency of historical events: this particular event did actually happen, therefore it was bound to happen; any rational explanation of the event ultimately comes up against an insuperable element of contingency, which colours the whole of historical thinking and writing. Hence, while science, thanks to the necessity of its hypothetical laws, is able to arrive at rigorous statements, perfectly rational, which, however, travel round the edge of empirical reality without ever penetrating it,1 history pierces into this reality and lives it over again, but is imprisoned within it, and can never escape into the realm of what might be (history, as we say, has nothing to do with ifs) and what ought to be.

(2) As regards the what, we find a similar polarization of scientific thought and historical. Developing along the ideal direction of space, science tends to think in terms of things, to conceive an identical and permanent substratum to which all empirical phenomena are referred. This substratum is either space itself, promoted from the status of a mathematical entity to that of a physical, as in the Cartesian type of science which to-day is enjoying a revival, or else it is something else occupying space, whose determinations tend to coincide with those of space, viz. matter. In history, on the contrary, conformably with the direction of time, which symbolizes becoming and movement, the what of things is expressed by the category of activity, as the driving force of becoming, the selfdevelopment of reality. An history conceived in terms of the category of substance would tend to eliminate all becoming and assert that there is nothing new under the sun, that everything is uniformity and repetition. To some extent this has actually been the ideal of naturalistic history, which has endeavoured to reduce the variety of human activities to mere effects of constant factors, for instance economic forces. The endeavour has always failed, and has only succeeded in eliminating everything which from the historical point of view is of any interest or importance. On the other hand, a science of nature which, instead of thinking in terms of things, tended to think in terms of activities, would be failing to discharge its proper function and struggling in vain to grapple with something inexpressible, incoherent, incapable of being measured. This is the

¹ Cf. Eddington's admirable description of the "circular" track of scientific reasoning in *The Nature of the Physical World*.

SCIENCE, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

danger that besets all those tendencies in science which try to introduce concepts of activity, such as force, life, etc., instead of confining themselves to recording the measurable and calculable effects of these activities, which, qua pure activity, fall outside the realm of

It is characteristic of substance, as grounded in spatial externality, to be "what it is," without increase or diminution; hence the typically scientific laws which refer to this substance as a whole, or to parts of it, always express relations of permanence, conservation, temporal invariability. Activity, on the contrary, develops, grows upon itself, concentrates into the acts of its becoming that which it has already become, and transcends its hitherto realized being in virtue of an energy which tends constantly to create new realizations. Its law is the law of development, of progress. Moreover, just as in space the parts are given in the whole, not individualized by themselves, but individualized only in the whole which circumscribes and defines them, so the parts of a substantial whole have no proper determinations of their own; each acquires consistency and self-sufficiency only through its relation to all the rest. Hence arises the tendency of scientific thought to generalize and to identify through abstracting, a tendency which finds complete satisfaction only when the assimilation of the parts of matter to each other is complete and nothing is left unassimilated. Activity, on the other hand, is always individualized in its manifestations; if its parts imply each other, they do so only as one individual implies another, in the sense that every act posits the conditions of new acts, every individuation demands fresh individuations, because of an inward energy unsatisfied with what has been done and always pressing forward to a new action. Consequently, historical events are organic systems, internally differentiated and articulated, whereas systems of scientific entities are homogeneous mechanical systems, devoid of inner differentiation.

(3) In the order of causality, the form appropriate to scientific thought is deterministic connexion, which resolves the temporal relation of cause and effect into a simultaneous nexus of effects, that is, into a universal law of permanence and cosmic conservation. There is here an exact correspondence with what we noticed above in the case of the relation between time and space in scientific thought. Reduced to a mere dimension of space, time, as time, is annihilated; instead of expressing a constant process of change and renovation, it only serves to confirm and reiterate relations of identity and invariability. Similarly, the category of cause serves in science as the mere complement of the category of substance, or rather, it is a means of reducing the variety of events to the identity of substance: it only signifies that the quantitative relations of the material world do not change with the movements of things. History

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knows a very different kind of causation. So far as it attributes validity to temporal succession as such, history demands an individualized causality, one which produces effects different from the cause, instead of assimilating them to it, and whose effects return into the cause in such a way that the product of an activity reunites itself with the activity that produced it. The type of historical causality is the intentional causality of which we have experience in all our conscious acts. The example in Plato's Phædo is familiar. Why is Socrates sitting in prison? Because (says the scientist, following Anaxagoras) he has bones, muscles, and sinews articulated in a certain way; but the philosopher replies: Because a sentence has been passed upon him which, though unjust, he does not wish to evade by flight, since that would contravene the laws. The two answers symbolize the two types of causal explanation. The difference is not the same as that between efficient and so-called final causes, as this is usually stated. Scientific causality is not efficient; it tends to reduce the synthetic relation of efficiency to an analytic relation of identity; it does not ask how the effect can be produced by or explained through the cause, but how the effect can be traced back to the cause, and this to antecedent effects, in an unbroken chain, each link of which is exactly equivalent to the next. Historical causality, on the contrary, is the true efficient causality, in so far as it is also final. The idea of an intentional causality, an idea which we derive from our psychological experience, combines in itself the two moments of efficiency and intentionality, because it implies the idea of an end as moving us to action. Does it follow that teleology ought to be introduced into historical explanations? Certainly; but only so far as teleology signifies intentionality, as the moving principle of consciousness. If teleology means a principle that transcends the process of historical becoming, we can have nothing to do with it; final causes operate just so far as we present them to our minds and set them before us as ends of our action. But the validity of ends as intentional motives does not imply that they are limited to the sphere of the single individual organism. There are societies which act as individuals, and in which the collective end pervades the activity of the single members; and there are conflicts between societies, and therefore between their ends, which constantly introduce modifications into the effects of historical causes.

In fine, the difference between the two modes of causal explanation lies in this: by deterministic causality we set up external and quantitative connexions between the parts of extended material substance; in history we set up internal connexions between the moments of becoming, so far as some of these actually explain others and include others in themselves, as the present is explained by the past and includes the past in itself. In the one case we have a con-

tinual action and reaction, in the other a continual agitation, or transference of a quantum of movement from one part of substance to another; in the one case a qualitative diversity of cause and effect, in the other a complete quantitative equivalence. Hence there are in science no genuine causes and no genuine effects, but only an unbroken chain of effects; whereas in history we find real causes, that is, spontaneous and intentional combinations of actions which do not refer outside themselves for the principle on which they depend, because history consists of individuals possessing initiative, whereas the entities of science, deprived as they are of individuality, possess nothing except the ability to transmit, impersonally, what comes to them from without.

Here too we must guard against illicit transferences from one mode of causal explanation to the other. Deterministic connexion, when transferred to the realm of history, makes it impossible to grasp the peculiar characteristics of historical events. Thus historical materialism, by attributing a uniform causal agency to economic facts, destroys all diversity among the effects of this agency, because it forgets that the so-called economic conditions do not act mechanically from outside, but produce their effects through a process of internal motivation which diversifies them according to the diversity of the agents' situations and the peculiar way in which their consciousness conceives them and reacts to them. And, on the other hand, intentional causality, applied to natural science, encumbers it with illegitimate animistic relations, ill adapted to the realm of depersonalized and quantitative entities in which science has its being.

(4) To complete our rapid outline of historical and scientific categories, the same antithesis reappears in the category of value. To assess the value or importance of a thing, we judge it by reference to a universal principle posited by ourselves as a criterion or standard of valuation. Now, it is characteristic of the entities of science and our ideas of them that, taken singly, they have no intrinsic value whatever, and they acquire it only so far as they are included in the entire system of entities or ideas of which they are parts. What has value is thus the system, and this absorbs and neutralizes within itself the single elements that go to make it up. Thus, if we take the supreme theoretic value, truth, no scientific proposition taken by itself can be regarded as true; truth is just the coherence of a whole system of scientific propositions, a system leaving no single proposition outside itself, isolated and disconnected. In history, on the contrary, general and common elements have by themselves no value at all; a history consisting of a mass of generalizations is empty and pointless. What counts is the individual; not of course the atomic individual, but the individualized action

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which differentiates itself from all other actions. And general ideas count just so far as they are fused with this individual and help to differentiate it. Individuals do not all stand on the same plane as historical agents; the more the individual can absorb into himself of the world in which he lives, the more his action asserts itself as an individual expression of collective desires and demands and aspirations, and the greater is its historical importance. In consequence, what is historically true is not general ideas but their individual embodiments.

In short: between science and history there is an inverse relation. The one is abstracting thought, which tends towards uniformity and identity, and cancels all the differences which it meets in its path. The other is individuating thought, tending towards multiformity and diversity, and enriching itself as it advances by collecting to itself all the individual determinations of activity that emerge in the course of time. On the one side we have a static projection of the world in space, on the other a dynamic progression in time.

Now, this opposition is not ultimate and irreducible. It is not of such a kind as to necessitate the complete destruction of one form of knowledge in the interests of the other. It is a constructive and fertile opposition. This appears from the fact that, as we already saw in the case of space and time, so also in the case of the respective categories, each side needs to be supplemented and integrated by the other, although it is opposed to the other. The category of possibility, which informs scientific thought, would be utterly impotent unless it could rest upon a factual reality. Every scientific abstraction, and therefore every hypothetical law, must have as its starting-point the observation of a certain "historical" group of phenomena. And, on the other hand, every reality must be rendered definite and concrete by its relation to unrealized possibilities. In studying the genesis of historical actions, therefore, we can be greatly helped by knowing the main alternatives which the unchanging nature of the agent sets before his activity. Similarly, every activity, in realizing itself, incarnates itself and, so to speak, substantializes itself in bodily form, and every substance reveals its nature by its activity. Again, all determinism presupposes an individual causality, and the effects of every individual cause, once produced, arrange themselves into a deterministic system. And lastly, all value implies a reciprocal relation between the individual and the universal. If the world of history is the world of variety, of novelty, of ceaseless creation, and the world of science that of uniformity, permanence, and conservation, it is clear that the one cannot exist utterly separated from the other, and must feel the other as necessary to itself, even if opposed to itself. Scientific thought could never advance, but would freeze to death in its own laws, if it

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ceased to renew and nourish itself by perpetual contact with historical experience. When we look at its systems of hypostatized entities, science gives us the impression of something rigid and static; but when we look at its inner growth, when we think of it as it lives in the mind of the scientist, we see that it constantly breaks through the hard and fast formulas in which it imprisons the world, and must be conceived as a continuous process of historical development. This is why we call science not abstract thought but abstracting thought; it not only creates abstractions, it also overcomes them; it is not a static system of formulas, but a dynamic systematizing process, perpetually deriving new material for assimilation and systematization from the inexhaustible variety of the historical world.

Historical thought, on the other hand, if in its movement it never encountered any halt or pause due to what we may perhaps describe as the coagulation of historical activity into substance, would merely waste away in an utter dispersion, an all-devouring Heraclitean flux. Novelty and variety are inconceivable without identity and permanence. Entities such as institutions, nations, states, cities, constitutions, economic laws, and so forth, are nothing but the results of a tendency on the part of activity to substantialize itself into things; and these things are what enable us to recognize the identity of the agents in the novelty of their actions, as well as the identity of the tendencies and goals of these actions, and give to historical

thought its solid constructive framework.

The task of showing that these two opposed forms of thought spring, in spite of their opposition, from a common root and must end in a final reunion is a task for philosophy. Philosophy as such cannot identify itself either with science or with history; it must rise above the conflict into a region where it can judge between the claims of the combatants. Scientific knowledge and historical knowledge form ideal divisions of the cognitive spirit, neither of which can claim by itself to exhaust reality, but each is bound to acknowledge the other as its own limit. Science only attains formal rigour in its laws by abstracting from the individuating conditions of the historical process; its limit, therefore, is laid down by the individual, that which can never be repeated. Laws of identity and statistical laws, the two great moûles of scientific construction, make abstraction precisely of whatever singularities there may be in the behaviour of phenomena; if we want to know which of the various possible paths is that actually chosen by reality in its becoming, there is nothing for it but an appeal to historical observation. History, on its side, is bound hand and foot to an irreversible temporal and causal series which prevents it from dominating its object in such a way as to embrace it in a law rising superior to time, and to a factual contingency which, however permeated it may be with

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rationalistic explanations, always to some extent resists the effort after complete assimilation. In any case, the rationality of history is an ex post facto rationality. Ante factum, history offers no foothold to reason; historical events cannot be scientifically foretold or anticipated. This is why history is of so little value for practical guidance. Action is directed towards the future, and the future lies wholly outside the field of historical knowledge. The formulas of science, on the contrary, eliminate time altogether, and with it the novelty of the historical process; and therefore they anticipate the future just sufficiently to enable us to use them with a certain degree of confidence as guides for action. This partially justifies the pragmatist theories of science which are so widespread in modern philosophy, though it would not justify a theory which deprived science of any theoretical value whatever.

To follow the rhythm of these two mental forms in their development, to grasp their necessity and constructive value for the life of the spirit, and to arrive through this process at a view of the world at once single and articulated—these are perhaps the most important tasks that confront the theory of knowledge at the present time. But if this is to be done, it seems to me that philosophers must first of all make up their minds to abandon their present fin de non recevoir with regard to dialectic. Throughout the history of the philosophical tradition from Plato to Hegel, dialectic has played a dominant part in the speculative explanation of the universe. Hegel's misuse of it, and then the growth of scientific habits of thought, have alienated the minds of philosophers from this method. which nevertheless is the royal road of philosophy. To-day the dialectical method seems to have become the unenvied monopoly of a little group of surviving Hegelians. But if philosophy is what it is generally thought to be, the theory of value and of valuation. I do not see how it can do without dialectic unless it is to surrender it prime raison d'être. It is in the nature of all values to polarize themselves into two opposite terms, conflicting with one another, and yet each at once demanding and supplementing the other. No beauty, no truth, no goodness is intelligible apart from this connexion with its own opposite; and the synthetic point of view, which combines the opposites into an articulated and living unity, is precisely the point of view characteristic of philosophy. If present-day speculation has abandoned dialectic, this is because philosophy has come by degrees to copy the methods of natural science, which, with its tendency to think in terms of things, congeals the results of intellectual labour into hard and fast schemata, from which every trace of the dialectical activity that created them is banished. The dialectical character of thought thus appears only in its processes, and not in its results. Concentrated as they are upon their objects, 178

SCIENCE, HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY

the particular sciences tend to embody thought in things; and obviously things, as static and circumscribed determinations of reality, admit of no further dialectical treatment. Philosophy, on the contrary, as the critical valuation of scientific concepts, leads the work of thought back to the focus of the activity from which it proceeds, and therefore the dialectical character of mental activity is bound to reappear in philosophy. Hence the dialectical problem of truth, as the antithesis of error and the overcoming of error, never appears in the particular sciences. There are only truths embedded, so to speak, in things, whence thought seems to extract them. It is only philosophy, with its centripetal movement, that disentangles these truths from the things and restores to them the fluidity that belongs to their true mental nature.

The relation between science and history, which we have here attempted to illustrate, is just such a dialectical relation, of the kind which philosophy alone has the power of grasping. If we place ourselves at the point of view of science, we are obliged to return a sheer negative to the claims of the historical point of view, and vice versa; only from the point of view of philosophy, from which the inner genesis of mental activity becomes visible, can we see the two points of view as opposed to each other, and, at the same time, as standing in need of each other and making good each other's defects.¹

¹ In speaking of the "point of view" of philosophy, I do not of course mean to refer exclusively to the professional philosopher as a different person from the historian and the scientist. I refer to the philosophical function of the mind, a function present both in the historian and in the scientist. That such a function is necessarily present in the minds of these persons is a corollary of the dialectical conception of philosophy stated in the text.

THE ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON

NORMAN CAMPBELL, Sc.D.

ALL candid philosophers, in setting out on their great task of coordinating and criticizing the whole range of human thought, must often feel embarrassed by the limitations of their own knowledge. Their difficulties in dealing with scientific thought have increased very greatly during the last thirty years. For, while science has been rapidly growing more complex and abstruse, philosophers have been tending to require a more intimate knowledge of it. They are no longer interested only in scientific methods (which, it is often assumed, can be studied apart from their applications); they are beginning to find significance in particular propositions and principles. Some of these cannot be comprehended in their entirety by anyone who has not submitted himself to a training so specialized and so severe as to be almost incompatible with the width of outlook that makes the philosopher. Accordingly, philosophers have abandoned all attempts to acquire their knowledge of certain branches of science (particularly physics) from the original memoirs and expository treatises addressed to scientists; they have recourse to interpreters.

Now it might be argued that interpreted science is not science at all. For interpretation to the laity of such a subject as mathematical physics involves the omission of essential elements, for example, the mathematical analysis and concepts summarizing extensive and intricate collections of facts. Without these elements the subject could never have advanced; from them the science derives its meaning for all serious students. The proper reply to such an objection is, presumably, that these elements, though essential to those who seek to advance science, are relatively unimportant to those who seek merely to understand it. But if this is so-and of course there is much to be said on the other sidethere must be other elements essential even to the philosopher; interpretation will involve distortion unless they are preserved. The identification of these elements is surely a problem for philosophy; the interpreter, in deciding what he must retain, commits himself to some form of philosophy; the philosopher whom he addresses may receive his knowledge of science from sources tainted by doctrines that his analysis of science may lead him to reject.

The dangers arising from this source might be avoided if the interpreters from whom philosophers receive their knowledge 180

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formed a large and representative body of scientists. For if the interpreters differed in their outlook, a comparison of them might enable the common (and therefore purely scientific) elements to be disentangled; if they agreed, any philosophical doctrines implied by their interpretation might be taken as truly and necessarily part of science. Actually the facts are very different. Few scientists attempt interpretation and fewer still succeed. Even among the very small group of fully equipped scientists who gain the attention of philosophers at all, some exercise much more influence than others. For many philosophers, and for most journalists and novelists, modern physics is simply what Sir Arthur

Eddington says.

His exceptional position has probably one of three reasons. The first, a very good one, is his exceptional power of expression; he may not have more to say than others, but his humour and literary charm enable him to say it better. The second is the authority that he derives from being himself a very great scientist, so great that it is almost impertinent for lesser men to call him so. This is not a good reason. For the laity do not read the works that prove his greatness; these need interpretation as much as the works of any other scientist. In the works that they do read he has no opportunity of showing that, as a scientist, he is anything more than well informed, incapable indeed of the minor errors that so often betray the amateur, but not more incapable than hundreds of well-trained men wholly devoid of distinction. On the other hand, it is not definitely a bad reason. The third reason is that he is much more than a scientist; unlike many great scientists, who become puerile as soon as they leave their own province, he is worth hearing on any subject on which he cares to speak. But this is a bad reason. For if his interests and his intelligence extend beyond the bounds of science, the danger that something alien to science will creep into that part of his work which professes to be purely interpretative becomes very serious indeed. My object here is to maintain that he has indeed fallen into this error—or, perhaps more accurately, that those who regard his work as purely interpretative have fallen into it. His error is one of omission rather than commission. He has distorted science, not by introducing foreign elements, but by leaving wholly out of account those essential elements from which science derives its practical value.

Of course a protest will at once be raised that practical value is not in the least essential to science, that only pragmatists believe that propositions are true because they are useful, and that the scientific propositions that interest the laity most, such as the doctrines of Evolution and Relativity, have so far been devoid of any practical value whatever. But though much of science has no actual

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practical value, it all has potential practical value; and, though this practical value, actual or potential, does not make science true, it makes it science. For some philosophers, no doubt, science is merely one of the various activities of the human mind, co-ordinate with art or religion; they would take as much interest in it (or as little) if it had no validity outside the laboratory, and if the experience with which it is concerned were as remote from the daily life of the plain man as the ecstasies of the sensitive artist and the religious mystic. To such I have nothing to say. But for most modern thinkers, science possesses a certain "authority," denied to art or religion or even mathematics, because it can handle those hard facts of everyday existence, which men may value differently, but none can wholly ignore. The power of prediction, and therefore of control, from which science derives its practical value, is the source also of its philosophic importance. A science that lacked such power, and could not distinguish facts from dreams, would have affected neither our material nor our spiritual life; the practical value of science and its intellectual interest are inseparable.

But, though they are inseparable, they attach to different parts of science. Practical value attaches to laws, intellectual interest to theories. Laws, in general, are interesting only because they establish theories; theories are useful only because they lead to the discovery of laws. Fundamentally laws and theories, though interdependent, are distinct, and confusion between them would destroy the basis of all scientific investigation. Superficially they are often so similar in their form and in their content that careful thought and extensive knowledge is needed to decide where the boundary lies. My chief charge against Eddington is that he encourages a confusion between laws and theories. In order to ascertain how the confusion may arise and to what errors it may give birth, we must start with a brief inquiry into the difference between them. Since the only science with which we are concerned here is physics, we may suppose for brevity that our laws are experimental and our theories mathematical.

A law states that certain experiments can be performed; that is all it states. If I assert that the pressure of a gas increases with its temperature, and if you doubt the statement or do not know what it means, I must demonstrate experiments to you. The experiment with which I shall start will be one involving a pressure-gauge and a thermometer; and if you were an expert, who by some mischance had failed to acquaint yourself with that particular law, that would suffice. But if you are completely ignorant of physical apparatus, you will rightly ask why I call the readings of one instrument pressure and those of the other temperature. To explain this I shall have to state other laws and perform other experiments to demon-

ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON
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strate them. For instance, nearly all thermometers are based on the law that bodies of different temperatures tend to the same temperature when brought into contact; this is the law that gives

the term temperature its meaning.

Here appears one of Eddington's minor but characteristic errors. He tells us again and again that the data of physics are "pointer readings," suggesting that they are confined to a very narrow and special region of experience. The suggestion is superficially plausible only because modern physicists are accustomed to leave so much of their work to instrument makers and standardizing laboratories; their practice is admirable as an economical division of labour, but it is most misleading in philosophical analysis. Pointer readings are interesting only because they are the identification marks of certain experiments of which they constitute one small and not very important element: these experiments are an essential, but concealed, constituent of any experiment involving pointer readings. The experiment that a law really means is almost always vastly more complex than the experiment that an expert would accept as a demonstration of it. If we want to arrive at the ultimate data of physics, we must analyse all the concepts, such as pressure and temperature, in terms of which laws are conventionally stated, and ask what are the experiments that they imply. We must continue our analysis (if we can) till we find laws involving no complex concepts, and meaning nothing but the experiments by which they are demonstrated. We shall then discover that the true data of physics are infinitely more complex than the highly specialized observations made in a modern laboratory; they include the whole of the incoherent mass of sensory experience that constitutes the daily life of the ordinary man.

This complexity of laws is the clue to their discovery. If, in order to discover a law, we had always to search the tangle of unanalysed experience in the hope of finding an experiment that could be demonstrated at will, progress would be very slow and fitful. Actually laws are discovered by combining previously known experiments to form new and more complex experiments. Thus, when we have found the laws that gases have pressures and temperatures, it is a simple matter to inquire whether there is a law relating the pressure of a gas to its temperature. In a highly developed science the number of experiments and the modes of their possible combination already known is so large that the formation of new combinations and the discovery of new laws is almost a matter of routine, requiring nothing but energy and an adequate training in recognized technique. Almost-but not quite! Even at this stage there is room for natural aptitude, and some are more successful in discovering laws than others. In the earlier stages natural aptitude is essential, and in

183

those who initiate a branch of science, starting from unanalysed

experiences, it amounts to genius.

One necessary ingredient of this aptitude is love of the work. Unlike the mathematician to whom (as a mathematical friend once told me) every material object other than a sheet of white paper is intellectually abhorrent, the experimenter is at home in the material world. He enjoys handling apparatus, making it, devising it, and getting it to work. This affection for the concrete is naturally accompanied by a distaste for the abstract. The experimenter finds little pleasure in pure thought; the propounding of paradoxes and the asking of unanswerable questions drives him to impotent fury. In particular, he shrinks from the question, so enticing to philosophers, why he believes that experiments demonstrable to-day will be demonstrable to-morrow. A belief that there are demonstrable experiments is inherent in the innermost substance of his thought; he cannot divest himself of it, even so far as to consider why he holds it. The most "reasonable" pronouncement he would be likely to make, if pressed, is that if experiments did not repeat themselves, there would be no joy in experimenting. A recent writer in this Journal announced that in the discovery of laws the scientist must assume something or other very profound. He would have been right if he had said "must not assume"; anybody who could assume any abstract proposition of the kind he stated could not be an experimental scientist and could not discover laws; but he could be a Bacon, a Whewell, or a Mill, discoursing about science without practising it.

This aversion from the logical and the abstract makes scientists appear very naïve and stupid fellows to those whose tastes differ. The point that I want to make is that this naïveté and stupidity is an essential part of their science, that these naïve and stupid people are the true scientists, who make science what it is and give it practical value.1

One word more before we leave laws. I have said nothing about numerical laws, which are the basis of all mathematical science; such laws, for example, as that the pressure of a gas is proportional to its temperature. It may be questioned whether this conception of proportionality is, as I have suggested, capable of being interpreted solely in terms of demonstrable experiments. Personally I think it can, while admitting a doubt. But there is no doubt that, even if such laws contain an element that is not experimental, they

Of course I, in my humble way an experimenter, do not plead guilty to stupidity. It seems to me that the philosophers are wrong who imagine that reason and logic can lead to the discovery of truth; they are merely ways of justifying and explaining truth to those who have themselves no power of discovery.

ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON

also contain elements that are. Eddington seems sometimes to suggest that physical laws are merely laws between numbers, numbers being purely mathematical and abstract conceptions. That is entirely false. It may be true that it is only the relation between numbers that interests the mathematician, and that, for example, the equation xy = c means exactly the same thing to him whether it represents a law concerning hyperbolas or one concerning perfect gases. But that is merely because he deliberately ignores a difference, not because the difference is not there. The sign = states, besides a numerical relation, the same in both laws, a physical relation, very different in the two, and describable only in terms of experiment.

Now let us turn to theories. Theories explain laws. The essence of explanation is the substitution of more for less satisfying concepts. It may take many forms, which it is not our business here to analyse and classify; but two forms require attention. One is explanation by generalization; ideas are the more satisfactory, the more general they are and the wider the field of experience that they cover; a thing is explained when it is shown to be a particular example of something more general. Explanation of this kind plays some part in science, and especially in its applications to facts of common experience. I offer a scientific explanation of the connection between low barometric pressure and rain, when I suggest that it arises from the more general connection between the cooling of a gas by reduction of pressure and the condensation of vapour contained in it. But this is not the explanation of a law by a theory, but the inclusion of a narrower within a wider law. Theoretical explanation, with which we are now concerned, may and usually does consist partly in generalization; for the theory may explain several laws, and thus exhibit each as a special case of something more general; but the generalization is not an important part of the explanation, and some important theories in these earlier stages have involved no generalization at all. Theories of science, which regard generalization as the main object of science, mistake the accidental for the essential.

The second form is explanation by familiarization; a mysterious event is explained when it is shown to consist of familiar happenings in unusual relation. The explanation offered by theories is rather of this form; for the essence of it is the introduction of new ideas, not contained in the laws to be explained, that are satisfactory because they are intrinsically acceptable and make an immediate appeal to the sense of intellectual fitness.

The connection established by the theory between the new ideas and those to be explained can probably be described in many ways; the way that seems to me most illuminating analyses a theory into

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two separate parts, the "hypothesis" and the "dictionary." The hypothesis consists of propositions about the new ideas, characteristic of the theory—the hypothetical ideas, as we shall call them; the dictionary relates these ideas (or combinations of them) to concepts involved in laws (such as temperature or pressure) in such a way that propositions about the hypothetical ideas can be translated into laws describing experiments.

Two examples should suffice to illustrate this analysis. In the dynamical theory of gases, the hypothesis consists of statements about the properties of molecules and the manner of their motions and reactions with themselves and the walls of the vessel; the dictionary relates the mean kinetic energy of a molecule to the temperature of the gas, the mean rate of change of momentum at the walls to the pressure, and so on. In Bohr's theory of spectra the hypothesis lays down the necessary conditions for a stable atomic orbit; the dictionary relates the transition between two

stable orbits to the emission of a line in the spectrum.

The theory is tested experimentally by inquiring whether deductions from the hypothesis, translated by the dictionary, describe experiments that are actually demonstrable. This criterion is necessary, but it is not sufficient. If it were sufficient, anyone could invent a theory to explain any law or set of laws. A further criterion is that the theory must predict or seem capable of predicting laws other than those on which it was originally based. Those who profess to regard theories as valuable only because they suggest new experiments would probably regard this as the chief criterion. But it is difficult to believe that this doctrine is really accepted by scientists -or at least by any physicists; they appear to accept it because they are timid about expressing their true opinions. For it leaves no room for explanation, which we all know, though we may not admit it, to be the real function of a theory. A theory explains only if the hypothetical ideas are intrinsically satisfactory, and the first question that must be asked about any theory before it is worth while to apply any new experimental tests is whether it is so plausible that, if it survived those tests, it would explain something.

But what makes a theory plausible? Until recently it was often maintained that the only plausible theories were "mechanical" theories in which there was a close analogy between the hypothesis and the laws governing some mechanical system, and that no theory could explain unless it were thus based on a mechanical analogy. The dynamical theory of gases is typical of such theories; the propositions of the hypothesis concerning the molecules are closely analogous to laws describing experiments on a collection of elastic balls. To-day (we are often told) plausibility consists rather in a 186

ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON

generality and simplicity that satisfies the mathematician's sense of form. Doubtless there has been a change in the ideas that physicists will admit into these theories as intrinsically satisfactory. But the extent of the "revolution" that has overthrown the old "classical" physics based on Newtonian mechanics is often exaggerated. Much of the plausibility of the older theories lay, not in their use of specifically Newtonian doctrines, but in the wider attempt to explain all forms of change as changes of motion and position; such changes seem hardly to require or to be capable of explanation. But this feature persists in the newer theories which adopt dynamical principles other than the Newtonian. Bohr's theory of spectra or Sommerfield's theory of the metallic state is in this sense as mechanical as the dynamical theory of gases. There persists an analogy between the hypothetical ideas and the concepts in terms of which laws are stated.

This analogy between hypothesis and laws is apt to obscure the distinction between them. When certain hypothetical ideas are called the position, velocity or mass of a molecule, it is not easy always to remember that statements about them are essentially different in character from statements about the position, velocity or mass of a material body. The confusion is further encouraged because the terms in which true laws are described are often derived from theories, just as the terms in which theories are described are usually derived from laws. For these and for other reasons that need not be given in detail, it is not always easy to decide whether a given statement is a law or a theory, and there are border-line cases not easy to classify. But that does not mean that the distinction is not valid or that there are not other cases in which it is perfectly clear. If it were neglected altogether, most theories would cease to fulfil their primary purpose, namely, to explain. Thus a molecular theory of elasticity would explain nothing if we really attributed to molecules elasticity of the same kind as that possessed by elastic bodies. The properties of a molecule, its position, velocity, elasticity, and so on, are entirely different things from the properties of material bodies called by the same names. For-this is the essential point-if they are displayed in experiment at all, the experiments are entirely different. Some hypothetical ideas, such as the position or velocity of an individual molecule, are not accessible to experiment at all; the dictionary contains no entries by means of which propositions concerning them can be converted into laws. Others, such as mass or mean velocity, are accessible to experiments, but only (it must be remembered) by means of the dictionary. The experiments by which we determine the mass of a molecule are entirely different from those by which we determine the mass of a billiard ball; moreover, even these experiments would not determine the mass unless the truth

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of the theory is assumed, while the mass of a billiard ball can be determined without any theory whatever.

The main fallacy of the doctrines against which I am inveighing is a neglect of this distinction between a law and a theory. Of course Eddington himself understands it perfectly; he could not do valuable scientific work if he did not. But in his popular writings he neglects it entirely. His neglect is so complete and so consistent that it must be deliberate; and indeed there is good reason for it. It enables him to make his exposition exciting by an appearance of paradox, and to avoid altogether any inquiry, necessarily somewhat tedious to the laity, into the evidence for the theories he expounds; his perfect freedom from any qualms in this matter is one of the main reasons why he is so readable, lucid, and inspiring.

The most striking example of his practice is his use, in expounding the theory of relativity, of his famous "illustration" of two men in aeroplanes smoking cigars. He tells us that "according to relativity" they would make the most surprising observations entirely incompatible with all our common-sense notions of time, and even with the difference between past, present, and future. The truth is that, if relativity tells us anything about these men smoking cigars in aeroplanes, it tells us (in conjunction with chemistry, physiology, and the older parts of physics) that they could not exist, that no two living beings could possibly move relatively to each other with a velocity nearly that of light, and yet be in a position to make any observations at all. If we want to know what relativity does predict in the realm of observations and experiment, we must inquire what are the observations and experiments that establish the theory; we shall then find that they are not in the least surprising; that they are perfectly consistent with common-sense notions of time and with a sharp distinction between past and future, and that they do not even involve two observers moving relatively to each other. In fact the main difficulty in obtaining conclusive experimental evidence in favour of Einstein's theory is that the laws that it predicts are qualitatively so exactly similar to those which have long been taken as natural and inevitable that it is difficult to be certain of the minute qualitative differences. The time, space, and motion of relativistic theory are very different things from the time, space, and motion of experiment, just as the velocity of a molecule is a very different thing from the velocity of a material body.

But, somebody will say, if certain purely practical obstacles were removed and if certain experiments, not possible now, were per-

Indeed, if he cared to defend himself from my criticisms he could point to passages in his books which make just the points that I am making here. But they are so unobtrusive that his non-scientific readers miss them.

ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON

formed—Stop there! When you propose that assumption, you immediately remove the discussion from the realm of science, just as when you say, If all men were contented with their lot, you remove it from the realm of politics. It may be great fun pursuing the consequences of your hypothesis, but it is not science. For science the distinction between what is and what is not possible, between experiments that can be demonstrated and experiments that cannot, is absolutely vital and essential; if it neglected that distinction for a moment, science would cease to be science; it would cease to have practical value.

Two other examples may be noticed. Eddington is always saying that the interior of the most solid body is "really" as empty as interstellar space, and contains only minute particles separated by distances incomparably larger than their dimensions. The conclusion that his readers are naturally inclined to draw is that facts are not facts and that things are not what they seem. Such a conclusion would be quite unjustified. The "distances" between intro-atomic electrons are quite different things from the distances between stars; they are detected by entirely different experiments; and the experiments that prove that the electrons are widely separated include, as an essential part, those that show that material bodies are impenetrable in the ordinary sense. The tenuity of an iron atom is not incompatible with the solidity of an iron bar, but rather dependent on it; if iron bars were not solid, we should have no evidence that iron atoms are tenuous.

Again, he makes great play with Heisenberg's Principle of Interdemination, which asserts (among other things) that it is impossible to determine both the position and the velocity of an electron; but he omits to point out that experimentally it is impossible to determine either. The position or the velocity of an electron does not mean the same thing as the position or the velocity of a rifle bullet. In fact it is such an entirely different thing, something so purely hypothetical and so distant from the realm of fact and laws, that Heisenberg himself, in an earlier state of his theory, was proclaiming that it ought to be removed entirely from the conceptions of physics. There is no difficulty in determining both the velocity and the position of any body accessible to experiment.

Lastly, Eddington suggests that Heisenberg's theory helps to solve the old puzzle about the freedom of the will by destroying much or all of the scientific evidence in favour of determinism. But surely such evidence as science ever produced in favour of determinism was based on the simple fact that there are laws, and that in certain departments of experience effects can be demonstrably predicted from ascertainable causes. Heisenberg's theory does not alter this fact in the smallest degree. It throws no doubt

on the validity of laws; indeed, the evidence for it, as for any theory, consists of laws; nor does it limit, but rather extend, the range of experience in which laws are discoverable. All that it does in this direction is to indicate once more that a complete explanation of laws must introduce ideas that are not suggested by analogies with laws.

But I shall be told that I am proving too much. These new conceptions of such great philosophic interest—a time that is a form of space in which past and future may be confused, or particles that have no positions but only probabilities of appearing in themthese have surely some scientific reality and therefore some philosophical significance. I do not deny it; what I maintain is that Eddington exaggerates and distorts their importance. Let me try to explain by analogy. All painters, even the least classical, would admit that the beauties of nature and of art are not wholly dissimilar, and that a painter may rightly be influenced by the possibility of representing natural objects on canvas. But many would deny vehemently that it is a legitimate criticism of a picture to point out that it is not much like any natural object, and that the object to which it is least unlike is exceedingly ugly; to understand the relation between natural and pictorial beauty and the place that representation should play in painting, a critic must study art with sufficient care to gain some appreciation of an artist's feelings.

In the same way I admit that these strange ideas have some place in science. They have influenced the inventor in framing his theory and, even more, the scientific world in understanding and accepting it. To them is due part of the intrinsic attractiveness of the theory. But they are not an essential or permanent part. The theories from the outset derived attractiveness also from mathematical elegance, and they are coming to derive it from familiarity and established use. The paradoxes about clocks and measuring-rods are vanishing from modern expositions of relativity; in the next generation they will probably disappear entirely from scientific writings and be remembered only by the misunderstandings that they have generated. To regard them as the main feature of the theory, and to base on them our conclusions concerning the nature of philosophical reality as revealed by science, is a vulgar error; the nature of their reality can be appreciated only by those who have studied science sufficiently to know how a scientist thinks.

For when a scientist says that a theory is true and that it gives information about reality, what he (like most others) means is that it satisfies his intellectual cravings. Now the chief of those cravings is a desire to know facts, just because they are facts, and a desire to explain them or relate them to each other in some sort of coherent scheme. The scientist is in little danger of confusing hypotheses with

ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON

laws, because a power and a wish to distinguish between imaginary and real facts is ingrained in his very nature. Nobody can understand what his attitude is towards the analogies that form part of theories who has not some experience of and sympathy with the scientist's attitude towards facts. It is not necessary that he should know all the facts in detail, for a scientist can appreciate fully theories in a branch of science of which his knowledge is very superficial. But he must know that there are facts behind the theory, and that the prime function of the theory is to explain those facts. Those who by temperament are naturally averse from facts, and have been encouraged by popular expositors to regard the experimental foundations of a theory as something wholly separate from its meaning, are as little fitted to discuss scientific theories and scientific reality as an intelligent but hermaphroditic oyster would be to appreciate the beauty and significance of erotic poetry.

Must we then admit that modern physics has no special message for philosophy, and that philosophers must return to regarding science merely as the empiric description of a field of experience in which they feel a scant interest? I do not profess to know. But it seems to me that if philosophy has anything to learn from recent science, the lesson is to be found, not in particular theories, which, like all theories, are liable to sudden modification and supersession, but in the great and probably permanent change in the relation of

mathematics and physics.

Much of mathematics takes its origin from experimental science, arithmetic from enumeration, geometry from the measurement of rigid bodies, and so on. In separating from the parent stock, mathematics confined itself to one part of experimental relations, the numerical part; it was thereby led to alter and generalize the concepts from which it started, producing from them concepts without validity in the experimental field, such as imaginary numbers, hyper-space, or continuity. When these first appeared, experimenters were inclined to hostility; they doubted whether any good could come of the study of concepts devoid of physical meaning. But they soon found that the new concepts were useful in calculation; they accordingly admitted that they were permissible, or indeed essential, in mathematical argument, though they still insisted that methods involving them were valid only in so far as they were mere substitutes for others in which physical meaning could be assigned to every concept. In the last stage they have realized that their criterion of physical meaning was too narrow, and that some of their apparently insoluble problems could be solved by admitting purely mathematical ideas into their theories (but not, of course, into their laws) on a standing of full equality with ideas that derived their meaning from experimental analogies.

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The first two of these stages can be paralleled in the relations between philosophy and science. Science became a separate study when it confined itself strictly to one part of the field of experience, in which personality can be eliminated and universal assent obtained; it developed concepts, such as that of an experimental law, which have no validity for experience outside its own field. Philosophers were mainly interested in this experience; they protested therefore that these concepts were not real, and doubted whether science could lead to truth. More recently they have admitted that the concepts of science are completely valid within its own field, and that scientific inquiry is the only method of discovering the kind of truth that attaches to empirical experience; but they are still loath to admit that scientific truth is whole or complete truth unless it survives re-examination by the tests that they have been in the habit of applying. Will the last stage come? Will philosophy ever find that many of its problems have been insoluble because its criteria of truth and reality are too narrow, and that they can be solved if these criteria are revised and widened so as to admit all the conclusions and concepts of science to the most complete forms of truth and reality?

IMAGINING AND REASONING

PROFESSOR H. WILDON CARR

I wish to discuss the nature and the relation to one another of two kinds of mental activity, and I can most clearly indicate what they are if I take some illustrations from familiar experience.

Imagine you are walking by a moonlit sea. The ripples sparkle in a broad expanse of sheen, forming a definite triangle, its apex far off on the surface of the water and its base spreading out on each side. As you watch the reflected moonlight you may see some object, say a boat propelled by rowers, move into the gleaming zone and become suddenly bathed in resplendent light. The rowers seem to have come out of the darkness into the light. The moonbeams which before were not falling on them seem now to be dazzling them. You know, of course, for you understand the laws of reflection and of the convergence of light rays, that this sudden illumination of the rowers in your prospect does not correspond with any change whatever in their actual experience, yet you find the illusion practically impossible to dissipate.

Again, imagine that you are in a room the walls of which are faced with mirrors and which is illuminated within. There will be no limit to the visible extension and a very sensible limit to the tactual extension. The phenomenon is familiar enough, and usually described as natural illusion. You know, you think, the exact position of the reflected image, it is reflected from the surface of the mirror, yet you are unable to locate it there or even to think it there, it lies for you somewhere behind the mirror. The visible extension behind the mirror has no counterpart whatever in the real world, yet you cannot by any effort or contrivance destroy the illusion.

Once again, imagine you are observing in a laboratory the projection of a beam of light from an incandescent gas through a prism to a screen. You see the band of the spectrum. Here there is no illusion. You see and can only see the spectrum, but you regard the spectrum as a phenomenon, and the real thing as electronic orbital movements in atoms, which you can never see.

In each of these cases what you objectify is a phenomenon, giving that term the recognized meaning of something existing in nature and not in your fancy, which yet cannot claim independent existence, whatever be its ground or cause, because its existence depends on the observer and his relation to the reality observed. Whether or

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not everything we observe is a phenomenon in this sense we need not inquire. It is sufficient for our present purpose that it should be granted that the sheen on the water, the visible extension behind the mirror, the spectrum on the screen, are non-existent in abstraction from the relation of the observer to the real thing, whatever it be.

I want to submit the experience of which these illustrations are

typical to psychological analysis.

We shall easily distinguish three factors. First, sensitivity, the passive power of receiving stimuli from without and experiencing them in the form of sensations; it is clear that without the organization of the special senses there can be no experience of phenomena. Second, reason or understanding, an active power of reflective consciousness. Third, imagination, an ill-defined factor, yet necessary if we are to account for the arising of an illusion.

It is the status of imagination which I wish to discuss. It is usually regarded as a subjective activity dependent on the passive power of receiving and retaining sense-impressions, recalling them as memories, and hence of recombining them more or less fantastically. Fantastic association and dissociation are the essence of imagination. It is recognized that imagination may have high æsthetic, intellectual, and moral value in the realm of art; it is what we seek to eschew and banish from the realm of science. We guard ourselves against the imagination; it is the fruitful source of illusion and error.

I am going to defend what to many may appear a paradoxical position. It is that imagination is more original, more fundamental, and more essential a factor in the mental life than sensation or understanding or reason. Were there no imagining, sensing would be meaningless, and thinking would be impossible, for there would be nothing to think about.

Let us see first what the philosophers have had to say on the question. The historical development of the problem in the modern period is most instructive to follow. Here I can of course give it only a brief and cursory reference. When modern science and philosophy arose in the seventeenth century the new method of doubt fixed attention upon the deceitfulness of the senses, and the false apport of the senses was attributed to imagination. Thus Descartes instances the case of persons who have undergone amputations, and still localize sensation in their non-existent limbs. Imagination was regarded generally, by the Cartesians, and also by the empiricists, as a kind of riotous activity to which the mind was subject when not under the control of the intellect. Imagination for them had no positive function and played no necessary part in conscious experience. As mental activity it presented a strong contrast to discursive reason which strives for 194

I M A G I N I N G A N D R E A S O N I N G

clearness and distinctness. Imagination was identified with confused and obscure thinking. Consequently the scheme of human knowledge was: first, impressions of external objects and internal desires and emotions on the senses; second, thinking or reasoning on this sense-given matter; out of which arose, third, the laws of association. This was the full account of mental activity on its theoretical side. Any slackening of the intellectual work led to confusion and obscurity, and this when it took the form of actual illusion was represented as the active work of a lively imagination. Yet even this lively imagination was an illusion, because imagination for them was an absence, not a presence. In sleep, for example, when the senses are closed to the external world, and the animal spirits, according to the theory then held, are coursing through the brain, reviving traces of past impressions, and under no control of reason, we have the illusion of dream. Imagination was identified with this negative reality of the dream state.

Kant was the first in the line of the historic philosophical development to discover that imagination is not the name for uncontrolled intellectuality, but a positive factor with its definite place in the scheme of knowledge, an activity sui generis in the formation of experience. It is curious and instructive to see how Kant was led to this discovery. Imagination is invoked by him in the Critique of Pure Reason, in the transcendental æsthetic and in the schematism of the categories. In the transcendental æsthetic he shows how the definitions, propositions, and operations of mathematics, though purely ideal in form, are yet wholly dependent on sense imagery for content. The logical understanding cannot get to work without the aid of the æsthetic imagination. In the transcendental analytic he shows how the concepts of physics in the pure forms of the categories of relation—substance, causality, reciprocity—are dependent on the imagination for the subsumption under them of the sense-matter of the universe. He was led to the important distinction between the reproductive and the productive or creative imagination. The reproductive imagination is the simple projection forward into the future of imagery recalled from the experience of the past. It differs from memory in being anticipation, not recollection. The productive imagination is that which gives shape, figure, objectivity to the manifold of sense. It creates, in fact, what the Gestalt psychologists now distinguish as Gestalten. This recognition of the imagination as a creative activity at once led to a differentiation of the realms of art and philosophy, and the first result of this new direction of mental science is the æsthetic theory of Kant's Critique of Judgment. It is not, however, till our own day that we have in the work of a contemporary philosopher, Benedetto Croce, the theory of the autonomy of imagining and

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imagination as a distinct moment in the life of the Spirit. The æsthetic activity, creative of images, is in the theory of Croce the pre-condition of the logical activity, creative of concepts.

Let us turn from the philosophical aspect of the problem to the scientific. How would the psychologist in the interest of his science analyse and interpret an experience such as we have instanced in our three examples? The psychologist approaches his problem unencumbered with any assumptions or inferences of metaphysical causation. Whether he be a behaviourist or an introspectionist, reality for him is psychical experience in its immediacy. His one interest is to discover by analysis the data of consciousness and the factors which constitute experience. Two kinds of psychical elements are easily recognized and readily distinguished, sensations, the æsthetic manifold; and percepts, images or ideas, the logical or intelligible manifold. To these the subject of experience is passive

or receptive, he responds to them in thinking and acting.

We are guided in our psychological analysis by the science of neurology. We know the mechanism of conscious action. The organism of a conscious agent is a sensori-motor system of reflex arcs, at one end of which is a sense terminal, at the other a muscular contraction. The nervous system is an integration of innumerable individual unit activities. On the psychical side this is experienced as sensations, a manifold of individual sense-impressions, transitory and unrelated existences, which are retained in memory, and can be recalled after they have ceased to exist, though in a different form, as images or representations. The neurological processes are mechanical and automatic; the psychical processes which accompany them appear to be dependent on them, and yet at the same time their whole significance depends on their autonomy. No one, so far, despite the most heroic efforts, has been able to impart intelligibility into the proposition that the brain thinks. The only thing the materialist can affirm, basing his appeal on facts, is that where there is no brain there is no thinking. The behaviourist indeed goes farther than the materialist, and denies that thinking or feeling is the product of any material or spiritual organ, whether we call it brain or mind. The mechanisms of the organism which result in actions, and the discursive thinking which results in ideas, are, he holds, not two distinguishable processes, but one and identical. They are two ways of regarding a single sequence of events.

The most effective criticism of the behaviourist theory came from Mr. Bertrand Russell in his *Analysis of Mind*. It would be tenable, he declared, were there no images. By images Mr. Russell seems to have meant memory images, and not perceptual images, not what are now called *Gestalten*. The argument was that a double-aspect theory of mechanical movements and psychical processes is

196

IMAGINING AND REASONING

rational if there be the possibility of a point correspondence between the constituent movements of the mechanism and the constituent processes of the psychism, and such correspondence is easily predicable of sense-data; but images are not sense-data, and they enter positively into the psychical situation, while what may be thought of as having corresponded with them on the physical side cannot be thought as existing in any meaning which physics can admit. The argument would have had still greater force had it been applied to *Gestalten*, to perceptual as well as to memory images.

We are brought then to the main problem. What are images, and what is the imagination which creates them? Images are not peculiar to human nature. The experiments of the Gestalt psychologists have shown that they have a place in the animal mind. They are an essential element in conscious activity wherever we meet it. It is imagery, not sensation, which determines any particular situation. It is imagination, not sensation, which creates the visible extension behind the mirror, the sheen on the water, the colours and bands of the spectrum. Images are pictorial and integral. If they present or represent an object or a situation they present it in its entirety. Suppose, to take an example from common life, you are invited to breakfast. There comes up in your mind an image which may include the odour of coffee and the sound of frizzling bacon—these are or have been sensations, and the image of breakfast may recall them; but it is the image, not any particular sensation or group of sensations, which will determine your response and govern the disposition of your action. What is true of the image of breakfast or of the breakfast table is true of the image of the world itself which is part of our daily consciousness. Our world is an image, and imagery is inseparable from our world. Without it we could not act continuously or experience the perfect unity of the real.

Psychologists have always thought that the image is composite and compounded. Following the principle that there is nothing in the understanding which has not been in the senses, it has proceeded as though its task were to construct the image artificially, or discover the natural process of its construction, out of what alone exists, the stream of transitory sense-impressions. The associationist psychology explained images by the laws of association, similarity, and contiguity. Images were thought to be no more than an aggregate or assemblage of sensations, and their variety and diversity were attributed to the fact that sensations of one kind are successive, not simultaneous. The traces therefore of past impressions are revived as idea, and associated with new impressions. By these associations judgments are made and concepts created. Images appeared therefore as the product of judging or reasoning

PHILOSOPHY

on sense-impressions, themselves irreducible. Conscious experience was accordingly resolved into a manifold of impressions on a sensitive organism and an integrating activity. What we have now discovered, and the Gestalt experiments have confirmed, is that images are more original than sensations, and imagining is more fundamental than feeling or judging. How are we to rationalize the paradox? The

reply is by a philosophy of the organism.

I say a philosophy, not a science of the organism, because in philosophy we can employ a finalistic method which in science, at least in its narrower meaning, is rejected. We can ask in regard to living activity the question which Kant asked in regard to knowledge: What are the *a priori* conditions of its possibility? Still more specifically, surveying living activity in its full extent we can inquire what are the needs of the organism which consciousness alone will enable it to meet, and we can deduce therefrom the nature of consciousness itself.

Living activity is individual, and every individual enters on its life history with a nature preformed and predestined to a definite range of activity. It comes into existence fitted in advance to respond to definite stimuli with appropriate action. It obeys an inward urge to express its nature in the conditions which favour that expression. Consciousness in a living creature appears as sensitivity to stimulus, which takes the form of feeling and enlightenment or understanding. Feeling and understanding are the directing forces in the forming of its actions. Consciousness varies in kind and in degree and in mode of expression, yet it is always relative to action and directed to the conservation of the individual or racial life. Consciousness appears the very essence of life, the terms are often synonymous, and yet life seems everywhere to dispense it with a strict economy. In the vegetable world individual natures express themselves without calling it in aid. The conditions of plant development depending on the fixation and immobility of the individual require it to imbibe its nourishment from the soil in which it grows and the atmosphere in which it breathes. Consciousness would not serve it, indeed it would be a handicap, and if we suppose consciousness to exist in right, it is suppressed or inhibited in fact. In the animal world, on the other hand, the free mobility of the individual makes consciousness in some degree a necessity of existence. Yet everywhere it seems proportional to the particular need. The purpose it serves is obvious. It enables the individual to form and carry out the actions which are appropriate to procure it food and maintain its existence. Wherever consciousness exists, it is one with the activity of the individual who possesses it. This discernment of the purpose of conscious activity enables us to determine its form a priori. We

IMAGINING AND REASONING

can, that is to say, put to ourselves the question, what are the a priori conditions of the possibility of consciously directed actions? At once we see that the first condition is that the situation shall be present to the mind of the individual in imagery. How otherwise could it act? Try to imagine, for example, an individual sensitive to the pain spots of the skin and to nothing else, and able to perform the reflex muscular actions which they originate, how could it direct its actions to purposive relief unless it could imagine? It might react to stimulus by movement, but it could not direct its actions. For this it must imagine. What is it to imagine? It is an activity sui generis. No sort of sensitivity to pain spots could generate images of needles and pins, sharp stones or thorns, and point the way of escape from them. And no combination or succession or aggregate of pain impressions could compose an image or provide material to thought. Certainly no thinking about pain impressions could generate the concept of an external cause. For conceptions there must be imagery.

Everyone recognizes that the perceptual world is the condition of the conceptual world. The perceptual world is the world of sense imagery. This imagery is not created by thinking in the logical meaning of the term. There is then an activity logically prior to thinking and its condition, an activity of imagining which gives us the perceptual world. Out of what then does the imagination create its images if not out of sense-impressions? What is the nature of its creation? A creation out of nothing offends the principle of intelligence itself. We have no need to resort to any such absurdity. For our answer we have only to turn to the living world. Every individual is born with a preformed nature, and its life is the unfolding and development of this nature in response to the external conditions which favour its development. The creative force is the dynamic character of the life principle itself. Wherever the expression of this life principle is conscious, it takes the form of an opposition between what is latent within and kinetic without. In more familiar phrase, consciousness must assume the form of a subject-object relation. This relation is not the external connection of independent existences, that is, it is not a relation of mind and nature each postulated as self-existent. It is a relation of polarity in which each factor derives its whole meaning from its opposition to the other. Take any living conscious creature in the first moment of its individual life, its nature consists of possibilities, latent and unexpressed, and its life activity consists in the continuous expression of this nature. The living activity which unfolds itself is expression. This expression we know as images, a form of knowledge quite distinct from sensations and from concepts or ideas. Images are particular, they are as private as sensations. The artist

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PHILOSOPHY

can give them extrinsic form, fixing them as it were in material, making tones, colours, plastic shapes become language, but the image exists only in the mind. The imagining power of the mind is therefore freedom to express, but what it expresses is determined by intuition, that is by its nature, which is the whole inherited past. The natural urge of every creature is towards expression. Nature exists as intuition, and intuition finds expression in imagery. This agrees with the fact that images are particular and characteristic of the individual and the species, and yet not arbitrary. The very fact that the imagination is capable of riotous extravagance shows that normally it is under the strong control of the organism. The fantasies of Don Quixote have the same origin as the commonplace imagery of Sancho Panza. This imagery is not generated by feeling or by thought, but by the life itself; and this activity of imagining is not a sensing or a reasoning, but an activity of æsthetic creation. This is the conclusion to which a philosophical analysis of experience must lead.

Let us now try to appreciate the scientific import. The Gestaltists have proved by their experiments that in all cases of recognition what is identified is not a sensation or aggregate of sensations but a shape, and like the ghost of Hamlet's father "a questionable shape." Can we conceive any way by which a shape is generated out of sensations and associations? Are shapes facts or fancies? If they are facts, it seems as though we must resolve them into the only things psychology has recognized as fact-sensations and their associations. Sensations are facts because we can correlate them with organic stimuli, and associations are facts because we can represent them as real relations. Images, shapes, Gestalten, come under neither category. If they are facts, not illusions, they must fall under a distinct category. We must recognize that imagining is a mental activity distinct alike from feeling and thinking, with an objective product, images, distinct alike from sense-impressions and ideas. In the mental life sensations are the occasion of the evoking of imagery not its cause, and images not sensations provide to thought the matter of its concepts.

To return to the examples of imagining from which we set out, the sheen on the water, the extension behind the mirror, the band of the spectrum—these are subjective appearances with absolutely no objective counterpart. They are shapes or images which do not exist in the objective world we conceive as Nature. The light which we conceive as radiant energy does not itself reveal the world of shapes and images to privileged souls. Like God's rain, it falls on the just and unjust. It is by the active principle of life itself that we must interpret the shape or image which gives to each individualized form of its activity the world of its effective action.

RIGHT AND GOOD: CONCLUSION—THE LIMITS OF ETHICS

PROFESSOR W. G. DE BURGH

I

THE two basic forms of action distinguished in the preceding articles, viz., moral action, where praxis is for praxis' sake, and action for a good, where praxis is for the sake of theôria, are found in close relationship to one another in human life. The part they play is rather that of abstract moments in a practical process than that of self-contained and isolable bits of conduct. No philosopher is likely to discount the importance of thus analysing the concrete into its factors before he rectifies the abstraction by showing how they co-operate in actual experience. In any individual biography we can find acts and courses of action in which duty is the dominant motive, and others in which the dominant motive is desire of good. Similarly, when we compare different biographies with one another, some exemplify most strikingly the struggle for righteousness against unruly passion, others the spontaneous aspiration of the soul to attain the goal of its desire. But neither the moral law nor the summum bonum wields an exclusive sovereignty. St. Paul and Luther, in their warfare against carnal desire, drew strength from the ideal vision; nor were St. Bernard or Spinoza, for all their absorption upon union with the divine, strangers to the call of moral obligation. In the lives of ordinary men, the types of conduct are, perhaps, more evenly balanced; yet here also the distinction is discernible. Moreover, it is easy to see how, despite their intrinsic difference, they come to be associated and "by just exchange" to effect a mutual

(a) We have already noted that habitual right action and the character fashioned thereby are pronounced "morally good," by the agent himself or by a spectator, passing judgment theoretically after the event. Thus, when a courageous act, done ex hypothesi from sense of duty in face of strong natural fear, without thought of any ulterior end, is envisaged as "good," the result is not merely to strengthen, as all discharge of duty necessarily strengthens, the man's power of moral volition, but also to furnish an additional motive for like actions when subsequent situations call for them. He will desire to act bravely, because he knows the worth of brave action in the fashioning of good character. Duty thus acquires a

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certain sweetness in the doing. On the other hand, there is obvious peril in such concentration on the goodness of dutiful action. If it should provoke to the thought "How good I am to do my duty!" or even "How good a thing it is to do my duty!", it gives a handle to the most deadly sin to which the moral life is liable, self-complacency. The moral man needs to guard sedulously against acquiescence in the cherished code. His protection lies, as Kant saw, in the realization that the command of duty, to will perfectly, surpasses all endeavour after its fulfilment. Only so long as "my station and its (finite) duties" is taken as the be-all and end-all of morality is the door left open for self-satisfaction.1

(b) So, again, there is a natural transition from action sub ratione boni to the idea of moral obligation. The higher and more remote the goal of desire, and the clearer the recognition that thirst is not to be quenched save in the fruition of a res infinita, et æterna, the steeper is found to be the path leading to its attainment. It grows steeper and steeper all the way. There will thus be many stages in the ascent when, despite enrichment of ardour in aspiration and of insight into the desired good, the will is beset by the allurements of transitory satisfactions and falters in its freely chosen purpose. There are times without number when the artist or the scholar, however absorbed he be in devotion to his calling, finds his spontaneity in abeyance, and has to revive a flagging energy by appeal to the authority of the moral law. At such moments the clouded insight needs to be clarified by the reminder that it is a moral duty to be faithful to the vision of the good. Dutifulness comes into play, as a motive to particular actions, within the general scheme of a life dedicated to love of goodness. For it is not only moral goodness, but goodness in every form, as beauty or knowledge or love, that is a possible source of moral obligation There are, indeed, other sources, besides the promotion of good, e.g. a promise made in the past, which are fruitful in generating duties. Nor do any of these general prima facie obligations serve as a complete explanation of the obligatoriness of a particular concrete duty.2 Moreover, the duty when recognized commands obedience as an end in itself, independently on the good it bids us realize. The co-operation of love of good and duty may be illustrated by a familiar example, that of a mother's relation to her child. Normally the motive of maternal affection suffices to secure action for the child's welfare; nor should we wholeheartedly commend the mother who needed habitually to remind herself that its promotion was a moral duty.

2 On these prima facie obligations, see Ross, The Right and the Good, ch. ii, pp. 19 ff.

It may be added that duty itself, as we shall note presently, enjoins (amongst other things) promotion of good.

RIGHT AND GOOD

Yet in the not infrequent cases when the natural affection errs either by excess or by defect, the principle of duty (always supposing that it has been trained by exercises in other relationships) is ready to spring into conscious activity, as regulative of a strong but capricious impulse. Further, the natural affection itself is refined and ennobled by the discharge of duty in other fields of life. There is an underlying unity in human personality which, despite real differences of activities and interests, precludes severance into watertight compartments. A wide gulf separates the display of maternal affection at the level of what is almost animal instinct from the wise and beneficent love that bears the impress of reasoned thought and moral habituation. Lastly, the moral motive is often found in association with other motives, such as love of beauty or personal affection, prompting to one and the same act. Kant was in error in holding that an act had value only when done exclusively for duty's sake. The moral worth, it is true, depends solely on this motive; but, as we have seen, moral worth is not the only kind of worth; and the value of an act, prompted by love in conjunction with a sense of duty, is enhanced, not diminished, by what Kant would regard as its "impurity."1

IT

We turn next to the religious life, not to discuss its credentials or its value, but simply to define its relationship to morality, and its yet closer relationship to the pursuit of the good. For the present purpose, therefore, we shall assume that God, the object of religion, is a genuine reality; and, further, that the experience of God in religion is an experience sui generis, distinguishable from other specific types of experience, such as art, science, or morality. Religion differs from these alike in the peculiar nature of its object and in the nature of the response which that object provokes in the human subject, viz., worship. The question of the origins of religion from experiences that were non-religious does not concern us.² We shall consider religion in its richest known expressions, not as the

¹ See Dr. Ross's interesting remarks on this question (op. cit., concluding chapter, pp. 168–173). He criticizes the term "mixed motives," substituting "the co-operation of elements to form a single motive." He would, of course, reject the limitation under which in these articles I have spoken of "moral worth."

² See Alexander, Space, Time and Deity, Bk. IV, ch. ii, init. "Various emotions enter into the full constitution of the religious sentiment—fear, admiration, self-abasement—but its distinctive constituent is the feeling of our going out towards something not ourselves and greater and higher than ourselves, with which we are in communion, a feeling whose object is not that of any of these subsidiary or suggesting emotions, nor of any combination of them" (vol ii. p. 373).

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crude feeling after God of those races which, in our ignorance, we call "primitive," though the so-called primitives were in fact already far advanced on the path of human development. If we touch for a moment on the historical, it is to note the parallelism with the successive stages in the history of the two other types of life with which we have been occupied. There is (1) a pre-religious stage, when the sense of the occult and aweful is directed not upon a concrete deity, but upon a mysterious impersonal source of power, provocative of dread rather than worship. On the properly religious level, we find (2) a succession of stages, theriomorphic and anthropomorphic, which may be gathered together under the rubric of polytheism, the worship of local and finite gods, culminating in monolatry, i.e. the exclusive worship of a single god by a given tribe or nation, while the gods of alien communities are yet recognized as real.2 The advance from polytheism and monolatry to (3) monotheism is conditioned by the intimate association of religion with the growth of intellectual inquiry and/or of the moral consciousness. Among the Greeks, as we see in Plato and Aristotle, science and philosophy issued in the formulation of a monotheistic postulate; God, defined as the Good self-moving Soul or as the First Mover being required to "save the phenomena" of motion in nature. Among the Hebrews, a people who, in antiquity at all events, were innocent of any scientific curiosity, the belief in one God, the Creator and righteous Governor of the whole world, was the fruit of the soul's travail in prolonged and bitter ethical experiences. In the higher religions of to-day monotheism has been permeated through and through by both the speculative and the ethical inheritance of mankind. The religious life is, in principle, the response of man's whole personality; of his intellect, his emotions, and his will, to the presence of the One individual and transcendent source of being and of value, the A and the Ω , who is at once the sovereign reality and the sovereign good.

What then is the relation of religion to human action? We have to remark, first, (1) that while religion always implies a rule of

² The recognition by the Greeks of a mysterious impersonal power (Atê Moira) behind Zeus may be regarded as a dim recognition of the inadequacy of any finite conception of the Unconditioned.

The "numinous" object is not necessarily an object of worship. Any object of experience may arouse the sense of numinosity. We find it surviving, in civilized mankind, in the eerie feeling provoked, say, by a graveyard at night. For Kant, again, not only "the moral law within," but the sublime in Nature ("the starry heavens above"), were charged with the numinous. A like impression would be produced by the magnificent and heroic in human personality and action, e.g. by a Cæsar or a Goethe, or the spectacle of Nelson bringing his fleet into action at Trafalgar, entirely apart from any religious, or even ethical, relevance. The cult among certain Hindus that gathered around John Nicholson after his death illustrates the transition to religious worship.

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conduct, it is never merely practical. On the one hand, it controls men's actions, in that it (a) enjoins religious observances and acts of worship, (b) requires obedience to the will of God in every expression of human will, and (c) arouses in the worshipper a desire for selfdiscipline and purification to fit him for the life of communion with the divine. But in religion, as in the endeavour after the Good, praxis is a means, and not an end. Religion begins and ends in vision (theôria). From the outset it imparts a revelation of truth, which generates an outlook upon life, couched, it may well be, in naïve and fragmentary imagery, but capable of ripening into a theodicy, which, like that of the Divina Commedia, appeals to the developed intelligence. Religion, as we have said, claims to direct and to satisfy man's whole nature, and especially the desire of the intellect for speculative truth. Moreover, its goal lies in the fruition of the visio Dei, a theoretical activity wherein labour is quieted in rest, and desire in the love that springs from knowledge of the sovereign Good. Even for the saint in viâ, the highest activity is the contemplation of God, so far as this is possible under this-worldly limitations. Once more, the very practical mission of religion requires a knowledge that is more than a working creed. Sin cannot be conquered by mere discipline, but only by a vision that involves ascent from praxis to theôria of the object that stirs to regeneration. This is evidenced not only by the history of Christianity, which from the first ages appropriated to its practical purposes the rich inheritance of Greek philosophy, but by that of Buddhism, the chief missionary faith of the East, which, though initially indifferent to speculative problems, developed naturally, in the five centuries succeeding its foundation, both a theology and a metaphysic. No religion that is true to its vocation can tolerate the subordination of theoretical to practical values. To ignore the claim of reason means for religion among civilized peoples a sure and speedy death.

Secondly (2), religion implies belief in the reality of its object; the primary *credendum* is existential, not an "ought" but an "is." The distinction of ideal and real, of value and fact, which, as we have seen, constitutes the unsolved antinomy of moral experience, is transcended in that of religion. For religion the ideal is God's will, present in the life of the many members of the invisible community, "in which, through faith for them, and for God we do not know how, the bad self is unreal." We cannot here discuss the manner

¹ Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 231; cf. the concluding chapter, and especially p. 331. "Faith involves the belief (1) that the course of the external world, despite appearances, is the realization of the ideal will; (2) that on the inner side the human and divine are one. Or the belief (1) that the world is the realization of humanity as a divine organic whole; and (2) that with that whole the inner wills of particular persons are identified. Faith must hold that,

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of the solution offered by religion, and in particular by Christianity, with its doctrines of grace, justification, and atonement. It must suffice to indicate the bridge that affords a passage from morality to religion, a bridge which can only be constructed, if at all, from the side not of morality but of religion.

We are now in a position (4) to define more precisely the relationship between the life of religion and that of moral duty. On the less developed levels religion often appears dissociated from morality; its practical observances may scarcely touch the ordinary business of life among its worshippers, and may in certain particulars enjoin actions which would be condemned as immoral by the contemporary ethical code outside the religious pale. But the higher religions are one and all ethical; the conduct they enjoin is, morally, in harmony with the highest moral convictions of the community. John Stuart Mill, for instance, claimed that the Utilitarian ethic was in entire accord with that of the New Testament. This assimilation of morality by religion operates in two directions. On the one hand, God is ethically qualified, not only as a God who loves righteousness and hates iniquity, but as a God who is Himself righteous, or, rather, is very righteousness. It is true that the ascription to God of "moral attributes" involves the use of analogy; God is moral eminenter, i.e. in a uniquely eminent way, and His goodness is divine goodness, transcending not only in degree, but in kind, the creaturely goodness of men. As Aristotle said long ago, it is absurd to speak of God as doing His duty in human fashion, or as exhibiting the virtues of temperance or courage in the manner of the good citizen of the Greek city-state. On the other hand, men's moral duties come to be regarded as divine commands. This is so at each stage of moral and religious advance; finite duties are ascribed to the will, now of finite gods, now of the one infinite God; and the recognition of God's unity in monotheistic faiths heralds that of the unconditionality of moral obligation. Yet, despite this intimate association, the difference remains. How else can we account for the fact that in all ages the saint has sought and found a welcome amongst publicans and sinners, while the moral Pharisees of his generation have proved his bitterest foes? No one will dispute that a man may be highly moral without being in the least degree religious; it is equally true that those who are keenly sensitive to God's presence may be afflicted with lack of

in Biblical language, there is 'a Kingdom of God,' that there is an organism which realizes itself in its members, and also in those members, on the subjective side, wills, and is conscious of itself, as they will and are conscious of themselves in it."

¹ Cf. Whitehead, Religion in the Making, p. 37. "Religion is the last refuge of human savagery. The uncritical association of religion with goodness is directly negatived by plain facts."

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self-control and moral blindness. The religion of these last is doubtless defective as religion; but to deny it the name of religion would be to shut our eyes to palpable facts. Again, the *praxis* of the converted sinner, even though it be that of a saint, is wont to be marked by an unconventionality, especially in a predilection for other sinners who are unconverted, that outrages the conscience of the man who lives by mere morality. It seems that moral conduct, without ceasing to be moral, is raised to a higher plane when it has been informed by the spirit of religion. "God," said Richard Hooker, "cares a great deal more for adverbs than he does for verbs." Only those who deny that the motive is relevant to the rightness of an action can be blind to the difference in the quality of conduct when inspired, not merely by the motive of duty, but by the desire to do God's will and to live for His glory.

All is, if I have grace to use it so, As ever in my great Task-master's eye.

The point was made, with his customary lucidity and precision, by St. Thomas Aguinas. Moral excellence, he held, was attainable by man by the natural light of reason, without the aid of the Christian revelation. The virtuous pagans were evidence for that; and Aristotle's Ethics sufficed as the expression of its theory. Christianity supplemented this self-contained morality of Reason in two ways. First, it revealed the three theological virtues, faith, hope, and charity. Thus much by way of addition. But, secondly, the influence of revelation and divine grace was manifested within the field of rational morals, in that it transfigured the four cardinal virtues of prudence, temperance, courage, and justice, by raising their practice to the plane of virtus infusa. What is noteworthy here is that religion effects this enrichment and ennoblement of morality, not so much by explicit ethical teaching, as by the new spirit breathed into the human soul by experience of the divine presence. It was not by enunciating a moral code, but by the regenerating influence of personal contact, that the Founder of Christianity revolutionized the lives and practice of His followers.

(5) The affinity of the religious life to that directed towards the Good is much more intimate. For in both theôria is dominant over praxis; both have their source in spontaneous aspiration after an object of desire, and their goal in fruition of an ideal Good. Indeed, religion might be subsumed under the life sub ratione boni, but for

¹ See Alexander's remarks on this, Space, Time and Deity, vol. ii. pp. 404–405. He insists that it is wrong to "call such persons hypocrites, because their life seems incompatible with their religion," and adds that "there is no good reason to doubt the sincerity and strength of the feeling towards God which they have."

two reasons: (a) that the scope of religion is not limited to practice, even though the practice be for the sake of vision; and (b) that in religion the summum bonum is identified with God. This last is the more serious ground for their differentiation as types of life. The distinction is obvious at the stage where religious worship is directed to a plurality of finite gods and action to a plurality of finite goods; though even here there is association, in that the goods in question are regarded as gifts of the gods, and arouse gratitude and love in the recipients. It is when men have come to recognize that the summum bonum must be sought in a res infinita et æterna that identification of the Good and God is naturally suggested. But, just as in the case of the identification of the Moral law with God's eternal will to Right, the passage implies a salto mortale into the realm of religious faith. The history of Platonism furnishes a striking illustration. In Plato God is not the supreme reality or the ultimate source of value. He creates the sensible world in the likeness of the Forms, and for the sake of the Good. But He is not Himself the Good; He is not a Form, but a soul; the sovereign reality and value is the Form of Good, which is the object of God's rational contemplation. With the growth of the religious consciousness in the closing years of the pre-Christian epoch and the first centuries A.D., this severance of God from the Good was felt to be a stumbling-block, and Neo-Platonism revised the Platonic doctrine by interpreting the intelligible world as a trinity in unity of divine substances and the Forms as the thought-contents of the divine intelligence. The identification of the Platonic Good with the God of Theism was finally effected when Christianity, through the mediation of St. Augustine, appropriated the Neo-Platonic legacy. Faith in ideal goodness, therefore, may incline to, but does not necessitate, faith in God. There are many thinkers to-day who, holding to the former but rejecting the latter, bear witness to the reality of the distinction between the life sub ratione boni and the life directed towards God. They occupy a position in this matter midway between those who regard the summum bonum as an ignis fatuus 1 and confine their quest of goodness to the sphere of finite goods, and those who, realizing that the summum bonum nowhere exists in the temporal world, seek-and find—it in the sovereign of the other-worldly order, revealed in the experience of religion.

(6) Thus the two types of practical life present a problem, insoluble by ethics, which religion claims to solve. Stated in philosophical terms, it is the problem of the synthesis of fact and value. Not that the severance is absolute even within the ethical field.

¹ E. F. Carritt, *Theory of Morals*, p. 74. Is it probable that the goal followed unanimously by philosophers for more than two thousand years should prove a mere hallucination?

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For there we find (a) that goods are actualized in living persons, in the scientist who wins knowledge and knows that he knows, in the artist who creates and contemplates things of beauty, in the moral agent who labours consciously to do his duty, in the lover whose life is motived by the vision of good. Even imagined good can only be thought as good for a possibly existing subject. We find, again. (b) that the actual course of events is such that goodness is realized within it, not as a mere thought-interpretation superimposed by the mind upon given fact-for barely given fact is never forthcoming—but as a character of the real. On the other hand, the ideal implied in all actual valuations is, of necessity, imperfectly realized in them; what we call the "actual" is a process of becoming, which, as Plato saw, lacks the stability of true being and is therefore never fully "actual." Our value-judgments thus present a struggle or tension of two moments, the temporal and the eternal, within human experience; a struggle whose issue cannot be decided within the limits of the spatio-temporal order. We are led to the thought of an other-worldly reality, a thought which, apart from religion, remains a mere thought—in Kant's language, a regulative Idea-a "value" standing in irreconcilable contrast to the "facts" of this-worldly experience.1

III

We come, finally, to the question of the diversity of values. The problem is not that of pluralism within each of the main groups of valuable objects, e.g., whether there is one ultimate truth or a plurality of ultimate truths standing side by side in irreducible togetherness (Herbart); whether, again, a single type of beauty is displayed in common by the creations of the several arts; and whether intrinsic goodness is to be discovered in one Good only (as for Plato) or (as for Dr. Moore in *Principia Ethica*) in a multiplicity of goods. Our concern here is with the diversity of standards or ideals, and particularly with those of Rightness and Goodness. Each, as we have seen, is one and infinite in suo genere. Are the genera finally distinct? "Beauty is truth, truth beauty," wrote John Keats, and added, "that is all ye know on earth, and all ye need to know." We need in fact to know a great deal more. Certainly it is not "on earth" that these measures, as the poet claims, lose their differences in identity. It may be true that a man stabbed his paramour in Brazil vesterday, but the knowledge of the event, for all its truth, is neither beautiful nor good. Croce may have erred in demarcating too rigidly

On this whole question see Sorley, Moral Values of the Idea of God, pp. 139 ff.; and A. E. Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist, vol. i. ch. ii and passim.

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the several activities—theoretical and practical, æsthetic and logical, economic and ethical—of the human spirit; but the differences on which he insists are very real. We may note, in passing, that it is incorrect, as Professor Taylor has recently pointed out, to speak of truth as a "value." What has value is not truth, but the knowledge of it in the mind of a knowing subject. Our question, then, is whether knowledge of truth (and all knowledge is true knowledge), beauty, love, rightness, goodness, are, not indeed reducible to one another, but specific variations on a single ultimate standard. Four considerations may be urged as pointing to the possibility of such a synthesis.

(r) It is the nature of reason to seek unity in experience and not to rest till she has found it. That the unity is there for the seeking is the faith of metaphysic, its "substance of things hoped for," its "evidence of things not seen." Ideals claim to fall within the real, and a bare togetherness of external relationship would spell irrationality at the very heart of reality. Doubtless Pluralist philosophers—and such abound to-day—will disparage this credendum, and echo Dr. Moore's epigram, that "to search for unity and system at the expense of truth is not, I take it, the proper business of philosophy, however universally it may have been the practice of philosophers." This statement, however, begs the question; only on the assumption that truth is pluralistic is there any possibility of such a sacrifice. It also involves an ignoratio elenchi. In metaphysics an article of faith is not a dogma. It remains what Kant called a "regulative Idea," i.e. a lode-star of intellectual inquiry, awaiting confirmation by the facts.

(2) There is further a practical motive for seeking a single standard of value. Human lives fall into groups according as they are directed towards one or other ideal end. A man has to choose, within limits, the sort of life he means to live, and his choice will involve selection among measures of value. No man can pursue all forms of goodness equally or all at once. One will rate beauty above moral goodness, another moral goodness above knowledge, a third will subordinate all three to the glory of God. How can a man decide which form is the highest if he cannot measure all alike by a single sovereign principle?²

(3) We have seen that value attaches not to abstract concepts, but to concrete existents, possessed of life and mind. Now, personal life is displayed at various levels of development; and advance from a lower to a higher level is marked by increased unification, both of self-hood and of the object-world. In the case of finite personality this process of unification is never complete, either on the side of the subject or of the object. But analogy points to the ideal of a perfectly unified experience, in which the knower and the known reality alike display the form of coherent system in the richest

² See Sorley, op. cit., pp. 52, 53.

Taylor, The Faith of a Moralist, vol. i. p. 39.

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variety of content. If the unification be all-inclusive, it should embrace standards of value as well as other constituents of the real.

Lastly (4), if the claims of religion be admitted, the problem which remains undecided for metaphysic receives a definite solution. God, if God there be, is the source alike of all that has being and of all its value. Religion is an illusion, unless the object of its worship not only enjoys the possession of beauty, knowledge, and goodness, but Himself is these things, and is them in undivided unity. That God is not merely bonus but bonitas was a familiar tenet of the mediæval schools. In the unity of His being all measures of value find their unity; "beauty is truth, truth beauty," in God, and in God alone. Therefore rightness and goodness also fall together in the being of God. The moral Law is thus conceived, inadequately, but at the farthest bound of human thought striving to fathom the divine nature, as the expression of His eternal Will for Right, What God wills is the really Right, ever adumbrated in men's judgments of rightness, yet ever eluding their grasp (Begriff): a Right which is no arbitrary fiat of a capricious sovereign, but the perfect enactment of God's vision of His own Goodness. For the religious consciousness, this solution of the problem of diversity of ideals lies ready to hand. For metaphysics, however, it is otherwise. The assurances of religion are not demonstrable, nor can its "immediate experiences" of God be accepted by philosophy at their face-value. Like all other claimants to immediacy, they must subject themselves to the scrutiny of speculative reason. On the other hand, since they proffer a solution of questions which ethics is bound to raise and to leave unanswered, they are claims of which any serious philosophy must take note. That is why they have been referred to here. But the inquiry into their validity is another story, which lies beyond the purview of these articles.

¹ See Taylor, op. cit., vol. i. pp. 101 ff.

(Concluded)

HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTIONI

WILLIAM BROWN, M.D., D.Sc.

In any consideration of the nature of suggestion we cannot omit reference to the extraordinary and startling phenomena which may sometimes be observed in hypnotized subjects. But it would be a mistake to look upon hypnosis as something uncanny, mysterious, and occult. Although we have even yet no thoroughly satisfactory theory of hypnosis, we understand it in general terms, and can bring it into line with other facts and phenomena of psychology known in everyday life. The hypnotic subject, and the phenomena of hypnosis, can be explained firstly in terms of mental dissociation, of the tendency for certain forms of psychical activity to occur independently of the rest of the mind, independently of other considerations; and, secondly, in terms of suggestion, of increased suggestibility. And these two, the phenomenon of dissociation and the phenomenon of suggestibility, are not unrelated to one another. They are related, but not to the extent of being identical with one another. It was the Nancy School of Hypnotism, led by Bernheim, who considered that hypnosis could be explained in terms of suggestibility. Charcot had previously explained hypnosis as an artificial hysteria—as a dissociation of the highest levels of the nervous system, a dissociation of mental and physiological activity at the higher conscious level. But the theory I om trying to sketch is the theory that combines both these statements. In my own view, based on the study of many hundreds of cases, hypnosis is explained both by dissociation and by increased suggestibility. We certainly do find increase of suggestibility occurring, partly explained in terms of dissociation, but not entirely so. On the other hand, the dissociation in its more pronounced forms may show itself independently of suggestibility. Which is the cause and which the effect of these two? Dissociation as a cause may bring with it increase of suggestibility. We can understand why that should be so. Does increased suggestibility on its side bring dissociation? It may tend to do so. A person who is in an increasingly suggestible state responds to just the one stimulus before him-it may be a stimulus from the outer world, or an idea aroused in his mind by the experimenter. He responds with his whole mind and strength to the

¹ Being part of a paper on "The Self: Psycho-Analysis and Psycho-Therapy," read before the Church Congress, Newport, Mon., on October 8, 1930.

HYPNOTISM AND SUGGESTION

suggestion, and that concentration in one direction may be considered to cause collateral suppression of other modes of mental activity, which may otherwise occur simultaneously or immediately afterwards. And that suppression of collateral mental activity may be regarded as a precursor or cause of a certain kind of dissociation. If a patient is so fixed on what the hypnotist is saying and suggesting that he is oblivious of everything else, it would not be surprising if later on, when his attention to the hypnotist is relaxed and the rest of his mind, the other powers of his mind, have sway once more, the memories of events that occurred during hypnosis would be absent. That is the tendency in deep hypnosis—for the person to forget completely the incidents of the hypnosis afterwards. In cases of artificial somnambulism, or what I call real hypnosis, the patient wakes up from sleep with no memory of what has occurred. We find that is the case in ordinary somnambulism. A person who walks in his sleep does not remember what has occurred when he wakes up. It must have been a dream that caused his somnambulism. but he is unable to remember it. Cases like these are just the cases that are hypnotizable. One can be certain to be able to hypnotize a patient who is frequently walking in his sleep, and under hypnotism one can recall the dream he is living through, so that he then knows why he is walking in his sleep, and the result of the recalling of his dream and the reassociating of that part of his mind with the memories is to abolish the somnambulism. I have found many cases of people who walk in their sleep who can be cured in this particular way, not by hypnotic suggestion but by using the dissociation side. It is quite obviously a state of dissociation, yet it is hypnotism which is most effective in overcoming the earlier dissociation.

And that leads us to a still profounder view of the hypnotic state. Hitherto we have thought of the mind simply as a sort of cinematographic film, a continuous series of memories, and that in dissociation certain limited parts of that memory-continuum are dissociated, cut off, from the rest of the memory. A person suffering from so-called amnesia is hypnotizable, and under hypnotism that lost stretch of memory can be recalled. But when a person is in a hypnotic state he tends to be dissociated even if he was not dissociated before. Dissociation and hypnosis show themselves in the form I have already described. At the end of the hypnotic slumber the patient wakes up, having forgotten what occurred during the hypnosis. If we look at the hypnotic state from the point of view of the normal mind, of the patient in his normal, non-hypnotized state, we see it is dissociation. He looks back on the hypnotic slumber as something of which he remembers nothing. If, on the other hand, one considers the hypnosis from the point of view of a hypnotized patient at the

time he is hypnotized, and also from the point of view of the hypnotist, one sees it is more a state of reintegration, and indeed, more accurately still, it can be regarded as a reaching out towards deeper strata or levels of the mind. To hypnotize a patient is metaphorically almost like driving a shaft through various geological strata to reach underlying strata, and the reason why under hypnotism lost memories are recalled seems to be that the background of the mind that is not ordinarily clear consciousness, the mental activities that are not ordinarily presented to the consciousness of the individual, become conscious as the area of consciousness is widened; and it is because of that, and for that reason, that the lost memory returns. You find the hypnotized person tends to have automatically, quite apart from any suggestion you can give him, a better memory than the unhypnotized person in his normal state. In easily hypnotized patients, such as shell-shocked soldiers, whom I treated during the war, I found it possible to recall almost any. specific memories one liked to choose. One could recall birthday memories. These are definite anniversaries, and can be independently tested, and I found that in quite a number of cases I could effect the recalling of memories of every birthday, right back to their first birthday. They would enumerate their birthday presents, what the weather was like on their birthday, and yet in their normal waking state they were quite unable to do this. There was greater accessibility, greater viability between one part of the mind and the other. The patient had greater powers of recall, greater control over his past memory. Besides that, one finds in the hypnotic state that not only does one's wish and decision and resolution and determination to recall memories prove more successful, not only are these processes more successful, but other mental processes produce more pronounced results. Thoughts of alterations in the body, not only as regards memories which are not recallable under ordinary conditions, the production of physical change in different parts of the body, are more easily brought about in the hypnotic state. One can produce rises of temperature—not only a feeling in special parts of the body, but actual physiological rises of temperature, no doubt through alteration in the blood-supply to that part of the body. It is the sympathetic nervous system in direct relationship with the bloodvessels that is stimulated more intensely in the hypnotic state than in the normal state. Of course we know that in the normal state, under special conditions, these parts of the nervous system can be thrown into a state of intense activity, but not at will. In hypnosis the hypnotist is able to bring about these changes in the hypnotized subject at will, and the subject himself can through self-hypnotism produce more effect than in the waking state. In the normal waking state will-power is related mainly to

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the voluntary nervous system. The voluntary muscles can be moved at will, as their name implies. The involuntary muscles, the muscles of the intestinal tract and of the bloodvessels, etc., cannot be moved at will. But they can be moved and contract and change under the influence of emotion and other forms of feeling. In the state of hypnosis the hypnotist can call out more pronounced changes in the involuntary muscular system by arousing in the patient the idea of such a change. Arousing the idea of increased blood-supply, or increased heart-rate, in the hypnotized subject seems to be sufficient to produce the result. And a further step is taken when the subject himself, with a little practice, learns to throw himself into the hypnotic state, and in that state becomes able to influence his own bodily functions. There is no doubt whatever about the facts. They are now almost a commonplace. admitted by everyone, although very seldom seen by people. It is only those who devote special attention to hypnotism, and who are able to see large numbers of such cases, who can verify it for themselves

EXAMPLES OF SELF-HYPNOTISM

As regards self-hypnotism, there were two demonstrations given to privately invited audiences in London in 1926, a day or two before the General Strike. Two fakirs of Egypt, Rahman Bey and Tara Bey, came over and demonstrated their powers on the platform. I was fortunate enough to be able to see both these cases from the stage itself. They were very similar to one another, they produced the same phenomena, which could be explained for the most part in terms of hypnosis. Tara Bey would hypnotize himself, and had his own especial method of doing it. He put his hands to the sides of his face, put his two thumbs over the carotid artery and special nerves of the neck, took a deep breath, you heard a sound in his throat as though he was swallowing his tongue, and he fell back rigid in the arms of his assistant, and in that rigid condition was anæsthetic, and could retain his rigidity. He was laid upon two scythe-shaped supports, one supporting his feet and the other his neck, and stretched like that could resist the blows of a heavy hammer. Then he was lifted off, and ceased to be rigid in the upright state, but retained his anæsthesia, so that pins and knitting-needles could be thrust through his cheeks. He took a knife and thrust it through the skin of his throat. Another test which he fulfilled was to lie flat on his back on a board full of spikes. There were hundreds of spikes driven into the board close together and fairly sharp, and he lay on these spikes and again allowed the . attendant to hammer his abdomen. He then got up, showing the marks in his back where the spikes had pressed on the skin, but

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only in a few points had there been penetration of the skin, and practically no bleeding. That test seemed more striking than it really was because the larger the number of spikes the less is the pressure on each single spike. The more terrible-looking the contraption the less severe it was. Then he put himself into a condition where he claimed to abolish the pulse and respiration. Actually that did not occur. Testing him, one noticed that the breathing was going on, and one could feel the pulse at the wrist, at a high rate (though feeble), 150 or 160, the normal rate being 72. In this condition of catalepsy Tara Bey allowed himself to be put into a coffin-shaped box, sand thrown over him, and the box fastened down, with sand heaped over it, and he was ready to remain in that box as long as the audience wished. As he knew the audience were not likely to wait a long time doing nothing, ten minutes was suggested, and he remained ten minutes, while his impresario gave the audience a sketch of his general philosophy of life. At the end of the ten minutes the sand was scraped away, the box was opened and put up vertically in sight of the audience, and just as the ten minutes came to an end he began to breathe more deeply and the colour came back to his face. He looked absolutely cataleptic and livid, but as he began to breathe more deeply his colour returned, and he stepped out of the box in a normal state once again. He claimed that he could do it for a much longer time. He claimed that some fakirs had been buried for days; indeed, there is a story that one in past centuries was buried for twenty years. As far as one can make out there is no evidence of that. The question arises: Does the individual while being buried in that state grow old? and the answer is that he grows old faster than if he lived the ordinary life. One would think that in a state of hibernation one could lengthen one's life, but instead of lengthening life it tends to shorten it. That is what the fakirs themselves say. These phenomena I have described illustrate the effects of self-hypnotism, the influence of mind on body. They show how the power of the mind over the body is increased and intensified in the condition of self-hypnosis. The respiration can be slowed, the pulse rate can be altered, the tendency to bleed can be diminished; but it is well not to be carried away by these phenomena, and not to be too credulous about them.

One should note that the parts of the skin that are tested in this way are parts that have a good blood-supply, but also are not supplied with any large arterial trunk. The cheek has a good supply, that is why it heals up so quickly. Wounds on the face heal up very quickly because the blood-supply is very good, but there are no big arterial trunks there. The same with the shoulder. The fakir took care to choose the parts of the shoulder where there was no big arterial trunk. As for the back, it is well known that

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the back is less sensitive than other parts of the body. The question arises whether in the hypnotic state other powers are increased. It has been claimed ever since the hypnotic state was known that the hypnotized person may have powers of clairvoyance and powers of telepathy. In the hypnotic state a person may be able to see events that occur at a distance or may become aware of thoughts in other people's minds. The case of Tara Bey may be taken to illustrate this. Tara Bey brought with him a hypnotic subject—an Armenian—whom he hypnotized and then used as a medium for the reception of telepathic messages. Tara Bey himself acted in the same way, carried out thought-reading experiments, which he himself claimed to be done by means of telepathy. He claimed also that in this state, and even in the waking state, he could foretell the future—give answers to questions referring to the future—and certainly one interesting thing did occur. A gentleman came up on the platform and silently asked a question of Tara Bey's subject. and Tara Bey, standing by, supposed to get the reply through the subject by telepathy, called out to the audience what the subject was saying. He seemed to be saying "Coronet." The gentleman had asked the question what would win the Derby, and had in his mind the possibility of the favourite, Coronach, winning it. If there was no collusion, an incident like that is either a remarkable coincidence or a clear illustration of the fact of telepathy. As far as one can make out, it was not known beforehand that the man would come up on the platform and ask that question. He had a definite standing as a responsible person, and, on the other hand, the impression we got was that Tara Bey himself did not even understand the significance of the answer, and certainly the hypnotized subject did not know English to any extent.

That brings me to the question of telepathy in relation to hypnosis. There are people who believe in telepathy, and yet hold that there is no clear evidence that the hypnotic state increases its frequency. That was not my own experience. I tested a number of hypnotized patients in France, and got definite examples of what seemed to be telepathy, whereas testing normal people under experimental conditions gave one little or no evidence of it. I am inclined to think (speaking now scientifically) that telepathy does occur more frequently in hypnotic cases. One is more likely to get phenomena that seem to illustrate telepathy from hypnotized patients than from unhypnotized patients. It may be due simply to the fact that the hypnotized patient has greater sensory powers than the non-hypnotized individual, and that in that way he can subconsciously guess what is going on, and can put two and two together, or draw inferences. We are not yet fully informed of the conditions under

¹ Coronach did actually win the Derby that year.

PHILOSOPHY

which telepathy may take place. One such condition may be a state of hypnosis increasing the frequency of telepathy, but even there we cannot be sure of telepathic results. Secondly, we cannot be sure that it is not in terms of association processes. The clearest example I myself have had of apparent telepathy came from visits to Mrs. Leonard, the well-known medium, and here she does seem to be throwing herself into a state of self-hypnosis before 'Feda' (her 'control') begins to talk and describe what the spirits are saying. Quite a good proportion of the talk does seem to correspond to interests and facts in the sitter's mind, of which he is not consciously aware. Under conditions of sitting to a medium, it is not one's conscious thoughts that influence the medium or are given back to one from the medium. It is what is in one's unconscious mind—what one is not consciously thinking of at the time.

Our central problem is the problem of suggestion, and I have only spoken of hypnosis as a stepping-stone or stage in the story of suggestion. I do not wish to give the impression that hypnotism is a method that is frequently used by psychotherapists; it is only in very special cases that hypnotism is used, and never without the consent of the patient. Indeed, the patient cannot be hypnotized against his will. The trouble is the other way. So many patients come and ask to be hypnotized, and they cannot be hypnotized. With the best will in the world the hypnotic state cannot be produced in them. Indeed, the doctor knows almost at once whether the patient is likely to be a good hypnotic subject or not. Patients who are easily hypnotized are clearly those who are dissociated and are hysterical. And further, the degree of dissociation seems to be related with the degree of hypnotizability. So, arguing from that generalization, one comes to the conclusion that the perfectly normal person would not be hypnotizable, and that anyone is hypnotizable only to the extent to which this hysterical dissociation is present. That does not mean that all weak-minded people are hypnotizable. Far from it. The hysterical is not necessarily weakminded, nor are mental defectives as a rule hypnotizable. There are exceptions. You can find instances where a feeble-minded person who has a strain of hysteria can be hypnotized, but you would be wrong to generalize from that. Hence the theory that hypnosis is an artificial hysteria is the most plausible theory at the present time—that hypnosis is an artificially produced dissociation of a hysterical nature. As the patient gets free of his dissociation he becomes less and less hypnotizable. If hypnotism is used to overcome a patient's dissociation, you will find on a later occasion that he is not so easily hypnotizable. And—here I agree with Professor Pierre Janet-the test of his cure is the extent to which he has Science and Personality, Oxford University Press, 1929, pp. 196-219.

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ceased to become hypnotizable. This test was verified by me in a whole series of cases during the war, cases who were found to be easily hypnotizable; the symptoms were cleared up under hypnosis; one reassociated the patients, and then found them less hypnoticable than before. The sort of cases where repeated hypnotism is justified are cases of drug addiction, alcoholism, and certain perversions of the instincts.

SUGGESTION WITHOUT HYPNOSIS

In most cases the ideal is to get the beneficial effects of suggestion without hypnosis, to get the patient into a state of increased suggestibility without any artificial dissociation of the mind. And that undoubtedly can be done. There is such a thing as a normal state of increased suggestibility. It is a state we all pass through as we fall asleep. In that intermediate state whatever dissociation there is is normal, not pathological, and in that state suggestion may more readily take effect. The stock example is to give the suggestion to oneself that one will wake up at a definite time next morning. If you give that suggestion during the course of the day it may not work; but if you wait till night and make the suggestion to yourself in a calm, confident way, you will find it does tend to work. If you are new to the experiment, you may find your sleep tends to be broken, and you will wake up earlier than the time fixed upon. In medical practice the simplest way to give suggestion is to ask the patient to lie on a couch with muscles relaxed, breathing slowly, deeply, and regularly, thinking of sleep and nothing but sleep, and then to put the necessary suggestions. If the patient has difficulty in concentrating his mind on sleep, I tell him to think about something neutral, something of an unemotional nature. Or again, if he says he cannot think of one definite thing, I ask him to turn passively away from thoughts as they come, just as a person who found a procession passing his window in which he took no interest would turn his eyes away from it. The patient is dwelling on the idea of passivity, not worrying about anything or anybody. He does not listen to what the doctor says, although he hears. And in that state, which Baudouin calls a state of contention -concentration without effort-the background of his mind is accessible to what is said and will accept it and carry it out. It is remarkable what effects may be obtained in special cases—not only in cases of illness. One was the case of a musician, who had lost power of concentration and all power to compose. He came for treatment, and under the influence of suggestion (after a preliminary course of analysis) he recovered his power to compose. He fell away again, and came a second time, and it worked in just the same way. After a course of ten hours he was able to compose once more,

and has had no difficulty whatever since. The method is one way of removing unnecessary inhibitions. At the other end of the scale it works in improving memory and power of concentration, and may help a certain type of child who is backward in its lessons.

All forms of suggestion-effects, both pathogenic and therapeutic, have their ultimate explanation in deep-seated reactions of the subconscious and unconscious mind, often both complex and distorted. An adequate unravelling of these hidden mental processes may entail a prolonged course of *deep mental analysis*, helped out by methods of "free association," dream interpretation, and other procedures first invented by Sigmund Freud, and constituting part of his technique of psycho-analysis. But permanent therapeutic effects may often be obtained by suggestion independently of deep analysis, although a certain amount of preliminary psychological analysis is always desirable.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

A. Pincherle has celebrated the centenary of Augustine, Bishop of Hippo, by dedicating to him a book¹ which has been a long time in preparation. It shows an excellent knowledge of the sources and literature, although it is presented bare of erudite embellishments and is directed towards an unspecialized public. It differs from the biographies of Augustine which have been and still are in circulation in Italy, and which, dividing his life into two parts, before and after the conversion, delight to represent him in the first period as a semi-devil and in the second as a sanctified convert. That a superficial and non-critical reading of the *Confessions* might inspire such a conventional picture is plausible; but the *Confessions* do not form Augustine's only book, and by themselves do not explain how it is that, instead of retiring to mortify himself in the desert after his conversion, Augustine continued, or rather intensified his literary activity, which shows no real separation from his earlier work.

All that has since been made over to historical criticism; and from the first page of his book Pincherle opportunely points out that from 1888 onwards Harnack and Boissier have advanced to a critical examination of Augustine's own account of his conversion, comparing it with his dialogues written at Cassiciacum in the period immediately preceding his baptism. They have shown that while the *Confessions* present to us a penitent, a convert who laments over the past, dedicating the greater part of his time to the reading of the Psalms, the later ones show us an Augustine still full of interest in philosophical and literary problems, a reader of Virgil, an enthusiastic admirer of Cicero, a vigilant administrator of the charities of his host.

Thus Augustine's spiritual crisis takes on quite a different character. When we treat of a conspicuously intellectual figure, it is not difficult to persuade ourselves that the forces there in conflict are for the most part forces of thought, and that the actual moral differences manifest themselves in the shock of adverse ethical conceptions. The design of Pincherle's work develops in accordance with this safe guide. He interprets Augustine's youthful Manicheism in the sense that the Manichean doctrine furnished him with an explanation of that duplicity of impulses and tendencies which he felt struggling within him; it explained to him the origin of evil, and helped him to resolve entirely that moral problem which was the only one that truly interested him. Manicheism drew him not so much as religion but as philosophy. Pincherle reduces the importance of the succeeding academic and sceptical phase as being merely transitional, and gives an analogous explanation of it, calling it a last attempt to interpret philosophically his Manicheism, and to save it by motives learnt from Cicero. Having embarked on this excellent route, Pincherle should have given greater prominence to Augustine's philosophical victory over Manicheism, won by the doctrine of the negativity of evil, which conquered the dualism of the Manichean powers. But here it seems to me that Pincherle has allowed

¹ A. PINCHERLE, Sant' Agostino d'Ippona, Bari, Laterza, 1930 (8°, pp. 306).

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himself to be interrupted by his preoccupation in saving the unity and continuity of Augustine's thought, in view of the last anti-Pelagian phase of his doctrine. In other words, he does not point out sufficiently, or feel the need for giving an adequate explanation of, the separation between the doctrine of the negativity of evil and of the liberty of the will on the one hand, formulated during the period anterior to the Donatistic and Pelagian conflicts, and on the other hand the doctrines of predestination, of the servant will and of grace, which belong to this latter time, and which reflect in some way the posthumous influences of disavowed Manicheism. Now the point which it was necessary to clear is, to my mind, this: if and in what measure the confessional and theological preoccupations, which inspired Augustine to insist on the solidarity of men in the sin of Adam and in their own incapacity to raise themselves by the forces of their own will, superimposed themselves on the exigencies of his philosophic thought, which carried him to recognize the liberty of will and the non-existence of evil as a positive reality.

Another fault in Pincherle's book lies in his having given a value not only predominant (that would have been acceptable), but also an exclusive value to the moral problems treated of by Augustine. What about the logic, and the cosmology, and the psychology-in that part at least which concerns the different aspects of morality? You may look in vain for one single indication of them in the whole volume. Yet the doctrine of divine illumination, of the seminal reasons and the trinitarian interpretations of the human spirit merited a profound examination, especially in view of the enormous importance which they had throughout medieval philosophy. With nothing more than the problems of will, of grace, and of predestination, it is possible to explain, for example, the Augustine of the Reformation, but certainly not the scholastic Augustinianism whose orientation is speculative rather than ethical. These observations, however, are not meant to diminish the importance of Pincherle's book, which is by far the best that there is to-day in Italy on Augustine, and which, in not a few points, especially in the analysis of the City of God, gains the full approbation of the reader.

In a notably interesting book A. BANFII relates the life of Galileo Galilei, interweaving with it the genetic exposition of the scientific and philosophical Galilean doctrines. Banfi, who did not specialize in research in the natural sciences, but was a student of philosophy, has given predominance to the methodological aspect of the thought of Galileo, which is without doubt the most important, because what distinguishes the science of the Tuscan mathematician from the science of his contemporaries is not so much the sum of the new results achieved (which alone is great enough) as the fertility of the new mental procedure from which the whole of modern science is derived. However, it would have been more desirable had the author given us a broader exemplification of that fertility, in order to show that, in Galileo, the method is born together with a new content of thought, and is not, as it is for example in Bacon, a rather abstract hypostasis, which explains his incomparably greater efficacy.

The best parts of the book are those in which the author describes the changes in Galileo's life. Up to the period of the Paduan teaching Banfi was guided by the old volume of Favaro; but later on, where the research assumes a more personal character, the interest of the reader does not languish. The author has notable powers for evocatory and reconstructive work; he never assumes the unsupportable tone of the panegyrist. Indeed, he lays no little

A. BANFI, Vita di Galileo Galilei, Milano-Roma, 1930, Soc. Editrice "La Cultura" (80°, pp. 273).

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censure on the moral and civic qualities of his hero. Outside the world of science, in which he moves with sovereign gesture, Galileo the man is mediocre: niggardly and self-interested in economic relations, dry and cynical in family life, weak in adversity. His attitude during the trial does not reveal any note of high humanity or disdainful pride: he cedes on all points to the Inquisitorial injunctions, and follows his prudential submission up to the point of condemning, even in private letters, that Copernicanism which had made his glory. He did so to such an extent that in his relations with the Inquisition he had the irrefutable alibi that his Dialogo dei Massimi Sistemi had been published in consequence of regular ecclesiastical approbation. But Inquisitorial perfidy, as Banfi illustrates so clearly, revealed itself in the cunning power (to which, it must needs be added, Galileo's acquiescence alone could assure success) to surmount this obstacle, charging him not so much with having published the book as with having violated a previous undertaking, contracted in writing before Cardinal Bellarmine. Now this undertaking (not to support Copernicanism after the condemnation of 1616), at least in the absolute form with which he had been charged, was only a falsification of the Curia, contradicted by the same declaration of Bellarmine. Yet, after having tried to excuse himself for it, he attributed to himself in his abjuration this crime as well, which gave the legal pretext for his condemnation.

To penetrate the secret of Hegel is a problem which has always tempted the historians of philosophy. Formerly the best way to attack it seemed to be to delve in the formulas of the Logic or of the Phenomenology, to seek there the key to the mystery. To-day it is preferable to follow another route: to study the genesis of these formulas by investigating the spiritual formation of Hegel, examining in particular the philosopher's youthful productions. After the great work of Dilthey, lately republished in the complete edition of the works of the German historian, many kindred writings have seen the light, which in part confirm and in part modify Dilthey's theses, as a basis for new documents which have appeared during these last years; particularly Hegel's youthful writings on theology, printed by Nohl in 1907, which had previously for the most part been preserved as manuscripts in the National Library of Berlin. A recent book by Della Volper follows the first steps of Hegel's literary activity from 1793 to 1800, and seeks to trace in them the first orientations of the future system. Della Volpe's principal thesis is that Hegel began as an illuminist, to be converted soon after to a mystical romantic trend, especially under the influence of Schiller's Æsthetic Letters, the philosophical poetry of his friend and codisciple Hölderlin, and the reading of the works of Meister Eckhart. Illuministic and Kantian motives are to be found in one of the very first writings of Hegel, in a Life of Jesus, which centres in "the dramatic struggle between the rational religion of Jesus, religion of the spiritual life within, understood in the Kantian sense as law and duty, and the church religion, external, ceremonial, of the Pharisees" (p. 42). Between this little work, composed at the age of twenty-four, and the Spirit of Christianity, produced in 1798-99, few years elapse, but they are decisive years for the spiritual formation of the philosopher. To the Kantian orientation succeeds a powerful hostility against the ethics of Kant, dividing the spirit into two parts, which cannot be absorbed the one with the other, "while the morality of Christ is the true morality, the elevation of the particular to the universal, the annulment of both the opposites through their harmonious union, very different

G. Della Volpe, Hegel romantico e mistico, Firenze, Le Monnier, 1929 (8°, pp. 224).

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from the abstract intellectual unity of Kant" (p. 136). In this sketch of Christian metaphysics of love, which is naturally founded on the Fourth Gospel and on the mystic tradition which completes it, we find the first indications not only of a dialectic mediation of the opposites through an activity more elevated than that of the intellect, but also of a phenomenological exposition of the life of the spirit. We should note also-and the author gives it a timely importance—the depth of the youthful Hegel's historical intuition, which detaches itself from the background of the illuministic mentality of 1700 in search of positive and constructive explanations of what Illuminism too easily confined among prejudices and superstitions: "When it has also been explained with the usual method of intellectual analysis"-says Hegel-"that the internal structure of dogmatics is a remnant of centuries of twilight, inacceptable in the times of the illuminati, it is nevertheless human to ask oneself how it can be explained that such a structure contrary to human reason has been able to grow up and be completed." These words, observes Della Volpe with Dilthey, express the state of mind common to different pioneers of the art of history. Della Volpe separates himself from the preceding literature on Hegel's youthful writings, which he usually follows, in so far as it tends to undervalue the influences of Fichte and Schelling, in comparison with Hölderlin and Eckhart, on the formation of Hegel's mind.

Della Volpe has also published an elaborate monograph on the mysticism of Meister Eckhart. In a long introduction he sets out a historical excursus on the principal philosophical formulations of the mysticism of the Ancients and of the Middle Ages, proceeding from the neo-Platonic school, through Augustine and pseudo-Dionysius the Areopagite, as far as the school of St. Victor and the Franciscan mysticism of the thirteenth century. This introduction aims partly at linking up Eckhart with his predecessors, partly at distinguishing him from them, showing that the traditional negative theology seeks to save divine transcendence through the concept that between God and man there is nothing in common, while the theology of Eckhart, "far from accentuating the transcendence, confirms openly the divine immanence," and expresses the "absorption, the identification of God in His creature" (pp. 195-6). This conclusion is perhaps too restricted; generally it is vain to ask mystics for rigorous solutions of philosophical problems, because they often follow a disconcerting line in their effusions. Anyhow, this thesis of Della Volpe, with convenient limitations, represents a useful reaction to certain recent interpretations of Eckhart which tend to make him an exponent of medieval thought closer to orthodoxy. The documentation of the book is founded on the treatises and sermons in German and on the Latin writings published by Denifle. Della Volpe shows their complete consistency with one another; if the first have a more mystic intonation, and the others a more theological one, this difference is explained, not by a substantial diversity of inspiration, but simply by the exigencies of the occasions on which they were delivered, the first being directed towards a common public of the faithful, the others to a restricted circle of the learned. Della Volpe's book abounds in long extracts of Eckhart's writings in Latin and German, which prove very useful to the reader who has not the opportunity to consult the works in full.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

¹ G. Della Volpe, Il misticismo speculativo di Maestro Eckart nei suoi rapporti storici, Bologna, Cappelli, 1930 (8°, pp. 286).

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PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA

MARXIST philosophers in Soviet Russia make a great deal of the distinction between 'dialectical' and 'mechanistic' materialism, but in spite of all that has been written about it by Lenin and others, the difference between these two theories is none too obvious to an outsider, and one is glad to have fresh light on the subject. B. Byhovsky's book, recently published in Moscow, The Philosophy of Dialectic Materialism (Ocherk philosophii dialecticheskago materialisma), is quite a good exposition of the doctrine in question, but it also leaves one wondering if there is much to choose between his version and the more old-fashioned presentations of the materialistic view. Following Holbach, Lenin, and Plehanov, Byhovsky defines matter from the epistomological point of view as that which affects our sense-organs and produces sensations in us. From the point of view of physics no definition of matter per genus et differentiam can be given because 'matter is all that exists,' and cannot be subsumed under any more general notion. All there is in the universe is matter and its manifestations. Consciousness, too, is a manifestation of matter: it is the function of entities organized in a certain way. Byhovsky does not say, however, that consciousness is caused by material processes; he definitely asserts that "material changes produce nothing but material changes," and that "existence and consciousness are not two distinct essences, but are a unity of matter and its qualities." "Subjectivity is an aspect or feature of the objective reality." At the same time Byhovsky emphatically maintains that consciousness is not an original but a derivative characteristic of matter, and is the product of a high degree of evolution. The contradiction between these two sets of assertions does not seem to trouble him. There is, he says, all the difference in the world between the dialectical materialism he is expounding and the mechanistic materialism of Hobbes, Holbach, and others. For the mechanistic materialism movement means merely a change of place, sensible qualities are merely subjective, the complex is reducible to the simple: matter is a combination of homogeneous elements, the highly complex forms of movement such as social or physiological changes are explained by mechanical laws, and so on. For the dialectical materialism, however, movement means every kind of change-qualitative as well as change in spatial position; qualities are 'objective specifications'; matter contains qualitative distinctions; and although the higher forms of life are produced by the lower, the new syntheses that spring up in the course of evolution give rise to new physical laws that cannot be reduced to a mere combination of those that hold at the more elementary levels. Everything is subject to the laws of mechanics, but not to its laws alone. Dialectic materialism interprets movement as the development of an A into a non-A, qualitatively distinct from and even opposed to it; the original A, however, is not destroyed but enters into the non-A as its constituent element. Thus, e.g., "the destruction of capitalism implies the assimilation of its technical and cultural achievements." Every existing thing is a unity of opposites, and every change is 'an embodied contradiction,' a conflict of warring forces giving rise to a new quality that contains fresh contradictions in its turn.

It is probably these vague echoes of the Hegelian philosophy that lead some of the younger thinkers from dialectical materialism to the study of Hegel, and, as was mentioned in the last Survey, to conclusions that rightly seem alarming to orthodox Marxists. But there must be great confusion of thought among the red philosophers, for they keep accusing one another of 'idealism,' when, quite obviously, no trace of that heresy can be detected in their writings. The recent victim of this accusation is, of all people, the red acade-

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mician, Deborin, who has furiously attacked idealism all his life, has modelled his own philosophy entirely on that of Lenin, and is one of the dullest and most complacent adherents of dialectical materialism that ever was! Deborin's official position is so secure that one can afford to laugh at his discomfiture in being classed with his sworn enemies; but it is no joke to be recognized as an idealist if one is not a persona grata with the Soviet Government. Bad news has been received of the one real philosopher that Soviet Russia can boast of—Losev, author of the Philosophy of Name, Ancient Cosmos and Modern Science, etc. He had the courage openly to defend a system of thought that is essentially spiritualistic, and the result is that his books—obstruse and profound metaphysical treatises—have been pronounced 'counter-revolutionary,' and he has been exiled to northern Siberia.

Several works of philosophical interest have been published by the Russian emigrés. One that particularly deserves mention is The Structure of Life, a little book by K. Starynkevitch, a Russian botanist who died in 1926 in Paris. It has just been printed in Prague, with a preface by Professor Lossky. Starynkevitch maintains that all organic life presupposes a special kind of interconnectedness between the component parts of an organism, in virtue of which each part knows, as it were, what the whole wants. He is careful to say that the expressions 'knows' and 'wants' are of course mere metaphors, for the faculties of knowing and willing arise at a late stage in the process of evolution, but they can only develop on the basis of a pre-conscious or 'primordial' intuition. It is this pre-conscious intuition that makes possible the purposive co-ordination between living cells, manifesting itself in the processes of growth, reproduction, readjustment to environment, etc., that are characteristic of all living organisms. This co-ordination exists not only in individual organisms such as a particular plant or the human body, but also in the case of groups or colonies of organisms such as a forest, a marsh, etc. A forest is more than the sum of individual trees that compose it: it is a living whole, reacting in a certain way to its environment, holding its own against the encroachments of the marsh-land or the steppes, and so on. Carrying this line of thought farther, Starynkevitch comes to the conclusion that all biological processes on our planet are interdependent, and form part of one living whole, which may as such be capable of reproduction. Following S. Arrenius's theory of panspermy according to which micro-organisms can be carried by the rays of light from one heavenly body to another, Starynkevitch works out the conception of 'planetary heredity.' The varied examples he gives of interdependence between the different forms of life make his little book fascinating reading. It is for specialists to say whether the facts admit of any other explanation than that offered by him; the philosophical interest of the book lies in his applying the conception of pre-conscious intuition, which some thinkers consider to be the necessary presupposition of cognition, to the processes of organic life as a whole.

The idea of organic unity so deeply characteristic of Russian thought is to be found in another form in Professor N. Alexeyev's Theory of the State. He understands by the State a social individual entity, the constituent elements of which are territory, population, a government, and an orderly way of life. Such an entity is an organic whole, a multi-human personality. It differs from a single human personality by not having a single centre of reference, but existing merely in and through particular individual minds. In so far as the State is composed of human personalities endowed with spiritual life, it is not only an organic process, but also something supra-organic. Political organization presupposes the existence of a leading social class, the authority of which is based upon its being regarded as in some sense superior to other

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classes. Modern democracy is an attempt to build up a State without a leading class, and is therefore bound to end in failure; only those States will survive that can succeed in training a leading class bound together by common beliefs and aspirations. A State with such a leading class would be an 'idiocracy,' and the best State will be one whose leading class is inspired by the true conception of the meaning of the world as a whole. The author's fear and distrust of democracy is typical of the Russian *emigrés* psychology, and so is his hopelessly theoretical way of handling the problems of political life.

A very interesting little book by B. Vysheslavtsev has been published by the Y.M.C.A. Press in Paris, The Heart in Christian and Indian Mysticism. By the 'heart' Vysheslavtsev means not only our emotional nature, but the ontological super-rational principle in which our true selfhood consists. That principle is the source both of good and of evil, for the essence of selfhood is freedom. It is both spiritual and physical, for it transcends the distinction between soul and body. In the course of the discussion Vysheslavtsev raises many important problems, and whether one agrees with his solution of them or no, one cannot help enjoying the clear and original way in which he presents the subject.

Father Sergey Bulgakov's book on *Ikons and Ikon-Worship*, just out of the press, is primarily theological, but has considerable philosophical interest. Starting with a consideration of the historical arguments for and against ikon-worship, Bulgakov passes to the general question in what sense, if any, can there be pictorial representation of God. His answer is bound up with his general theory of the relation between God and the world, and, roughly stated, consists in saying that all creation, and man especially, is in its eternal essence a living ikon of the Deity. The world is made in God's image, and a reflection of some aspect of Godhead may be caught in a work of art. In painting an ikon of Christ the artist represents not only Christ's physical body, but also His divinity, in so far as the body is a symbol or image of the spirit.

An excellent book on modern German thought has been written in French by a Russian philosopher, G. Gurvitch: Les tendences actuelles de la Philosophie allemande. G. Husserl, M. Scheler, E. Lask, N. Hartmann. M. Heidegger. (Paris, Librairie philosophique Vrin. 1930.) Gurvitch's knowledge of German philosophy is very thorough, and his book on Fichte's ethics (written in German) is said to be a fine piece of work.

Another young Russian philosopher who writes in French, Alexandre Koyré, has brought out a book that is of great value to those who are interested in the history of Russian thought: La philosophie et le problème national en Russie au début du XIX^e siècle (Paris, Librairie ancienne Honoré Champion).

The first number of *Der Russische Gedanke* for 1931 contains articles by Lapshin, A. Weidemann, Yakovenko, Zenkovsky, Karsavin, and others, three reports of the Oxford Congress of Philosophy, some portraits, and many reviews. It is a very interesting number; most of the articles are concerned with philosophical subjects, but some deal with Russian literature and history; three are not by Russian authors, but by foreigners interested in Russian thought. It is worth while to say a few words about Professor Lapshin's and Zenkovsky's articles. Lapshin in his *Von der Ueberwindung des Solipsismus* argues that Kantian transcendentalism, of which he is an exponent, need not lead to solipsism, for unperceived events and other selves may be regarded as objects of *possible* experience; the assertion that all objects as cognized by me are my ideas should be interpreted in the light of the distinction between the psycho-physical and the epistemological self. Zenkovsky in his article *Die Philosophie der religiösen Erfahrung* sketches out his conception of religious experience. By 'experience' he means a content of consciousness that has a

given character, is conditioned by the interaction between subject and object, and has objective reference. Criticizing the attempts made by Durkheim, Freud, and others to explain religious experience as derivative, he points out that the experiences from which it is supposed to be derived (e.g. social relations) already contain the religious element. One is driven to the conclusion that there are to be found in our consciousness religious data which are sui generis, and can only be explained by the interaction between the knowing subject and a trans-subjective principle. That principle reveals itself in mystical experience as an all-embracing whole, and consequently many religious people are inclined to interpret it in the spirit of pantheism. This, however, is not the only deliverance of religious consciousness: in many cases it is supplemented by an experience of communion with the supreme principle recognized as a personal or a super-personal being, revealing Itself to us through the Word. The fact that there are many revelations, and that to some extent they contra dict one another, does not prove that revelation as such is merely subjective, any more than hallucinations and illusions prove all perception to be false. Zenkovsky solves the contradiction between the pantheistic and the theistic deliverances of consciousness by pointing out that in the pantheistic experience the vision of the divine aspect of the created world is mistaken for the vision of the Deity Itself.

Zenkovsky has something more to say with regard to pantheism in a long article in Put, in which he expounds his conception of the relation between God and the world and defends the idea of creation versus 'emanation.' Another interesting article in the same journal is G. Florovsky's spirited attack on German idealism, in which he detects pantheistic tendencies. It is not altogether clear what these authors mean by 'pantheism,' but it evidently is like a red rag to a bull to them! They both write brilliantly, but their arguments would be more convincing if they did not take it for granted that 'pantheistic tendencies' are essentially reprehensible. There is a very good article by Vysheslavtsev, in which he applies the psycho-analytical conception of sublimation to the problems of moral life, and an excellent one by S. Frank

on Psycho-analysis as a Philosophy.

A new book by Professor Lossky, Values and Existence, has just been published in Paris, too late for giving an account of it in the present Survey.

NATALIE DUDDINGTON.

NEW BOOKS

The Faith of a Moralist: Gifford Lectures delivered in the University of St. Andrews, 1926-1928. By A. E. Taylor. Series I, "The Theological Implications of Morality," pp. xx + 437. Series II. "Natural Theology and the Positive Religions," pp. xxii + 437. (London: Macmillan and Co. 1930. In Two Volumes, 15s. each.)

Professor Taylor's Gifford Lectures present the moral argument to Theism in a new and original form. The purport of the First Series is to show how the moral life of man furnishes an approach not merely to the God of Natural Theology, but to the God of Revelation. It bears witness "to three great strictly supernatural or other-world realities—God, grace, eternal life." In the Second Series this admission of the supernatural is developed further to the conclusion that the "revelational, historical, authoritarian, and institutional elements" present in all the higher religious faiths are no "irrelevant trappings, but themselves an integral and indispensable factor in a living religion" (II. 11-12)—and, we may add, in a living morality. Professor Taylor asks the following questions: (a) Is the moral end, the good for man, to be found in the satisfaction of merely temporal interests, or does it imply an other-worldly goal of aspiration, that is at once eternal and real? If so, what is this super-temporal good, and what is its bearing on our actual life and its obligations? (b) Can the good be attained by man's unaided effort. or is "an antecedent outgoing movement" on the part of the res infinita et æterna, in other words, the grace of God, a presupposition of the moral life? The answer to these questions shows that Ethics, while possessed of a relative autonomy, points beyond itself to a theology, which, since it embraces the belief in God's initiative of self-disclosure, passes the limits of Pure Reason.

This is a high argument, worthy of a distinguished philosopher, and not to be essayed by any but one who knows religion from within. Professor Taylor brings to his task the courage born of a great sincerity. He is well aware that his conclusions do not admit of logical demonstration. The appeal is to reason, not in its restricted sense of logical ratiocination, but as inclusive of a reasonable faith. His contention is just that reason demands from the philosopher the recognition of contingency, i.e. of what defies 'rationalization, in the dealings of God with man. He is studiously careful to preserve an impartial balance between the claims of Christianity and other faiths. Yet his interest in his theme is not merely theoretical. He writes as a fervent believer in the Christian revelation, who is deeply sensible of the danger to morality as well as to religion from the growing laicization of our public education. Secularism is the enemy. Hence, in the more controversial sections of the lectures, he concentrates on the refutation of Naturalism rather than of other types of non-religious ethical theory. His eye is fixed from first to last upon his Gifford audience, members of the cultured public who are not professed philosophers. This is all to the good; for philosophy is still too prone to linger on its academic pinnacle. At the same time, it explains certain imperfections in the author's presentation of his subject, e.g. diffuseness in exposition and a tendency to repetition of earlier statements, which, while legitimate in a lecture, impair the impressiveness of a book when read. We cannot but regret that, as he tells us in the Preface, he refrained from recasting

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the lectures "in a severer literary form." But this is of secondary moment, compared with the originality and daring of Professor Taylor's design and the fine quality of his achievement.

The basis on which Professor Taylor's argument rests is twofold, (a) his

theory of Fact and Value, (b) his theory of Time.

(a) Religion stands or falls with the belief in the existence of its object. This is why the religious life, as is explained in the Second Series, can never be merely an affair of spiritual values, severed from historical attachments. God cannot be manufactured out of universals. Morality, on the other hand, remains, as bare morality, within the limits of the 'ought,' which is irreducible to terms of 'is.' "A moral conviction is a belief not in the actuality or reality of anything, but a belief in the goodness of certain things, or . . . in the rightness of certain kinds of conduct" (I. 28). If this severance is ultimate, as is held e.g. by McTaggart and Mr. Russell, the moral life can never span the

gulf that parts it from religion.

In his second chapter Professor Taylor gives three arguments to show that this is not the case. (i) The severance rests upon a false abstraction. Universals are valueless in abstracto; virtue and knowledge, for example, have value only as the concrete experiences of actual persons. What is loosely spoken of as truth-value is really the value of the knowledge of an individual knower. Value thus belongs only to the actual; we are told later (II. 147) that God is "the supreme value at the basis of fact." (ii) The non-existent cannot be the object of a significant judgment. All propositions have existential import; the universal, as "a formal implication, not between propositions, but between propositional functions," is "something less than an actual proposition" (I. 48). But individual existence is not restricted to what has location and date in Space-Time. There follows an illuminating discussion of Aristotle's doctrine of analogous predication as applicable to the concept of existence, in which Professor Taylor implicitly refutes, what he nowhere treats explicitly, the theory, held by Dr. Moore and others, of the "subsistence" as distinct from the "existence" of universals. (iii) No hard and fast line can be drawn between given fact and our interpretations of it in terms of value. We never meet with a bare datum devoid of meaning, or with interpretation barely superimposed by the mind on fact. The actual world is such that values, like other real qualities, are found within it. In Professor Whitehead's language, a res vera destitute of ingredient objects is as mythical an abstraction as a merely possible object that has no ingredience in a res vera. This last point is developed in fuller detail in the later pages of chapter viii, where Professor Taylor, in reference to the dictum that "the other world is this world rightly understood," insists that all understanding is appreciation, and that value is discoverable, not in man's moral experience only, but throughout Nature. The world presents in its structure a hierarchy of patterns, kinematical, biological, psychological, moral; a hierarchy wherein the more abstract subordinate patterns reproduce, "in varying degrees of fullness and distinctness, the characteristic pattern of the whole" (I. 360), and admit of understanding and appreciation just in so far as they are seen to be instrumental to the richer and all-pervasive pattern. The whole pattern must indeed remain unfathomable to our intellect, "but the richer partial patterns at least indicate to us what are relatively the dominant features." These "dominant features in the pattern of reality" are what we mean by values (I. 374).

The facts are what they are through men's moral valuations, and those valuations reveal the nature of the facts. But there are bad actualities as well as good. Professor Taylor is not the man to ignore the problem of evil

in the world and man. He wonders rather (I. 163-4) that so many moralists, always excepting Plato and Kant—and, we may add, Butler—have shirked this issue, confining their attention to the nature of goodness and the good. Nor does ideal value admit of complete realization within the sphere of temporal existence. Yet, if it be not realizable, man's moral life is an illusion, and his struggle against evil passion a vain endeavour. The discussion of value here brings us to the theory of Time.

(b) Morality and religion alike imply that Time is real. Professor Taylor ably vindicates its reality against McTaggart (see the admirable criticism in the note appended to chapter iii) and ancient and modern theosophical theories. Morality and religion alike imply transcendence of the temporal order. Here Professor Taylor comes to grips with Naturalism. Time is indeed the stuff out of which the moral life is shaped; but if that life has any meaning, it means a tension between the temporal and the eternal. To be aware of the temporal is already to transcend it. Man not merely, like lower organisms, has a history, responding to the environment in a manner dependent on the route by which he has reached his present state; his past is a living past, which he can shape by rational purpose, thus presaging an ideal experience in which past and future are gathered within the compass of the present. What sort of Time, what sort of Eternity, does morality thus imply? The Time that is real is not the abstract Time of mathematical physics, with mere succession of earlier and later, and no past, present, or future; but the lived Time of human conative experience, Bergson's durée reelle, with its 'no more' and 'not yet', and with succession within the 'now'. (Professor Taylor returns to this theme in the eighth chapter of the Second Series, where he subjects Bergson's theory of intellect to very trenchant criticism). The eternity, which is requisite for man's attainment of the moral goal, is not the absolute eternity of God, without duration or succession, but a continuous present, which, though without consciousness of past and future as such, admits of succession within its unending stretch, and of progress not towards, but in fruition. The successiveness would lie, not in the knower or in the knowing, but solely in the known (I. 429). This highly interesting, if difficult, view of a Heaven that allows of a real "communion of saints" in reciprocal relations of service and of a visio Dei that forms a sequence of wonderful surprises, is supported by analogies from the richest human experiences (e.g. the full enjoyment of music or intellectual converse), and by reference both to the Aristotelian distinction of γένεσις and ενέργεια, and to the Thomist concept of ævum, i.e. of a "participated eternity", which is "all at once", and yet permits of the consciousness of "before and after" within the "now". Professor Taylor claims that it "conforms exactly" to Boethius's classic definition of eternity.

Since the basis of the moral life is in the temporal and its crown in the supernatural, the Good for man must be sought beyond the limits of the historical order. Professor Taylor is alive to the difficulty of determining its nature. "The 'Form of Good' may be 'the master-light of all our seeing', but if we are asked what it is, though the better men we are, the less hopelessly vague our answer may be expected to be, the best of us has nothing like a 'clear and distinct idea' of what he would be at'' (I. 70). But interpretation, on Cartesian lines, in terms of 'clear and distinct ideas,' equally breaks down whenever we pass beyond those aspects of nature that are explicable by purely kinematical formulæ. It is a grave error "to contrast the life of ethics as lived in the clear daylight with the life of religion as one of twilight, mystery, and danger. All these are to be found in the ethical life itself" (I. 161). All Utopias modelled after the fashion of man's temporal environment seem on examination "at

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least as likely to prove a 'hell on earth' as a 'heaven below.'" Moral insight does not decipher the future in the light of the present and the past, but rather the past and present in the light of a future, which, when it arrives, reveals the significance of the antecedent happenings for an unforeseeable and startling issue. This is what Hegel called 'the cunning of Reason'; and it is applied significantly, in the Second Series of these lectures, to justify the

sudden and intrusive character of religious revelation (II. 85 ff.). Professor Taylor identifies—in our opinion somewhat rapidly—the Moral Ideal with God. He has no patience with mere abstractions. The supreme Value must be One and Individual. As against the doctrine of a plurality of intrinsic goods, he appeals to the principles of analogical unity and of hierarchical order, and to the evidence, within human experience, that moral advance means progressive unification alike of personality and of the goods that are the objects of its desire (I. 101 ff.). As against Kant, he argues that the Moral Law is impotent to excite worship; "we cannot worship what is no richer in quality than our own self; we can only worship what is all, and more than all, we mean when we speak of ourselves as living, intelligent, moral, and personal" (I. 159). Further, the attainment of the Good, the task of becoming like to God, is impossible apart from grace. Professor Taylor is troubled by the failure of ethical thinkers, especially Spinoza and Kant, to handle the problem of the adequate motivation of the Will for Good. If man is to reshape his personality and rise from the plane of the temporal to the eternal, it can only be through an act of initiative from the divine going forth to meet his responsive effort. God must be the efficient as well as the final cause of moral redemption. Such is the purport of the chapter (vi) entitled "The Initiative of the Eternal," perhaps the finest in the first volume, in which the author effects the passage from morality to a theology that is not merely natural but revealed. In the following chapter he treats of the super-temporal destiny thus marked out for man by his moral nature. Following the Platonic and Christian tradition, for which the belief in immortality is bound up with the belief in God, he rejects alike McTaggart's non-theistic and non-ethical arguments, the historic metaphysical argument from the simplicity of the soul (which proves only that, if the soul perishes, it perishes all at once), and the empirical argument from psychical phenomena. None of these has the ethical basis requisite for adequate demonstration. Professor Taylor holds that demonstration is possible, if it be granted that moral obligation is unconditional and that its claim is unrealizable within thisworldly experience. Reality of function implies a real environment for its exercise. Moral vision, like physical vision, implies a real object (I. 231); and the object is nowhere discoverable in a world of becoming which, as such, possesses no abiding actuality. "Unless we admit that moral imperatives cannot and need not be justified at all, and to have no genuine obligatoriness about them, we must be prepared to admit that there is good rational ground for anticipating a destination of human persons which is ignored when such persons are thought of as merely transient; morality will thus bear a real witness of its own to the presence of the seeds of immortality in us" (I. 293).

Professor Taylor will hardly expect the line of reasoning by which he develops the implications of morality to these fine issues to be accepted without cavil by the majority of philosophic critics. The present reviewer, finding himself in substantial agreement with the argument, is inclined rather to question whether the delimitation of the spheres of morality and religion has been drawn with sufficiently firm a hand. We readily agree that morality is not a self-contained form of experience, but points beyond itself to a goal incommensurable with any temporal actualization; that man's desire for

good, when thought out, is found to be a desire for a res infinita et æterna; and that when religion is brought to bear on human conduct, it raises moral praxis to a higher and richer plane. Moreover, it effects this transfiguration, as Professor Taylor well shows (II. 63-65, 269 ff.), not so much by express ethical teaching as indirectly, by its revelation of the nature of God. In the Second Series Professor Taylor makes abundantly clear that religion is "something quite different from a moral rule of life" (II. 67), that "morality at its best, and the practice of the presence of God are two, not one" (II. 68), and that to treat religion as an "instrumental adjunct" to morality means death alike to genuine worship and to earnest moral endeavour (II. 137). But, in the First Series, we find him constantly characterizing the moral life in terms which are proper only to religion; as when the notion of sin is described as ethical rather than theological (I. 163, 169), or repentance is spoken of as a constant feature of moral experience (I. 85, 175), or the moral life is regarded as a "dying life" (I. 132), or "Thou must be born again" is said to be "the central proposition of all genuine morality" (I. 233). There is a certain ambiguity between such a "genuine morality," which is in fact morality enriched by religion, and the "mere morality," of which Professor Taylor is apt to speak with, it seems to us, undue disparagement. We regret that he should not have set out on his enterprise by defining clearly and in detail the nature of morality as such, the morality that we find expounded, e.g., by Aristotle and Dr. Moore, and have subsequently developed from this basis its implications of self-transcendence. There would then have been no danger of blurring the distinction between mere morality and morality informed by the spirit and temper of religion. As it is, Professor Taylor tends to interpret the moral life proleptically, as the virtus infusa, so clearly distinguished by St. Thomas from the morality attainable by the natural light of reason, i.e. as virtue raised to a higher power through the possession of revealed truth and the inspiration of supernatural grace. The morality realizable in the lives of good men who are "deity-blind" is something quite different in its character and value from the morality of Naturalism on the one hand, and, on the other, the transfigured praxis of the saint.

There is a further point which we should like to question in Professor Taylor's account of the moral life. He follows the historical tradition in interpreting it as a life lived *sub ratione boni* and motived solely by desire of good, in opposition to the Kantian doctrine which interprets it in the light of the concept of duty, holding that an action to be moral must be done for the sake of its own rightness and for no ulterior end. But we refrain from labouring here our grounds for disagreement, since they have been fully

expressed in articles recently published in this Journal.

The Second Series of Lectures, entitled "Natural Theology and the Positive Religions," deal with the question how far a philosopher is reasonably justified in accepting, in principle, the contingent or historical, as distinct from the purely rational, features regarded as essential by all the great positive religions. These features are (1) their claim to rest on an immediately given revelation (ch. ii.); (2) the inclusion among their credenda of assertions as to historical fact (ch. iii.); (3) the miraculous character of certain of these alleged facts (ch. iv.); (4) their appeal to an authority, which, as divine, is held to be infallible and final (ch. v.); and (5) their prescription of a corporate rule of life and worship, their institutions, and their sacraments (chs. vi, vii). Professor Taylor endeavours to handle these features as common to the higher world-religions and to avoid as far as possible discussion of doctrines and practices peculiar to his own form of Christianity. His aim throughout is to show the speculative insufficiency of any purely Natural Theology, and so to

PHILOSOPHY

vindicate the intrinsic reasonableness of a faith in a supernatural revelation. He is fully aware that he is skating upon thin ice. He obviously must turn for concrete illustration to the religion with which he has direct personal acquaintance; and he has a pleasant way of ruling out a particular topic as "of course" beyond the strict programme of his lecture, and then expatiating upon it, to the delight and instruction of the reader. But no one can charge him with transgressing the limits prescribed to a Gifford Lecturer. The arms of the founder are, in fact, wider than those of St. Peter; and Professor Taylor need have no fear that when he meets Lord Gifford in their true patria he will be visited with reproaches for his bold ventures.

In discussing this Second Series we must limit ourselves to three general observations. (I) The argument throughout rests on analogy between those aspects of secular experience which defy rationalization and those in which the positive religions discern the marks of supernatural agency. So genius in art and science presents a like intrusiveness to prophetic revelation, disclosing suddenly, at rare intervals and to a few chosen spirits, a vision of reality which demands an act of faith for its acceptance. So in the evolutionary process new qualities emerge, to be accepted as inexplicable fact, displaying in their emergence an abruptness and discontinuity analogous to the miraculous in religion. Scientific knowledge of the physical is the product of intelligence controlled by the authority of sense-perception, an authority incapable of rational justification, and whose claim to "infallibility" does not preclude all possibility of error. Family and communal life generate their appropriate forms of ceremonial observance which serve to focus and foster the personal loyalty of their members. Once more, Professor Taylor shows, in what is perhaps the most impressive chapter in the Series, how the principle exemplified everywhere in the intellectual and moral life of man, that the physical ministers to the spiritual as its outward and visible embodiment; would lead us to expect that "if there is a further level of the life of the spirit concerned with conscious relation to the divine," the highest gifts of God should, "as a general rule, come to us in connection with, and dependence on, physical things and bodily acts as their channels or instruments. In a world where nature is full of sacraments, it would be strange if grace had not its sacraments too" (II. 303). (2) In chapter viii ("The Ultimate Tension"), Professor Taylor returns to the problem of Time and the Eternal. The acceptance of the historical element in religion "requires us to ascribe a significance to Time and temporal events and processes which is denied to them" by many philosophers (II. 321). After a detailed exposition, on the lines laid down by Dr. Whitehead, of the limits and relative justification of the rationalist theory of Space-Time, he shows how a thoroughgoing historical view of nature has come to replace the abstract and geometrical, and how contingency and individuality are discernible in every quarter of the universe from the electron to man. The world of becoming is revealed as a world, not of mere becoming, but of yéregis eis ouglar, i.e. becoming that tends to stable activity of selfexpression as its end. God in His perfect self-contained individuality furnishes the solution of the tension "Becoming and time . . . should be thought of, not as the logical contraries of being and eternity, but as depotentialized, imperfectly communicated, being and eternity" (II. 366). "We are temporal, not because there is a foreign element in our being which does not come from God, but because what there is in us is not the whole plenitude of the riches of God's being" (ibid.). "When we say of God that He, and He only, is strictly and fully the eternal being . . . , we do not mean that there is nothing in this life in any way answering to what we experience as movement and process; we mean that the experience is there, but that in Him it is not, as it is in

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on 'y il varying degree with all His creatures, one of being more or less at the mercy of circumstance; there is nothing in Him like what we experience as movement to an unknown or half-known goal" (II. 365). And, at the close of the same chapter, Professor Taylor, dealing with the difficult problem of Divine Impassibility, stretches this admission of movement into God's nature to the length of ascribing to Him an emotional life, which, in its freedom from transition from a lower to a higher grade of activity, transcends our own, just as, in the way of knowledge, our discursive processes are transcended in His perfect intellectual intuition (II. 371).

(3) Both these points raise a problem, to which Professor Taylor's views on epistemology are highly relevant. "It is a grave mistake to assume," he writes in his closing chapter (II. 378), "that a theory of knowledge is, by itself, a sufficient basis for a metaphysical philosophy." For "we are not related to the real as spectators to a picture," but as actors within an unfinished drama; and the drama presents contingent features which resist inclusion within the cadres of logical categories. Alternative metaphysical interpretations, as Kant himself saw, are always possible, and "the choice between them has to be made on other than purely speculative grounds." "It would be disloyalty to reason to deny that the real world is one in which the prosecution of science is possible; it is not disloyalty to hold that the world is something other and more than a mere field for the elaboration of science." Religion with its specific experiences can claim autonomy and the right to think out its own data unfettered by any categories imposed from without. There is room for a genuine knowledge that is the outcome of religious faith.

This doctrine is very important, especially in regard to the possibility of knowledge of God. Professor Taylor is firm in his refusal to base religious faith merely on emotion, to the exclusion of intellectual apprehension of reality. We wish he had developed more fully his suggestion that "there may be truth that is not propositional," difficult as it may be to make room for it in a metaphysical scheme (II. 386). We have seen how constantly he recurs to the "way of analogy," which was formulated with such precision by St. Thomas; it is his obvious refuge from the via remotionis and its confession of "absolute nescience" of the Divine nature. While we are wholly with him in his desire thus to secure positive knowledge of God, we feel a little uneasy at his silence on the difficulties that beset his path. There is need for a criterion of such analogies, to save from illegitimate anthropomorphism: and where can the criterion be found? Again, what proportion is there between the Creator and the creature, the infinite and the finite? It is hard to justify an analogy, where one term is incommensurable with the remainder. Nor does the word eminenter furnish a very satisfactory solution; it states a problem rather than answers it. What we seem to need is an attribute possessed alike by God and man in widely differing measure, but without difference in kind. We cannot assert this either of goodness or of intelligence or of power; is it possible to follow a hint given by St. Bernard and assert it of love? In that event, the term love, alike in God's love for man and in man's love for God (and for God alone), would be not merely analogous, but univocal, in meaning. We should be provided with a positive standard in the light of which we could test all further predications.

To conclude: Professor Taylor shows us in these volumes that the *Dieu des pauvres et des humbles* is also the *Dieu des savants et des philosophes* (II. 320). The supposed contrast vanishes before a reasonable metaphysic. We have done scant justice to the breadth and penetration with which Professor Taylor handles this high argument. We have barely noticed his frequent and acute criticisms of other philosophers, notably of Plato, Spinoza, and

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Kant among the classics, and among the moderns of McTaggart, M. Bergson, and Professor Whitehead. We have said nothing of his treatment of the problem of evil, of his tentative but arresting excursions into eschatology, or of the discussion of contingency and freedom that forms the Appendix to the second volume. He has provided a storehouse of speculative treasure, alike for the philosopher and the theologian. Above all, he has succeeded where, we are sure, he most desired success. Thanks to his book, it will no longer be possible for a serious metaphysic to ignore the claims of revealed theology to give knowledge of the nature of the real.

W. G. DE BURGH.

The Right and the Good. By W. D. Ross, M.A., LL.D., Provost of Oriel College, Oxford. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1930. Pp. vi + 176. Price 10s. 6d.)

This is a masterly essay on what is perhaps the most difficult group of problems in moral philosophy. It is masterly alike in design, in argument, and in expression. Dr. Ross states his views definitely, but without a trace of dogmatism; he says precisely what he means, and bases his conclusions on careful examination of the evidence and with full discussion of relevant objections. He never loses sight of Aristotle's counsel to attach weight to the judgments of men of trained moral character who are not professed philosophers, allowing that there is much in "what we really think" that deserves to rank as knowledge. Abstract principles are illustrated throughout by examples drawn from concrete moral experience. The style is condensed, but never at the cost of clarity, and is singularly free from technicalities. The book does not make easy reading, for the author is all out for "the rigour of the game," and eschews the diffuseness and irrelevancies with which so many writers on ethics seek to edify the public. But the serious student, be he philosopher or no, will find it an invaluable source of enlightenment; if we may use a phrase which Dr. Ross himself shows to be inaccurate, it is a model of what an ethical treatise "ought to be."

Chapters I and II deal with "Right." Subjectivist and sociological explanations are briefly dismissed, on the ground that they have been adequately countered by other writers. The "Ideal Utilitarianism" of Dr. Moore, on the other hand, is criticized in detail, especially in its later form, according to which productivity of the greatest possible good is held to be the sole determining ground of the rightness of an act. The decisive objection to this theory is its implication "that the only morally significant relation in which my neighbours stand to me is that of being possible beneficiaries by my action" (19). Is this even plausible? Dr. Ross admits, of course, that there is a prima facie obligation to promote good, and that in certain situations this obligation may be paramount; but it fails "to do justice to the highly personal character of duty" (22), or to explain why we ought to pay a debt or keep a promise. even in the face of counter "optimific" probabilities. The alleged synthetic connexion between "right" and "productive of most good" is neither selfevident, nor deductively demonstrable, nor capable of inductive establishment. Dr. Ross agrees with Professor Prichard, to whom he acknowledges his indebtedness in the Preface, that the concept of Right, like that of Good, is indefinable and ultimate.

Professor Prichard's influence may also be discerned in two positions set forth in these opening chapters, which call for closer consideration. (I) The rightness of an act is sharply distinguished from the moral goodness of an action

on the ground that the former is wholly independent, the latter wholly dependent, on the motive. (We note in passing a slight ambiguity in Dr. Ross's exposition: is it the whole action, i.e. "the doing of the act from a certain motive," or merely the motive, that is morally good or bad?) It follows that a right act may be a morally bad action, a wrong act a morally good one, and that "nothing that ought to be done is ever morally good" (4). This doctrine carries with it far-reaching consequences; e.g. as regards the distinctions of justice and benevolence, benevolence and beneficence (53), the differences of types of moral judgments (101-102), and the denial that right is a form of value (122, 132-133). The present reviewer has stated his objections to it in a recent number of this Journal, and will only refer here to the two arguments put forward by Dr. Ross. (a) "Ought" implies "can"; but "it is not the case that I can by choice produce a certain motive in myself at a moment's notice, still less that I can at a moment's notice make it effective in stimulating me to act" (5). The case, however, is not so simple as it seems. Are we not here up against the whole problem of moral freedom, and particularly that aspect of it which has received all too little attention from ethical writers, how we can secure effective control of the passions by reason. The difficulty is no greater than that of making myself act rightly on Dr. Ross's interpretation of a right act. In his closing chapter (VII, on "Moral Goodness") Dr. Ross explains "the moral goodness both of actions and feelings" as arising from "their proceeding from a certain kind of desire" (156). Is it the case that desires are less capable of control than acts? However difficult the task, the control of desire is surely the main business of the moral life. And what sense is there in calling an action morally good, if it is not possible to command the motive (or desire) on which the goodness depends? The truth seems to be that on any view of the relation of motive to obligation we are confronted with a contradiction intrinsic to moral experience. "Ought" implies "can"; yet, in any concrete moral action, duty remains unfulfilled. The discussion of this antinomy would lead, as it led Kant and Bradley, into the field of metaphysics, and Dr. Ross rigorously avoids all such excursions. When, however, he comes to ask what in an individual situation it is obligatory to do, and takes the case of the duty to return a borrowed book to a friend, he insists that the duty has not been done unless we actually secure the book's return, despite the fact that certain steps in the process lie outside of our control. The book may be "destroyed in a railway accident or stolen by a dishonest postman." "We get the curious consequence that however carelessly I pack or dispatch the book, if it comes to hand I have done my duty; and however carefully I have acted, if the book does not come to hand I have not done my duty" (45). What then becomes of the principle that "ought" implies "can"? (b) Dr. Ross's second argument is a reductio ad absurdum. "If the sense of duty is to be my motive for doing a certain act, it must be the sense that it is my duty to do that act. If, therefore, we say "it is my duty to do act A from the sense of duty," this means "it is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A." And here the whole expression is in contradiction with a part of itself. The whole sentence says, "It is my duty to-do _act_A_from_the_sense_that_it_is_my_duty_to_do_act_A." But the latter part of the sentence implies that what I think is that it is my duty to-do-act-A simply" (ibid.). Are we not here again faced by the antinomy which we said was inherent in all moral experience? No particular dutiful act A is adequate to express the principle of duty universal which is the moral motive. If I have any moral knowledge at all, I know that after doing what I call my duty in a given situation (and it is only by thus acting that I can in any measure realize the universal), I remain, for all my effort,

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an unprofitable servant. I have not done what it was my duty to do. Again, when the motive is particularized as my sense that it is my duty to do act A, it merges in the intention, in what I will to do. Thus if the act be taken, as it should be taken, to mean the inner act of will, exclusive of features in the overt act which lie beyond our control, difference of motive entails difference, not merely in the action, but in the act. The error which results in so much argument "at cross-purposes" (156) lies not in the failure to distinguish moral goodness from rightness, but in the illegitimate severance of abstract motive from an equally abstract act. The distinction between what is right and what is morally good rests not, as Dr. Ross holds, on the exclusion of motive from the one and its inclusion in the other, but on two quite different grounds. The judgment of moral goodness is passed (a) on a system of acts or on standing desires and dispositions to act, and (b) from the standpoint, not of the man acting, but of himself or another theoretically reviewing the action, as an impartial spectator, after the event. The strict and concrete moral

judgment is that of "right."

(II) We have seen that the beneficiary relation is not the only one that has moral significance. There are others, e.g. of creditor to debtor, child to parent, friend to friend, which generate prima facie obligations (19). Dr. Ross attaches much importance to these prima facie or conditional duties, giving an excellent classification of them and of the ways in which they arise. They are not actual or absolute duties; they are general, not particular; actual duties are toti-resultant attributes of an act, belonging to it in virtue of its whole nature, while these are parti-resultant, belonging to an act in virtue of some one component of its nature (28). They are not arbitrary, but objective facts involved in an element of the practical situation, and bearing witness to the moral order which "is just as much part of the fundamental nature of the universe . . . as is the spatial or numerical structure expressed in the axioms of geometry or arithmetic" (29-30). Moreover, these prima facie duties are self-evident and strictly known (Dr. Ross is very insistent upon this), whereas particular duties are neither self-evident nor deducible from self-evident principles, but matters of probable opinion. "ἐν τῆ αἰσθήσει ή κρίσις. This sense of our particular duty in particular circumstances, preceded and informed by the fullest reflection we can bestow on the act in all its bearings, is highly fallible, but it is the only guide we have to our duty" (42). In his desire to vindicate a place in ethics for moral knowledge, Dr. Ross seems to us to exaggerate the importance of the abstract principles which alone we can be said to know. They enter doubtless into the theoretical review of the practical situation antecedent to the decision as to what we ought to do. But subsumption of cases under general principles is normally very subordinate to the particular factors in a situation; what counts, for instance, is my peculiar obligation to A rather than the general obligation of gratitude to a benefactor. In grave moral crises we often do not know our duty till we are plunged in the specific situation; the vision, when it comes, comes as a surprise, unforeseeable by ourselves or others.

We have dwelt on the matter of the two opening chapters because the views there expressed are of special importance for an understanding of moral action. The rest of Dr. Ross's book (save for two appendices on "Rights" and on "Punishment," and the concluding chapter on "Moral Goodness") carries us beyond the field of morality proper to a discussion of the whole problem of Value. Space forbids us giving to these chapters the attention they richly deserve. The analysis of the varied uses of the term "Good" in Chapter III is quite the best we know. In defining "intrinsic good," Dr. Ross engages in one of the "private fights" with Dr. Moore, which, despite a wide

measure of agreement, occur at intervals throughout the volume. The issue in this case is the applicability of the principle of organic unities to the discrimination between "intrinsic" and "ultimate" goods. Chapter IV (on the "Nature of Good"), the longest in the book, is largely taken up with criticism of Professor Perry's and Professor Urban's theories of value. Dr. Ross himself rejects all relational interpretations, whether ontological (e.g. of coherence between elements in the object, or, again, of fulfilment to tendency) or psychological (Perry), maintaining that goodness is a consequential property, "that anything that is good must be good either by virtue of its whole nature apart from its goodness, or by virtue of something in its nature other than goodness" (79). Value is not, as Professor Urban holds, an objective, though only objectives, or, preferably, facts (since objectives are no real entities) possess value (111-113). Moreover, the value-judgment carries an existential implication; "actual value presupposes actual existence, and conditional value supposed existence" (114). Dr. Ross, it will be seen, has no truck with subjectivism, either in the case of right or in that of good. The claim of beauty to possess intrinsic value gives rise to a very interesting discussion (124 ff.). Beauty is certainly not subjective, nor, being sensuous, purely objective; it is grounded on the power things have of producing in minds the experience of æsthetic enjoyment. Dr. Ross, we may note, accepts the traditional view that secondary qualities are relative to the percipient. Rightness, on the other hand, is intrinsic, but not a value; an act only has moral value when done from a good motive, i.e. as a morally good action. The last half of the chapter also contains another "private fight" with Dr. Moore, this time on the distinction between difference of intrinsic nature and difference of quality, and on the sort of necessity by which two things that are exactly alike must have

In Chapter V the author asks "what kind of things are intrinsically good?" His answer is brief; he falls back, as does Dr. Moore in Principia Ethica, on his happy gift of judicious intuition. Only states of consciousness possess intrinsic value; and, among these, virtue, pleasure, the apportionment of pleasure to the virtuous, knowledge and, in a less degree, right opinion, together with their combinations (e.g. æsthetic enjoyment and the mutual love of persons). Chapter VI is concerned with the commensurability and grading of these intrinsic goods. The main conclusions are these: (a) Pleasures are commensurable, and "the conditions for rough commensuration are sometimes fulfilled"; further, "the difference between physical and mental objects in respect of commensurability is not so complete as it might appear" (143). (b) "The intrinsic value of a state of knowledge or opinion seems to depend on three elements: (i) the degree of its groundedness on fact, (ii) the degree to which the strength of conviction with which it is held corresponds to its groundedness, (iii) the generality of the fact known, or believed to exist" (148). Inferential knowledge must not be rated above non-inferential, or vice versa. On count (iii) Dr. Ross appears to hold that right opinion in metaphysics (where little knowledge is possible) may surpass in value such departmental knowledge as can be obtained in, say, chemistry. Finally (c), pleasure is vastly inferior in value to knowledge; and both knowledge and, a fortiori, pleasure are not merely inferior to, but incommensurable with, virtue. No increase in knowledge can atone for failure to do our duty or for deterioration of moral character. Dr. Ross explicitly disclaims any intention of advocating asceticism, but it is startling to find him here falling into line with a celebrated dictum of Newman. The chapter, already referred to, on "Moral Goodness," in which he distinguishes and balances in value the various morally good desires, and discusses both vicious motives and the problem of

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co-operating motives, brings to a close a book which forms a notable contribution to the living study of moral philosophy.

W. G. DE BURGH.

The Revolt against Dualism: an Inquiry concerning the Existence of Ideas.

By Arthur O. Lovejoy. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1930.

Pp. xii + 325. Price 158.)

In selecting "The Revolt against Dualism" as the theme of his *Carus* lectures, Professor Lovejoy has certainly chosen a problem of great interest to contemporary philosophers. The result is a book of considerable importance. It should do much to aid us in thinking clearly with regard to the topics discussed. Unfortunately, the style in which the book is written makes difficult reading; the sentences are apt to be excessively long, with parenthetical interruptions of an irritating kind. But Professor Lovejoy's logical method is wholly admirable, and the book well repays the pains of reading it.

"It is," says Professor Lovejoy, "primarily with hypothetical questions that philosophical inquiries ought, I think, to be concerned. Philosophy would proceed with a somewhat steadier gait, and agreement among philosophers would come about more rapidly, if they would oftener put the problems they discuss, and especially those they first discuss, expressly in this form: If certain things (which some philosophers or other men believe) are provisionally taken as true, what other things must or may be true? A great part of philosophy, in other words, should consist of attempts to determine what sets of propositions, in certain fields of investigation, properly go together" (p. 257). Only by the adoption of such a method could philosophy be made, as surely it should be made, a properly cooperative effort. The time for elaborate metaphysical constructions seems hardly yet to have arrived. The gain to philosophy would no doubt be considerable if philosophers were content to leave to popular scientists the ambitious construction of imposing systems, and were to devote themselves to the patient followingout of the consequences of plausible hypotheses. This is the method that Professor Lovejoy has in the main adopted in this book. He has sought to show that non-dualistic hypotheses lead to consequences that are unplausible, so that these consequences throw doubt upon the initial hypotheses. The method calls for much detailed and careful analysis. Of such analysis Professor Lovejoy is a master. Whether the outcome of his inquiry be acceptable or not, no one could follow his arguments without learning much to his profit. The present reviewer at least has been forced to reject some favourite prejudices which cannot withstand Professor Lovejoy's analysis.

In the short space at the disposal of this review it is impossible to do justice to the contents of this book or adequately to express the criticism to which it may be subject. All that can be done is to indicate the nature of Professor Lovejoy's argument and to suggest one important defect which the present reviewer finds in his treatment. The basis of Professor Lovejoy's argument is the acceptance of the common-sense view of knowledge as, in the main, to be justified. Thus he agrees that experience yields objects that are relatively permanent, independent of the observer who may be said to know these objects, and common to many such observers. But at the same time common sense admits the diversity of what is "immediately known"—the datum or content—from the object of which knowledge is claimed. Accordingly the most plausible initial hypothesis is that of epistemological dualism, viz. some form of the theory of representative ideas. Further, common sense unhesitatingly assumes the diversity of the physical and the psychical.

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But, as Professor Lovejoy points out, it is not immediately evident that the former, *i.e.* epistemological dualism, implies the latter, *i.e.* psychophysical dualism. Reasons for denying the one are not necessarily reasons for denying the other. It is, however, characteristic of twentieth-century philosophy to revolt against both types of dualism. In the opinion of Professor Lovejoy this revolt has definitely failed.

The first two lectures are devoted to an admirably clear statement of the nature of Cartesian and Natural Dualism, and to the difficulties to which these doctrines give rise. There follow two lectures dealing with the theory of "Objective Relativism"—the name given by Professor Murphy to a theory that in the main derives from Whitehead. In his discussion of this theory Professor Lovejoy calls attention to the extreme ambiguity of the word "relativity," now so frequently bandied about by philosophers and physicists. He well says: "One of the things most to be desired—though doubtless hardly to be expected—in the discussion not only of the philosophical doctrine we are now considering, but also of the physical theory of relativity, is the discontinuance of the use of this ambiguous word, and the substitution in each case of one or another of the expressions 'caused' or 'conditioned by,' 'respective to,' or 'appearing from the standpoint of.' The present fashion of employing a single term masks the fact that different sorts of 'relativity' are in question in different parts of the theory or in different interpretations of it" (p. 141). There can be no doubt that the adoption of some such terminology would conduce to greater clearness. The criticism, in Lecture V, of Whitehead's denial of simple location makes evident certain difficulties in Whitehead's doctrine due to his assumption that all relations are internal. Not all Professor Lovejoy's criticisms seem to the present reviewer to be well founded, but he has undoubtedly pointed out difficulties that are quite fundamental. His criticism is as timely as it is searching.

Lectures VI and VII are devoted to a detailed discussion of Mr. Bertrand Russell's various attempts to bring about a "unification of mind and matter." These lectures contain material that will be of interest to all students of Mr. Russell's philosophical writings. But Professor Lovejoy's criticism here suffers from a serious defect, namely, his failure to take any notice of Mr. Russell's theory of descriptions. There are difficulties enough in Mr. Russell's views, but Professor Lovejoy has added a quite gratuitous difficulty owing to his failure to understand what Mr. Russell means by a 'logical fiction.' It is true that Mr. Russell's habitual carelessness of expression, and the unfortunate terminology in which he sometimes chooses to express himself, do constitute a serious obstacle to the understanding of his doctrines. Nevertheless, an understanding of what precisely Mr. Russell means by 'logical fiction' is an

essential prerequisite to any final criticism of his views.

In the last two lectures an attempt is made to review the problem of knowledge in the light of the considerations adduced in the preceding lectures. It is impossible to summarize them here. Attention may be called to the acute criticism of Eddington's view that the external world consists of mind-stuff, and to some interesting remarks with regard to the principle of indeterminacy.

The conclusion to which Professor Lovejoy is himself finally led is stated as follows: "If you are to believe in a real physical world... you must necessarily be a dualist in both senses of the term; you must hold (a) that there are given in experience particular existents which are not parts of that world, and you must hold (b) that whatever knowledge of real objects you have is indirect or representative, that the datum whereby you know an object is not identical with the object known" (p. 303). This datum is said to be "essentially of the nature of 'ideas,' as Descartes and Locke (for the most part)

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used that term" (p. 264). Our knowledge of the external world is mediated through these ideas. In the opinion of the present reviewer this conclusion is not warranted. It is the cardinal defect of Professor Lovejoy's treatment that he nowhere attempts to analyse the notion of indirect knowledge. He simply takes it for granted that to know indirectly is to know mediately, and that to know mediately is to know through representative ideas. Moreover, "representative" seems to be taken here as being equivalent to "resembling." although Professor Lovejoy has also insisted that these "ideas," or data, are "destitute of the essential properties and relations implied either by the historic concept of the 'physical' or by the contemporary physicist's concept of it, and possess properties which physical things lack" (p. 264). But may not knowledge be indirect without being representative or mediated? Professor Lovejoy does not consider the possibility. On the contrary, his acceptance of a theory of representative ideas is based simply upon the discovery that knowledge of physical objects is not direct. The alternative, namely, that knowledge may be indirect without being either inferential or representative, is surely one that merits consideration as a plausible hypothesis.

L. S. STEBBING.

Our Knowledge of One Another. By C. C. J. Webb, F.B.A. (London: Humphrey Milford & Co. 1930. Pp. 18. Price 1s. 6d.)

In this, the Hertz Philosophical Lecture for 1930, Professor Webb treats of a problem which, as he notes at the outset, has received in the past less attention from philosophers than those of the nature of self-consciousness or of our knowledge of the external world; though the recent treatment of it by Professor Alexander (in *Space, Time and Deity*, Vol II), Dr. Broad (in *The Mind and its Place in Nature*), and Mr. C. Delisle Burns (*The Contact between Minds*), has done much to redress the balance (a later discussion still is that of Mr. W. W. Spencer's *Our Knowledge of Other Minds*,¹) Dr. Webb's excellent lecture is too short to allow him to deal with more than one or two aspects of the question.

He begins by rejecting, and here he is on unassailable ground, the theory given in its naïvest form by J. S. Mill, that awareness of other persons is to be accounted for by a process of analogical reasoning, inferring the presence of an "other" mind from outward reactions similar to our own. Such an inference assumes that we are already outside the solipsism from which it professes to explain our escape. The experience of intercommunication "presupposes the existence of a mutual rapport between persons"; but if we have granted this "spiritual rapport," our knowledge of one another may be said to be "mediated" by the perception of external happenings.

The last part of Dr. Webb's lecture is concerned with religious experience. Here he follows Professor Alexander in denying that there is anything in the "response" of Deity strictly analogous to the response of a human person. The differences between the two relationships are: (1) that whereas in human personal intercourse it is only the perception of objects of a certain kind that mediates to us the knowledge of other persons, in the religious experience any object may have this mediating function with reference to its object, i.e. Deity; (2) that this object is not a mere fellow being, but there is attributed to it "a mystical intimacy with us."

I have only space for two very curtly stated comments. First, I do not think it can be maintained (though the error, if error it be, is on the right side)

r An excellent, rather less recent, treatment of the subject by a German thinker is to be found in the late Professor Max Scheler's Zur Phēnomenologie und Theorie der Sympathiegefühle.

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that "our knowledge of one another would seem to be anterior in time to our consciousness of self as such," though it is true, as Dr. Webb later says, that "reflection on oneself as separate from one's fellows is subsequent to our recognition of them." These two statements are not, of course, equivalents. We may recognize a thing without reflecting upon it, and, anyhow, recognition must come first. I should prefer to say that self- and other-consciousness are born together, that self-knowledge and fellow-knowledge grow together and illumine one another by a process of give-and-take, but that reflective realization of one's own selfhood is certainly much later than the simple recognition of other selves.

Second, I do not see why Dr. Webb accepts Alexander's negative interpretation of the experience of Divine "response." The sort of Theism that Dr. Webb puts forward does not, to say the least, seem incompatible with a belief in a more specific form of revelation and self-expression on the part of the Deity than would be consistent with Dr. Alexander's own theology.

J. W. HARVEY.

The Mysterious Universe. By SIR JAMES JEANS. (London: Cambridge University Press. 1930. Pp. viii + 154. Price 3s. 6d. net.)

This book is an expansion of the Rede Lecture given by the author at Cambridge in November last, and is meant to be read as a sequel to *The Universe Around Us*. There is a widespread conviction, he says, that the new theories in astronomy and physics are likely to produce an immense change in our outlook on the universe as a whole and on the significance of human life. Since this is ultimately a subject for philosophical discussion, Sir James Jeans has set himself the task of stating in simple language what physical science has to say as regards relevant facts and hypotheses, for it is only after this that discussion may legitimately pass into the realms of philosophy.

The book is therefore concerned in the first four chapters with an account of The Dying Sun, The New World of Modern Physics, Matter and Radiation, Relativity and the Ether. In the fifth and final chapter, called "Into the Deep Waters," Sir James Jeans gives his own interpretation of present tendencies in physical science, without claiming to be a philosopher "either by

training or inclination."

Taking, then, the first four chapters, we find outlined in Sir James Jeans' best style those advances in physical and astronomical theory which have come to the front recently and stimulated public interest. The author is cautious enough to admit that the "apparent capriciousness in nature may be found, in the light of fuller knowledge, to arise out of the inevitable operation of the law of cause and effect" (p. 22). He thinks that the puzzle of the notion of causation, and whether it can be applied rigidly to the ultimate constituents of the universe, lies ultimately in the problem of time. "It is always the puzzle of the nature of time that brings our thoughts to a standstill. And if time is so fundamental that an understanding of its true nature is for ever beyond our reach, then so also in all probability is a decision in the age-long controversy between determinism and freewill" (p. 30).

There are three errors: one minor one involving a miscalculation of the probability of disintegration of radium atoms (p. 21); another with regard to Einstein's universe, whose size one is led to believe depends on the quantity of matter in it (pp. 60-61) and not on the mass-density; and a third with regard to Fig. 2, Plate II, which is described in the text as produced by electrons

shot through a tiny aperture; this has not yet been done.

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It is, however, with the last chapter that philosophers are chiefly concerned, in which Sir James Jeans puts forward tentatively his philosophical speculations. He seems to agree with those who "would hold that, from the broad philosophical standpoint, the outstanding achievement of twentieth-century physics is not the theory of relativity, with its welding together of space and time, or the theory of quanta, with its apparent negation of the laws of causation, or the dissection of the atom, with the resulting discovery that things are not what they seem; it is the general recognition that we are not yet in contact with ultimate reality" (p. 127). What is now being realised by some scientific men is that their knowledge of the world is only symbolic. This, of course, they would have known long ago if it had not been for that lofty disdain of philosophy which characterized so many scientists of the latter half of the nineteenth century, and which is still all too common to-day. Scientists are now tardily inclined to endorse Locke's conclusion that "the real essence of substances" is forever unknowable. They used to think that the universe was a vast machine: that, of course, they were not entitled to do; what they were entitled to assume was that the 'reality' behind the 'pointer-readings' they observed was machine-like, i.e. something whose parts were in strict causal relationship. Nowadays the suggestion is that the 'reality' behind the 'pointer-readings' cannot be machine-like, since there may not be strict causation.

Sir James Jeans thinks that since the behaviour of Nature appears to be best described by mathematical relations of a kind known as 'pure,' therefore the reality behind these pointer-readings, which constitute the variables in the equations, must behave like the mind of a pure mathematician. (This raises the very difficult question, as the author admits, as to whether any branch of mathematics is really 'pure' and composed of concepts divorced entirely from experience.) Sir James then goes on tentatively to suggest that if Nature behaves like a mind, and a mind consists of thoughts, then perhaps we may best regard Nature as made up of thoughts, and (after a quotation from Berkeley) these thoughts as occurring in a universal mind, that of the Great Architect of the Universe, who strongly resembles a mathematician.

The concept of Ineffable Purity must, it seems, be interpreted mathematically; and the uniformity of nature merely "proclaims the self-consistency of this mind" (p. 140). This view also explains why physics is becoming so abstract, and further "implies, of course, that the final truth about a phenomenon resides in the mathematical description of it" (p. 140). Any construction of models or pictures to illustrate the formulæ "is not a step towards, but a step away, from reality "(p. 141).

This, then, represents briefly, and rather inadequately, the philosophical tendency of modern physics as interpreted in a brilliant and stimulating way

by one of the foremost mathematical physicists of the day.

There is an aspect of this book, however, which is wholly deplorable, and that is as an exposition of the scientific spirit and method. There are many statements which it is hard to believe were written by a Secretary of the Royal Society. On page 15 we are told, "Confronted with a natural world which was to all appearances as capricious as himself, man's first impulse was to create Nature in his own image"—a dogmatic statement ignoring the work of scientists who have given a lifetime of study to the question of early cults and beliefs, and the doubt which exists as to whether magic based on simple association may not be earlier than the 'projection' view. Again, on page 23, in discussing cosmic radiation, the author recalls the suggestion that this may have biological effects, and may have "turned monkeys into men." This sort

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of phrase one expects in the popular press, but surely one is entitled to something more accurate from a Secretary of the Royal Society. Yet again, on page 29, "To-day science . . . has no longer any unanswerable argument to bring against our innate conviction of freewill." As though the work of Freud had no bearing on the question; as though Pavlov's experiments were beneath notice—but then astronomers are above sex and saliva! And finally, the ludicrous ending to the chapter on "Matter and Radiation"-"the whole story of its creation (the universe) can be told with perfect accuracy and completeness in the six words: 'God said "Let there be light".'"

Scientists, of course, know what to discount, but the sales of this book are reaching the hundred thousand class, and its effect on the public must be considered. It is in this regard that Sir James Jeans has been severely criticized in the leading scientific weekly. No wonder that Sir James is recommended from the pulpit; no wonder that Sir Arthur Eddington is quoted by the page in spiritualistic journals; and the statement that physics is now mystical has penetrated into such a stronghold of conservatism and respecta-

bility as the Law Quarterly Review.2

It does seem that, by the nature of their profession, astronomers attain a certain cosmic aloofness which enables them to ignore the work of scientists and philosophers in other fields than their own, and it is for this reason that they are the last people to whom the public should look for authoritative views on science, and that their philosophies, such as they are, are practically worthless. As H. L. Mencken shrewdly observes, speaking of writers of this sort:3 "All they really prove is that a man may be a competent astronomer or physicist and yet no scientist, just as Blind Tom was a competent pianist without being a musician."

The publishers announce in the daily press that Miss Tallulah Bankhead has been pleased to observe that this book contains What Every Girl Should Know. We had not suspected Miss Bankhead capable of such profound philosophical criticism; for ourselves, we can only say that we entirely agree.

G. B. Brown.

Franciscan Philosophy at Oxford in the Thirteenth Century. By D. E. SHARP, M.A., D.Phil. (Oxford University Press. London: Humphrey Milford. 1930. Pp. viii + 419. Price 21s. net.)

This work, for which Dr. Dorothy Sharp has been awarded a doctorate in the University of Oxford, is unique of its kind, and cannot but be of the greatest use to students desirous of acquiring something more than a passing acquaintance with thought in mediæval Oxford. Dr. Sharp has devoted years to a painstaking and detailed examination of writings, many of which exist only in manuscripts. She has summarized their contents under various heads, such as matter and form, cosmology, psychology, angelology, natural theology. Where the matter was of special importance she has transcribed long passages word for word, and throughout, in summarizing, has given copious and exact references, not only to manuscripts or printed works, but also to relevant passages in the works of Aristotle. The work as a whole is heavy reading, but if anyone wants to know what kind of philosophy was being taught in Oxford during the latter half of the eighteenth century, there they will find it, and, should they desire further information, will discover where it is to be found.

Dr. Sharp confines herself to the writings of six philosophers, all of the same

¹ Nature, November 22, 1930.

² January 1931.

³ Treatise on the Gods, p. 307.

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school of thought, and all of them, save one, Franciscans. The exception is Grosseteste, first Chancellor of the University, and later Bishop of Lincoln. He is rightly placed at the head of the list, for, though not a Franciscan, he was their first lecturer in theology, and had a very great influence on the subsequent development of the School. Whether Richard of Middleton should have been included is more open to question. It is possible, but by no means certain, that he was an Englishman. He may have studied at Oxford, but the first person who affirmed this lived two and a half centuries later. His closest associations are with Paris, where he taught, and of which University he was a Master. He would seem, too, with respect to several points which were then controverted, to have approached far nearer to the Thomist doctrine than did most Franciscans of the Oxford School. Thus, with St. Thomas, he rejects (1) the ontological argument, (2) the Augustinian theory of rationes seminales immanent in matter, and (3) the doctrine—fundamental in Augustinianism -that divine illumination is the sole source whence we derive knowledge of eternal and necessary truth. He admits, too, that matter is, if not the principle of individuation, at least its sine qua non, and again, that in existent being there is compositio ex essentia et actuali existentia, while his account of our knowledge of God approximates yet closer to the Thomist position.

Drawn by the coherence of Aristotelianism, by its apparent success in analysing and interpreting nature, and by the fact that many of the conclusions to which it leads are similar to those which can be deduced from the Christian revelation, Franciscan, Dominican, and secular alike adopt Aristotelian principles, and seek to adapt them to another tradition, inherited from Plato, Augustine, Bæthius, and Anselm. Were one to blue-pencil in Dr. Sharp's book the doctrines which are derived from Aristotle, at least onehalf of her book would be blue-pencilled. All admit that in created being there is potentiality or capacity for being and change, as well as actual character or form; that in corporeal being, form, save in man's case, is educed from the potentialities of matter; and that this eduction involves process and adaptation, though the emergence of the form itself is a mutatio, not a motus, and so is instantaneous; and again, that forms may recede into the potentiality of matter, whence they emerged; and that in the case of compounds the elementary forms remain not only in potentia, but virtualiter. Their account of the generation of living beings is also in all essentials Aristotelian, as Dr. Sharp is careful to point out. So, too, do they follow Aristotle in their account of how the universal is derived from perceptual experience. It exists in the thing, but not as a universal. In the thing its universality is but potential; it becomes actual only when apprehended by mind. Dr. Sharp does indeed quote a passage from Scotus on p. 297, in which he seems to affirm that the universal has being as a universal apart from mind; but he is here stating, I think, not his own doctrine, but a consequence deducible from a doctrine which he rejects.

Franciscan philosophy at Oxford is Aristotelian from the very outset, but its Aristotelianism at first is by no means so thoroughgoing as is that of the Dominicans in Paris. In its philosophy of nature it clings to the Augustinian doctrine of rationes seminales, existent in matter, and ever seeking to express themselves. In its theory of knowledge also it remains faithful to Augustine, for it does not admit that all knowledge is derived from perceptual experience: our knowledge of necessary and eternal truth presupposes divine illumination. It maintains, too, against Aristotle and St. Thomas, that it is possible to prove philosophically, not only that the universe is finite in extent, but also that it had a beginning. When we reach Scotus, however, we find both the cosmological theory of rationes seminales and the epistemological doctrines of illumination repudiated. Nor does Scotus admit that reason can either prove or

disprove the eternity of the world. He is at one with St. Thomas here, as he is at one with him also in asserting the immateriality of angels and of the human soul, and again in his method of proving the existence of God; for though he does not deny the validity of the ontological argument, he prefers a posteriori arguments.

Dr. Sharp rejects the authenticity of a work commonly attributed to Scotus, namely the de Rerum Principio, and replies to the arguments by which Dr. Harris has sought to defend it. She might have added that since the discovery of the MS 95 of Todi, containing the first fifteen questions with which the work deals, it has become practically certain that the de Rerum Principio is the work of Vitalis a Furno. Yet, in spite of the fact that Dr. Harris in the second volume of his Duns Scotus relied largely on this spurious work, the conclusion which he reached is substantially the same as that now reached by Dr. Sharp. St. Thomas and Scotus are both thoroughgoing Aristotelians, and in essentials agree: it is only as to details that differences arise, save in the case of the real distinction between essence and existence, which Thomists hold to be fundamental in their system. For Scotus matter is knowable apart from form, and might conceivably exist apart from form, though in fact it never does. St. Thomas denies this, while Scotus on his part rejects the Thomist theory that form is individualized by matter. Scotus teaches that there exists a bodily form distinct from the soul, but, on the other hand, that faculties are not distinct from the soul. St. Thomas denies the existence of a forma corporeitatis, but affirms a real distinction between faculties and soul. And on each of these points Scotus is supported by the teaching and arguments of his predecessors. as Dr. Sharp has shown. I do not think she is right, however, in saying (p. 287) that Scotus anywhere identifies active and passive potency with potentia objectiva et subjectiva, or that he taught actio in distans (p. 287), or that he held that God could not know the contingent (p. 361). He teaches merely that God's knowledge of the future is not of the same kind or order as his knowledge of necessary truth; and that light, since it brings about no substantial change in the medium which it traverses, uses the medium as if it were not a medium.

If Richard of Middleton is to be regarded as an Oxford Franciscan, he must be classed with Scotus as a thoroughgoing Aristotelian, Pecham, on the other hand, belongs to the earlier school, and it is interesting to see how his carefully elaborated arguments for the immortality of the human soul are, upon examination by the more sceptical Scotus, declared to be inconclusive. A long passage, cited on pp. 190, 191, from the Dominican Fishacre, discusses the three views currently held as to the relation between the rational soul and the so-called animal and vegetative souls in man. Dr. Sharp thinks that Pecham held the view that the latter are distinct forms subordinated to the higher rational form, but the fact that Pecham regards them as quasi-material forms which "dispose" or prepare the way for the advent of the rational soul does not imply that they remain after the infusion of the latter. The Thomist also held this. Hence, one would have been glad of further evidence as to what Pecham's theory really was, and as to how he reconciled plurality of forms with that unity of soul on which he insisted so strongly, and this again with that bodily form-forma corporcitatis-which Grosseteste had so ingeniously accounted for by his theory of light. It is a pity this latter theory vanished so soon, for modern theory also, according to Jeans, seeks, just as Grosseteste did. to "reduce the whole universe to a world of light, potential or existent." Dr. Sharp has done excellent work in compiling from his various writings the metaphysical theories of Grosseteste, and again in giving us so full an account of the philosophy of Thomas of York, which as yet exists only in inaccessible

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manuscripts. Is one right in saying that this Oxford school was experimentalist? It would seem to be very doubtful except in the case of Roger Bacon.

Inevitably, in so vast a work, there are many statements to which one might take exception, and especially do I find this to be the case in the concluding chapter. Amongst the "things" involved in the Aristotelian and Scholastic account of becoming, the final cause should certainly be included. Again, matter surely for Aristotle is entirely passive: it is Augustine, and the Franciscans who ascribe to it activity. Nor does Aristotle in the passages cited on p. 372 refer to "privation as an accident of matter": he says merely that privation is accidental or incidental. Again, though Scholastics certainly teachas did Aristotle-that the agent must contain at least in virtute what they are to produce, I do not think that this doctrine was intended to avoid "any emanational exhaustion of the agent's power during its operation on other beings"; nor can I find either in Grosseteste or Bacon any evidence of such a theory. Plato, too, does not adopt as his three first principles: God, Ideas, and Matter, but God, Ideas, and a certain something which he first calls a receptacle $(\delta\pi\delta\delta o\chi\dot{\eta})$, and then identifies with space. Nor is this third factor intractable, but rather indifferent to form. It is true that many philosophers have identified this receptacle with matter, but it is scarce true to say that Plato "came to the conclusion that matter is best called receptivity." Neither is it exact to say that Aristotle in 1029a speaks of matter as a substance: he discusses the view of those who maintain this, but only to reject it, his own doctrine being that substance comprises both matter and form. More seriously inaccurate is the statement that "Albert the Great and St. Thomas treated matter as mere receptivity." They do nothing of the kind. They lay no less stress on the potentiality of matter than does the Franciscan school. The difference between the two schools lies firstly in the fact the Thomist conceives matter as something which is potentially extended and will inevitably become extended as soon as it is actualized, whereas the Franciscan school in its early period identifies matter with potentiality of any kind, and so ascribes it to angelic beings, which the Thomist declines to do. Again, the Franciscansas Dr. Sharpe rightly points out-incline to the view that matter has some sort of reality, and so of knowability apart from form; whereas the Thomist denies this, as he also declines-with Richard of Middleton and with Scotus-to ascribe to matter any sort of activity, however inchoate.

A task of great complexity and enormous detail, requiring no small skill alike in the reading of manuscripts, and in the translating of highly technical terms and phrases, has been successfully accomplished, and it were ungrateful to find fault with occasional ambiguities or what seem to be misinterpretations. Dr. Sharp's work provides the student with a mine of useful information, and withal, abundant references; wherein to my mind lies its chief value, for, if one wonders whether a technical term has been rightly rendered, or a doctrine rightly understood, one is never left in doubt as to where the passage comes from upon which the author's statement has been based. There are also valuable bibliographies and two most useful indices.

LESLIE J. WALKER.

Church, State, and Study. By ERNEST BARKER, Litt.D., D.Lit., LL.D. (London: Methuen & Co. 1930. Pp. vii + 280. Price 10s. 6d.)

It would be misleading if, without explanation, we called *Church*, *State*, and *Study* a philosophical book. Most of its problems belong primarily to the 248

NEW BOOKS

storian. Some of them belong to the theologian, some to the "educationist," some to the lawyer. But the book is philosophical in the sense that its author approaches every problem from the point of view of a man steeped in philosophical conceptions: a man possessed by that unifying vision of the world which is the philosopher's distinctive mark.

In every historical movement of which he treats Professor Barker seeks to trace the thought which it embodies—to show its place in the whole, its relation to what Hegel would call the "self-actualizing Idea," the "Idea which reflects itself in history." Indeed, we may find proof throughout these pages that the influence of Hegel on Professor Barker's thought has been much greater than the casual reader might infer from a first reading of the book. "The vast mass of human volitions, interests, and activities are the means and instruments which the World-Spirit uses to fulfil its purpose." This Hegelian text might have been Professor Barker's motto. Few single books show a wider acquaintance than does this volume with the varied interests of mankind. Few writers know better than its author how to think these varied interests into unity.

Thus, incidentally, the book serves to correct the misapprehension, still not uncommon, that traditional philosophy has dealt always with a world remote from that of everyday life. These essays stand in instructive contrast with another work which appeared almost in the same month, The Quest for Certainty, Professor Dewey's Gifford Lectures. "The notion," says Professor Dewey, "that the office of knowledge is to uncover the antecedently real, rather than to gain the kind of understanding which is necessary to deal with practical problems as they arise," "has ruled philosophy ever since the time of the Greeks." Apart from the odd antithesis here implied-for surely a knowledge of what the world (or anything else) is is not quite irrelevant in deciding how we are to deal with it—it is strange that a writer of Professor Dewey's ability could present the latter part of his sentence as a statement of fact. Philosophers have no doubt used language that is not understood "outside the schools." It does not follow that no one "outside the schools" is concerned with the problems which those technical terms are intended to elucidate. Indeed, it is only necessary to turn over the pages of the classical writers of philosophy (from Plato downwards, who would have men fix their eyes on the "form of the Good" in order that they may "act wisely in private and public affairs"2) to see how untrue it is that philosophy has regarded practical problems as beneath its notice. Professor Barker, who holds that "political theory may be independent of the study of history," who recognizes that there are questions of political theory which are "the same yesterday, to-day, and for ever," that we "have to discuss what the State is semper et ubique,"3 affirms none the less that "political philosophy, no less than other forms, must study the busy hum of affairs in the cave before it can move into the upper light of contemplation."4 Thus Professor Barker puts into close relation with one another such a mundane matter as the "rate of interest"-which "in the new security" of the Empire "sank to one-third of what it had been under the Republic"and the "religious feelings" which "supported the institution of the Empire and its continuance." He asserts that the Empire was "more than the solution of a problem-it was a salvation." He finds in the poetry of Virgil and Horace "no adulation, but the expression of a feeling as genuine as that of Tennyson for Victoria and the Victorian Age."5

The Quest for Certainty, p. 20.
Church, State, and Study, pp. 200–201.

² 517 C. ⁵ Pp. 14-15. 4 P. 194.

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It is in fact impossible to read this book without being compelled, in perifirst place, to look at many practical and historical problems in new context^{er} and with new interest; and, secondly, without acquiring much useful material for the discussion of questions which are philosophical in the narrower sense of that term.

I. In the first essay Professor Barker's conception of history is illustrated by his comments on the change which occurred when "by the end of the third century emperor-worship was passing and the empire was feeling its way towards a new form." "For ten centuries" religion had been an "attribute or dependency of the State." "By the third century . . . the religious motive long spreading westward from its home in the East . . . acquires the dominance." In similar vein Professor Barker remarks that the Sicilians are "good enough philosophers to give the name of the

organizing idea" (Mafia) "to the society which it constitutes."2

In the essay on Mediæval Civilization the most notable saying, perhaps, is the warning to those "whose wits will persist in going wool-gathering into the Middle Ages to find a comfort which they cannot draw from the golden age of international finance."3 "An uncritical mediævalism," he tells them, "is the child of ignorance of the Middle Ages." "Sick of vaunting national cultures, we may recur to an age in which they had not been born . . . but we must remember, all the same, that the strength of the Middle Ages was rooted in weakness." "The Middle Ages had not attained a national economy." "A national economy has a higher economic value than a municipal or parochial economy because it means the production of a greater number of utilities at a less cost, and a richer and fuller life of the mind"—a defence at once of Free Trade and of modern culture. There is a truth, no doubt, in the contention of a modern Jesuit that the Middle Ages are not "dark ages" but "bright ages"—days bright with examples of heroism and piety, of artistic and philosophical achievement. To that perpetual clash of rival ideals-of Classicism with Romanticism, Hebraism with Hellenism, Individualism with Socialism, and so forth—which is the distinctive characteristic of modern life, there is in the Middle Ages nothing really similar. The absence of such mental conflicts gave the Middle Ages an ease, spontaneity, and naturalness both in conduct, in thought, and in artistic creation. But this is only one half of the truth. Thus we may give wider application than he himself gives to it to Professor Barker's phrase,4 "Unity of a sort is easy when there are few factors to be united; it is more difficult, and it is a higher thing, when it is a synthesis of many different elements."

The warning against "uncritical Mediævalism" is the more likely to be taken to heart in the right quarters when it is expressed with the learning, sympathy, and moderation which go with a synthesis as wide as Professor Barker's. His attitude to the Middle Ages may indeed be illustrated indirectly by a remark in which (in a later essay) he brings together two distant epochs—our own and that of Pericles—with both of which the Middle Ages stand in strong contrast. "It is Pericles, and not Bismarck, who is really modern, because it is he who is our nearest spiritual kin." "It is Greece of the fifth century before Christ . . . which is present in the spirit of this age as its analogue and inspiration." "What must primarily be comprehended if we would comprehend ourselves . . . may be what is very far from us in time."

It is thus highly characteristic of Professor Barker's thought that the book gets more and more "thrilling"—no milder word is adequate—as it

1 P. 32. 4 P. 48. ² P. 163. 5 P. 223.

3 P. 47.

NEW BOOKS

deproaches our own times; that Chapters V, VI, and VII—Christianity and 'Nationality, the "Rule of Law," and the Discredited State—are in some ways the best in the whole series.

II. Of the specifically philosophical problems on which the book throws light one is the problem of Individualism. If, against the familiar thesis that morality is essentially social—that man as a moral being cannot even be conceived apart from the social relations in which moral principles are exhibited-someone had the hardihood to maintain that even the solitary on a desert island (who after long isolation had adopted Solipsism as a serious Creed) might still recognize that it was wrong to wallow in sensual imaginations, and better to husband his resources than to waste them, to bear pain courageously than to bewail it, it would seem that both sides to the dispute might draw material from this book. Professor Barker describes sympathetically the conception of St. Paul, "who held that the Christian Church was a single organic unity—the fulness of him that filleth all in all, fitly joined together and compacted by that which every joint supplieth."2 Yet it is doubtful whether Professor Barker would affirm—in spite of his recognition of the importance of "the virtues of sympathy as well as of the virtues of sclitude"3-that apart from social life no rational morality is possible. "Christianity," he says,4 "did not begin as a Church. Our Lord was a teacher of men." "The positive core of Puritanisms was insistence on the individual will, and a cultivation of that solitude in which individual will is tempered and hardened." If right will is the best of all rational functions—if "nothing in the world or even out of it can be regarded as unconditionally good except a Good Will only"—then the very highest moral act is an act of the individual. Dean Rashdall used to argue (in opposition to the saying of St. Thomas6 that "the perfection of the Universe is what God chiefly intended in the creation of the world"), that a perfect Universe is inconceivable, since however many moral and rational individuals it contains it might always conceivably contain still more such individuals, and therefore any conceivable Universe would be capable of improvement. Without agreeing with the Dean that at every conceivable point an addition to the numbers of rational beings must make the Universe better, we may still hold that the organic unity of mankind or the world can only come to its best in its fruition or recognition, and that the Universe is only recognized as one by the thought of the Individual. On this theory it is the individual spectators who confer on the world its highest value.

But perhaps Professor Barker's best contribution to philosophic thought is to be found not in single passages which may be quoted but in the book as a whole. Reference has been made already to Hegel's *Philosophy of History*. The educated man of our day is inclined to admit the unity of

If the age of Pericles is the "analogue" of our own, a similar comparison may be drawn between the age of Cicero and the Eighteenth Century, or again between the Age of Councils and the Reformation. Compared with Plato, the controversial manners of Athanassius and of Luther are barbaric, and about equally barbaric. Civilization is thus remarkably similar just before it enters the darkness of the Middle Ages to what it becomes just as it is emerging from it. If we represented its course between Pericles' time and our own by a descending and reascending curve, this metaphor would express a truth which is not expressed in Hegel's comparison of the progress of civilization with the ages of man (Greek civilization the "youth," Roman the "manhood," Germanic the rich "maturity" of our race). Yet the metaphor of the curve must not be so used as to allow us to forget that we have, as christians, something in common, not only with Dante and Aquinas, but also with the earliest Franciscans and the author of the Golden Legend, which even Plato and Pericles do not share with us.

² P. 133 5 Pp. 114-115.

³ P. 115. ⁶ Summa Theologica, I. 50. 3.

⁴ P. 145.

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history. At the same time he doubts here the interpretative value of co. logical categories-One, Many, All (as when the relations of Eastern Despotism, Greek Aristocracy and Democracy, and Germanic Monarchy are explained by reference to the "one," the "some," the "all," who are conscious of freedom under these systems), or again of Insichseyn and Fürsichseyn (as when Buddhism is defined as the religion of the former). If we ask "How then is the unity of history to be apprehended?" it is natural to answer that a rudimentary apprehension of the unity is already present whenever long periods are seen as a connected story. Whenever we let our minds run rapidly over the events of centuries—whether e.g. we do this in the disjointed manner in which the author of the Golden Legend's gives us the history of Europe from the sixth century to the thirteenth, or in the more connected style in which in Paradiso (Canto VI)2 Justinian recounts the history of Roman rule from Æneas to Charlemagne—our interest in such summary treatment implies a perception of some connecting bond. History has become an Epic. In the words of Professor Freeman, "the whole story, from the beginning to our own time, forms one tale." The analogy of the Epic (if it is not a false analogy) suggests that historical knowledge, if it became complete, would have an a priori as well as an a posteriori aspect; that while such completeness involves on the one hand the activity of sense and memory enjoying and recording the changing scenes, it must require on the other hand an activity of thought like that of the creative artist. For such thought Greece, Rome, the Middle Ages, the Renaissance, are "pages in the book to show" how by a necessity—analogous to the æsthetic necessity which prescribes to a poem its true development—the self-actuating Idea must reflect itself in history. Is this unity, then, real or imaginary? No one can be quite indifferent to the question, and we can all of us in some measure put it to the test. If a reader begins, say, with such a framework or sketch as Professor Freeman provides in some of his smaller books, does the unity of history become clearer or less clear as he advances in knowledge of the details? The analogy of the Epic suggests (whatever answer we give to the question just asked) that Professor Barker's studies in civilization, ancient, mediæval, and modern, may give us the same kind of assistance to the understanding of human history as good Homeric or Shakesperian criticism affords for the wise reading of Homer or Shakespeare. The method which Professor Barker's historical studies suggest to the philosopher is thus in some respects not quite Hegelian. It is perhaps none the less well fitted to enforce the real lesson of Hegel. Professor Barker gives a timely warning against the thoughtless and unselective accumulation of mere detail which is sometimes covered by the word "research."3 In the handling of detail he is himself an example to every writer of history. Indeed, it is hard to conceive the student, or even the man of general education, who will not reap a rich reward from the study of Professor Barker's pages.

C. J. SHEBBEARE.

The Interpretation of Development and Heredity. A Study in Biological Method. By E. S. Russell, O.B.E., D.Sc. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1930. Pp. 312. Price 15s. net.)

Dr. Russell describes his book as a "study in biological method," but it is much more than this. It is a historical summary of the conceptions that have been held with regard to the nature of the process of organic develop-

¹ Under the heading "History of St. Pelagius." ² Paradiso, VI. 34-96. ³ P. 227.

doment, or ontogeny (and it may usefully be supplemented by the reading of the a recent book by Professor Cole on Early Theories of Sexual Generation, where there is much that is quaint and curious on the matter). Dr. Russell's book is also critical, but constructive too, when he works out his organismal conception of development, and it is a well-balanced and judicial survey of what he calls a major problem in biology.

There have always been two contrasted attitudes with regard to the nature of the process whereby the ovum, or other germinal unit, becomes the fully developed organism. In the past, and at present, many biologists have seen in the ovum, or spermatozoon, something that contained, in miniature, or latent, or potentially, or involved, that which evolved into the specific animal body. This was the notion of "preformation." Others have believed that in the ontogeny there was something that was not in the germ, that grew up upon the germ. This was the notion of "epigenesis." But since two ova of related species A and B develop into the animals A and B, even though those ova are habitant in precisely the same physical environment, it appears that specifically different reasons inhere in the ova why they become A and B. Therefore there is, if not an actual preformation of the adult structures, at least an involution of those structures. The "external factors" of the environment do not evoke those structures in their specificities. What then is the developmental agency that we appear to be obliged to postulate? In his valuable chapter on the "Misuse of Abstraction" Dr. Russell traces out the growths of the attitudes taken by embryologists with regard to this problem. Workers on the physiological side may study the effect of temperature, of the chemistry of the nutritive medium, of operative interference with the embryo, etc., and it has thus happened that they have extended the notions of their methods to their conceptions of the agency. Therefore we have the physical-chemical hypotheses of development, or, comparing the process with the acquirement and establishment of a habit by an animal, a psychical or mnemic hypothesis has been the result. Or, again, by extending the scope of the morphological method of biology to visible and invisible structural units within the germ-cell nucleus, we have the modern, "particulate" conception that comes from the study of genetics. These are examples of current ontogenetic hypotheses, and of the misuse of the method of abstraction.

Dr. Russell's "organismal" view may be summarized: The ovum about to develop is an organism; the developing embryo is a creature that assimilates and which may be irritable, mobile, predatory, and reproductive—it is all that an organism (in the ordinary sense) may be; it is a functional unity, and this unity is expressed in the activities of maintenance, growth, and reproduction; in it the functional activities are influenced by the past—by the ancestral experience; in it the functional activities cannot be understood (and certainly cannot be described) without reference to the future, or end, of the developmental process; it is not a sum of parts, for the parts must be integrated—just as erroneously should we call a multitude of minute straight lines laid together, end by end, in a certain way, a curve, for that which generates the curve is a mathematical function; the organism endures, in Bergson's sense; it is something dynamic, and not static (as suggested in the "stages" of the embryologist).

The most striking thing about a developmental process is its tectonic activity. The embryo assimilates nutritive materials, and may behave as if it had perceptions, and it reproduces cells. But it assembles those cells as the specific organ-rudiments, and it differentiates, or shapes, them as tissue-elements—bone-cells, muscle-cells, nerve-cells, etc. This is what particularly

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interests us in an embryogeny. What is the assembling agency? We have the clearest and most immediate intuition of its nature in our own minds as rn artisans, writers, painters, composers, etc. This psycho-biological conception of development has been called "anthropomorphic," and it is suspect by the physiology of our time. Why it should be suspect is a curious study, and that the naïve notions of a "material basis of inheritance," of "carriers of hereditary qualities," or of "organ-forming substances," should still persist and be regarded as orthodox, marks an extraordinary phase in biology.

Over and over again this "anthropomorphic" view of the developmental

process has recurred. We find it clearly expressed by Oken (in 1805). The ovum is an entire animal in idea and design only, but not in structure. In it the animal resides as an impalpable spectre, and not as a corporeal miniature. The ovum is related to the animal which it becomes as the thought is to the word. A similar view was formulated by Driesch (although Dr. Russell thinks that he spoiled it by the application of the Aristotelian conception of a morphogenetic entelechy). It was the view taken by Samuel Butler and Hering, and (with a physical extension) by Semon. Clearly the notion has persistence, so that biologists have been driven to it again and again in spite of the success of the methods of experimental embryology, and clearly because of the enormous difficulties of purely physical hypotheses. For such physical and chemical notions always include the conception of increasing randomness. If there are chemical physical processes that go on of themselves, each successive phase of the process must be represented by an assemblage of parts that is more random than the last one. Only when physical-chemical processes are coupled may this law of increasing randomness be reversed; but if there are coupled processes in a developmental career, then it is the coupling agency that has to be explained. In an embryogeny the physical-chemical system assumes, in a regular succession, a series of highly specific configurations, with increase of available energy and entropy decrease, and it is quite conceivable that all this may happen, of itself, at random, and without any coupling agencies that are external to the system. But the improbability of all this is incredibly great. Let us suppose that the stones, bricks, mortar, etc., that are the materials necessary for the construction of a house be dumped, at random, upon the ground where the house is to stand, and suppose that, of themselves, these materials fell together in the form of the house.

The improbability of such a "fortuitous concourse" of materials would be comparable with that of the embryogeny that would occur purely by physicochemical processes. Such an improbability is incredibly small (it has been found to be of the same order of magnitude as that of all the houses in London catching fire independently of each other, or "by accident," on the same day, or of all the inhabitants of London committing suicide, also independently of each other). Improbable events like these are therefore to be compared with our experience that millions of developmental processes are being completed in every minute fraction of a second. Surely the conclusion is an obvious one—that a developmental process does not occur at random. And, returning to the analogy of a building operation, it is quite conceivable that observers on, say, the moon might be puzzled how to describe the agencies involved in a great building and might not deduce organismal ones. Yet we know that mentality is the assembling agency concerned.

In considering development, most of the other great problems of biology are implied. Heredity simply means that the developmental process by which an ovum became the parent is similar to the process by which the egg borne by the parent becomes the offspring. Modern genetics simply studies minute (and often trivial, or pathological) differences in the developmental process do the germ-cells reproduced by organisms that conjugate sexually. Evolution means that the developmental process may be a little different in the egg borne by the parent from the process in the egg borne by the offspring. And so on. Wherever biology has speculative interest, and in all those fields where it makes strong appeal to the non-technical reader, the problems of organic development are implied. To such readers Dr. Russell's book will be as a "feast of richness," not only because of its materials, but also from its critical-constructive discussions, and because of its methodological interest. Biology is still a young and naïve science, for the wealth of its data far surpasses that of the physical sciences (or at least of the science that considers only the things that we call inorganic). These data are still woefully incomplete, and while this is so biology may remain largely intuitional in its methods. But books such as this one (and Dr. Woodger's Biological Principles) make a good beginning in the construction of a logic of biology. From this point of view alone Dr. Russell's book is strongly to be commended.

JAS. JOHNSTONE.

Creative Mind. By C. Spearman, Ph.D., LL.D., F.R.S. (London: Nisbet & Co., Ltd.; Cambridge: The University Press. 1930. Pp. xii + 153. Price 5s. net.)

This volume is the first of a new series entitled "The Contemporary Library of Psychology," to be published under the editorship of Dr. F. Aveling. The series is described as being planned "with a view to presenting the problems of Psychology in a popular way, but at the same time without any loss of scientific accuracy." If the work under review may be taken as representative of the standard to be maintained, it is evident that the editor and his Advisory Board have a solid respect for the general reader. The popular appeal has not entailed writing down, for while Professor Spearman has done much to make his little book attractive, it is by no means light reading; and being a development rather than a re-statement of his distinctive theories of mental process, it should fulfil the editor's aim in being of service to students and general reader alike. The book is copiously illustrated by reproductions (small but clear) of well-known pictures, and is in all respects admirably produced. The series should meet with a warm welcome.

Professor Spearman brings his noegenetic principles to bear upon the psychological problems presented by creative activity in the arts, in behaviour, and in science and philosophy. The territory surveyed is too extensive to be adequately explored in a book of this size, and it would have been better had the author limited himself to the topics of the earlier chapters in order to develop his thesis more thoroughly. In particular, we could have dispensed with the chapter headed "Behaviour" (though actually dealing with certain tests of reasoning).

The argument is most adequately presented in the chapters on pictorial art. Its outcome is that "the final act in creativity must be assigned to the third noegenetic process; that of displacing a relation from the ideas which were its original fundaments to another idea, and thereby generating the further idea which is correlative to the last named, and which may be entirely novel" (p. 77). The other cognitive principles, quantitative as well as qualitative, together with emotion, though no less essential to the process of artistic creation, are subordinate to that which creates the material of the work of art. We would suggest here that the quantitative principles are the basis of selective criticism of the material provided by the eduction of correlates,

and not in themselves creative. For while the principles of retentivity, whavelength of the same thing" (p. 45), offers an explanation of the satisfaction which the observer finds in repeated details, it cannot well account for the act by which they were produced. It explains why the artist painted them, but not how he came to repeat just those details just that number of times. In the "Birth of Venus" we notice "the delightful repetitions in the ribs of the shell, in the ripples of the sea, . . . and the folds of the drapery." But there is no proof that Botticelli was under the necessity of painting ripples until the contrary principle of fatigue operated to bring them to an end, so that on another day, when less susceptible to fatigue, he might have given us still more. If we remember that the artist is throughout both creator and critical observer, the sphere of the quantitative principles can be distinguished from that of the more truly creative qualitative ones.

This small book has substantial importance if regarded as a test of the theory stated in "The Nature of Intelligence and the Principles of Cognition." If the validity of the noegenetic principles be accepted, then it may be admitted that the details of a work of art are explicable as instances of correlate eduction; but many will question whether Professor Spearman's argument accounts for the composition as a whole. Quoting the principle that the quantity of mental output must be regarded as constant, he says: "And this first quantitative law of psychology does at once prove to be that of art also; it is that which bids the artist to eliminate everything irrelevant to his aim. . . . For since the total output of energy is obliged to be constant, every expenditure of it irrelevant to the aim must leave so much the less to promote this" (p. 41). But what is this aim, and how is it psychologically determined? To say that the artist aims at the creation of beauty would be inadequate, for the aim is a specific embodiment of beauty. But this initial conception, however fragmentary and schematic, is surely the most significant creative act in the whole process, to which all that follows is subordinate. To demand a psychological analysis of that act is doubtless improper when considering a book of this scope, but any account of the process of artistic creation must take note of that first moment. Possibly this, too, falls under the eductive principles, but we cannot see that Professor Spearman has made it clear. Without this artistic intention there is no determinate direction to the play of eduction. Since any fundament has many correlates of a given category, some selection must be made even before conscious criticism plays a part. By itself eduction might produce a picture, but it is always this picture which needs explanation. We can account on these lines for the construction of a composition from an arbitrary starting-point, or for filling in a sketch, but it does not account for the existence of that sketch, nor for the purposeful striving of the artist to achieve his aim.

After the fuller treatment of this section the writer is justified in treating the other arts more summarily, though readers will hope for a more thorough treatment at a later date. Readers of this *Journal* will wish that space had permitted him to develop Chapter XI, where in eight short pages he teases the metaphysician with references to the bucket "in which Kant so cleverly stood and lifted himself up by the handles; the empty hat out of which Hegel handed rabbit after rabbit."

Professor Spearman's book is at once a significant contribution to the study of the more complex mental process and a valuable supplement to his earlier works, while many will find in it an attractive introduction to the more austere argument of *The Nature of Intelligence*.

A. W. WOLTERS.

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Mandoref Unbound, a Promethean Religion for the Modern World. By WILLIAM POPPERELL MONTAGUE, Professor of Philosophy, Columbia University. (New Haven: Yale University Press; London: Humphrey Milford, Oxford University Press. 1930. Pp. 98. Price \$1.50; 7s.)

This volume consists of three lectures, delivered in the Dwight Hanington Terry Foundation, the first of which discusses The Modern Challenge to the Old Religion; the second advocates A Sanctionless Morality; and the third develops the conception of God Finite and God Infinite. Rejecting all Modernism, which seeks to restate Christianity in terms of modern thought, the author demands "a revolutionary recantation of religion and a radical reinterpretation of the supernatural and of its relation to us" (p. 2). He begins the game by loading the dice. Instead of criticizing Christainity at its best, he caricatures it at its worst. It is to be hoped that so unlovely a type is not prevalent in America, and that prejudice has painted the portrait that he gives. "The phases of Christianity that appear most repugnant to the modern temper are, first its methodology of Authoritarianism; second, its ethics of Asceticism and Other-Worldliness; third, its metaphysics of Supernaturalism" (p. 8). As regards the indictment of Christianity, he defines his own position in the words: "As regards the methodological and ethical indictments, we were in accord with the critics and their destructive conclusions; but with the attack on supernaturalism we were in only partial agreement" (pp. 26-27). Rejecting Christianity, the author holds to a kind of theism of his own. This treatment of the Old Religion in this first lecture shows so little philosophical impartiality that he makes it more difficult to approach his own solution without prejudice; but we must try to do so.

The second lecture is distinctly an improvement on the first. He recognizes in man the sentiment of approval of some and disapproval of other actions. As in the conduct of the dog we may detect three motives, self-interest, sympathy, and suggestibility, so in human conscience; but "it is undoubtedly infinitely more extensive in each of its three aspects than in the brute" (pp. 37-38). Of these three potentialities, "it is not good that the third factor, suggestibility, should be the most important, for it alone is purely provisional, secondary, and instrumental to the other two" (p. 40). For "to replace these causeless or categorical imperatives by hypothetical imperatives, where the feeling of what is right is justified by the knowledge that what is good will ensue, is the primary task for ethical theory, and also the prerequisite for a sound and progressive morality" (p. 42). Nevertheless, "the recognition of the de facto conscience must not wait upon its de jure authentication, desirable though that may be, for, in the case of duty, esse est percipi. It is here that the traditional utilitarians have been wrong, and the intuitionists and rigorists have been right" (p. 43). What then is duty? "Interest in perfecting one's life and the life of others by quickening and intensifying existing potentialities, extending their number and scope, organizing them so that their conflicts will be harmonized, and then mobilizing all the energies of will and intellect to bring them to actuality, and thus add cubits to the stature of our being; that, as I see it, is the whole field of duty" (p. 45). In this egoism and altruism can be harmonized, for the self which takes an interest in other selves, becomes greater in itself. To the question, "Is it not always possible for us to make ourselves over and to change our existing nature and its desires?" (p. 51), he gives an emphatic affirmative answer. Agreeing with James regarding man's spontaneity, he does not "agree with him when he goes on to reduce all voluntary effort to attention. There is a great deal of truth in the ideomotor theory, but it does not explain all conscious action. A prospective act can be at the focus if attention without being willed, and it can be willed without being at the focus of attention" (p. 54). But must

not the prospective act be displaced from the focus of it is not to be willed, must it not be replaced at the focus by the act which is willed? Is not volitivit primarily direction of the attention? A consequence of the view of duty here taken is "the Relativity of Good and the Invariance of Virtue" (p. 55). The Good is abundant life. "The ideal of a maximum life emerges as the internal and autonomous absolute that replaces the external and heteronymous standards that we have rejected. Life seeks its own maximum, and the summum bonum, or supreme regulative criterion for values, is maximum abundance of life" (p. 57). "Life as thus conceived prescribes its own invariants, two absolute virtues that shine steadily down upon the flux of changing goods. They are invariants because they mark the road of maximum variation. These two virtues are Love and Enthusiasm" (p. 58). While Buddha and Christ are quoted as "the highest earthly exemplars of this ideal of love," the author betrays either his ignorance of the teaching of Jesus, or his prejudice against Christianity, when he adds: "In Buddha one finds the more universal sympathy, extending as it does to brute as well as to human life"; for even if Jesus did not give specific instructions on the treatment of animals, do not His references to God's care for the flowers of the field and the birds of the air, God's knowledge of the fall of every sparrow, the Shepherd's grief at the loss of the one sheep, as an analogy of God's love for every sinner; the lifting of the ox or the ass out of the pit on a Sabbath day, imply that universal sympathy? His advocacy of enthusiasm is carried too far, and expressed recklessly, and his attack on temperance is intemperate. One of the minor evils of Prohibition in America seems to be that philosophers deteriorate morally in depreciating self-restraint as a necessary element in morals. But even this philosopher is not quite consistent, for he concedes that "we should use temperance in our sins and sorrows' (p. 62). The morality here advocated is to be autonomous. "It is my thesis that true morality is without sanction, for sanctions are external justifications for righteousness and apologies for the good" (p. 63). Accordingly "religion as the foundation of morality should be abandoned, as indeed it is being abandoned" (pp. 64-65). Religion as a sanction external to morality may certainly be abandoned. But if the belief in God as moral perfection, and of the Universe as not against, but with morality gives a wider horizon, a firmer assurance, a larger prospect, a deeper motive, as the Christian moralist contends, can morality be divorced from religion? If in any sense there be God, as the next lecture tries to show, must not morality take Him into account? Is there no duty to Him?

The third lecture offers a substitute for the God of the old religion. From the autonomy of morality some thinkers have concluded that religion is no longer necessary; but not so the author. "It is this yearning for the infinite and the sense of desolation attending the prospect of its frustration that constitutes the motive to seek religion and to make wistful and diligent inquiry as to the possibility of its truth" (p. 67). The problem is this: "How can the amount of evil and purposelessness in the world be compatible with the existence of a God? How can the amount of goodness and purposefulness in the world be compatible with the non-existence of a God?" (p. 68). Dealing with the problem of Evil on the same lines as J. S. Mill, and giving less than two pages to the consideration, the author confidently reaches the conclusion that "there can exist no omnipotent God" (p. 70.) The solution of the Problem of Good is found in a telelogical as opposed to a mechanical interpretation of the Universe. "The kind of causality that we know best, . . . the causality that operates in our lives and minds, is not an alien accident, but an essential ingredient of the world that spawns us" (p. 73). Combining the conclusions of the two arguments, "we are confronted with a God, or something very like

tred, that exists, not as an omnipotent monarch, a giver of laws and punishients, but as an ascending force, a nisus, a thrust toward concentration, organization, and life. This power appears to labour slowly and under difficulties. We can liken it to a yeast that, through the zons, pervades the chaos of matter and slowly leavens it with spirit" (p. 74). The author cannot stop here, however, and is compelled to ask: "Are we then forced to conclude that the finite God, which solved for us the Problem of Good, requires as correlate the infinite God of religious tradition, who seemed to be precluded by the Problem of Evil?" (pp. 74-75). An argument too closely knit to be reproduced in the Relation of Mind and Matter leads to the conclusion that "the potentiality of being is the sentience of being, and that as potentiality is ubiquitous and omnipresent, so therefore is consciousness" (p. 82). The author accepts the conception of a cosmic mind, and that mind is personal. For "personality is mind become substantive and autonomous, mind become spirit. If the universe has a mind, that mind would be more rather than less personal than ours, for it would have more rather than less of unity and organicity" (p. 83). As "a person must have an environment," God has the world, "that in God which is not God" as his "internal environment." The relation of "the unitary and personal yet infinite cosmic consciousness" to "the finite God that is the cosmic nisus" is that of "mind to will." "The purpose and value sought by the Great Life is that of the lesser lives within; no fixed telos or end, but a maximum increase of life itself" (p. 84). The religion corresponding to this new theology must meet "the New Worldliness," humanity sufficient unto itself, satisfied in itself; having no place for and no need of God or heaven. Promethean Religion must take the place of the traditional. This religion will be based on "the two great truths, supremacy of the ideal and the power of free intelligence." It will find the cosmic God, not in Zeus, or Jehovah, but in the spirit of Prometheus, "the Hellenic symbol of what Christians name the Holy Ghost." "Religious experience at its highest and deepest would be the contact which mortal men might have with immortal spirit, the Holy Spirit of God" (p. 91). But even if this is possible, does humanity, self-sufficient and self-satisfied, need it? Many do not feel their need of it at all. At this point one deplorable lapse of taste must be referred to. "There is the story of one who was welcomed to a wedding feast and who turned water into wine, but that story has been put on the Puritan Index, and to refer to it at a Dry dinner would be the height of bad form" (p. 94). This author, however, rather surprises us by a plea for such contact. Man is so constituted that "for better or worse there is associated with this finitude a longing for the infinite. Though finite, man needs the infinite to complete and unify his own being" (p. 95). As there is a chance at least that there is such a cosmic mind, "there is a chance, however small, that a union with the holy spirit of this Promethean God will be attained, and that by such union one's world will be made radiant, and one's life become a high romance" (p. 98). If man in his religion needs this completion, does he not need it in his morality also? To offer a few words of estimate in conclusion. It is only in America, with its disregard of history, its self-confidence, its tendency to exaggeration in either the positive or the negative direction in religion and morals, that such a book could have been written. The author has more knowledge than judgment, more enthusiasm than wisdom, more arrogance than reverence, more cleverness than insight. He is not likely to prove himself "the prophet of a new dispensation," and his Promethean Religion will not displace the older religions by which men have lived.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

Il misticismo speculativo di Maestro Eckhart nei suoi rapporti storici. B.
DELLA VOLPE. (Bologna: Licinio Cappelli. 1930. Pp. vii + 291. Lire 2

Meister Eckhart (1260-1327) is one of those prominent figures whose prominence is not quite secure. For many philosophers he is too religious; for many of the religious he is too rationalistic. The orthodox know him as a proscribed heretic; and those to whom a heretic is a hero cannot be assured that Eckhart's behaviour before his judges was heroic. Some authorities make him the father of German idealism, another strips away all his titles except that of having Germanized and so popularized the terminology of the Scholastic philosophy. Turning from opinions to facts, we are forced to allow him at least historical importance. Tauler and Seuse (Suso), and probably Ruysbroeck as well, proceeded directly from him; the Brethren of the Free Life invoked his name, though not with perfect justification; and Luther, through the anonymous Theologia Germanica, which is Eckhartian in doctrine, drew from him some of the most distinctive ideas of his own protestantism. But these facts belong to the history of religious thought: dispute arises when we try to assign to Eckhart his precise place in the history of philosophy. That he has some place in it is indisputable. (1) He certainly passed through the highest philosophical discipline the Schools could offer, and an undoubted philosopher of later date, Nicholas of Cusa, acknowledges debt to him. (2) The student of mediæval thought cannot sharply separate the religious and the philosophical. (3) Mysticism, especially when expounded by someone aware of philosophical exigencies, falls within the sphere of the philosopher's interest. In any case Eckhart appears, as a product and as a factor, in the dissolution of mediæval Scholasticism. How much a product and how much a factor is the question that has not yet been settled.

A new study of Eckhart is consequently to be welcomed. It is to be welcomed for the further reason that recent scholarship has cast serious doubts on the authenticity of many of the works attributed to him. The Latin works stand firm. It is the German sermons and tracts in the unreliable text edited by Pfeiffer (Deutsche Mystiker des 14 Jahrhunderts, Vol. II, 1857) that are placed under suspicion-e.g. of the 110 sermons and 18 tracts given by Pfeiffer, only about 30 of the former and one of the latter are now generally accepted. Many are at best transcripts given by hearers. Signor della Volpe, without pursuing the question, gives a full bibliography of it on p. 112 (students without Italian may turn to Ueberweg's Grundriss, Zweiter Teil, ir Auflage, pp. 553 and 779), and bases his study on the accepted residuum. From this residuum he gives liberal quotations in footnotes, and thereby supplies his reader with considerable first-hand material. It is extremely useful to have the 28 articles of the Bull of condemnation of 1329 (pp. 106 ff.) The author's interest being historical rather than evaluative, antecedents are emphasized. The first five chapters are devoted to the mystical line that runs from Plotinus through the pseudo-Dionysius to St. Bonaventura. The exposition here has the defect of not being sufficiently subordinated to the main purpose of the book: it becomes an episodic history of mystical philosophies rather than a selection and linking together of so much of the earlier thought as had an extrinsic connection or an intrinsic affinity with the thought of Eckhart.

Four chapters deal with Eckhart himself. They constitute a very careful and well-ordered statement of his ideas. S. della Volpe finds in them an interesting contradiction, interesting because it seems to be necessitated and to a certain extent justifiable. For Eckhart the mystical experience culminates in a union of the creature with the Creator so complete that all distinction between them is cancelled, which amounts to a divinization of

man. (This ideal is either the ground or the corollary of his metaphysical doctrine of immanentism, that God is in all and is all.) And yet, when he treats of ethics, he preaches a doctrine of complete humiliation, of the worthlessness of human values. In calling this a paradox, S. della Volpe names it rightly. But I cannot be sure that he is right in dwelling on it or in regarding it as peculiar to Eckhart. It is only a paradox, and something very like it is found in most mystics, even in so rational and sober a mystic as Spinoza. In Eckhart, as in Spinoza, only the All is real: all finitude is, in its finitude, unreal. The finite spirit acquires reality, becomes divine, only when it loses its finitude. A pantheistic metaphysic of this kind, therefore, does not divinize the individual: indeed, it makes such divinization impossible. Consequently, it is compatible with (though not of itself involving) the disparagement of all values that belong to us as finite.

I should hesitate to follow the author's claim that Eckhart was the first really independent mystic of the Middle Ages. His words are: "The mystical ethic of Eckhart is little less than revolutionary; it is the first great assertion of the religious sentiment divested of all externality and affirming itself as pure and absolute internality and as spiritual autonomy. . . . The fundamental difference between him and the mystics who preceded him is that in his wholly concentrated passion for God he did in fact transgress that boundary between God and the creature which the other mystics had upheld, though at times their language seems to go beyond their intentions." To accept at their face-value the extremer statements of Eckhart while discounting the equally extreme statements of other mystics is a procedure that requires explicit defence. That the others escaped condemnation is no proof that they were at heart more orthodox, but perhaps only that they held their heresies with charity, so making them innocuous. If the full tale of ecclesiastical censure were told we might find that it was provoked more by pride, affront, and so on, than by opinions. Bruno broke his monastic vows, and Luther insulted his canonical superior. I am not sure that we know enough about Eckhart's personality to say how much his condemnation was due to his doctrines alone.

But these are minor criticisms. I have a secret sympathy with the author's contention that Eckhart's subsequent influence operated much more on the practical than on the intellectual side of mysticism—from which I should draw the conclusion that he is not so important in the history of philosophy as he is usually represented to be. The "dissolution of scholasticism" is not an isolable dramatic moment precipitated by one or two philosophers, but simply one phase among several of a slow cultural change, in which, as at all periods, each phase was sensitive to the rest, so that its course was determined by them and their conditions as well as by its own antecedents.

T. E. JESSOP.

Yoga Philosophy in Relation to Other Systems of Indian Thought. By S. N. Das Gupta, M.A., Ph.D.(Cal.), Ph.D.(Cantab.), I.E.S. (Published by the University of Calcutta. 1930. Pp. x + 360.)

The author is so well known to English readers since the publication of the earlier volumes of his *History of Indian Philosophy*, that he needs no introduction here. He has, moreover, in particular, specialized in both the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems. This is a happy choice because, though European scholars have done something towards the opening up of the Vedānta and Sāmkhya systems to the Occident, yet, as Professor Lanman once said, the

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history of Yoga, both as a theoretic system and body of practices, had still to be written. This fact, however, is by no means so strange as he thought. The author has made the subject his own, and besides the present work has published A Study of Patanjali in 1920, and a work entitled Yoga, its Philosophy and Religion, in 1924. In an estimation of the present book, it is to be remembered that the manuscript was ready several years before the author's History of Indian Philosophy was composed.

As the author observes, throughout all the epochs of Indian culture we find the highest reverence paid to the Yogins, who were believed to know the truth beyond the ken of ordinary vision, and also to wield wonderful powers, not only over their own but over other minds, as also over external objects. In the West, too, the most outstanding figures in India are, in the popular judgment, elephants, jewelled Mahārājas, and wonder-working Yogins. "Can you produce a Yogī?" is in the writer's experience a common request

of the sight-seeing Western traveller to his English host.

It is true, as Professor Lanman has observed, that little has been said of Yoga practices. This is due to lack of understanding of the subject-matter. The system embodies a code of practices by which it is claimed that the truth taught can be verified. Such verification, it is affirmed, is as veritable as ordinary sense perception. As regards occult powers (siddhi), it is only in comparatively recent times that metapsychical phenomena have come to be generally discussed, and in part understood. Even the author, who shows a commendable desire to give a fair and unprejudiced account of the system and to defend it against prejudiced attack, yet says (p. 5) that he has himself kept close to the rational parts of the system, without particularly stressing the experimental portion, because, though some of the phenomena of which Yoga speaks have been verified in some quarters, in modern times, yet other phenomena described in Yoga are, he thinks (to quote his words), "of so mysterious a nature that people are rightly sceptical until they can be verified by the testimony of our own times." Formerly these occult practices were considered unworthy of discussion, and were explained on the grounds of credulity and fraud. But as all systems of Indian philosophy are in unanimous agreement as to the worth of Yoga experience, which, as regards several matters, is receiving some support in the West, the author adopts the standpoint that whilst we should neither uncritically accept the facts of Yoga experience, neither should we unceremoniously dismiss them as being altogether untrustworthy. In any case there is now no ground for timidity in discussing them. The question is one of proof. What is wanted is, to use the language of a recent work (Raul Montandon, Les Radiations Humaines), an experimental demonstration of the existence of the subtle bodies of man, such as we find in the work of the late Dr. Gustave Geley, and others.

It will be readily seen that the subject demands more than a linguistic or philosophical endowment, however great. The author himself cites the verse which says that "Yoga is itself the teacher for those who take to Yoga." It is possible, however, to deal, as the author has done in the main, with one side, the theoretic, with, however, an occasional glance towards the occult practices of Yoga. Thus he points out that if the assumption of Yoga is proved, that the individual mind (Kāryya Buddhi) is a part of and in contact with a larger psychical whole (Kārana Buddhi), it would account for many unexplained facts of abnormal psychology, as also of telepathy and other kindred psychical phenomena. The author says that it is gratifying for an Indian to notice that the controversies of the scientific world have been steadily approaching in a direction which, so far at least as the general scheme is concerned, is familiar to the student of Yoga philosophy. This

262

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statement is the more interesting and authoritative as it is the result of a

consideration of his subject from quite an objective standpoint.

As regards historical origins, the author's view is that the systems which now pass by the names of Sāmkhya and Yoga respectively derive from a common stock, the difference being that the atheistic Samkhya stresses the theoretic and the Theistic Samkhya the practical side of the common teaching. Besides practice in the Patanjali method, Yoga developed on "Tantric" lines as the cult of the physical, both gross and subtle (Hatha Yoga), in the form called Mantra Yoga, and in the celebrated method which produces the particular ecstasy of Kundalini Yoga. The Professor gives valuable testimony to the strength of these "Tantric" influences, but omits to deal further with the matter because, in his view, these "Tantric" elements "have little philosophic importance" (pp. 50, 51). There may have been some grounds in this case for this manner of dealing with the subject, but in the reviewer's opinion Sādhanā and Yoga have the philosophic importance of the doctrinal systems of which they are the practical expression. For instance, the Bhūtashuddhi rite involves the adoption of the Sankhyan evolution from the Psychophysical, Potential, or Prakriti, which, however, in the non-dualistic systems is not a Principle of Unconsciousness as in Sankhya-Yoga, but the power (Shahti) of Consciousness (Chit) worshipped as the Mother of the Universe.

Chapters II and III are of value. Chapter II should be read with Chapter I, and Chapter III with Chapter IV. The theory of the *Gunas*, or Factors, of *Prakriti* is a very leading part of the system, which may be concisely summarized by saying that *vis-à-vis* the *Purusha* or Consciousness, they state the functions of unconscious *Prakriti* as Presentation of Consciousness, Veiling of Consciousness, and the Activity which makes one or other of the first

two functions predominate the one over the other.

Chapter V treats of the theory of Soul, which latter term is not so suitable as the word "Spirit," which the Author sometimes uses, because mind is alien to the nature of the *Purusha* or Spirit as it is in itself. Chapter VI deals with Yoga Cosmology, and Chapter VII with Yoga physics. In Chapter VIII the author well explains the meaning of Sāmkhya Atheism and Yoga Theism. We may here observe that belief in a "Personal God" (to use a current expression) is no part of the common *Dharma* of the Buddhist, Jaina, or Brahmanical systems. There has always been some amount of Atheism in India, but, as the author points out, the Atheism of East and West differ, the latter having not been able to go much beyond materialism, sometimes of a crude kind. Chapter IX deals with the Yoga psychology.

These latter chapters may prove difficult reading for the unversed reader, as the author deals with what he calls "the metaphysical fictions" over which the commentators quarrel. To understand these and other matters it is necessary that the principal doctrines should be set forth in stronger relief from the details accompanying them. Modern Indian writers are too apt to assume that because a matter is clear to them, it must be so to the Western reader. Thus some of these latter consider that to speak of "Unconscious Mind" is a contradiction in terms, though acceptance is now becoming more and more common of the term "unconscious mental process." But neither in Sāmkhya-Yoga nor in Vedānta is there any contradiction, for each of these systems distinguishes between Mind, which, as it is in itself, is Un-

conscious and Consciousness which illuminates its operations.

The question of freewill and determination is so often neglected that I looked to the Index to see whether the author had anything to say on the matter. The Index is silent, but the author refers to the subject in pp. 318-321.

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It is not generally understood that Vedānta (leaving aside the Māyāvādin's Māyā) is a common-sense philosophy, which, as such, posits an abiding self, a world of change which is, as it appears, man's freewill, and responsibility. There is also no doctrine more widely nor more firmly held in India than the doctrine of Karma, which, the author says, "stands as the principle of determinism." He finds a difficulty in reconciling freewill with Karma, and appears to hold the opinion that we must make our election for one or the other, though Hinduism holds to both. The question is of such importance that we would have welcomed a more extended treatment of it.

In the event of another edition being printed we would suggest that all the Sanskrit terms and quotations should be translated, and thus make the

work more useful by attracting a wider circle of readers.

All that the author has to say on his subject-matter is of both interest and value, coming as it does from one who has made a special study of the Sāmkhya and Yoga systems, and who is well equipped by his general philosophical and Sanskritic knowledge to express an opinion as to what these systems mean.

JOHN WOODROFFE.

John Dewey, the Man and His Philosophy. Addresses Delivered in New York in Celebration of His Seventieth Birthday. (Cambridge, U.S.A.: Harvard University Press. London: Oxford University Press, Humphrey Milford. 1930. Pp. vii + 181. Price, 10s. 6d.)

As the sub-title indicates, this is a composite volume containing addresses delivered by various speakers on a public occasion, apparently printed much as they were delivered. (There is even a section entitled The Toastmaster's Words.) Only three of the seven main contributions are directly concerned with Professor Dewey's philosophy; the bulk of the book is devoted to his influence as an educational reformer. It is, however, interesting to learn that his educational theory is a direct consequence of his theory of knowledge, viz., that "knowing" means the same as "knowing how to do." This doctrine, it seems, has not only revolutionized American education, but has overflowed into China, Mexico, and even Turkey; and we are assured that it will be Europe's turn very soon.

Professor George H. Mead speaks on The Philosophies of Royce, James, and Dewey in Their American Setting, and contends that Mr. Dewey has provided us with the first really native American philosophy. (His predecessors had all been "nostalgic" exponents of an alien tradition, from which even James had not fully broken away.) Indeed, we are told that Mr. Dewey has produced nothing less than "the philosophy of American practicality." If this is what he has really done-and it seems not unlikely-it is clearly the duty of all intelligent Europeans to study his doctrines more carefully than has been hitherto usual, at any rate in this country; even if they are false, they must obviously be important. Professor Herbert W. Schneider discusses The Prospects of Empirical Philosophy, and appends a pleasing if somewhat lengthy myth about Pan and Logos, and their respective contributions to Mr. Dewey's mental equipment. But it is a pity that he suffers from a sort of persecutionmania with regard to the pre-Deweyan and non-empirical philosophers. We can hardly believe that they were really as stupid and as tyrannical as all that. Mr. James Harvey Robinson's contribution on John Dewey and Liberal Thought is somewhat more philosophical and less hultur-geschichtlich, but not very novel. He urges us to do away with substances and replace them by events, and to substitute verbs for nouns wherever possible, e.g. "minding"

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for "mind" (and "mattering" for "matter"?); and promises that if we do many traditional problems will disappear, particularly all those concerned with the relations between minds and physical objects.

The last nine pages of the book contain Professor Dewey's Response, which, as we should expect, is both wise and felicitous. It is interesting to find that he at least has his doubts about that "American practicality" of which he is supposed to be the philosophical exponent, and expects that his countrymen will one day get tired of being practical and turn to something else.

H. H. PRICE.

The Monadology of Leibniz. By Professor H. Wildon Carr. (London: The Favil Press, 1930. Pp. ix + 213. Price 10s. net.)

We have here a commentator who is thoroughly in sympathy with the general philosophical views of the author whom he studies. Professor Wildon Carr has for long devoted his remarkable energies to the defence of a modern monadology, and, though his own views have been also profoundly influenced by modern idealism and recent scientific theories, they seem to owe even more to the influence of Leibniz himself; and he will no doubt succeed in bringing home to many readers Leibniz's striking and well-thought-out conception of the universe as a harmonious system of genuine individuals, and in encouraging them to study him more deeply themselves. The book indeed is not of a very ambitious type. It is rather of the nature of an introduction for students than of an original contribution to scholarship and thought, and as a study of Leibniz could not bear comparison with the work of Professor Latta. Hence a reviewer may perhaps be justified in passing it over rather more briefly than its author's reputation would seem to warrant, especially as from the nature of the case it would be impossible satisfactorily to discuss it without a detailed study of the philosophy of Leibniz, for which space would obviously be inadequate. It is only fair to add that Professor Wildon Carr has also produced a work which claims to give an account of Leibniz's life and philosophy as a whole (Leibniz, Benn, 1929).

The present work consists of a brief introduction; a translation of the Monadology, with very copious, though (in view of the condensed character of Leibniz's treatise) not excessive, notes; a translation (without notes) of (a) a letter on "The Origin of the Theory of Monads," (b) an "Elucidation concerning the Monads," (c) "Elucidations of the Reform of the Ontological Argument, the Definition of Matter, the Theory of the Pre-established Harmony, and the Nature of Free-will"; and some short supplementary essays intended to bring out the ultimate value of Leibniz's thought. In a most interesting essay Professor Wildon Carr defends the paradoxical view that there is no interaction between monads, but only intercommunication, chiefly against the argument that the denial of interaction would lead to solipsism. That his defence will satisfy most readers seems doubtful, and at any rate the disjunctive proposition that a self must either be a substance in a sense of the term which implies complete independence, or have a merely adjectival existence, on which he bases his whole doctrine, seems to me emphatically neither a necessity of thought nor in accord with the world as we know it. There are also points in the Monadology where exception might be taken to the clearness or relevance of his comments, and it may be doubted whether he does not in his interpretation assimilate Leibniz too much to modern idealism. The

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translation is good and very readable, but there are a certain number of places where he would have done better to follow the original more carefully.

A. C. EWING.

Studies in the Eighteenth-Century Background of Hume's Empiricism. By Mary Shaw Kuypers. (The University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis. 1930. Pp. viii + 134. Price \$1.50.)

These Studies deal with a part of the immediate background of Hume's thought, which has suffered neglect through the preoccupation of Hume's critics until recent times with his relation to the English epistemological tradition. The writer accepts the newer attitude to Hume, first set forth by Professor Kemp Smith in his articles on "The Naturalism of Hume." Hume's naturalistic position is regarded as of more importance than the phenomenalism, in which he merely amplifies certain positions reached by Locke and Berkeley; and an attempt is made to interpret his thought as a whole in the light of his confessed enthusiasm for the experimental method. The main purpose of these Studies is to show the relation between Hume's application of this method and certain contemporary tendencies in the fields of thought in which he applied it.

The Studies are divided into two groups. The first group, we are told in the Preface, is "concerned with the historic development which brought the problem of causation to the foreground both in science itself and in the philosophic interpretations placed upon it." The problem of causation is shown to have emerged from the metaphysical interpretations of Newton's empirical, scientific concepts, and in particular from the transformation of forces conceived as methodological principles—the Vis Inertiæ and the Vis Gravitationis—into forces conceived as metaphysical entities. This historical development is traced with sufficient fullness to make it clear and interesting.

The second group of Studies deals with Hume's empirical treatment of the problems of force or causality, of morals, of politics, and of the interpretation of history. Evidence is brought forward to show his acquaintance with, and interest in, the science of the period and its philosophical interpretations; and his discussions of causality and, incidentally, of mathematics, of space and time, and of primary and secondary qualities, are connected with the problems raised in the development of science. The point that is emphasized throughout is Hume's insistence on the application of empiricism, of Newton's experimental method in contrast to the dogmatic rationalism of his followers and those who expounded him in the interests of theology. When she turns to the social sciences the author is again concerned chiefly with Hume's method, and she rightly insists on the unity which this method gives to his thought on different subjects.

These Studies are successful in making Hume's method stand out "with some of the prominence which he himself attached to it" (p. 89), and in relating it to its background in eighteenth-century thought. It is no part of the author's purpose to give a critical discussion of Hume's right, from the epistemological standpoint, to his enthusiasm for the experimental method, nor to raise the question of the value of naturalism. But studies such as those which she offers are of great help in the understanding of Hume's thought; and that is a matter of interest, even if a consistent naturalism should seem to the reader as unacceptable in its attempted explanations as in its denials.

In Mind, N.S. 14, 1905.

A Philosophy of Reality. By E. L. Young. (Publications of the University of Manchester. No. ccvi. Manchester University Press. 1930. Pp. xi + 266. Price 8s. 6d. net.)

This book, while claiming to set forth a philosophy of reality and accepting the position that the function of philosophy is to explain the universe, dispenses with the stereotyped methods of most philosophies, with what the irreverent are apt to call philosophical jargon, and with all transcendentalism. For this reason it will appeal to those who are interested in philosophy but who are not professional philosophers. The treatment of philosophical problems is fresh and stimulating; there are throughout many fruitful remarks which will repay the trouble of serious reflection; and there is gathered into its pages much interesting scientific material which will prove helpful and suggestive to others.

The whole book breathes the air of a sane, healthy realism, confining itself to "the known and realizable universe and not with anything beyond it." It endeavours to show that the universe is not alien to man and to the human mind. It manifests a confidence in science which apparently requires no critical examination but only an exposition of scientific results. Philosophically, it is in fact an interpretation of reality on the basis of the realism of common sense and of physical science. The author is concerned simply with an exposition of the view to which knowledge seems to him to point, though there are some bogeys, of course, even scientific ones, to be dispatched. Yet, in spite of the generally clear and vigorous style, the critically minded will experience difficulties. The stress laid on movement and vibrations instead of clarifying the problem seems rather to raise one. Terms like union ("union is subjectivity"), integration, unification, require some elucidation. The nature, status, and rôle of mind and consciousness in reality remain far from being clear, and the doctrine that matter and spirit are "the two aspects of reality" is apparently accepted without any critical analysis of its meaning in relation to the other positions maintained in the book.

B. M. LAING.

Pleasure and Instinct. By A. H. B. Allen. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1930. Pp. lx + 336. Price 12s. 6d.)

In Pleasure and Instinct feelings are shown to be states of the "self" which depend upon the processes of conation. This is an ancient theory, but the author treats it afresh in a clear and convincing manner. Having summarized the chief views upon the nature of pleasure and unpleasure in general, the problem of sensory affective states is considered; and these are explained as due to the satisfaction or frustration of organic cravings. Whether specific to a given sensory organ, or belonging to the organism as a whole (maintainance or enhancement of function, on the one hand, and depression which the organism resists, on the other) these cravings are conative in character; and their mental analogues are the sensory couple, pleasure and unpleasure. The author then turns his attention to the instincts, which he classifies under the main heads of (1) self-maintenance, including also propagation and a number of separate impulses developed as subsidiary to it; (2) the spiritual impulses of "self-maximation" and "self-giving"; (3) fear and anger, as reactions safeguarding the other instincts. Instincts themselves are regarded as the conative trends of life; and pleasure is the mark of the normal development of any one of them towards its goal; while unpleasure characteri es frustration, and is due to the conflict between the persistence of the impulse and its thwarting. Feelings are next compared with and distinguished from sensa-

PHILOSOPHY

tions as having a subjective "warmth and value" correlated with success or failure in the satisfaction of conative trends. The view is developed that conscious desire for pleasure is not a primary motive for action. The original is "the emergence into consciousness of a latent craving for some form of activity to which the organism is predisposed." In the exercise of such activity, however, the experience of pleasure may arise; and subsequently, as a value, pleasure may itself become a subsidiary end or motive. This consideration leads to the examination of the question whether there may not be other feelings than pleasure and unpleasure also which may constitute values; and the author suggests that such feelings are to be found in connection with degrees of more or less self-direction of mental activity, as well as with degrees of vividness or intensity with which the self is engaged in its reactions. It will be seen that the thesis is a dynamic and personalistic one, developing from the point of view of affective feeling a line of thought which is receiving increasing emphasis in contemporary psychology, both experimental and theoretic. There is an Index of Authors to whose work reference is made in the volume; but unfortunately a subject-index is lacking.

F. AVELING.

Religion and the Reign of Science. By F. L. Cross, M.A., B.Sc. (London: Longmans, Green & Co. 1930. Pp. ix+111. Price 4s. net.)

Mr. Cross is librarian at Pusey House, and this book is in the Anglican Library of Faith and Thought. Its purpose is to give a brief account of the relation between religion and modern scientific theories. After a chapter on the scientific age in which we live, Mr. Cross goes on to discuss the connection between religion and physics, biology, psychology, Biblical criticism, philosophy, and, finally, religion and the life of the spirit. This is a formidable programme, and no man living could discuss all these topics with equal competence. Mr. Cross's purpose is not technical, of course, but popular, and he has succeeded in providing a very readable book, and though most will enter a demurrer here and there, as a whole his criticisms are justly put.

One cannot understand what is meant by such a statement as this: "The Christian community is not merely the sum-total of all those who . . . have professed the Christian name. It is something more than these, more than its members; it exists apart from them. And if, as it is here contended, the Church exists as a corporate body, then there is no reason why it should not make corporate judgments." What a flock is apart from the sheep is not easy to see. This seems the old fallacy that since man collectively is different from man individually, the crowd is in itself something apart from its members. A few sociologists have tried to maintain this, but not one has been able to say more than Mr. Cross, that it is "something." One yet waits for any further characterization. There is a slight slip on p. 55. It was in 1875 that Wundt went to Leipzig. He founded his laboratory in 1879.

On the other hand, one welcomes the statement that the rather disappointing results that have followed the high expectations of psychology have been due to the following of wrong methods, based on the methods of mathematics and physics and the ignoring of individuality. In the chapter on philosophy the brevity necessarily enforced makes for a little inaccuracy, almost inevitably. It is hardly exact to say, for example, that Whitehead "holds that God and the world stand very much in the relation in which Christianity has explained them by its doctrine of creation," especially as he goes on to say that that doctrine is contained in essence in the first chapter

268

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of Genesis. Genesis scarcely agrees with Whitehead that "It is as true to say that God creates the world as that the world creates God."

Such points as these, however, are incidental to and inseparable from the writing of such a book as this, where a vast area must be covered in a single chapter. One must judge rather by the whole, and so judging, one welcomes Mr. Cross's book as a clear and honest attempt to deal with great issues in a way that will prove helpful and explanatory to the average reader.

E. S. WATERHOUSE.

The Psychology of Clothes. By J. C. Flügel, B.A., D.Sc. (London: Institute of Psycho-Analysis and Hogarth Press. 1930. Pp. 257. Price 21s.)

The modern outlook in psychology finds one of its fullest and happiest expressions in this book. The reader is led away from his prejudices by being shown the admirable qualities and services rendered by the most diverse custom and fashion, and by emulating the detached affectionateness of the author to his subject he can, if he so wishes, make his own approach from a new angle. At the same time, the book omits nothing but the pedantry from the textbooks on this topic. In one sense it is rather frightening to discover how prejudiced and "overclothed" our thoughts are on this subject, and how little we dare think nakedly about the social and sexual problems involved; we are as ashamed of the working of our minds as of the contours of our bodies. Dr. Flügel shows how unnecessary are these shames and modesties without flaunting our weaknesses or swaggering before us as do the reformers. It is clear that he believes in the ultimate control of reason over man's behaviour, but is alive to the fact that mankind is prone to deceive itself, that it is acting reasonably, when, in fact, it is reacting unwittingly against some emotional impulse.

It is impossible in a small space to give an idea of the great range and detailed thinking of this admirable book; a few examples must suffice. The study of individual differences in the mental attitude to clothes leads the author to establish certain types. The rebellious type gets little satisfaction from clothes, and is never resigned to them, feels constricted, impeded, and imprisoned. Clothes for these people are never so attractive as nakedness. The resigned type has the same general psychological make-up as the rebellious (I have omitted three pages of close description and discussion), except that the habit of wearing clothes is so strong that there is no longer a struggle, but only a wish for the freedom of nakedness. The unemotional type is incapable of being pleased or annoyed by clothes or nakedness. In these three types there is little conscious satisfaction in clothes; in those that follow the satisfaction is either in a reaction of inhibitory nature against the excitements of clothing or nakedness, or is found in a sublimation of impulses of exhibitionism or display. So we have the prudish type and the duty type, in which latter certain features of costume such as stiffness, tightness, or severity of line have become symbols of work or duty, the kind of clothes being not merely a reaction against self-display, but a brake on any runaway tendencies towards softness or self-indulgence. Where the conscious satisfaction in clothes is more direct, we may have the protected type, who are before all things warmly dressed (contrasting with the rebellious type). Next comes the supported type, or those who feel pleasurably supported by tight or stiff clothes. In the case of the sublimated type there is a fusion of clothes and body into a harmonious unity. Lastly, there is the self-satisfied type, which has something in common with the unemotional and the sublimated types, and presents a rather irritating smugness and self-complacency about clothes. This brief outline does not do

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justice to the penetrating analysis which each type receives in this book, nor will scrappy quotations show its range. To take one instance more, the author calls our attention to the remarkable change that took place in the decorativeness of men's clothing at the end of the eighteenth century, and shows how it came about that the great social and political upheaval of that period made men drab, but left women gaily dressed. He then goes on to ask how it has been possible for men, who used to look like peacocks and to enjoy their finery, to endure the giving up of display, and further, what has become of the energy that went into dressing. When Dr. Flügel asks a question, he does not shirk difficulties in giving an answer. In another part of the book the fashions of immaturity of figure, of maturity, and the concealment of age are discussed with a truly wonderful fairness and detachment. Most books on this subject are biased somewhere, and one feels that they would be read by naked savages or overdressed courtiers with qualified approval; such readers might, perhaps, have their fancy tickled by the praise or condemnation of some loved or hated foible, but would never be really won over to the author's way of looking at the subject. In this case, however, one feels that the book can be handed to anybody, from Greenland to Patagonia, from Bloomsbury to Mayfair, with the certainty that every private foible or prejudice of the reader has been given its best advocacy, and has been placed in relation to everyone else's foibles and prejudices. Does anyone say he has no prejudices or private fancies about clothes? Let him read this book; he will neither cast the book nor his clothes nor his prejudices aside (it is not propaganda), but will wear his prejudices henceforth with a better grace. JOHN RICKMAN.

Spinoza on God. By Joseph Ratner. New York: Henry Holt & Co. 1930. 8vo, pp. xiv + 88. Price \$1.50.

This little book is intended as a contribution to the textual analysis, and only indirectly to the philosophical interpretation, of Spinoza's *Ethics*, or rather of a part of it, albeit a very important part of it. Mr. Ratner rightly protests against the tendency to reach Spinoza texts in the light of a pre-conceived interpretation of his whole philosophy. Several years ago the present writer voiced the same protest, and illustrated it by reference to a number of important passages in the *Ethics*.

With regard to Mr. Ratner's main points, let me say at once that I entirely agree with him, in fact I have explicitly and emphatically urged the same views in the commentaries to my translations of Spinoza's Short Treatise and his Correspondence, the latter of which is referred to by Mr. Ratner. Of these main contentions the first relates to the substantial character of the attributes (compare Short Treatise, pp. 174 ff.). And intimately connected with this is the second main contention, namely, that the Hegelian, and still too common, interpretation of Spinoza's phrase, omnis determinatio est negatio is utterly wrong. It means that the limitation or delimitation of finite objects is negation, or an indication of what they are not. But it has no reference to the characterization of substance by its attributes. (This was pointed out explicitly in the Correspondence, p. 431.) Mr. Ratner's emphasis on this view is not only right, but seems especially necessary in America. For I notice to my amazement that in his otherwise excellent book on Types of Philosophy Professor W. E. Hocking has repeated this misinterpretation of Spinoza at least four times.

For the rest, without subscribing to everything that Mr. Ratner says in it, one may commend his little book as a helpful contribution to the study of some of the fundamental ideas of Spinoza.

A. Wolf.

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Rational Induction. An Analysis of the Method of Science and Philosophy.

By Homer H. Dubs, Ph.D. (Chicago: the University of Chicago Press. 1930. London: Cambridge University Press. Pp. xv. + 510. Price 21s. net.)

Dr. Dubs is of opinion that while the problem of knowledge has received a great deal of attention from philosophers, the logically prior problem, How do we know when we have attained to knowledge? has never been adequately treated. This problem is the main theme of the volume under review. What is Knowledge, and how is it to be justified? These are the chief questions to be answered. According to Dr. Dubs, knowledge consists of propositions which, if thoroughly understood, together with their proximate and ultimate grounds, will bring about the assent of every unprejudiced mind. Now such knowledge (as distinguished from mere opinion) is established by means of the method of hypothesis and verification. This method is described by Dr. Dubs as "rational induction." Hence the main title of his book.

The volume covers a wide range of subjects, and the chapters sometimes appear to be rather loosely connected. In fact, the author himself kindly suggests to the busy reader that the main points of the book may be grasped by reading four specified chapters out of the fifteen chapters which it contains. Nor does it appear to contain anything strikingly new. One recognizes old friends in its strong points and in its weaknesses. Sometimes they appear more or less disguised in a new nomenclature, but this presents no real difficulty. As a whole the book is comparatively easy and pleasant to read, and the author's fondness of tilting against the foibles of contemporary philosophers adds to the reader's enjoyment. Of course, after reading all that Dr. Dubs has to say about "rational induction" in general, the wise reader will do well to turn to one of the more orthodox accounts of scientific methods and learn also something about the differences between the various inductive methods.

A. Wolf.

Psychopathology. By J. S. NICOLE, M.R.C.P. & S. (London: Baillière Tindall & Cox. 1930. Pp. xii + 203. Price 10s. 6d.)

This book is divided into two parts, the main text and three appendices. In the main text Dr. Nicole has endeavoured to summarize the teachings of the various authorities on psychotherapy and psychopathology who have influenced psychological medicine during the present century. He starts with an historical introduction, and then he proceeds to discuss the teachings of Morton Prince, Freud, Jung, Adler, Rivers, Watson, Kempf, Berman, and Kretchmer. He discusses the Biochemical researches so popular at present in the laboratories of Mental Hospitals, and ends his résumé by pointing out that in all probability all these different methods of approach have some value for psychopathology, but so far they are not sufficiently correlated to be used as a whole. It is obvious from these summaries that Dr. Nicole has read voraciously, and has himself understood all he has read. It seems a pity, therefore, that he has not given us more of his own conclusions, for the summaries are bare expositions without comment. Further, it is doubtful whether Dr. Nicole has succeeded in presenting the summaries in a way which will be of much use to others. The whole only occupies 100 pages, and so is too brief for the uninstructed, and probably contain nothing outside the knowledge of those already familiar with the subject. We think, however, that this book may be of great use to those who wish to revise and collate their reading for

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such an examination as the D.P.M., and the full bibliography at the end of the book will allow such persons readily to fill up any lacunæ they may discover in their knowledge of the subject.

The first appendix is concerned with the various modern concepts of the ego, a difficult but important subject which the author reviews admirably.

In the second appendix the author joins the ranks of those who have attempted to give a short, concise summary of Jung's physiological types, but it is to be doubted if he or any of his fellows have succeeded in making them any clearer to the general reader. Dr. Nicole insists on the importance of understanding these types from the point of view of dealing not only with patients, but also with staff, so that suitable nurses and attendants may be found for individual patients.

In the third appendix the author discusses the Herd instinct, and the exceedingly lax way in which this term has been used in modern psychological

literature.

Altogether this book shows great erudition on the part of the author and is pleasantly presented, but in our opinion too much has been attempted in too small a compass.

R. G. G.

Contemporary Thought of Germany. By W. Tudor Jones, M.A., D. Phil. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1930. Pp. viii + 278. Price 5s. net.)

As Mr. Tudor Jones considers over a hundred philosophers in 276 small pages, detailed treatment is out of the question. But a short book on contemporary German philosophy is clearly required. There are people who wish to be acquainted with the main outlines of German philosophical thought without having to trouble about the details, and for these the absence of detail is a recommendation. They want an account of the main tendencies and an exposition of the leading ideas of the principal thinkers.

The present volume is to be followed by another, and one gathers that the distinction between them is somewhat elastic. The first volume deals with the older men, who made their mark during last century, but it includes many whose chief works have been published during the present centurysuch as Driesch, Eucken and Husserl, to name but three. The second volume will deal with the younger men. Writers have been grouped to illustrate schools. The problem of distinguishing between schools usually presents difficulties. There are, of course, obvious distinctions, as between Mach and Cohen. But there are usually doubtful distinctions as well-cases where one wonders whether the resemblance or difference between thinkers is the more important. Mr. Tudor Jones has distinguished six groups, which undoubtedly represent six main currents of contemporary German philosophy, and any disagreement with his classification must be slight. It may be remarked that he has neglected the neo-scholastic movement (but perhaps this is reserved for the second volume); that Münsterberg and Rickert should not be classed with the Neo-Kantians, and that the omission of some philosophers for the sake of treating others more fully would have been an improvement, although the inclusion of many names does give the book an added value as a work of reference. But the reader will discover the kind of outlook which distinguishes one group of philosophers from another, and the kind of theory which each philosopher held. He must not expect precise statement. German philosophical writing is often involved and obscure. Mr. Tudor Jones might well maintain that an imprecise rendering now is worth more than a precise

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rendering at some hypothetical future date. But he is certainly more successful with some writers than with others-more successful, for example, with Nietzsche than with Husserl. HELEN KNIGHT.

Grades of Significance. By G. N. M. TYRRELL, B.Sc. (London: Rider & Co. 1931. Pp. 221. Price 7s. 6d. net).

Mr. Tyrrell writes interestingly, simply, and clearly on the nature of personality and of the various aspects of reality with which personality is in touch, with the object of showing that the material world is merely an aspect of reality and not reality itself, and that there are other and wider aspects of which personality may be, and often is, aware. He is clear that our reactions toward so-called facts are very largely conditioned by our philosophical pre-suppositions, and that this is especially the case in regard to psychic research; and his purpose is to put forward a point of view whose presuppositions shall be in accordance with modern scientific and philosophic developments, and which shall enable the facts elicited by psychic research to be put in a proper light.

From his point of view these facts show that personality, which in ordinary life is normally in touch with reality through the facts of the body and the sense-world, is capable of being stretched (the word is his own) so as to get into touch with wider aspects, much in the same way as one can be in touch with a printed book, regarding it merely as a collection of black marks on a white ground, obeying certain laws of relationship, or regarding it as the expression of a meaning, which has nothing to do with black and white, nor even with the laws connecting letters into words. Imagine a race of savants preoccupied with these laws, who had never heard of printed words as expressing meanings, confronted for the first time by someone who claimed that through them he could get into touch with a world of a different order, and you have a situation parallel to that which arises when the materialistically minded person is confronted with the claims made by psychic research.

Mr. Tyrrell is not pleading on behalf of spiritualism "as a religious cult," as he phrases it; he is greatly in sympathy with Dean Inge's fears of the extravagances of belief into which one may be led by substituting for the realm of eternal values a temporal existence stretching out indefinitely. He is aware that evidence for the survival of personality after death is not in itself evidence of immortality, and that the problem of the nature of time is not to be solved in this way. His position in regard to eternal values themselves is indeed very much akin to that of Dean Inge. What he is pleading for is a sober and helpful attitude toward the investigations made by psychic research (which he regards as scientific and not religious), and a recognition of the way in which they point to a widening of the significance of the nature of reality and of the powers of personality. And however we may disagree with particular details of his position, we can only wish him every success in his main object.

L. J. RUSSELL.

Books received also:-

F. H. Bradley, O.M., LL.D. Aphorisms. Oxford: Clarendon Press: Humphrey Milford. 1930. Pp. 30. 5s.

C. J. Ducasse. The Philosophy of Art. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. xiv + 314. 12s. 6d.

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Contemporary Thought of Germany. By W. Tudor Jones, M.A., D. Phil. (London: Williams & Norgate, Ltd. 1930. Pp. viii + 278. Price 5s. net.)

As Mr. Tudor Jones considers over a hundred philosophers in 276 small pages, detailed treatment is out of the question. But a short book on contemporary German philosophy is clearly required. There are people who wish to be acquainted with the main outlines of German philosophical thought without having to trouble about the details, and for these the absence of detail is a recommendation. They want an account of the main tendencies and an exposition of the leading ideas of the principal thinkers.

The present volume is to be followed by another, and one gathers that the distinction between them is somewhat elastic. The first volume deals with the older men, who made their mark during last century, but it includes many whose chief works have been published during the present centurysuch as Driesch, Eucken and Husserl, to name but three. The second volume will deal with the younger men. Writers have been grouped to illustrate schools. The problem of distinguishing between schools usually presents difficulties. There are, of course, obvious distinctions, as between Mach and Cohen. But there are usually doubtful distinctions as well-cases where one wonders whether the resemblance or difference between thinkers is the more important. Mr. Tudor Jones has distinguished six groups, which undoubtedly represent six main currents of contemporary German philosophy, and any disagreement with his classification must be slight. It may be remarked that he has neglected the neo-scholastic movement (but perhaps this is reserved for the second volume); that Münsterberg and Rickert should not be classed with the Neo-Kantians, and that the omission of some philosophers for the sake of treating others more fully would have been an improvement, although the inclusion of many names does give the book an added value as a work of reference. But the reader will discover the kind of outlook which distinguishes one group of philosophers from another, and the kind of theory which each philosopher held. He must not expect precise statement. German philosophical writing is often involved and obscure. Mr. Tudor Jones might well maintain that an imprecise rendering now is worth more than a precise

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rendering at some hypothetical future date. But he is certainly more successful with some writers than with others—more successful, for example, with Nietzsche than with Husserl.

Helen Knight.

Grades of Significance. By G. N. M. Tyrrell, B.Sc. (London: Rider & Co. 1931. Pp. 221. Price 7s. 6d. net).

Mr. Tyrrell writes interestingly, simply, and clearly on the nature of personality and of the various aspects of reality with which personality is in touch, with the object of showing that the material world is merely an aspect of reality and not reality itself, and that there are other and wider aspects of which personality may be, and often is, aware. He is clear that our reactions toward so-called facts are very largely conditioned by our philosophical pre-suppositions, and that this is especially the case in regard to psychic research; and his purpose is to put forward a point of view whose presuppositions shall be in accordance with modern scientific and philosophic developments, and which shall enable the facts elicited by psychic research to be put in a proper light.

From his point of view these facts show that personality, which in ordinary life is normally in touch with reality through the facts of the body and the sense-world, is capable of being stretched (the word is his own) so as to get into touch with wider aspects, much in the same way as one can be in touch with a printed book, regarding it merely as a collection of black marks on a white ground, obeying certain laws of relationship, or regarding it as the expression of a meaning, which has nothing to do with black and white, nor even with the laws connecting letters into words. Imagine a race of savants preoccupied with these laws, who had never heard of printed words as expressing meanings, confronted for the first time by someone who claimed that through them he could get into touch with a world of a different order, and you have a situation parallel to that which arises when the materialistically minded person is confronted with the claims made by psychic research.

Mr. Tyrrell is not pleading on behalf of spiritualism "as a religious cult," as he phrases it; he is greatly in sympathy with Dean Inge's fears of the extravagances of belief into which one may be led by substituting for the realm of eternal values a temporal existence stretching out indefinitely. He is aware that evidence for the survival of personality after death is not in itself evidence of immortality, and that the problem of the nature of time is not to be solved in this way. His position in regard to eternal values themselves is indeed very much akin to that of Dean Inge. What he is pleading for is a sober and helpful attitude toward the investigations made by psychic research (which he regards as scientific and not religious), and a recognition of the way in which they point to a widening of the significance of the nature of reality and of the powers of personality. And however we may disagree with particular details of his position, we can only wish him every success in his main object.

L. J. RUSSELL.

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CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF THE Journal of Philosophical Studies

DEAR SIR,

In the January number of La Critica Signor Croce takes me to task for a remark I made concerning him in my review of Ugo Spirito's Idealismo italiano e i suoi critici, in the Journal of Philosophical Studies of July 1930. Since I seem to have misled your readers, I feel obliged to make amends by communicating his strictures: "In a review by Jessop in this excellent philosophical organ . . . emphasis is given to an affirmation and an exhortation attributed to me, namely, that (in La Critica) I have reproached the youth of Italy for busying itself with the abstract principles of philosophy instead of applying them in literary criticism, history, etc. This, writes the reviewer, 'is of interest as showing Croce's superb confidence in the finality of his findings, and the authority a teacher can acquire in Italy.' I do not know whether this false interpretation is to be found, though it may well be in the book under review, nor shall I take the trouble to clarify such a trifling detail, since I am now accustomed to see and discount in books, reviews, and journals similar ineptitudes and confusions. But since Jessop has fallen into that misunderstanding, I must explain to him that although I have recommended, and still recommend, in word and still more in deed and example, historical studies as at once a stimulus to and a control of philosophical thinking, I have never dreamed of exhorting anyone to 'application,' that is to mechanical tasks, to thinking without thinking. This in truth would be not so much conceit as stupidity. . . . The advice I have given is the same as that given by Giambattista Vico, when he recommended the young to read the poets, historians, and orators in order to stock the memory and prepare material for judgment, thereby avoiding the danger of becoming subtle, barren, and socially useless. This was the plain meaning of my article on 'Troppa filosofia' "

I freely accept the correction, and apologize for having uncritically followed Signor Spirito's version of "Troppa filosofia". And perhaps Signor Croce will pardon me more readily if I mention that in translating my expression "superb confidence" by "superba fiducia" he has misinterpreted the adjective. The English "superb" is

by no means always a pejorative.

May I take this opportunity of begging Signor Croce to induce a publisher to reissue the English translation of his valuable *Breviario di Estetica*, now out of print?

T. E. Jessop.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

Summer Term begins on April 28th, and ends on June 30th.

"The Philosophy of Contemporary Literature," a course of six weekly lectures by C. R. Morris, M.A. (Fellow and Tutor of Balliol College, Oxford), on Tuesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14, Gordon Square, W.C.1, in the Summer Term, beginning May 5, 1931. The lectures are free to members. For non-members of the Institute the fee for the course is 12s. 6d.

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276

CONTENTS

. ,	OPEN LETTER TO MEMBERS OF THE INSTITUTE	279
I.	SUBJECTIVE AIM IN PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PHILO- SOPHY: Professor C. Lloyd Morgan	281
II.	COSMIC PURPOSE: PROFESSOR J. W. HARVEY	295
III.	IS MORAL PROGRESS A REALITY? PROFESSOR G. C. FIELD	307
IV.	McTAGGART'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION: ROBERT LEET PATTERSON, M.A., B.D	323
V.	PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM AND POINT OF VIEW: ADRIAN COATES, M.A.	336
VI.	AN OUTLINE OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY: R. F. RATTRAY, M.A., Ph.D.	347
VII.	PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY:	
	PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE	365
	PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY	370
III.	NEW BOOKS	377
IX.	CORRESPONDENCE:	
	THE ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON: A DEFENCE.	398
	THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD	400
X.	INSTITUTE NOTES	402

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PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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OPEN LETTER TO THE MEMBERS OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

After the disturbing announcements of previous communications, the Executive Committee thinks it owes to the members of the Institute that they should be apprised of the measures that have been taken to deal with the crisis caused by the sudden death of Mr. Emile Garcke, who was so generous a supporter. As a result of that event the Committee found itself committed to an expenditure which would leave a deficit at the end of the year ended March 31, 1931, of approximately £1,000. Two problems faced the Committee: first, that of providing for this deficit; secondly, that of reducing expenditure for succeeding years so as to keep it within the limits of present income.

With a view to the solution of the former of these problems, the letter which the members received in January of this year was issued asking for donations. The sum received in response amounted to about £400, and this was an encouraging indication of the interest of members in the work of the Institute. In addition to this sum, some special donations were conditionally promised amounting to £350. There was still a gap to be filled, but through the exertions of the Director of Studies an anonymous friend of the Institute has given a donation of £500, which will enable the Institute to meet all its obligations and look forward with hope to the future.

But that this hope should be realized it was necessary to face the second of the above problems, and a Sub-Committee of the Executive was formed to report on the possibility of reducing expenditure without materially impairing the work of the Institute. Its recommendations fell under the four main heads: of economies in the printing and publishing of the Journal; in the payments for lectures: in rent of the premises in Gordon Square; and in the salaries of officers. Owing to the loyal spirit in which these proposed economies were accepted by all concerned, the generous offer of unpaid courses by some of the academic members of the Institute. and the liberal proposal by the Trustees of University Hall of reduced terms for the offices in that building, we think we see our way to begin the new Session in October with but little if any diminution in the extent or efficiency of the work previously undertaken. But in writing this letter to members we desire, while warmly thanking them for their support under specially trying circumstances in the past, to remind them that success in the future will depend entirely upon the continuance of that support, and particularly on a substantial increase of membership. The Executive hopes to take special measures to secure that object, but its main reliance is on the efforts of the members themselves. If each made himself responsible for one additional member the finances of the Institute would be placed on a securer basis than they have yet attained, and the crisis through which we have passed would prove in the end to have been a consolidating and strengthening experience.

Speaking for the Council and the Executive, we would add that nothing that has occurred has shaken our faith in the importance and entire practicability of the work we have taken in hand, namely, of opening the opportunity of philosophical culture to a wider public

than has hitherto been able to enjoy it.

John H. Muirhead, Herbert Samuel, for the Council.

SUBJECTIVE AIM IN PROFESSOR WHITE-HEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

PROFESSOR C. LLOYD MORGAN

In *Process and Reality* Professor A. N. Whitehead formulates a Cosmology which embodies a resolute attempt to combine in one philosophical synthesis a scientific account of Concrescence with a metaphysical explanation thereof in terms of Creativity.

I seek here to play the part of a commentator who approaches this cosmology through the avenue of comparative psychology.

I

One who comments on the thesis of a colleague may be permitted to state at the outset the chief tenets of his own philosophical creed.

In the ABC of my philosophy I place under the heading A all Agency or Activity, creative or directive; under B all physical events to be discussed in terms of their Behaviour; and under C all mental occurrences of which Consciousness in us is the most salient example.

These three are inseparable, though each may be distinguished from the others, and may be discussed in abstraction from the others. In this sense each forms a 'closed system.' But only in abstraction from the others. The aim of the philosopher is to rise above such abstraction and to see all physical events, all mental occurrences, and all forms of agency as one whole within which all instances of A, B, and C shall be included.

None the less, we do well to use abstractions as the steps by which to rise above them that we may see all things wholly, so long as we bear in mind that a 'closed-system' method of inquiry is only a means to the philosophical end we have in view.

Now, as a matter of history, those men of science whose inquiries lie within the closed system of physics have in practice been led—or many of them have been led—to exclude agency from their special field of work as physicists. And taking for granted the mental processes of the observer and the thinker in perceiving and in reasoning, they have handed 'mind' over to the psychologist for discussion within his closed system of inquiry.

But those who are at work within that closed system fall into two schools. The members of one school lay emphasis on the agency of mind. The members of the other school regard all explanation in terms of such agency as beyond the scope of the science of psychology.

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As a policy of method I choose the latter course. In other words, modern comparative psychology as such has, for me, no more concern with agency than has modern physics.

On this understanding there are, broadly speaking, two main provinces of natural science—physics and psychology. These I label B and C respectively. In biology they are so intimately co-related that, given such-and-such physical events in one closed system, concomitant mental occurrences in the other can (even now) in large measure be inferred. None the less, they may be distinguished. But biologists fall into two schools. The members of one school invoke agency, that of Life or Mind, to account for all the physiological processes they observe. Members of the other school are content to record their observations and to formulate generalizations in terms of which these observations may be interpreted. As a policy of scientific method I subscribe to the tenets of the latter school; and I distinguish a physical and physiological body-story under B from a psychological mind-story under C.

Each story deals with 'concrescence,' which, as I read it, is advance through new products to further novelty—physical products in this

story, mental products in that.

But here, as commentator on Mr. Whitehead's text, I am faced by a difficulty. I elect to use different words in the universe of discourse of this story and of that—to reserve, for example, the words 'experience' and 'feeling' for primary use only in a psychological context. Mr. Whitehead elects to use these words in a much wider sense so as to do duty in both contexts. He speaks, for example, of a 'percipient event' in the body. I reserve the word 'percipient' for use in mind-story only. In the body there is, I should say, a recipient event consequent on the stimulation of specialized 'receptors.' For me all recipience is physical; all percipience is mental. The so-called 'avenues' of sense are paths of recipience to be interpreted physically and physiologically. I should not speak, with Locke, of ideas 'conveyed in' by 'the senses.'

In distinguishing 'creativity' under A from 'concrescence' under B or C, I am fully prepared to follow Mr. Whitehead. And yet we both seek to include them in one philosophical synthesis which shall do justice alike to natural science and to the metaphysics of agency. But here, too, there are verbal difficulties which centre in the word 'cause.' Mr. Whitehead proclaims from the house-top of his system that we can give no metaphysical explanation of any new step onwards in concrescent advance, or any subsequent recurrence of like events, unless we fully reinstate causality, both efficient and final, in its rightful position of metaphysical pre-eminence. Under the ban of science they have been ousted from what purports to be a comprehensive cosmology—as he thinks with disastrous results.

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

None the less, I, for one, should still exclude causality, final or efficient, from the council-chambers of natural science. I should speak of the so-called 'laws of causation' in science as 'laws of relatedness,' on the understanding that both physical and mental relatedness are included on like terms. If relatedness suffices for the scientific interpretation of all concrescence under the headings B and C, may we not reserve the word 'cause' for use only in that metaphysical universe of discourse in which agency plays the title-rôle?

II

Near the outset of Process and Reality Mr. Whitehead lays much stress on 'dipolar prehension.' In any instance of prehension, he says, there are three factors: (a) the subject which is prehending; (b) the datum prehended; and (c) the 'subjective form' which is how that subject prehends that datum.

He then introduces the word 'superject.' The datum, he says, is superjective at one pole and implies the subject at the other pole. Hence the word 'subject' may always be construed as 'subject-

superject.'

Thus far the psychologist, as man of science, may find little difficulty, at any rate on first inspection. He may suppose that 'dipolarity' merely re-names the distinction he is wont to draw between subject and object. But he must probe deeper.

In Mr. Whitehead's usage the word 'object' has metaphysical import. It is that which is 'ingressive' into an 'actual entity or occasion.' It is 'eternal' in 'potentiality,' whereas the actual occasion is passing and perishing. We have therefore to distinguish two kinds of dipolar prehension: 'physical prehension' between actual entities, and 'conceptual prehension' of eternal objects.

Such use of the words 'physical' and 'conceptual' gives pause to the psychologist. He commonly reserves the latter for use only at the reflective level of concrescence in human thought. Not so in Mr. Whitehead's usage. It is applicable at all levels of 'experience,' including those which lie far below the level of that which he speaks of as 'conscious.' It is applicable comprehensively to the interpretation of 'experience' of the week-old infant; of the embryo in the womb; of each molecule therein or elsewhere. Conceptual prehension is universal in its range. It is in this metaphysical or ultimate sense that 'subject-superject' comes into the philosophical picture. It is in this creative sense, as I understand, that 'subjective form' should be construed.

In Mr. Whitehead's philosophy the eternal objects which are ingressive into actual occasions of concrescence subserve subjective creativity in the category of the ultimate. Creativity is the 'principle

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of novelty,' the producer of all that is new in concrescent advance. In the fluent world of actual occasions concrescence is, he says, inherent in the constitution of each particular entity. But apart from creativity, each actual entity momentarily perishes as such. Under repetition, however, it is succeeded by another on some line of advance. Hence there is 'transition' in fluency. Concrescence proceeds toward the final cause which is the 'subjective aim'; transition is the vehicle of the efficient cause which is the 'immortal past.'

It seems, then, that subjective aim is always central. And when we pass to further detail, such words as 'appetition,' 'end,' 'ideal,' 'satisfaction,' and 'purpose' are introduced to fill in the 'conceptual' picture.

So closely interwoven is the texture of Mr. Whitehead's thought that it is not easy to summarize his thesis without omitting relevant qualifications. Let me try to do so in brief.

Take some concrescent process. Metaphysically underlying this process from outset to outcome there is subjective aim in ultimate creativity; and that which is aimed at is the superjective end, with subjective satisfaction in its attainment. Any such process is in accord with the whole order of nature, which, as such, is differentiated from mere 'givenness' by the introduction of 'adaptation' for the attainment of some end. When this end is reached there is fulfilment of the primordial appetition which is the basis of all order. We have here the 'dominant ideal' that creatively inspires the given process of concrescence. The full ideal, however, is only partially attained owing to the inclusion of some measure of disorder, with like measure of dissatisfaction. Notwithstanding this occasional missing of the mark, the subjective aim at satisfaction constitutes the final cause or 'lure' whereby there is determinate concrescence; and the satisfaction attained is an element in the content of creative purpose.

All this holds good for any process of concrescence in molecule no less than in man. Underlying every actual *Process*, as fluent, is creative *Reality*, as eternal.

III

Permit me now to supplement the ABC of my philosophy by adding some account of the 'r, 2, 3' of my psychology under C, namely, that branch of natural science which deals genetically and comparatively with the mentality of concrescent organisms.

On these terms, apart from such mentality as we may impute or attribute to others than ourselves, one turns to first-hand experience as it is disclosed in and to oneself. I find in myself three salient 'levels' of mentality which I can analytically distinguish—sentient;

284

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

perceptive; and reflective. These I label 1, 2, and 3. Let me take them in analytic order downwards.

3. At the reflective, or self-conscious, level I find generalized 'ideas' with correlative 'feelings.' I here use the word 'ideas' in the wide Lockian sense. Reflective ideas are those to which there is reference on my part when I am thinking—I include under the word 'feeling' my enjoyment or awareness in so thinking.

Chief among the reflective ideas that I find are those which have reference to a self—myself or another—and to a space-time frame of events. In typical reflection in daily life there is reference of self

to some 'place' in this frame of reference.

2. At the perceptive, or conscious, level of my mentality I can analytically distinguish much that is going on all day long in which there is no reflective reference to self and no space-time scheme of events to which past or future occasions are reflectively referred. There is only that which occurs within the current now-occasion of the passing moment of action. But I find on any 'now-occasion' what I speak of as 'fore-experience' of that which I reflectively interpret as 'just-coming'—fore-taste, for example, as I raise a cup of coffee to my lips. This, no doubt, I reflectively interpret as a mental bequest of what has come on previous occasions of like nature. But I have not perceptively in mind, there and then, either retrospective reference to some past occasion, or prospective reference to some future occasion, in a space-time scheme. Fore-experience as such is adjunct to some this occasion.

I. At the sentient, or subconscious, level I find no such fore-experience. There is only the mental accompaniment of those fundamental processes, physical and physiological, which afford the bare data of 'experience.' There is just a colour, a touch, a smell, a twinge, a sentient somewhat, and so on; perhaps only feeling 'fit' or 'all-overish'; abstracted from the 'meaning' each conveys.

Under 1, 2, and 3 the emphasis here falls on temporal relations. And since we live forwards (though reflectively we may think backwards with reference to past occasions), the main stress in interpreting the psychological '1, 2, 3' is in forward regard. Hence one may say: In reflection there is prospective reference to some future occasion; in perception, fore-experience on some this-occasion; in sentience, as such, no time-reference—only some perishing 'now.'

In my first-hand experience I find mental occurrences at all three levels, normally going on concurrently, hand-in-hand. In their fluent

relatedness they constitute my adult mentality.

I pass now to imputation. By this I mean the attribution of mentality at some level, or levels, to someone other than myself. I include under 'someone' an infant, an amœba, and (speculatively no doubt) perchance a molecule.

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In reflective scrutiny I discern no such evidence as leads me to impute mentality at all three levels even to all living organisms. To the fœtus during the months before birth I impute sentience only. To the infant from birth to about two and a half years I impute perception also. Not till then, and thence onwards in increasing measure, do I impute reflective mentality. In terms of mentality I classify animals as (I) sentient only, (2) perceptive also, and (3) incipiently reflective (some apes).

Here let me pause. I speak analytically of 'levels' of mentality in some given organism. In myself only have I such first-hand experience as can be submitted by me to first-hand analysis. It is 'distinguishing' analysis, not 'separating' analysis, where that which is submitted to such drastic treatment is thereby destroyed. It is analogous to that which Sir Wm. Bragg applies to a crystal that he may disclose the rôles which molecules and atoms play in that crystal as an intact whole, where events are going on simultaneously at different 'levels.'

Genetically I speak of 'stages' of mentality.

A canon of genetic interpretation which I have been led to accept is this: Since in concrescent order stage 3 follows 2, and this follows 1, it is not in accordance with sound scientific method to render an account of what happens at a lower stage of advance in terms appropriate to the interpretation of events at a higher level which has not yet been reached.

In the genetic order of concrescent advance reflection is more than perception; perception more than sentience. Here the 'more than' discloses concrescent novelty. But the reflective person is also perceptive; and, as perceptive, he is also sentient. The 'more than' involves the 'also.' Sentience, however, does not imply perception; nor does perception imply reflection. There is a natural order of mental concrescence in the advance of evolutionary process and in that of individual development.

IV

Having indicated my psychological outlook, I now come back into touch with Mr. Whitehead—into intimate touch with subjective aim and satisfaction in psychological regard.

From this point of view each includes a mode of awareness in enjoyment—awareness in aiming in one case, awareness in feeling satisfied in the other case. But subjective aim implies reference to an end in view, now aimed at but not yet attained; satisfaction implies reference to a precedent end in view, then aimed at and now attained.

On these terms, however, the whole procedure is typically reflec-286

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

tive on the part of some person. There are two phases in the procedure: a precedent phase when he is looking forward with prospective reference and aiming with appetition; a subsequent phase when he is looking backward with retrospective reference and feeling satisfied in the attainment of the precedent end.

To a merely sentient creature I impute no such subjective aim on his part, and therefore no correlative satisfaction. When a flash makes me blink, what happens may be interpreted if we allow little, if anything, more than belongs to the sentient level of mentality. There is, so far as I can introspectively discover, no subjective aim on my part. Blinking 'with the eyelids' has, no doubt, as its sentient accompaniment, awareness in so behaving. But I should not speak of this as 'satisfaction' if there be no retrospective reference to a precedent end in view which was then prospectively aimed at and is now attained.

This takes us down to a level of mentality at which, as I believe, no subjective aim has taken form in the process of concrescence. But, just now, we are concerned with that later stage of genetic advance at which subjective aim has taken form, perhaps as a dominant ideal.

Thus far one rests content with regarding subjective aim and consequent satisfaction as late incidents in the course of mental concrescence. Until the reflective stage of mentality is reached they are not yet in evidence. Thus far, however, they are left unexplained. To account for them—and not merely to render a generalized account of them-we must introduce the metaphysics of that creative agency to which their origin is due. Mr. Whitehead does so under the covering notion of 'objectification.' Here we have not only actual relatedness but potential causality of which the relational world disclosed by science is the expression. In the actual world, objectification constitutes the efficient cause through which any new stage of concrescence arises. But the subjective aim, as 'conceptual,' constitutes the final cause whereby there is determinate concrescence at any stage of advance. And the satisfaction that results remains as an element in the content of creative purpose. Philosophically to explain concrescence, an 'urge' onwards and a 'lure' forwards are metaphysically demanded.

Even so, I submit that, in an abstractedly scientific interpretation of concrescence, neither urge nor lure should be invoked. Under that policy of method which I accept, cause, efficient or final, is relegated to the metaphysics of agency. Concrescence is interpreted in terms of relatedness. In this interpretation we are concerned only with "the relations of states of things in the actual world"—as Mr. Whitehead puts it.

In the course of mental concrescence one is led up to 'teleological

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relatedness,' which may be psychologically characterized as that mode of reflective relatedness which comprises prospective reference to an end in view. As psychologist, I entertain no doubt that such teleological relatedness there is—a very late outcome of concrescent process when the stage of reflection has been reached. As psychologist, I entertain no doubt that there is, on the part of each human person, subjective aim, end in view, dominant ideal, and eventual satisfaction (if all goes well). As psychologist, however, I am content to render such scientific account as I can of those modes of relatedness which I find within this process of reflective concrescence, and of that state of affairs which is its outcome. As psychologist, I deal professedly and explicitly with C3 in my schema. I abstract from B and from A, save in so far as that which they severally comprise is 'represented' or 'symbolized' 'by way of idea'—to adopt Berkeley's phrase.

But Mr. Whitehead bids us rise above such abstract treatment and embrace A, B, and C within one comprehensive synthesis. As complementary to concrescence he lays stress on creativity, with ingression of eternal objects, and with conceptual prehension by the potentially creative subject, to explain or account for the fluent actuality that we find.

When I seek to follow his lead and to work things out on his lines, I am somewhat 'embrangled in difficulties.' For psychology, teleological relatedness is a very late outcome of a long process of actual concrescence. It is discussed, let us say, in terms of subjective aim and satisfaction, with prospective and retrospective reference, within a space-time frame.

We then pass from psychology to metaphysics. We introduce or reinstate the category of creativity. And here also what we are said to find is, again, subjective aim and satisfaction. That which comes last in temporal process, on one highly specialized line of concrescent advance, is given metaphysical priority with eternal being as potential in the content of creative purpose. In brief, we are invited to identify teleological relatedness as concrescent with final causality as creative.

Now those who have been led to believe in some agency creative and directive of the course of events in the actual world, have commonly regarded such identification as legitimate. Others have harboured grave doubts, centred perhaps in the question: Is not this too anthropomorphic? A doctrine of concrescence tends to emphasize these doubts. How so?

Take concrescence in man. There has been advance through new products towards further novelty. We reach subjective aim as psychologically interpreted. But the process of concrescence will, for long ages to come, continue its advance towards further novelty.



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What this further novelty may be the future will disclose. We cannot foretell. It may be something far 'more than' subjective aim in human mentality.

If, then, we grant that in some way future novelty lies open to the all-embracing vision of that creativity which is "the producer of all that is new in concrescent advance," must not any description couched in terms of subjective aim be—as Bradley might have said—so 'infected by' psychological concrescence as to be quite inadequate as applied in the metaphysical category of the ultimate and the eternal, since it is through and through timeful with prospective reference, and since, in the actual world, it is, so far as we know, applicable only to men and some few of their congeners?

In fine: if we discuss subjective aim in terms of teleological relatedness as, with its many shortcomings, the highest as yet attained in the concrescent advance of mankind, let us remember that it may, and as many believe does, fall so far short of that which has being in the ultimate category of creativity as to call for some other name by which it should be designated. I impute without hesitation subjective aim, as psychologically defined in relational terms, to human folk when they have reached a high status of concrescent mentality. But I question whether one is justified in imputing subjective aim, as thus characterized, to that mentality which Mr. Whitehead attributes to creativity.

Nay, more. I question the advisability of using the word 'mentality' in the context of creativity. I should reserve it for use in the context of concrescence. And this, not because I deny to creativity the potentiality of producing all the novelty that we find in the course of concrescent advance, including new stages of mentality, but because I doubt whether the promise and potency of concrescent mentality necessarily implies mentality as an attribute of creativity

itself in the category of the ultimate.

In brief, and in terms of my A, B, C, I distinguish concrescent mentality in C from creative activity in A, and do not transfer that which characterizes C to A or that which characterizes A to C. I regard subjective aim as characterizing C3. And, unless it be radically re-defined, say in terms which Mr. Whitehead designates 'conceptual,' its transference to A seems to me to annul the distinction between C and A.

V

From the psychological standpoint subjective aim falls under my heading C₃. But in the metaphysics of creativity that to which Mr. Whitehead gives the same name is objectified at all stages of concrescence.

I pass now to C2 at the perceptive level of mentality. And in

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this section I try to keep within the closed system of C in abstraction

from that of B (physical) and that of A (metaphysical).

If I may use the word 'idea' in the wide Lockian sense, then, for me, all mental reference in perception is to ideas. Following Berkeley, I say that what is perceived is in mind 'by way of idea,' as distinguished from that which is in mind 'by way of attribute,' or (as I should say) by way of feeling. I use the word 'feeling' here in a restricted C-sense. Moreover, I speak of 'reference to' ideas, and of 'awareness in' feeling.

It may be said that this 'reference to' is what others name 'apprehension of.' Psychologically this is not so. That to which there is psychological reference is some idea in mind. That of which there is said to be direct apprehension—with stress on the word 'direct'—is some physical thing or event. On these terms, since that which is thus apprehended in perception is physical, one steps outside the closed system of mind; and since apprehending is mental, one steps outside the closed system of physics.

We thus reach a parting of the philosophical ways. Briefly stated in its historical setting the question long ago arose: Do perceptive ideas exactly resemble or do they only serve to represent what in either case we speak of as the 'sensible qualities' of things in the external world? Locke replied: Some are resemblant and some are not. Thus he drew, or accepted, a distinction between 'primary' and 'secondary' qualities. Then came Berkeley. This distinction, he said, is invalid; all perceptive ideas are representative only. Hume followed suit. Enter Reid. Not representative only, he says; resemblant in all those ways in which common sense assures us that they are so.

An old story this, but still a live issue. In more modern setting, and in terms of closed systems, the question is: Are our minds as perceptive so clean up against things in the external world as to justify the belief that colours, shapes, distances from us, and so forth, are directly apprehended? If so, since resemblance is merged in identity, it follows that these 'qualities' are what they are, and as they are, within B, whether they are apprehended by someone or not. This in effect takes us back to common-sense Reid. The alternative belief takes us back a step farther to Hume.

There lies the parting of the ways. It should be remembered, however, that to account for all so-called 'qualities' Mr. Whitehead postulates (under my heading A) eternal objects which are in such wise ingressive into actual entities as to give 'subjective form' to the 'conceptual prehension' of colours and shapes and distances. Herein lies the metaphysical pivot of his thesis. But just now this does not come within the psychological scope of this section.

Let me, then, revert to Thomas Reid. He relies on the assurance

290

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

of common sense. This assurance he speaks of as 'instinctive.' His commentator, Hamilton, substitutes the word 'intuitive.' Here the psychologist has something to say, since intuition for him implies

a mental process and its product.

I take as an instance of perception the naïve location of an object just there in that which we reflectively interpret as spatial relatedness to other neighbouring objects and to the body of him that perceives. Have we an intuition of visual 'thereness'? Has a month-old infant a like intuition? I suppose that most of us would reply that in some sense he has. But in what sense? Some would say: In the sense that so to perceive an object is 'originally' given in the very nature of mind. I should say: Only in a 'derivative' sense as that which is acquired in the course of individual experience.

There are, I should say, two modes of sentient 'awareness in feeling' when there is reference by way of idea to an object as 'there' for visual perception, namely, (i) awareness in retinal sensing, and (ii) awareness in behaving, as the gaze is directed towards and focussed on the object. These two sets of feelings combine when anything is perceived as 'out there.' So too in all 'active touch,' tactual feelings and motor feelings similarly combine. Furthermore, as Berkeley showed, 'active sight' and 'active touch' normally combine in richer perceptive synthesis. Hence reference to spatial position is not original (nativistic) but acquired. It arises in the course of individual experience as a new product of associative concrescence and gives perceptive 'fore-experience' of spatial thereness on each 'now-occasion' as it comes in the normal life of perception.

Of this new product of associative concrescence one may say, as Professor Höffding (interpreting James Mill) said thirty years ago: "Several ideas and feelings may enter into so intimate a union with one another as to become inseparable, while the new totality, thus formed, possesses qualities which are not possessed by any of its parts." And he adds that the new totality can 'become' what James Mill spoke of as 'a substantive principle of human nature.' Of like concrescent origin, as I believe, are all forms of common-sense intuition in the perceptive field of reference. One and all are derivative and individually acquired.

I lay stress on the perceptive field because in the reflective field, as interpreted by modern physics, we have far outrun the range of common-sense intuition. In this field every step in advance takes us farther from resemblance towards that mathematical symbolism which is the reflective form of representation. Here the plain man finds much that runs counter to the cherished 'intuitions' of common sense. Only when we come back to the platform of everyday life in naïve perception is he bidden still to accept direct apprehension as part of his philosophical creed on the sufficient evidence of common sense—to tread the path of Thomas Reid and not that of David Hume.

VI

Whether one elects to tread this path or that in the world of daily acquaintance, one is faced by questions with respect to the characterizing features of this naïve perceptive acquaintance. On these characterizing features Mr. Whitehead has a good deal to say.

In approaching them as psychological commentator, let me go back to Hume, brought up to date by those who have followed his lead. He was predominantly, but not only, concerned with what Mr. Whitehead speaks of as 'presentational immediacy,' as this is given through the traditional five senses, by which, as Locke had supposed, ideas are in some way 'conveyed in' to the mind. But Mr. Whitehead contends that this is not the whole story. There is also 'causal efficacy'. This, he says, "is not that sort of perception which has received most attention in the philosophical tradition. Philosophers," he tells us, "have disdained the information about the universe obtained through these visceral feelings and have concentrated attention on visual feelings."

Here the word 'feelings' is used in that widely extended sense which enables them to play a part in the system of physics. Thus used, Mr. Whitehead can apply to feelings the professedly physical notion of 'vector character.' I use the word 'feelings' in a psychological sense to name modes of mental awareness in experiencing. But, for Mr. Whitehead, causal efficacy goes deeper. It emphasizes 'conceptual prehension.' It must be taken in the light of 'subjective form' and 'subjective aim' in the ultimate category of creativity. There let us leave them for a while and revert to psychological treatment.

When an infant's gaze turns, soon after his birth, to a softly illuminated patch in the visual field, I impute to him awareness in so behaving 'with the eyes.' And when a flash makes me blink, I am aware in thus behaving 'with the eyelids.' This leads one to distinguish a factor in experience which we may name 'motor feeling' as concomitant with behaving. Thus we have sensory feelings in seeing with the retina, and motor feelings in behaving (accommodating and focussing) with the muscles within and around the eyeballs. These, as was shown in the foregoing section, may perceptively combine.

But when a vivid flash of lightning makes me blink, my whole body is more or less affected—heart-beat, respiration, alimentary system, glandular system, and the rest. Let us speak of all this as accompanied by 'visceral feeling,' which, at the perceptive level, shall include all feeling that is other than sensory and other than

PROFESSOR WHITEHEAD'S PHILOSOPHY

motor. It will include, for example, the sensory feeling one has when one cries 'with the lachrymal glands.' Rather loosely, but to subserve the purpose in hand, one may label all such feelings of visceral origin 'emotional.'

On these terms we can distinguish 'feelings' of three kinds: say, visual, visceral, and motor. And we may say that data are thus afforded for three modes of perception: 'presentational,' 'emotional,' and (let me say) 'behavioural.' I think Mr. Whitehead might agree that they may so combine in associative concrescence as to constitute what Professor Höffding speaks of as 'a new totality' with unforeseen novelty in individual experience.

Apart from this, let us now turn to what Mr. Whitehead says with respect to the first two. He urges that "the whole notion of prehension should be inverted. We prehend other actual entities," he says, "more primatively by direct mediation of emotional tone, and only secondarily and waveringly by direct mediation of sense."

But we have also to reckon with the third mode of prehension—that by mediation of 'causal efficacy.' Taking this in the sense of psychological 'mediacy' in motor feelings, and waiving the question which of the three should, in this context, be regarded as primary, secondary, or tertiary, I can come into line with Mr. Whitehead in so far as I, too, believe that, at the perceptive stage of mental concrescence, there is a complex datum derivative in its character as a totality from sense-feelings, visceral feelings, and motor feelings. That is what I should mean by speaking with Hume of seeing 'with the eyes,' or, more generally, of perceiving 'with the body.' It is with the whole body—with concomitant events, sensory, visceral, and motor, in that body—that we perceive in all three 'modes of mediacy.'

A question here arises, however, with respect to the meaning to be attached to the words 'with the body.' For me the meaning is that mental 'feelings and ideas' are always 'concomitant' with physical and physiological events 'in the body.' This and no more. But is this what Mr. Whitehead means when he uses these words? It is not, as I understand, all that he means. From the metaphysical standpoint of creative agency in the realm of potential reality they are used with that 'conceptual' implication which Mr. Whitehead invites us to attach to 'subject' and 'superject' in the category of the ultimate. In all prehension we have to reckon not only with some concrescent organism, as actual, but with the whole realm of potential reality therein objectified. Here the words 'with the body' are used in an instrumental sense—as concrescent means to the attainment of that conceptual end which is the subjective aim of creativity.

I revert now to that more mundane sense of the words 'with the body' in which they mean 'concomitant with events in the body.' Then it is with the whole body, comprising events, sensory, visceral,

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and motor, in that body that we, and many animals, perceive in three modes which are analytically distinguishable, though they normally combine in associative synthesis.

When, however, we pass to 'physical prehension' far below the level of perception—from the case, let us say, of my prehending 'with my body' to that of an atom's prehending 'with its body'—I must call a halt. In its body there is, I submit, no such differentiation as to lend countenance to the belief that a like differentiation of sense-feeling, visceral feeling, and motor feeling has appeared on the scene in the course of concrescent advance.

If perceptive apprehension, under my heading C2, has origin through associative concrescence, and if it implies the differentiation of sensory, visceral, and motor factors in sentience, under C1, I find grave psychological difficulties in accepting a doctrine of 'physical prehension' so universal in its range as to be applicable to crystals, to molecules, to atoms, to electrons—in a word, to all 'sub-living' organisms—in which no differentiation of like factors obtains. Even in the amœba such differentiation seems to be only hazily incipient.

VII

In *Process and Reality* Mr. Whitehead essays the difficult task of combining in one philosophical synthesis concrescent novelty, as actual and temporal, with causal creativity, as potential and eternal. He has in many ways thrown new light from fresh points of view on an old problem. For this all serious thinkers are deeply indebted to him; and among them those whose province it is to deal in psychological terms with the mentality of organisms.

To some few living organisms—the very few that have reached the reflective level of mentality—they impute subjective aim (as they characterize it) with prospective reference, and in due course some measure of reflective satisfaction if the outcome accords with the precedent aim. Any psychological interpretation of such procedure demands full recognition of time-reference. If the time-factor be eliminated, one can make no headway in such interpretation.

But when we turn to metaphysical explanation sub quadam specie aternitatis, are we not bidden wholly to eliminate this time-factor? Can we then discuss potential creativity in the same terminology as that which we employ in interpreting actual concrescence at successive stages of human mentality, infantile and adult? It may be that the conditions of the problem are such as to render any psychological interpretation of causal creativity impossible. If that be so, why not say frankly: The terminology here used in discussing the metaphysical problem must be completely divested of all its merely psychological meaning?

COSMIC PURPOSE

Professor J. W. HARVEY

The phrase "Cosmic Purpose" and others akin to it are familiar enough, particularly in the literature of edification. It is the aim of this article to examine the idea the words convey rather more closely than we do in our common use of them; to deflate the expression, so to speak, of those gaseous suggestions of "uplift" which too often hang about it. The question involved is, of course, in what sense, if in any, purpose may be attributed to the Cosmos, to the universe in its totality. And we have to ask, in case the term so used should turn out to be really misused, Is it a sheer error that dissolves away under criticism, or is there some valid core of meaning which may be restated in other terms? If these are well-worn questions, yet the problem is too fundamental for them ever to be altogether trite.

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It may be best to begin, in Aristotelian fashion, with a summary of certain typical opinions on the matter, those of intelligent but not specially "philosophical" persons. Four such typical standpoints may be considered. They differ markedly from one another, but all have certain points in common, and these I note first.

Every common-sense view about purpose and its place in reality takes for granted, I think, the reality of temporal process. If "purpose" is denied to the Cosmos, it is not because the realization of purposes "takes time." Suggestions that time is "unreal" belong to a phase of thought more metaphysical (or more sophisticated)

than that which I am at the moment considering.

Again, I do not think that there would be, at this level, any dispute as to the meaning of "purpose." For a process or a course of events to manifest purpose it would be admitted that there must be a Mind or Spirit capable of looking before and after, and shaping the course of events in order to bring about a future result. An envisaged "ideal" "not-yet" must both have determined and given value to the experienced actual "now," if "purpose" as common sense understands the term is to be admitted. "Blind" purpose, such as instinctive behaviour has been held to exhibit (though this is never wholly "blind"), and such as has been detected by some thinkers in plant life, is, from the standpoint from which I am starting, purpose in a very Pickwickian sense indeed; and with this I am not at present concerned.

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Our diverse typical views agree, then, in taking time as real and in the meaning they assign to the notion of purpose. Otherwise they differ. I will call them the views of Smith, Brown, Jones, and Robinson. Smith's position is that of unreflective Christian orthodoxy. "Cosmic" purpose means the supreme overruling purpose of God or "providence," to which all the happenings in nature conform. Its relation to the finite and fragmentary purposes of men is not probably thought out very clearly; but Smith does not doubt that it is a harmonious relation. The best human purposes adumbrate or indicate, however imperfectly, the general nature of the divine purpose. We can at any rate be confident of the direction, though we cannot define the goal. The realization of a completely harmonious social or ultra-social order would probably be the nearest Smith could come to specifying the nature of this end or goal; but he prefers to put it in religious terms as "the realization of the Kingdom of God." He is perhaps content to accept the language of poetry and speak of "a far-off divine event to which the whole creation moves." What he is mainly concerned to maintain is that this divine purpose which the "whole creation" is engaged in realizing is not indifferent to, but corroborative of, man's highest and most earnest endeavours and aspirations. The world is not only through and through teleological, but the "telos" is one which man can in some measure already make his own, and which had he better understanding he could acknowledge to be the end and aim of his truest being.

Brown is a man of a more agnostic temper. He does not deny that the universe may be fundamentally teleological, or even that the "cosmic" purpose may be called in a sense "divine." But if so, it is the purpose of a deus ignotus, a deus absconditus, and we can in nowise equate or even compare it with any purpose of man. Brown feels, in fact, drawn to emphasize the incommensurableness. of cosmic and human teleology. Ends may be—are being—furthered by the universe, but they are not our ends, to which the cosmic process is supremely indifferent, though not, of course (as a sort of inverted anthropomorphism would have it), actively hostile. If he speaks in religious phrase, it will be in the words of the Psalmist: "For my ways are not as your ways, neither are my thoughts your thoughts, saith the Lord." If he adopts the language of the poet, he will say, with Sir William Watson (in that fine agnostic utterance The Unknown God): "Though kneeling nations watch and yearn, does the primordial purpose turn?"

A stage farther in the same movement away from the position oft Smith is represented by Jones. Jones likes to think of himself asy a man of emancipated mind who has outgrown the naïve and unscientific ascription of "purpose" to the universe at large. The

296

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Universe to him is Nature, and Nature is mechanism. Determinism must therefore replace teleology. Man, it is true, has his purposes: Nature provides the firm and assured material basis upon which he may work and with which he may implement them. But there is no extra-human or super-human purpose anywhere, and to use language to that effect is to fall into sentimentalism and self-deception, if not into sheer obscurantism.

The fourth typical view, that of Robinson, is at once a refusal to attribute purpose to the Cosmos and a repudiation of the mechanistic or any other "scientific" scheme which is for Jones the obvious alternative interpretation. The Cosmos as an ordered system disappears. The universe (if even that term may be kept, for Robinson inclines to a defiant pluralism) in its ultimate nature is an overwhelming mystery, parent alike of cruelty, disaster, frustration, and of beauty, joy, and thrilling fruition. If he may toy with the poet's dream that the "dreaming, dark, dumb thing" may become eventually a conscious will, it is for him but a dream. But for Robinson, if there is one thing more childish than the assumption that the inscrutable mystery that is Reality is a benign providence, it is the arrogant claim of "science" that its nature is to be adequately comprehended and formulated in terms of law, order, fixed and regular system.

These four representative opinions, though not by any means equally widely held or equally influential, are all, I think, typical contemporary points of view. For the first and second there is a Cosmic purpose: it means "God's purpose," which is held to be in the former case providential to man, while the latter denies our right to assume that it has any relevance to human concerns. For the third and fourth there is no "cosmic purpose," mechanism being its substitute in the one case and mystery in the other.

II

Consideration of the attitudes I have tried to present above may begin by a dismissal of the fourth, ascribed to my imaginary Robinson. Robinson is a mystic, though a literary and poetical rather than a religious mystic, and his attitude is not really based on rational considerations at all; his conviction upon this matter is part of a thoroughgoing epistemological scepticism as to the power of thought to interpret the nature of reality. He will hardly, therefore, deign to argue upon the question, and we may spare ourselves the trouble of considering his position further. This is not to say that his position is not in some ways the most interesting and challenging of the four; but as the most sceptical of them it would demand separate and lengthy treatment.

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Turning to the position of mechanistic determinism, we are dealing with a belief that is put forward and defended on rational grounds. Mechanism excludes teleology: if future events are determined causally by past and present events, and are in principle exactly ascertainable, they cannot (it is maintained) be determined

purposefully.

But the prestige of mechanistic determinism has suffered something of an eclipse to-day even among the Scientists, and its claim need not be dealt with at length. In the first place, if "mechanism" is taken in its strictest sense of explanation in terms of mechanics, Mr. Jones, the mechanist, has to be told that he is trying to "have it both ways." The attractiveness of "mechanism" as a key-conception is due to our familiarity with machines, and a machine embodies a "purpose" in the double sense of being the product of an inventive, contriving mind and being itself productive of intended results. In claiming, therefore, to disavow a universal purposiveness as anthropomorphic illusion, and to affirm Nature as a fixed predetermined order, the popular "mechanist" is all the time exploiting a phraseology which carries with it like a sort of penumbra the suggestion-none the less comforting for being kept vague and unanalysed—that this order may, after all, be assumed to mean something, to be "getting" somewhere, to have point and drive and effective purport.

This criticism that a "mechanism" is, literally, a device, and that a device implies an end, is a familiar one enough, but it will be probably dismissed by the mechanists as a verbal quibble. Still, when we have widened the word to the utmost and freed it from the clinging suggestion of "a machine," there is still to be considered the objection that to claim that mechanism excludes teleology is to claim that a "how" can exclude a "why." No regularity in a determinate causal nexus is incompatible with purpose. Explanation—to adopt a familiar contrast—may be mechanical-causal and interpretation teleological. The determinist world of physics may be not only "in order" but "in order to"—an end. The teleological view of Nature is at war not with any conception of order, however rigid, but rather with the conception of the universe as a mere chaos.

This plea that mechanism and teleology are not in any way at variance has often been made. But it leaves our scientific mechanist cold, and it is easy to see why. It is a cogent plea on condition that both categories are applied not to the totality of all that is, but to a part only; on condition, that is, that "nature" is not the total reality. This granted, we can posit a Purposer making use for ends of his own of a "natural order" which may be as rigid and mechanistic as we please. But once this transcendent Real, the wielder or bearer of the purpose, is denied or left out of account, the opposition

between determinist causation and teleology does become a real and irresolvable one. Thus Descartes and Newton have no difficulty in affecting the reconciliation; whereas to Kant the problem is more complex because he cannot allow himself to bring super-nature—his ethically based theism—fairly and squarely into his interpretation of "Nature." And the modern materialist for whom there is no reality at all beyond "Nature" finds himself unshaken in the belief that no reconciliation between the two points of view is possible.

If there is a "Super-nature," then "Nature"—the world of the scientist-may be at once mechanically and teleologically determined. If there is none, it cannot be both. Can this conclusion be avoided by reinterpreting the conception of "purpose" so as to make it wholly "immanent"? If so, we might identify "Nature" with "all that is" and yet hold that natural processes, and even Nature as whole, have a purposive aspect. But what will this mean? It must mean that we recognize in the present not only the "promise" or prospect of a more valuable future, but a "nisus" towards and for it. We are almost bound to use metaphorical language, to speak with Leibniz or Professor Alexander of the present "big with" or pregnant with the future or with some yet unrealized supreme "quality," or to speak with Shakespeare of "the prophetic soul of the wide world dreaming on things to come." Thus the conception of "immanent teleology" applied to the Cosmos as a whole either is a mere comforting "als ob" which cannot be taken too much in earnest, or it takes us right out of the world-view of mechanistic determinism.

It is in fact the growing recognition of the inadequacy of mechanistic determinism as a scheme of explanation which makes it necessary for the disbeliever in "cosmic purpose" to dig deeper and base his objection upon more fundamental grounds.

III

The more thoroughgoing criticism of the notion of a cosmic purpose, a universal teleology, may begin by considering what is really maintained by those who affirm it. Both the typical views on this side (those of "Smith" and "Brown") contrast, though in different degrees, "cosmic" and human purpose, which would seem to indicate that they do not strictly attribute purpose to the "totality of all that is." And this follows also from the fact that both views—though again with different degrees of explicitness—regard "Nature" as not the source of the cosmic purpose or its bearer, so much as the sphere of its manifestation. The phrase expresses, in effect, the universally pervasive and controlling operation of a supreme power and will "at the back of" reality, which for the more theistic of the two points of view becomes the "creator"

Digitized by Arya Samaj Foundation Chennai and eGangotri $P\ H\ I\ L\ O\ S\ O\ P\ H\ Y$

of nature the "creation." But leaving this latter conception out of account, the phrase "cosmic purpose" will be a phrase like "the policy of Russia." The Russian state as a whole corresponds to the absolute total Reality. Within it is a directing power, making and carrying out the "policy" in and through the citizens of the state and their institutions. The illustration used by Aristotle (Metaphysics, xii, 1075a) might be adapted to the present discussion.

Is the "good" in the world, he asks in effect, like the leader in an army, a distinguishable reality within it, or is it more comparable with the spirit of loyal co-operation that animates the army through all its ranks? (Aristotle says "the order of the parts," but the above is a permissible extension of his meaning.) Aristotle suggests that it is both: we may recognize a "good" as the unifying principle pervading the world, yet as specially embodied in the power directing and controlling it. Just so, theist and semi-theist may find the will of the "power behind" manifested through and for the whole natural order, and so employ the rather vague term "cosmic purpose."

Taken in this way the phrase points towards theism, and definitely away from pantheism or any form of monism. The army co-operates to carry out the general's strategy, and in identifying itself loyally with it may be said to make that strategy its own. But it does not literally make or devise the strategy. As Aristotle puts it, "the leader does not depend on the 'order' of the army, but vice versa." In the same way Smith will speak of man being a "fellow-worker with God," and Brown will speak of "accepting the inscrutable decrees of heaven"; yet neither will claim that man can modify in any way or contribute anything to the supreme purpose or plan which it is his business to acknowledge and realize. And probably both would agree that to accept a view like that of the late Dr. McTaggart, for whom the universe was in the last resort a society of immortal individuals undirected by any single supreme overruling will, would be to deprive the term cosmic purpose of all real meaning.

But here we are confronted by the real difficulty in the conception, rendered familiar by the criticism in particular of Rationalists and Idealists of different schools.

The realization of a purpose implies usually two things which seem to make it impossible to attribute purpose either literally to the totality of all that is or in the more theistic interpretation just considered to the "Father and Fashioner of all that is." These two things are, first, an environment, spiritual or material, to serve at once as the arena, the means, and the inspiration of achievement; and, second, an imperfection in the purposer, the contrast between the incomplete actual present and the envisaged ideal. And the difficulty of finding a meaning for these when we pass from human

to divine purposings is well illustrated in one of the most famous of all attempts at a cosmic teleology, that of Plato's Timæus. There the $i\pi o\delta o\chi \acute{\eta}$ or matrix supplies the arena and the material, the $\epsilon i \delta \eta$ or Forms contemplated by "God" the inspiration or pattern for the carrying out of the Creator's divine purpose, while his need to impart his perfection is Plato's way of admitting that even the divine nature has not really completeness and self-sufficiency. The attempt was a heroic one, but the advowedly seminythic character of the account suggests that Plato is trying to fuse together in the fervour of his creative vision elements that are really incompatible.

To be engaged in working out a purpose is to be so far limited and defective; "finite" in the modern sense, "infinite" (i.e. incomplete, without wholeness) in the Greek sense of the term. Can the whole of reality be thought of so? Or even that which is the supreme reality?

More modern philosophic critics of cosmic teleology reinforce this objection by attempting to show that the temporal process is "unreal" in the sense of not being ultimate, that the "last word" about the world is not that it is "passage." This is, as already hinted, to cast doubt upon what unreflective common sense assumes without question to be real. But the doubt once cast is disquietingly clinging and oddly infectious. Even so whole-hearted a believer in time, change, process, and the dramatic and purposive character of reality as William James is found admitting "the solid meaning of life is always the same eternal thing. . . . In this solid and tridimensional sense, so to call it, those philosophers are right who contend that the world is a standing thing, with no real progress, no real history. The changing conditions of history touch only the surface of the show."

This claim that the Cosmos must be whole and entire, and ultimately supra-temporal, and therefore that the conception of purpose cannot be applied to it as a whole, leaves us with the question: What, then, are we to do with this teleological category? For it seems to clamour for employment, it demands obstinately to be applied—even to the universe in its entirety. The critics of teleology have to tell us what attitude we must take up about it. And they are quite ready to do so. Two of the most famous solutions to the problem may be briefly considered.

IV

First, there is the endeavour of Spinoza, heroic in its austerity, to think away the whole teleological category as a human illusion.

Talks to Teachers, pp. 299 ff.; quoted by Bosanquet, The Meeting of Extremes in Contemporary Philosophy, p. 191.

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In the famous Appendix to Part I of the *Ethics* he seeks to show that it is possible simply to lay aside our attribute of "final causes" to Nature or God, and therewith to discard all the human "standards" and "values" which are the badge of our servitude. If we think clearly, we are to recognize that there is no place for all these in a world of absolute systematic determination. They are a pathetic fallacy, and teleology dissolves when we see things clearly and distinctly as they are.

But this heroic renunciation cannot really be made. It is not merely that even an illusion remains an obstinate fact, though this familiar platitude is strangely often disregarded. Nothing is unmade by a name. The most "illusory" experience remains obstinately knocking at the door of our minds, a guest who, however unwelcome, cannot finally be excluded. Spinoza, it is true, was very conscious of the pertinacity of the illusory "values" of "imagination." But Spinoza, as has been noted, virtually gives back what he has bid us abandon by reinstating values and a goal for human effort under the name of "perfection"; and with this returns willy-nilly the idea of final causes and teleology. "Fines" expellas furca, tamen usque recurrent. It is not indeed possible consistently to think away our valuations. It may appear to be so because it is easy to confuse two very different things—the substitution of new values for old and the abandonment of the category of value altogether. We may, for instance, with Nietzsche, welcome a "transvaluation of moral values," but to rethink our verdicts is not to unthink the judgment of value itself.

The other answer to the question what is to be done with teleology is that of Hegelian, or perhaps rather Neo-Hegelian, Absolutism. Instead of contemptuous dismissal, the claim of purpose receives a qualified and rather grudging welcome. It has a right to admittance, but it must not be allowed to presume or to suppose that it can be anything more than a subordinate member of the household. In other words, the teleological point of view has its place in reality, but must not be applied to reality as a whole. Teleology refers to finite conscious experients. Reality is a Totality, i.e. a complete Individuality, and the sort of unity displayed in the realization of a plan, in choosing means for ends, doing this for the sake of that, can never be more than a "sub-form" of individuality (i.e. it is only a quasi-individual form of unity?). Its application to the Universe "is got at primarily by freeing the idea of end from some incidents of finite purpose which cannot apply to the true whole."3 Purpose is bound up with Time, and

^{*} E.g., by Professor Laird in his Study in Value.

³ B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value.

³ Bosanquet.

Time with indefinite and therefore ever incomplete process, and purpose, therefore, must share the subordination that on this type of theory befalls Time. Temporality is real, but Reality is not temporal. The time-scheme, one might perhaps say, is true "for all intents and purposes"; the purpose-scheme is true for all time. But this is not to deny that both are inadequate characterizations of the Absolute Real.

The Absolutist position, particularly as developed so eloquently by its modern English exponents, offers indeed a formidable criticism of the attempt to apply the conception of purpose in its stricter sense to reality as a whole. But an uneasy doubt remains, whether it has done quite full justice to the teleological point of view. It is to repeat a familiar criticism to suggest that Absolutism tends to present us with a "Totality" which, in absorbing finite "individuality" and taking over its name, has come to sacrifice something of its meaning. It is possible perhaps to detect in the belief in a "cosmic purpose" a fumbling protest on behalf of the unique import of the particular and against a too smooth and even incorporation of all the subordinate reals into a single all-comprehensive Reality.

V

We suggest, then, that the attribution of purpose even to the whole of reality does figure in groping fashion a true meaning which it fails literally to express.

What this is may perhaps be made clearer by a reference to instances in which the notion of purpose is misapplied even within the sphere of ordinary human concerns. Examples may be found in the everyday business of life as well as in the field of moral and æsthetic judgments. As to the latter, it is sufficient to note that, leaving out of account all disputed questions of ethical theory, the point of view of purpose, in so far as it implies "means and end," cannot possibly always do justice to the facts of voluntary action. We often act "on purpose" where we could not say we act "for a purpose." It introduces a false abstraction and separation of elements, by which the act and its result are set in a misleading contrast. Again, in a work of art, it is becoming a commonplace that to ask the purpose of the picture or the tragedy is to reveal mere crass ignorance of what a work of art is. The "purpose" of King Lear, or of Shakespeare in writing King Lear, was-King Lear. If there was any ulterior purpose in Shakespeare's mind, then "the less Shakespeare he." The tragedy embodies its end: it is means and end together. But the chief point which a work of art, such as a drama, illustrates is this: If we take it in its temporal character, as a whole of successive parts, the acts and scenes, is there any sense in which

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we can regard these parts as standing to one another in the relation of means to end—as embodying, that is to say, the gradual realization of a purpose? We cannot, clearly, in the obvious and ordinary sense of these words; or rather, if we can, that is in so far forth a damaging criticism of the play. (One might say, for instance, of an inferior piece of work: "Act 2 has no justification save to prepare for the crisis in the third act." But in a masterpiece each scene of the play adds something to the total impression; is certainly not merely a means to some "effect" later to be produced.) And yet—and this is the special relevancy of the illustration—we can none the less say that one act "leads up to" a later situation. That is not its sole "purpose," but that is one of its aspects. And we can and must recognize that though the import and significance of the play pervade the whole, and though every part may have a value for the whole, yet there are in it moments-or a single moment-of climax, crisis, culmination, in which the significance of the whole is in a unique degree concentrated and focussed. These are the moments, the great scenes, that give the play its "point"; and in this sense it would not be very unnatural, though it would be strictly inaccurate, to speak of them as being the purpose of the other scenes and parts.

We see the same thing well illustrated in a more trivial instance, in the difference between a good story well and ill told. A man with no gift for anecdote may remember every word which comprised the "point" of the story, but in his hands it is a dull and lifeless thing just because the details which "lead up to" the point are merely the "means," and not, as in the hands of the real raconteur, themselves charged with a flavour of the "interest" which makes the story engrossing as a whole. And yet, though over-impatience to "get to the point" may spoil both the telling and the hearing of the story, there is a sense in which the "point" may be called the purpose of it.

Another illustration might be taken from the experience of travel. A man cruising for pleasure may plan out his voyage with a certain destination in mind. In a sense the journey, as far as the destination, is a "means" for arriving there, a route among other possible routes. But the most satisfactory journeys are those in which every place has also a value in itself, and not merely as a stage on the passage to the next. The destination need not be the purpose of the whole voyage, for this has value and meaning throughout. And yet the

Many a sightseeing tourist finds travel disappointing because he has not disengaged himself from the means-and-end point of view, and so does not allow himself to find *fruition* in each new experience as it comes. His purpose is in fact not even, e.g., "to get to Rome," but "to return home after having been to Rome."

destination may, by its character of culmination, by being the acme of the entire experience, assume plausibly enough the appearance of being the "end" to which the rest of the journey is a "means."

The above examples are drawn, as is to be expected, from types of experience in which the time-factor enters very intimately. But the same point is illustrated (though less obviously) by others in which temporal process plays a much less essential part. In some forms of æsthetic experience, for instance, though the appreciation of the work of art "takes time," as its creation "took time," yet time does not enter into its meaning. We may wander about a cathedral for hours gaining a richer and richer experience of it, and its architect and builders may have worked at it for decades making it a richer and richer object to experience; but, once completed, it is "all there together," and there is no reason but the defect of our faculties why we should not intuit it in a single perceptual instant. Yet in this case, as in the others, we might, incorrectly but not unnaturally, select a certain part of the building as its virtual "purpose," because, though every part of it had its own contribution to make to the whole effect, this part had a special and crowning importance to which the others were also subordinate.

In short, within the sphere of ordinary human experience the application of purposive terms may sometimes be in strictness mistaken and yet not without some justification. In so far as "means" and "ends" fall apart, and "means" become, as it were, an alien price to be paid away to secure the "end," teleology gives but an imperfect and frustrated unity, and some experiences have an aspect of wholeness to which this point of view does less than justice. But even in such cases the conception of purpose may, none the less, have relative validity in pointing to the special function in such experiences of particular dominant "moments," focussing points for the meaning of the whole, to which the subordinate elements are ancillary, and from which in turn they derive a secondary import.

And so with the affirmation of a "Cosmic Purpose." Press the conception home, and we are caught in knots which a defiant Theism may cut but can hardly disentangle. Yet to dismiss it with contumely is too drastic a renunciation, and even to damn it, as Absolutism does, with faint and mitigated praise may be to slur or blur an element of true insight contained in it. And this would seem to be the implicit affirmation that Reality in its temporal aspect (whether this can be transcended or no) means culmination rather than destination. Thus the cosmic process will be thought of not so much as the passage to an indefinitely distant goal or outcome (which is what the term "purpose" strictly used would seem to imply) as a historical-dramatic process containing dominant "moments," focal points, which contribute to the significance of the whole—in

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so far as we insist upon the wholeness of the Real—yet draw to themselves the meaning of subordinate features: crucial contexts in the march of time, climaxes, or even a single climax, in "the eternal deed that is the heart of reality."

B. Bosanquet, The Principle of Individuality and Value.

IS MORAL PROGRESS A REALITY?

PROFESSOR G. C. FIELD

Is there really such a thing as moral progress? Do we get any better as time goes on? It is a question which must often exercise the minds of those who reflect on moral questions at all. And it is a frequent topic of discussion, both in private conversations and in the written contributions of a good many of our popular philosophers. Of some of these contributions one may safely say that their chief value is as a warning against the dangers of hasty generalization on a subject such as this. And, taking advantage of such a warning, I shall make no attempt to give a final or dogmatic answer to this question. All I can try to do, within the limits of a single lecture, is to disentangle some of the most important considerations that seem to be in people's minds in discussing this question, and to estimate their importance as arguments on one side or the other.

I dare say that some of my audience will expect me to begin the discussion with a series of careful definitions, in which I should state at length exactly what I mean by "moral," by "progress," and perhaps by "reality." I am not sure that there might not be something to be said about the meaning of "is" and "a." On some subjects, and in the hand of some writers, this might be no doubt a fruitful method of approach. But I will ask to be allowed here to adopt another method, which in my own thinking I have often found more fruitful, and begin by supposing that we know what we mean by these terms, at least enough to start the discussion. And perhaps at the end of such a discussion we may find that our meaning has become somewhat clearer to ourselves than it was before. And we may be prepared then to make an attempt at the definition which we evaded at the beginning.

Are there any undoubted facts that we can start from which will be relevant to this discussion? One fact, that seems to me not to admit of doubt, is that people do make moral judgments. That fact is the starting-point of all ethical discussions. And it remains a fact if the final conclusion of our discussion is that we have no grounds for making such judgments. And a further fact is that at any particular time in any particular society there is a large number of such judgments which are generally accepted without very much question, and which most of us do no more than apply to particular actions

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and particular persons as we become acquainted with them. These are what we call the accepted moral standards of the time, or the ordinary ideas of morality current among us. Further—and here we come on something more immediately relevant to our particular problem—these accepted standards or current ideas do change from one time to another, and, at the same time, differ from one group of people to another. It is true that these differences have often been very greatly exaggerated. But that there are some differences can hardly be doubted. And I suggest that one meaning of our question is, Are these changes in the accepted standards, which influence so much of our conduct, always or sometimes changes for the better?

Here, at the outset, I can imagine that a difference of opinion might develop from some quarters. It might be urged that it did not matter so greatly what our moral standards or ideals were. The important thing is that we should live up to them. And progress must therefore be looked for in an increased fulfilment of these ideals rather than in any change in the ideals themselves. But there are grave objections to this view. It might be suggested that one result of it would be that moral progress could be attained just as well by lowering the ideals as by making a greater effort to live up to them. We could get our standards observed by simply leaving out anything that people found very difficult. And that would certainly be a queer meaning of progress. Yet I do not think that this argument is the real objection against the view. For, though such a result might be theoretically possible, it seems that in practice the much more likely result would be that, as the moral standards were lowered, the efforts to live up to them by those who found it difficult would be correspondingly weakened.

It seems to me to lie in the very meaning of moral standard or moral ideal that it implies a principle of conduct which in some way is different from other principles of conduct or other possible motives for action at work among us, and which, on occasions, may conflict with them. If the conflict is a real conflict, there will always be the possibility that for some people in some circumstances these other motives may prove stronger than the moral motive. There will always, therefore, be a certain gap between accepted moral standards and actual conduct. On the other hand, if the gap becomes too wide, if it becomes so wide that the supposed moral ideal has little or no influence on conduct, then I should say that it does not deserve to be called an accepted moral standard at all, even though unthinking people say that it is.

To illustrate what I mean, I should say that at the present time among ourselves it really is an accepted principle of conduct that lying and stealing are wrong, though there are plenty of liars and thieves. But, at the lowest, we condemn these things in other people,

we resent it if we are accused of them ourselves, and we feel ashamed if we are found out in them. Here the accepted moral standard really influences conduct, and undoubtedly prevents many lies or thefts from taking place, to which we should otherwise be tempted. On the other hand, a large number of people at the present time state, in words, that they believe in the Christian principle of morality, which, among other things, teaches that material wealth is etiher a positively bad thing or a thing of no value in itself at all, and that the pursuit of wealth is not a worthy object. But, in fact, these ideas exercise no influence at all on the vast majority of us. No one is ashamed of wanting to be rich or of doing everything in his power to become so, as long as he does not infringe certain other moral principles, like those mentioned above, which really are accepted. Nor does it ever occur to us to condemn other people for wanting to be rich. It is clear that the notion that riches are bad or worthless is not really in any sense among the accepted moral ideas of the present time, even though we sometimes say that it is.

I conclude, then, that the gap between moral principles and moral practice must always exist. And though, no doubt, it varies in extent from one age or one country to the other, the variations only occur between relatively narrow limits. Not much, therefore, in the way of moral progress can be looked for in this direction. And we return to our accepted moral standards. These, as we have seen, undoubtedly change. How are we to tell whether and when the changes are changes for the better?

I do not suppose that anyone would maintain that there is continuous progress, and that all changes are necessarily for the better. Yet some of the arguments against the reality of moral progress to be met with in popular writings seem to assume that that is the position which has to be refuted. It is very easy to pick out certain periods in certain places and show that the current moral ideas there were in some respects more like our own than the current moral ideas of some intervening period. No doubt King Hammurabi's legal code was, tried by our standards, on many points more enlightened than the English law a century or more ago. But this appeal to isolated instances is very superficial. It would apply equally to our scientific knowledge and our control of the material world. Scientific knowledge has been acquired and lost again in some dark age. And useful arts have been learnt and disappeared. Yet no one would doubt that there has been progress in scientific discovery and invention. We have to deal with more serious difficulties than that. I can only suggest a few of them here.

r. I think that the suggestion that moral progress must be sought for in the realm of accepted standards and current ideas would be distasteful to some people because it might seem to throw doubt on the reality of anything that could properly be called morality at all. Others, no doubt, would welcome it for the same reason. For it might seem to lend support to the view that the whole idea of morality was merely a set of conventions, accepted just because they were customary, changing just as fashions in dress or social behaviour change, and with no more authority than these. We must dispose of this at the outset, if we are to go on talking about moral progress at all.

If I were asked to prove that morality was not merely custom and convention, I confess that I should decline the challenge. I cannot, that is to say, offer any proof which must inevitably and absolutely convince anyone with the certainty and self-evidence of, say, the simple propositions of arithmetic. Even with these, as a matter of fact, if anyone chooses to say that he doesn't see them and doesn't believe them, we are helpless. "The single resolute doubter," to whom appeal has sometimes been made, can never really be refuted in this or any other branch of thought. At any rate, in our thinking about moral questions, all that we can do is to examine carefully such evidence as we can find and decide, each of us for himself, in which direction we think it points. And in this respect our thinking about morality is no worse off than our thinking about any other question to do with human beings. Certainly our opponents will be in just the same plight as ourselves. It sometimes seems to be supposed that, because we cannot prove with mathematical certainty that morality is not merely custom, it is thereby proved that it is. At any rate, that is about all the argument that we generally get for this point of view. But the single resolute doubter would be just as awkward a customer for those who do not believe in morality as for those who do.

With this proviso, I will summarize briefly the considerations which seem to me to give an overwhelming degree of probability to the view that morality is not merely custom or convention. In the first place, I am influenced by my own experience, which seems, as far as I can judge, to be shared by a large number of other people. I seem to myself, when I judge anything to be right or wrong, to be judging something about it entirely different from judging that it is the custom or not the custom. I may not be clear about all that is implied by calling something right or wrong. I may recognize that what particular things I believe to be right or wrong is sometimes influenced by custom. But that is an entirely different thing from recognizing that the rightness or wrongness, the quality that I ascribed to these things, merely meant customary or not customary. When I say that I have been accustomed to regard such-and-such an action as right, I do not mean that I have been accustomed to regard it as customary. So my own experience seems to tell me that

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right and customary are different things. And I want much better reasons than any I have ever seen given for doubting the testimony of my experience. At any rate, the burden of proof seems to me to lie with those who would have me doubt it. And I cannot find that

they are very well prepared to shoulder this burden.

Further, if morality is merely custom, it seems impossible to see how anyone could ever come to criticize or challenge a custom on moral grounds. Yet that this is not infrequently done, and sometimes done successfully, seems beyond dispute. Finally, though I attach less importance to this argument than the others, we may ask how the custom of thinking of some things as right and some as wrong ever arose in the first place. It is like the old tag from the eighteenth-century controversy. "Religion was merely the invention of the priests." "Then who invented priests?" This seems to be less decisive than the other arguments, because there are undoubted cases of fashions and customs arising from nowhere or from purely trivial and accidental causes. But such cases, on inspection, seem to differ in character, to be far less tenacious, and less widely spread than the custom of judging things to be right and wrong, or good and bad. So that this argument does seem to be to add to the probability created by the others, though it would be less decisive by itself.

2. There is another, but closely allied, set of difficulties in connection with this matter of the conventions of morality. There are many who, while not denying the existence of morality, would feel that, so far as it was a matter of convention, it was not really morality at all. If, therefore, the only kind of progress to be looked for is in the accepted moral standards, this is not really moral progress. That must be looked for, if anywhere, deep in our inmost nature, apart from all influence of custom or environment. And when they look for it here, they seem to despair of finding it. "The accepted ideas of morality may change from time to time," they tell us. "But we don't change. We don't get any more moral by nature. Take anyone of us and put us in a different environment and among a different set of ideas, and we shall behave according to those ideas. Human nature doesn't change. It is only the framework of custom and convention which changes." I saw not long ago a letter in a daily paper on the subject of cruelty to animals and the alleged superiority of our own country over certain other countries in this respect. And the writer concluded his argument: "So we see that our supposed humanity is merely"-note the "merely"-"a matter of training and environment, and not due to any innate moral superiority." I remember, too, a cynical Italian friend of mine speaking scornfully of the objections that some English people feel to bull-fighting, and characterizing it as "a mere veneer," on the ground that, according

to him, English people who lived in Spain often became as enthusiastic

spectators of bull-fights as the Spaniards.

It is interesting to see how the ancient distinction between the natural and the conventional reappears so continuously. It began in the fifth century before Christ, and the fallacies that it rests on were exposed by Plato and Aristotle. But it was never completely laid to rest. It reappears, for instance, in the seventeenth century with Hobbes, and again, in a different form, in the myth of the "noble savage" of the eighteenth century. We see the kind of form that it adopts to-day. To the quotations just given we may add the remarks so frequently heard during or just after the war. In war, we were often told, all our acquired conventions of behaviour fell away, and we got the real man, human nature as it really is, stripped of the trappings of civilization in its naked savagery. It was not completely true, of course, even in war. But the important question to ask is, why the qualities that came out in war should be regarded as "real" or "natural," any more than the qualities that developed in peace.

The idea that still seems at the back of the minds of people who talk like this is that all the restraints which customs and conventions involve are something imposed on us from outside, not expressions of our own "real" nature. In our heart of hearts, our "real" natural selves, we really want to be free of them and follow our impulses unchecked. Yet such an idea is extraordinarily opposed to all the available evidence. If we look at the history of the human race, as far as we can know it, we should rather conclude that the vast majority of mankind yearns for such restraints. We hug our chains. One of our strongest natural impulses is to build up a system of customs and conventions and accepted ideas to control our conduct. So the most natural man is the most completely conventional man. It requires a tremendous and continual effort to free ourselves from the control of conventions. And such an effort is rarely successful except within very narrow limits.

If we ever do succeed in getting rid of a set of conventions on a large scale, it is only to replace them by others. To anyone who knows what the war was really like, it must seem particularly laughable to represent it as an outburst of unrestrained natural impulses freed at last from artificial controls. There can have been few conditions in which so many impulses had to be so frequently restrained and so many other impulses artificially imposed. To take but one instance, we know that it was the constant occupation of those in charge of training troops to keep up the aggressive spirit of the Army. And there was a vast apparatus of training and propaganda devoted to the end of whipping up our hatred of the enemy beyond what we should have felt if left to ourselves. It is the same thing in other connections. No doubt the Spanish youth has to learn to repress

any feelings of pity for the sufferings of animals in the bull-ring that might arise in his mind. The force of public opinion and the unpopularity he would incur by expressing them would certainly be normally sufficient to drive them out of his mind. Similarly, the vendetta or family feud in countries in which it is practised is kept alive quite as much by the force of public opinion as by the "natural" impulses of those who practise it. I have been told that in one of the last trials for a vendetta murder in Corsica, in which a perfectly inoffensive man was killed in repayment of some wrong supposed to have been done by his father, the murderer pleaded that he had been driven to it by the jeers of his fellow-villagers at his first impulse to leave things alone. Again, it is obvious and familiar how much sexual laxity is due, in part at any rate, to the pressure of public opinion in circles in which it is considered the right thing. Even in the milder form of obscene conversation we know how often we simulate an enjoyment of it that we do not feel for fear of being thought prudish and easily shocked, or for fear of being told that our knowledge of modern psychology is not up to date, and that we are suffering from Victorian repressions. We are afraid even to mention the obvious truth that an exclusive attention to any one subject can become extremely boring. Altogether, it is clear that there is quite as much conventional immorality as conventional morality. And the "natural" man is still far to seek.

We shall not find him until we realize that he is not a different person from the conventional man. Convention is natural, as we have seen. Further, not only is convention in general natural, but each particular convention of any importance is natural, or has something natural about it. It seems to me extraordinarily improbable that any convention, any idea about what was or was not to be done in human conduct, could ever become widely spread or be held for more than a very short time unless it was based on some impulse or felt need innate in human beings. Without that, it could never get

accepted for long or by many people at all.

The situation as I picture it is something like this. We all have a number of different tendencies innate in us. That is the raw material out of which the actual "we's" are made. But, considered by themselves, these natural tendencies are an abstraction, hardly more than bare potentialities, the embryo of human nature. The actual way in which they work is the result of many influences that come to bear on us. These influences give a greater or lesser degree of organization to these tendencies. They strengthen some at the expense of others. Sometimes they may bring into actual working potentialities that we should never have realized to exist in ourselves otherwise. Conversely, they may so shut off the openings for development of other potentialities that we fail to realize that we have them. Our

actual, real selves are not these abstract potentialities, but the potentialities as developed by these various influences. And among these influences probably the greatest and most important are our conventions, the ideas of what is or is not to be done which we find current about us.

That, perhaps, will help us to answer the well-worn question, Can human nature be changed? The original tendencies, probably, do not change to any great extent. At any rate, there is no evidence that they do. But the ways in which they are developed and organized can and do change enormously. These changes, it is true, only arise from the development of the tendencies already there. There is, therefore, a certain limit to the possibilities of change. Human nature is not infinitely plastic. But we do not know how plastic it is. We are beginning, I think, to find out something about some of the tendencies which will always be there and must always be taken into account. And I can conceive no more fascinating and no more valuable study. But we have still advanced a very little way in this, much less far than many people think. We know very little about what can be made of these tendencies, the different forms in which they might be trained to express themselves. And we cannot speak with any certainty about what further potentialities there may or may not be in us which might be brought out by favourable influences.

We see, then, if this argument is correct, that there is no reason to despise convention. What we are made by convention is just as much our real nature as anything else about us. And we may be quite satisfied of the reality of moral progress if we can find that there is any progress in our conventions or our accepted ideas of right and wrong.

3. We must now face a third difficulty. How are we going to judge between one set of conventions and another? As I have described it, it looks as if all conventions came about in very much the same way. Further, our own ideas will be largely the result of the conventions among which we live. How are we going to get outside these influences, and judge whether one set of accepted ideas of right and wrong is nearer the truth than others? We must attempt something of the kind if we are to decide whether the changes in moral ideas are to be called progress or not.

We may ignore the conventions of thought and action which make no claim to any moral basis, those, for instance, which base their claim on being up to date and in the latest fashion. On the other hand, we must not commit the *naïveté* of supposing that all those who do not use, or even repudiate the use of, the accepted moral terms like right and wrong are therefore not to be regarded as actuated by moral considerations. Mr. Bertrand Russell, for instance,

who, to judge by his writings, sometimes likes to think of himself as the type of the cold, hard, scientific intellect, emancipated from all the prejudices of morality, in reality makes much more the impression of having the soul of a prophet, with all the reforming zeal and the readiness to condemn characteristic of that type. And many lesser men are shy of speaking of right or wrong, or good or bad, and prefer to use some colloquial substitute, fashionable at the moment. But the attitude that these express is exactly the same. When we say, "That's a rotten thing to do," or whatever the fashionable phrase of the moment is, we mean no more nor less than that it is a bad or wrong action. At any rate, it is clear that there are quite enough conventions of morality to occupy our attention. On what ground, if any, are we going to pronounce one to be morally superior to the other?

Here, perhaps, the amateur of definitions will think that I cannot escape his demand to supply him with a clear definition of what I mean by moral. Yet I think I can evade him once more. And to explain why I must give, briefly and dogmatically, my general view of the nature of our thinking of the nature of th

of the nature of our thinking about morality.

As I see it, human beings in all ages have had, or thought they had, glimpses of certain properties which human actions and characters, and perhaps other things as well, seemed to possess. They indicated these by terms like right and wrong, good and bad, or the equivalents in other languages. They have never been more than glimpses, and sometimes different people's glimpses seem to have given them rather different impressions of the facts concerned. But the impressions always had something in common. They would all agree that the positive moral property was, in some way, a reason for pursuing those things in which it was present, and the negative moral property a reason for avoidance. And they would agree that a reason of this order stood somehow on a different footing from other possible reasons, a difference which we can best express by saying that it claimed a special degree of authority. I think, too, though the impressions here seem more confused, that they would all agree in ascribing some sort of universality to the moral fact. Its claim would not be regarded as a private claim on one individual alone. We say, "What's right for one person is right for another." But that is expressing it more definitely than the first glimpses of this feature would allow. Then it is clear that the moral reason for doing something is not identical with simply and directly desiring to do it, whatever the relations between the two may turn out to be. On the other hand, it does seem part of all the impressions of the moral facts that a certain attitude, which at any rate contains emotional elements, is closely connected with our belief in their presence in any particular case That is what we call in our language the attitude of

approval or disapproval. These feelings are hard to analyse, and perhaps they contain some different elements in different cases. But there seems to be always a core which is recognizably identical in all cases.

These seem to me the chief marks of identification in which all impressions of the moral facts are agreed. But, of course, it does not amount to a complete description or definition. To work out, as far as possible, such a description or definition is the task of moral philosophy. And a long and difficult task it is, which can never be completed with absolute certainty. Some have found it so difficult that they have preferred to say that there are no facts there, that there is nothing in reality which possesses these marks of identification, and that the supposed glimpses were a mere illusion. But that seems to me extraordinarily improbable, and I have never seen any argument of serious weight in support of it. So I will ask to be allowed to assume for the purpose of the present discussion that there is really something there, and that there are such facts as right and wrong, or good and bad. But to define them, to say what they are, beyond these few hints would involve developing a whole system of moral philosophy, which would demand at least twenty lectures of this length before even the outlines were sketched.

Fortunately for the human race, however, it is not necessary to work out a complete system of moral philosophy before we can make moral judgments about particular things. Our marks of identification are sufficient to enable us to arrive at some view about what things are good and what bad before we know the full nature of the facts which the words "good" and "bad" indicate. Of course, in most of our conduct we act on views about what is right and wrong which have already been arrived at and embodied in the conventions of our time. And that is quite natural and proper. But in the present discussion we have to put ourselves at the point of view which tries, for a moment, to stand outside these and judge them in the light of conclusions arrived at by our own thinking. And in this investigation we work with very much the same methods of thought and use the same evidence as in the more purely philosophical task of trying to decide what the general nature of the properties, rightness and wrongness, is. What is the evidence that we can use as the basis of our conclusions?

Well, of course, the moral conventions, our own and other people's, form an important part of our evidence. It might be thought that we could do little with them without a standard, derived from some other source, by which to judge them. But at least we could see whether any one set of conventions was consistent with itself. If we find that it condemns one set of actions and approves another, which on the closest investigation appears to be of precisely the 316

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same general type as the first, we shall be justified in suspecting that there is something wrong. A good instance of this can be found in the attitude adopted towards national movements. When a national group within a state claims its freedom and rises up in support of it, public opinion in other countries often approves of the rising as of a nation rightly struggling to be free, and condemns the repression of it as tyrannical and oppressive. But when one of these countries finds itself in its turn faced by a national uprising, its public opinion will often condemn this as treachery and disloyalty, and approve the justifiable severity of its own methods of repression. Of course, there are sometimes real differences between the different cases. But as the phenomenon is so general, and as almost every country has at some time condemned a rising against itself or its allies, and approved risings against other countries, particularly those with which its relations are not friendly, we are justified in supposing that there is some self-contradiction here.

Following on from this, we might find, on examining a large number of different conventions at different times and different places, that there seemed to be certain underlying ideas at the back of most or all of them. But some might show a much clearer realization of them and take them much more seriously than others. We should probably be justified in saying that these showed a higher stage of development, unless we found that the greater attention to one feature of this kind was simply attained by a correspondingly

greater neglect of some other equally essential feature.

Finally, something might be learned by observing the effects of a contact between two different civilizations with different standards and conventions. Sometimes, when this occurs, the one group seems to recognize almost immediately that the other group represents a higher type than its own. Of course, this evidence must be used with great caution. It would be very rash to suppose that the conventions which survive are necessarily, in all circumstances, the best. But if a convention or set of conventions goes down at once, as soon as it comes into contact with other ideas, there is probably something wrong with it. Westermarck tells us how often the approval of cannibalism disappears almost immediately when the tribes which practise it come into contact with another civilization, before there is any question of a forcible suppression of it.

But we cannot remain content with classifying and analysing various moral conventions, as if they were natural objects emotionally indifferent to us. Our own moral attitude has to come into consideration. Many people, perhaps, would claim that they judged of right and wrong by their own inner light. They would say that they feel that this or that was right or wrong, or that they know it instinctively or intuitively, or any other of the ambiguous phrases that are

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intended to convey the certainty of direct acquaintance. I believe that these phrases express an important fact. It seems to me as certain as anything in this matter can be that there is such a thing as first-hand moral experience. This is the origin and foundation of all moral conventions and all theories of ethics. But I am much less certain of the forms it takes and the way in which it works. It is an experience which badly needs further analysis. And, in default of this, anything that I have to say about it can only be put forward tentatively and provisionally.

I think that we should do well to be very cautious about appealing too readily to our own first-hand moral experience. I do not believe that such experience is a very common thing. I should imagine that it has come to most of us at one time or another. But it comes comparatively rarely. Perhaps that is what distinguishes the great moral reformers from the rest of us, that they are constantly and continuously able to see a light that only comes in occasional flashes to the great majority. Again, it is possible to confuse it with other experiences. Thus, the shock of being faced with an unaccustomed or unpopular idea may often masquerade as real moral disapproval. It is true that the two can probably be distinguished without difficulty by a little resolute introspective examination. But many people do not like the effort of examining themselves thus. Finally, it is often very easy to be mistaken about the situation which arouses this experience. The action which we approve or condemn may be in reality very different from what we think it, though if it had been as we thought it our approval or condemnation would have been justified. Perhaps that is why it is in general much safer to confine our judgments to our own actions where we have at least much greater knowledge of the nature of the action than we can have of other people's.

There is another point, important if it is true. It seems to me that this first-hand moral experience only comes to us in connection with a particular situation. Its typical form is the conviction that this particular action here and now in these circumstances is or would be right or wrong. We try, rightly, to generalize it afterwards, to draw some rule from it that will apply to other cases. But in this we are going beyond the immediate experience and drawing inferences from it. And the certainty diminishes accordingly.

But, with all qualifications, first-hand moral experience is a factor of great importance. It is the basis on which we build a good deal of our own moral principles. And it is at the bottom of the moral conventions of any age or group. We might perhaps describe moral conventions as an erection of interpretation and inference on the foundations of moral experience, held together in relative permanence by the cement of custom and habit, though the metaphor ought to be

IS MORAL PROGRESS A REALITY?

modified to allow for the fact that the solidifying power of custom generally modifies the shape in some degree. But our moral experience also provides some help in the criticism and evaluation of moral conventions. We can compare our interpretations and generalizations of our particular experiences with those expressed in the customary standards of the age we are considering. Conversely, when the general rules laid down by some set of conventions are applied to a particular case, we may have a direct moral experience which drives us to differ from the conventions. I suppose that is how movements of revolt and reform begin. People have been taking certain rules of right and wrong for granted. And then one day someone is faced with a concrete situation in which the thought of applying these ideas or the actual spectacle of these ideas being applied awakens him with a shock, and he says to himself: "No, this won't do. This cannot be right." We must remember also that it is possible for such revolts to be carried too far, and for a whole set of ideas to be condemned unjustifiably because they happen to have been associated with one which is in conflict with the reformer's first-hand experience.

I must not delay too long over this aspect of the problem. So I will only just mention the help that we can get from other people's evidence, particularly the great thinkers and moralists. Some of them are helpful because of their own strong moral sense, some because of their special sensitiveness to the moral atmosphere around them which makes them good interpreters of the current ideas of their time, and some because of their reasoning powers which enable them to see, more clearly than most of us, just what general conclusions can be drawn from the evidence. A few, like Plato, seem to combine all these qualifications. In general, I would say that any moral idea which is or has been widely held, and any idea which is seriously maintained by a serious moral thinker, has to be taken into account as evidence. If we cannot accept it, we must at least be able to explain how it has come to be held. I must pass over too several auxiliary studies which may at times help us in our search.

And so we come back to our original question, Is moral progress a reality? Can we, on the basis of this evidence, say with any confidence, that accepted moral standards improve? I shall hardly be expected at this stage to construct a complete set of standards by which to measure all the differences between the morality of one age and the morality of another, nor to examine the whole history of the world in the light of them. But I will suggest one or two points which seem to me to emerge pretty clearly from the consideration which we have mentioned.

Thus, there is one general principle which seems to be implied in a great many of the most widely accepted moral judgments, and which

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has been stated explicitly, in one form or another, by many of those who have thought most deeply on moral questions. That is, the principle formulated by Kant in his second maxim, that we ought always to treat human beings as ends, never merely as means. It is the same idea which was expressed, less successfully, by Bentham when he said that everyone was to count for one, and no one for more than one, in the distribution of happiness. And I suppose that the good Christian would express the same idea by saying that one man's soul is just as well worth saving as another's.

It seems to me clear beyond a doubt that in modern times this principle has attained a much clearer recognition and a greater influence on our accepted ideas of right conduct. Most of the great movements which mark the last hundred years or so—the abolition of slavery, the emancipation of women, the increased care for the interests of children, and, in general, any movement which takes the form of a protest against the idea of any group or class being regarded as existing simply for the sake of some other group or class—are expressions of this principle. And it shows itself in many other slighter and subtler ways. It is still far from being recognized universally in all relations of life. And in the application to particular cases we may have made mistakes in detail. But these can be corrected by experience as we go along. And the general tendency marks a clear moral advance.

"Ah!" our professional pessimist would say, "this may be all right. But why pick out this particular moment as a test of progress? What guarantee have you that there may not be a reaction against all this in a century or so, or indeed to-morrow, and we may relapse into barbarism again. That is what generally happens. Look at the fate of the Babylonian, Minoan, Egyptian, Greek, Roman, and Byzantine civilizations! Look at Mexico! Look at Peru!" and so on and so on. There is truth, of course, in the reminder. But to me the most significant fact is, not that human beings relapse into barbarism from time to time, but that they generally climb out of it again. It would be absurd to take the occasional reaction as being the real and important fact and neglect the long process of rebuilding order and civilization which seems to have occupied our race for at least as much of our time as the other. Certainly, if anyone held that we had simply to sit still and we should automatically improve, the pessimist's warning would be valuable. But it does nothing to weaken the belief, which I hold that the facts point to, that there is a natural tendency in us which makes for moral progress. It simply points out, what is undoubtedly true, that this cannot work under all possible conditions, but needs favourable circumstances, or perhaps rather the avoidance of certain particularly strong unfavourable circumstances.

IS MORAL PROGRESS A REALITY?

But are there any grounds for thinking that the circumstances are any more likely to be favourable than unfavourable as time goes on? I think there are certain grounds for hope, though none for excessive confidence. Probably more people throughout the world than at any previous time are interested in finding out what the favourable circumstances are, though we are only at the beginning of the task yet. And, with increased knowledge, we are also finding out that to some degree these circumstances are within our control. The state of civilization, for instance, has in some ways been affected by material conditions, such as the food supply, or the prevalence of certain enfeebling diseases. And over them our control is increasing all the time. Then, again, many or most of the relapses into barbarism have been the result of the unexpected impact of other races of lower standards. That, certainly, becomes less likely, with the increase of knowledge of different races and the increase of contact between them

But I would not exaggerate the grounds for optimism. Our know-ledge and control is still imperfect, and probably will always remain so, though it may improve greatly on the present conditions. One factor in particular, which seems to me of the first importance, is one about which it is most difficult to prophesy. That is the emergence of individuals of exceptional power who will exercise an influence one way or the other. I have already spoken of the influence of great moral reformers. But the other possibility is equally present. A man of commanding personality and powers of leadership may emerge who will appeal with particular force to some baser motives in us. It is not difficult to glorify some of our lower passions till they begin to masquerade as moral principles in our minds. I can think of at least two political leaders in different countries in modern times who have had influence in this direction, and many more who have tried to attain it without success.

The same kind of influence, on a much smaller scale, is exercised for good or bad by countless individuals, who stand out just enough from those who immediately surround them to have such influence on them. And the way in which this will work is the most impossible to foresee of anything. They are themselves, of course, largely the product of the surrounding influences which are common to their whole society. But the little bit extra which they add of their own may be the result of such innumerable different causes that it is not a calculable factor. The difference that each one makes may be infinitesimal in amount. But the sum of all their contributions may be considerable. So that the results that these may produce cannot be foreseen.

If this is true, it would seem that there is nothing inevitable about moral progress, or about moral retrogression, if by inevitable we

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mean something that cannot be affected by the action of individuals. But there does appear to be a natural tendency in the direction of progress. And the production of the conditions which favour the development of this tendency depends to a considerable and increasing degree on our own wills and our own efforts. With this we may well rest content.

McTAGGART'S CONTRIBUTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

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THE title of this paper may, at first glance, somewhat surprise the casual reader. That the writings of a philosopher who was, by his own confession, an atheist should contain a trenchant critique of the theistic position is only to be expected; but the suggestion that any positive contribution to the philosophy of religion can be found in them may appear somewhat startling, and even paradoxical.

McTaggart's atheism, however, was of a very unusual type. Like every other constructive and systematic metaphysician, he sought to deal in an adequate and comprehensive manner, not only with the nature and structure of ultimate Reality, but also with the great problems of human destiny, with life and death and immortality, with the freedom of the will, and with the soul's attainment of the Beatific Vision. Scores of men less able than he have discoursed on these topics, and have elicited a widespread interest and approval. But they have usually been theists, whose teaching has been welcomed by that multitudinous band of theologians and ecclesiastics who are busy erecting props and stays beneath the shaky walls of traditional and conventional religion. Some few of them, on the other hand, have been naturalists, like Mr. Russell and Professor Santayana; and their strictures and condemnations have been grist to the mill which supplies so many of our contemporary social and intellectual radicals with their philosophy. But McTaggart was neither. He stood apart and alone. By conviction he was an atheist, and therefore an object of dislike and suspicion to the conventionally religious mind. But he was also an idealist, and ipso facto the mortal enemy of all

In truth, the more closely we examine McTaggart's position, the more original and significant does it appear. For his teaching introduces into Western philosophy a way of thinking which, although long familiar to the Orient, has heretofore found no outstanding advocate in the Occident. Atheism, to the popular mind, has always been to all intents and purposes identical with Materialism. Idealism, on the other hand, has been the traditional friend of religion, and many of its exponents and defenders have been professed theists. It is, of course, also true that, from the Middle Ages to the present day, idealistic speculation has from time to time shown a pronounced tendency to develop in a non-theistic direction. One has but to cite

such names as David of Dinant, Spinoza, Bradley, and Bosanquet in support of this assertion. But the systems which these thinkers elaborated, although they denied the existence of a personal God and reduced the human soul to the rank of a transient manifestation or phenomenal appearance of Reality, nevertheless may be properly described as pantheistic rather than atheistic. For they provide us with a God, a Substance, or an Absolute, call it what you will, which serves as the source of all finite existents, and which is to be regarded as the object of veneration or worship.

In the Orient, however, the conception of the universe as an organism or ordered whole, embracing a multitude of finite spirits which are neither created by, nor manifestations of, any single and ultimate Spirit, is one which has been widely held for over a score of centuries. We have but to turn to the Sānkhya philosophy, or to the religious systems of the Jains and the Buddhists, to discover that such is the case. That a conception of this sort should at last have become domiciled within the realm of Occidental metaphysics, and should have been elaborated and defended with all the subtlety and logical acuteness of such an intellect as McTaggart's, is surely an event of the highest importance, and one which certainly should not be ignored by any whose interests draw them toward the philosophy of religion.

It would, of course, be absurd to suggest that McTaggart's system was in any sense a derivation from or an adaptation of the work of Oriental thinkers. His reasoning was emphatically his own, original, profound, and massive. It is quite possible that it would have attained its present finished form had none of these Eastern metaphysicians ever existed. Yet it is also permissible to point out that McTaggart may have found in their teaching much that was congenial and suggestive. A certain kinship of thought and feeling there undoubtedly is, just as equally clearly there are pronounced dissimilarities and disagreements. In as much as the purpose of this article is to examine the nature and extent of McTaggart's contribution to the philosophy of religion, we may conveniently scrutinize at once those aspects of his thought which agree with the Eastern philosophies in question in opposition to the conventional theistic religious thought of the West, and thereafter proceed to the consideration of those aspects of his system which are original and unique.

At the outset, however, we must face the objection that we are engaged upon a fruitless task. An atheistic religion, it may be urged, is an impossible paradox. But let us see. Religion, according to Martineau, is the "belief in an ever-living God." If we accept this definition, what shall we say of the polytheistic faiths in which such a vast proportion of mankind have believed? Had the Greeks and the

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Romans, the Celts and the Teutons no religion? So narrow a definition is obviously useless, not only for the philosopher, but for the historian and the anthropologist as well. Shall we than concede that religion can be either monotheistic or polytheistic, but deny that it can be atheistic? How then are we to characterize systems of thought which affirm the reality of spirit and its persistence through an indefinite series of births and deaths, which emphasize the everpresent influence of the moral law upon its destiny, which inculcate the practice of contemplation and stress the value of mystic insight, and which teach that the individual spirit is capable of finding its deliverance and its salvation by passing into Nirvana, the "Immortal," the "Unshakable Refuge?" If such doctrines are not religious, what are they?

It is evident that such theories as those outlined above are far more akin to the theistic interpretation of the universe than the naturalistic. If a dividing line be drawn, they are on religion's side. Of course, if our definition of religion be so framed as to include the belief in a God or gods, then Buddhism and Jainism are not religions. Call them then philosophies if you choose. Classify these systems by what name you will, their significance and importance for the philosophy of religion remains unchanged. And that is all that is here contended for. Accordingly we shall assume for our present purpose that the religious status of these movements has been conceded, and that the philosophies upon which they are based are philosophies of religion.

In the light of the foregoing discussion, it is clear that the religious import of McTaggart's philosophy cannot be denied. For in his view the universe consists of a society of uncreated and eternal selves, which exist sub specie temporis through a succession of lives, in each of which the lot of the individual self is largely determined by the fact that, sub specie æternitatis, it is united to one or more other selves in a relation of love. Moreover, the terminus of this series of lives is found in the final stage of the "C" series, in which the self awakens to the realization of indescribable and unimaginable blessedness.

It is, of course, true that both Buddhism and Jainism acknowledge the existence of a multitude of so-called "gods," but since the term is merely used to denote spirits of the highest rank in the universe, endowed with exceptional power and blessedness, but as much members of the cosmos and as completely subject to its laws as spirits of the lowest order, both religions are commonly and correctly classed as atheistic.

² According to McTaggart, time is unreal. Consequently our perceptions of simultaneous or successive events are in fact misperceptions of unchanging entities and the relations subsisting among them. For our percepta in reality form a non-temporal order (the "C" series), each term of which includes within itself all the anterior terms of the series, and is in like manner included in all those posterior.

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The similarity which these doctrines bear to those of the Indian sects, of which we have just spoken, is indeed striking. To make the parallel as complete as possible, we may add that McTaggart actually did encourage the practice of mysticism. He believed, as a matter of fact, that he had succeeded in showing that the universe is, on the whole, good; and therefore such as the will of a good man may acquiesce in. Consequently he felt that the claims of religion—unless these were understood to include the existence of an object deserving of worship-were vindicated by his philosophy.

Impressive as these points of resemblance are, however, the dissimilarities are equally prominent. In the first place, McTaggart denies the reality of time. It may be that the logical interpretation of Buddha's teaching would lead us to the same conclusion. But it is none the less certain that vast numbers of Buddhists would refuse to follow us. Furthermore, if McTaggart's theory of the "C" series of included and inclusive terms is sound, it completely shatters all hope of an immediate and individual escape from the illusion of time.

The practical significance of this doctrine is momentous. If the Buddhist is right, it is possible by holy living and by devotion to the practice of asceticism and of mystical contemplation to attain Nirvana in this life, and so at the moment of decease to enter Parinirvana, thereby passing beyond birth and death. Or, if this be pitching one's hopes too high, one may at least aspire to be reborn in one of the heavens with better prospects of attaining Nirvana there. This hope, in all essentials, the atheistic Buddhist shares with the theistic or pantheistic Hindu. For each the way of salvation is the same.

What is soundless, touchless, formless, imperishable, Likewise tasteless, constant, odourless, Without beginning, without end, higher than the great, stable-By discerning That one is liberated from the mouth of death.2

If McTaggart is right, on the other hand, salvation is to be attained only in the final stage of the "C" series, which from the view-point of the anterior stages is perceived as future, and into which, sub specie temporis, we all enter together. This theory, as its author has been at pains to point out,3 in its emphasis upon a state of blessedness which is at once timeless and yet future, markedly resembles the Christian doctrine of heaven. But here again there is a difference which is of the greatest importance. The Christian, at least the Protestant Christian, hopes to enter heaven at the conclusion of this present life. "The souls of believers," as the Westminster Catechism

The same suggestion might well be made in the case of Jainism.

² Katha Upanishad, Hume's translation.

3 The Nature of Existence, secs. 738-9.

tells us, "do immediately pass into glory." Thus a way of escape is found, not through mystic illumination, but by the prosaic everyday process of dying. Such a doctrine doubtless affords the greatest consolation to those who believe in it. Yet if McTaggart's contention be sound, it is a vain hope. Before each of us stretches the remainder of the temporal process from which there is no escape. From the illusion of time philosophy is helpless to deliver us, but it can at least teach us that it is an allusion, and can encourage us with the assurance that the final state of the "C" series is one of very great good.

"Of the nature of that good we know something. We know that it is a timeless and endless state of love—love so direct, so intimate, and so powerful that even the deepest mystic rapture gives us but the slightest foretaste of its perfection. We know that we shall know nothing but our beloved, and those they love, and ourselves as loving them, and that only in this shall we seek and find satisfaction. Between the present and that fruition there stretches a future which may well need courage. For, while there will be in it much good, and increasing good, there may await us evils which we can now measure only by their infinite insignificance as compared with the

final reward."1

Thus it will be seen that the practice of mysticism offers no short cut to the Eternal. Is it not then useless? To this the reply is undoubtedly—No. But when we seek to discover the place of mysticism in religion and philosophy, and to determine what are its proper functions, the answers to our questions are less obvious. A thoroughly rationalistic spirit pervades the whole of McTaggart's writings. Nowhere do we find an attempt to escape from the toilsome path of argumentation, nowhere is there an appeal to a special illumination. On the contrary, the argument everywhere proceeds in an orderly and consecutive manner, advancing from point to point in conformity with the laws of logic. It is, of course, true that McTaggart does appeal to emotional and volitional experiences for data upon which to base his inferences, but in this there is nothing which distinguishes him from other philosophers who admit the validity of introspection.

Indeed, McTaggart was extremely suspicious of the validity of mystical experiences, and was unwilling to use them as a basis for metaphysical arguments. In his opinion mystics generally see what they expect to see. In an extremely interesting passage in his chapter on "Error and the 'C' Series" McTaggart states his position in regard

to the claims of mysticism with characteristic clearness.

"But how about perceptions of God or of the universe? And, in the first place, are there any such perceptions at all in our present

1 The Nature of Existence, sec. 913.

2 Ibid., sec. 523.

experience? It has been asserted by various people that they have had such perceptions. I doubt, however, whether this is a correct account of what they have experienced. No doubt they have experienced something, and, if our theory of the nature of spirit is correct, that experience must really be perceptions; but when they say that they have perceived God, or the universe, they mean that they have had perceptions of them, as distinct from judgments about them, or imagings of them. In the language we have adopted, they are speaking not only of perceptions, but of perceptions which are apparent perceptions.

"In such cases, I am inclined to think, a judgment has been mistaken for a perception. It is not difficult to mistake an immediate judgment that something exists for a perception of that thing. Nor is it difficult to make the mistake, even when the judgment is not immediate, but has been based on reasons, provided that the judgment is firmly held, and is one of sufficient interest to excite a strong emotion in the person who makes it. To the possibility of these mistakes, and indeed to the great difficulty of avoiding them, I believe that most people would bear witness who have any experience of mystical states of mind, and who have the power and the resolution to analyse the states they experience.

"And it does not seem improbable that the cases in which people have supposed themselves to have perceptions of God, or of the universe, are cases in which a judgment has in this manner been mistaken

for a perception."

The importance of these paragraphs is enhanced when we recall that the man who wrote them was himself at times the subject of mystical experiences. But it would be a mistake to see in the above passage anything like an unqualified condemnation of mysticism. Nothing could be more foreign to the spirit which pervades the whole of McTaggart's writings than the attempt to banish any problem from the field of discussion by a dogmatic pronunciamento. This is made clear, in the present instance, beyond all shadow of doubt, by the opening sentence of the very paragraph which follows upon those just, quoted: "We cannot," he writes, "absolutely exclude the possibility that there may occur, in present experience, a perception of God or

This individual sentence, taken by itself, might indeed seem to indicate nothing more than a desire to be scrupulously fair, and an unwillingness to dogmatize. But in reality McTaggart's attitude was by no means merely negative. Not only is the practice of mysticism commended in his writings, but its influence is unmistakably present in his philosophy. To it we owe much of that breadth of vision, that comprehensive outlook, that sympathy with and understanding of the spiritual life, its ideals and its problems, its agonies

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McTAGGART'S PHILOSOPHY OF RELIGION

and its triumphs, which so characterize his teaching. Nevertheless, it is emphatically true that the place of mysticism is at the crown, and not at the base, of his metaphysical system. It is a beam that shines, not from the point of departure beneath, but from the ultimate goal above. When we have climbed as far as we are able, in that light we may see light.

Mysticism has assumed many forms in the history of religion, but its most characteristic expression has involved the recognition of the supreme metaphysical significance of love. And here McTaggart and the mystic are in complete agreement. But what is love? According to McTaggart, it is "a liking which is felt toward persons, and

which is intense and passionate."

"This must not mislead us," he writes, "into exaggerating the closeness of its relation to sexual desire. It is often found in connection with that desire. But it is also found in connection with other bonds of union—kindred, early intimacy, similarity of disposition or of opinions, gratitude, and so forth. And it is also found without any such connection in instances where it can only be said that two people belong to one another—such love as is recorded in the *Vita Nuova* and *In Memoriam*."

It has already been pointed out that love, in McTaggart's system, fulfils a function somewhat similar to that of Karma. It does not indeed carry out the task of rewarding and punishing us in each life for our good and evil deeds in previous lives, but none the less it does furnish the principle of order which determines the environment in which rebirth shall take place. Moreover, as we have seen, it is present in a unique degree in the final stage of the "C" series. It provides, if we may so phrase it, the *content* of salvation. To this thought McTaggart returns again and again. It is in truth the very heart of all his teaching.

"Can we say any more about the value in selves in respect of their final stage? We have seen that it will be one of very great good, if good is to be judged by any one, or any combination, of the qualities of knowledge, virtue, emotion, pleasure, or fullness of life—under which last name we may sum up both amount and intensity of consciousness. Is there anything more?

"I hold, as I have said, that the possession of any one of these qualities makes that good which possesses it. But it seems to me also that those thinkers are right who attribute an unique and supreme goodness to love."²

Thus love is the supreme good, yet not the only good. How then is it related to other goods? The solution is as follows:—

"Can we say that love is incommensurably better than any other good? This seems attractive, but I cannot think it is correct. If it

The Nature of Existence, secs. 459 and 461.

* Ibid., sec. 850.

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were so, it would follow that, starting from any standpoint—my own at present, for example—the smallest conceivable increase in love would be better than the greatest possible increase in knowledge, virtue, pleasure, or fullness of life. And it does not seem to me that this is true.

"Is there any other way in which love could hold a supreme and unique position? I think that there is. It would hold such a position if it were true that love is capable of being so good that no possible goodness arising from knowledge, virtue, pleasure, or fullness of life could equal it. And it is this view—a view which has been held by many people, mystics and non-mystics—which I believe to be true. It seems to me that, when love has reached or passed a certain point, it would be more good than any possible amount of knowledge, virtue, pleasure, or fullness of life could be. This does not, so far as I am concerned, spring from any belief that I have reached such a point. It is a conclusion which seems to me to follow from contemplating the nature of love on the one hand, and other qualities on the other hand."

From this high evaluation of love follows the important consequence that in so far as we, in our present experience, come to know what love is, in just so far we are acquainted directly and empirically with the nature of the Absolute. In this fashion we actually lay hold upon the very "stuff of reality." It is not a symbol or a manifestation of something more ultimate, it is the ultimate itself. Purified and elevated to a degree of intensity beyond all our present powers of comprehension and imagination as it may be, love, in the Eternal, is nothing else but love. The significance of this doctrine is indeed profound, and its similarity to the teachings of the mystics is sufficiently obvious.

Closely connected with this view is the further theory that in absolute reality selves perceive one another directly. As we are of course aware, this is not the case in present experience. Hence there arises a seeming paradox.

"Love as we now experience it has often been described as an essentially restful state, and also as essentially a state of unrest. The incompatibility of these statements is only apparent. It is essentially restful because it presents itself as something which is sufficient in itself, which needs no justification, which is good unconditionally, whenever it does arise, whatever may be the circumstances in which it has arisen. And it is essentially unrestful because, in proportion as it becomes more intense, we desire, more and more intensely, not indeed anything else but love, but love more intense and more absorbing."²

This twofold aspect of love is due to the illusion of time, and to

The Nature of Existence, secs. 850-1.

Ibid., sec. 471.

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the fact that in present experience lovers are unable directly to perceiver their beloved.

"What is it," asks McTaggart, "that they want? Is it just a quantitative increase in the intensity of love? If so, the desire must remain for ever unsatiated, since beyond any intensity of love which was reached there would be a greater intensity which could be desired. But most people who have endeavoured to interpret it have interpreted it, and I think rightly, as a desire for a state whose greater intensity of love will flow from a qualitative difference in the nature of the union, a difference which brings the perfect rest which love here only longs for.

"Some thinkers, especially Oriental mystics, have concluded that love could only reach its goal when the lover and the beloved become identical. But then the attainment would be suicidal. Love would be destroyed by it, since love depends upon a relation between two persons. And does love seek its fruition in anything but love? Surely the truer interpretation is that which looks for attainment, when we shall no more see through a glass darkly, but face to face—when the lover knows the beloved as he knows

himself."

Such is McTaggart's conception of the Beatific Vision. In this magnificent outburst of mysticism his philosophy culminates. But what renders it so extraordinarily interesting for us is the fact that a purely atheistic conclusion has thus been reached from premisses which have hitherto been generally regarded as peculiarly favourable to the formulation of a theistic metaphysic. The weapons which were forged in the theist's own armoury have been used against him. A challenge has thereby been presented to him which he cannot afford to ignore.

The content of this challenge is to be found in the implications of McTaggart's positive teaching rather than in the reasons which he gives for rejecting the idea of God. These are indeed weighty, but they are also more familiar and less original. Thus a theism of the Absolutist type is rejected because it involves the assertion that finite persons are included in the being of a single Infinite Person—a conclusion which is incompatible with the proposition—the truth of which McTaggart holds to be self-evident—that one self cannot be a part of another self.² And again, the notion of a creative God is obviously incompatible with the doctrine of the unreality of time. For the same reason, the existence of a God who controls and governs the universe is also inadmissible.³ Nor is it possible that any one self should appear to create the universe and other selves, since, "sub specie temporis, no self appears to exist before any other self." ⁴

¹ The Nature of Existence, sec. 471.

³ Ibid., sec. 495.

² Ibid., sec. 491.

⁴ Ibid., sec. 494.

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It is, however, possible that one self should appear to control the universe.

"I see no reason why there should not be such a person—a person who was not a God, but who, sub specie temporis, and from the standpoint of our present experience, appeared as a controlling God. And such an appearance would be a phenomenon bene fundatum. The statement that there was a God would not be true, but it would have as close a relation to the truth as the statements that there are mountains in Switzerland, and that thunder follows lightning."

It may be said without fear of contradiction that, even did McTaggart's system make a place for such an apparent God, it would still deserve to be styled atheistic quite as much as the systems of the Jains and the Buddhists. But as a matter of fact McTaggart holds that, while the existence of such a being is abstractly possible, there is no evidence to show that its existence is actual.²

When, however, we turn from these negative conclusions to the positive aspect of McTaggart's teaching, it becomes fully evident that he has yet another, and possibly more cogent, reason for rejecting the theistic hypothesis. In his eyes it is, if not utterly incompatible, at least not easy to reconcile with the unique value and importance which he attributes to human love. At first sight such an opinion may seem extraordinary in view of the teaching of the mystics. But it is to the mystics themselves that one may appeal in support of it. For many of them, Christian, Moslem, and Hindu, the love which served as the single motive-power and inspiration of their lives was the love, not of man, but of God. Thus the Sufi, Rabi'a, replied to the question whether she hated the Devil with the answer that she was "too much taken up with loving God to love or hate anything else." Similarly in the writings of such famous Christian mystics as Ruysbroeck we find it laid down that the creatures are to be loved "for God's sake." To love any finite being for its own sake was apparently deemed worldly. Nor was such an outlook by any means wholly due to an ascetic pervertion of the primitive Christian message. In the very words of Jesus, which are held by many to embody the essence of his teaching, we are commanded to love God "with all our heart, and with all our soul, and with all our mind, and with all our strength," but our neighbour "as ourselves."

In this connection the history of Sufi mysticism is of especial interest, for there we see human love accorded ever a higher and higher place even as the stark monotheism of Rabi'a and the early devotees gradually expands into a pantheistic monism. In primitive Sufism God seems to have been regarded as the only legitimate

The Nature of Existence, sec. 496 2 Ibid., sec. 499.

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object of love. Gradually, however, human love came to be looked upon as an indispensable initiation into the love of God. In the words of Jalalu'd Din Rumi:—

Whether it be of this world or of that, Thy love will lead thee yonder at the last.²

Viewed in this light, such love is rather a means to an end than an end in itself. But Pantheistic fervour could not be restrained from pressing on to a third stage in which the individual loved is identified with God, and human love therefore given a supreme value. The term God, however, in this connection is to be understood to mean, not a personal being, but ultimate reality (al-Haqq).3

The similarity of this position to that of McTaggart is unmistakable, as he himself clearly recognized. His sympathy with it was shown, not only in his fondness for Attar's famous poem, *The Colloquy of the Birds*, but in the distinction which he was accustomed to draw between theistic and atheistic mysticism, and in his

declared preference for the latter.4

The issue which McTaggart has raised, implicitly rather than explicitly, but none the less forcefully, is one of fundamental importance for the theist. Can Theism afford to accept his evaluation of human love? Many doubtless would assert that it can. But the view is not without its difficulties. If there be in truth a God who

Professor R. A. Nicholson has translated the following account of an incident in the life of Fudayl ibn 'Iyād, which, as he truly says, would be touching if it were not so edifying: "One day he had in his lap a child four years old, and chanced to give it a kiss, as is the way of fathers. The child said: 'Father, do you love me?' 'Yes,' said Fudayl. 'Do you love Gcd?' 'Yes.' 'How many hearts have you?' 'One.' 'Then,' asked the child, 'how can you love two with one heart?' Fudayl perceived that the child's words were a divine admonition. In his zeal for God he began to beat his head and repented of his love for the child, and gave his heart wholly to God.'' (The Mystics of Islam, p. 109.)

3 Thus the poet just quoted could also write,

Ye who in search of God, of God pursue,
Ye need not search, for God is you, is you!
Why seek ye something that was missing ne'er?
Save you none is, but you are—where, oh, where?

Ibid., p. 119

4 McTaggart was quite content to have his system described as pantheistic. But it was not pantheistic in the same sense as the systems of Spinoza or Bradley, for instance, in which the self enjoys only an apparent or adjectival existence. For McTaggart the self is real, substantival, and eternal. It is, however, an atheistic pantheism, since in his opinion the term God should be used only to connote a personal being who is supreme (Studies in Hegelian Cosmology, sect. 96; Some Dogmas of Religion (second edition), sects. 152-3.) Any attempt to employ it in a wider sense could, he held, result in nothing but misunderstanding and confusion.

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is infinite in beauty and goodness, is it not inevitable that those who are privileged to behold him should lose themselves in the rapture of that vision to the forgetfulness of all human beings? On the other hand, is it not to be expected that those who find in the love of other finite personalities the satisfaction of all that is highest in their natures and the crown of their desires, should recoil from the suggestion that such love is not an end in itself, but only a means to the attainment of some more ultimate good? And if love of God is just as good as, but no better than, love of Smith, does it not follow that God is only one person among other persons, and so not really God at all? If the theist is to answer these questions satisfactorily, it would seem that he must show that love for God and love for individual human beings are so related that neither can reach its full development except in conjunction with the other.

Theism is, of course, compatible with the rejection of McTaggart's estimate of the value of human love. Probably few theists, however, would care to associate themselves with Fudayl ibn 'Iyad in his attitude of unqualified condemnation of it. For those who concede that it possesses some value, two alternatives present themselves. Either love for human beings must be regarded as a mere initiation into the love of God, as a necessary but preliminary stage through which the soul passes on its way to the ultimate goal—in other words, as the means to an end-or else it must be treated as an end in itself,

but yet a subordinate end, as a genuine but inferior good.

The former alternative will at once involve those who embrace it in a contradiction. Loyalty and constancy are of the very essence of love. In loving we identify our own interests and fortunes with those of our beloved, and in so doing find the deepest satisfaction of which human nature is capable. The suggestion that inducing and cultivating such love can be a purely temporary measure adopted with ulterior ends in view betrays a complete ignorance of its fundamental character. Surely loyalty to God cannot be learned through disloyalty to man.

Clearly then it is the second alternative which the theist will chose. He will recognize human love as an end in itself; nevertheless, he will contend that it is not "the chief end of man," and that supreme value is to be found in love for God alone. But in doing so he will stand on very slippery ground. If love for God exceeds in value love for any finite being, will it not inevitably attract to itself the interest and devotion of the worshipper in such measure that little love will be left to bestow upon any other object? A modern student of mysticism has admitted that "the impoverishment of ordinary human affections in response to the exclusive demands of the divine is responsible for an element of hardness in the mystical character in human relationships towards which the ordinary man finds it

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difficult to be sympathetic." Now this could not be true of an atheistic mysticism. The question is whether it is true of all types of theistic mysticism.

Furthermore, it seems quite impossible that those who have once experienced that emotional concentration of the self which an "intense and passionate" human relationship can evoke could conceive that love for God can surpass it. It is difficult to see how the theist can assert the contrary without committing himself to the proposition that the value of an emotion is determined by the nature of its object. And this is at least open to question.

It is not my purpose to attempt to answer these questions, but to raise them—to make clear the vital importance of McTaggart's conclusions for any theistic philosophy. For this reason I have made no attempt to criticize the chain of arguments by which he arrived at them. These arguments may be proof against all attempts at refutation. If this be the case, his conclusions will receive additional weight; but if the logical structure collapse, it will not of course follow that they have been thereby disproved. As mere hypotheses they are in the highest degree stimulating and suggestive. But above all there remains McTaggart's estimate of the worth of human love in and for itself. This is not based on any argument. It is a direct judgment of value. And it is this insight which constitutes the supreme value of his philosophy.

1 R. H. Thouless, The Lady Julian, p. 116.

PHILOSOPHY AS CRITICISM AND POINT OF VIEW

ADRIAN COATES, M.A.

Last year the B.B.C. arranged for certain eminent men to broadcast their Points of View to the public. The result was a most interesting series of talks; but for the sceptical philosopher the series was chiefly entertaining for its brilliantly illustrating the old tag: quot homines, tot sententiæ. One was struck not merely by the discrepancy of opinion, but by how each speaker was 'true to type': the biologist, the physicist with a taste for spiritualism, the Christian Platonist, and the rest-each spoke his part and told of a world built according

to his own particular measuring-rod.

This lack of agreement between intelligent and honest men on the most fundamental questions of life and conduct is of course a common-place as old at least as Timon of Phlius; but the problem presented by it is more urgent and contemporary to-day than it ever has been. It is unnecessary to dilate upon the well-known tendencies in modern thought to question or ignore the claims of any rationalistic, absolutist philosophy: it will be enough to illustrate my reference by a typical quotation from Dr. R. G. Gordon's authoritative work on Personality. Discussing the question of the relationship between Mind and Body, he notices "in what different ways individuals react in their thoughts and feelings to events, theories, and objects; and how impossible it is for those of different types to appreciate each other's point of view." "Such being the case," he concludes, "it is inevitable that there must be differences in the way in which the relationship of Body and Mind appeals to various types of persons." There one has the modern empirical attitude which dismisses philosophy as no more than a 'point of view,' valuable perhaps to the person who holds it, but with no further claim to anyone's regard.

I cannot help applying this kind of reasoning to myself. When I consider the development of my own philosophical standpoint, I am bound to recognize that it is the product of my own individual history and temperament, and that if they had been other than they were, it would hardly have been possible that I should now hold the opinions which I do hold, and which I am prepared to defend against all comers. Yet if one's opinions are but an expression of one's personality, in what sense can one claim them to be true? To opinions

so based the notion of truth seems inapplicable.

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I suppose the conventional answer to this sceptical attitude is, that if pressed to its conclusion it would lead to the denial of the possibility of all knowledge, and that if we are to hold any opinion whatsoever we must assume that the individual is able to rise above his limitations and 'know the Cosmos as it is.' But this sort of argument will not have any force with those who deny that there is a Cosmos, and moreover it ignores a large class of facts which it is necessary for philosophy in some way or another to take account of. We can point out certainly to the empirical scientist, as Burtt points out in the case of Newton, that "there is no escape from metaphysics, for every statement involves certain metaphysical postulates; and the most dangerous person is the one who talks metaphysics without realizing the fact." Similarly we can point out to the irrationalist of Mr. Aldous Huxley's type that insomuch as he condescends to argue or present a case he is ipso facto assuming what he is trying to disprove, that is, the possibility of arguments and opinions having some basis independent of the individual's moods and fancies. So too the pragmatist, who defines 'truth' by just such a 'trick of logic' as he condemns the orthodox schools for, is compelled continually to assume that the word has an intrinsic meaning of its own.

But arguments of this sort have only a negative validity. We can insist that there are facts, and that the words 'true' and 'false' must at any rate sometimes mean what they are commonly supposed to mean; but one such fact is, that philosophical opinions can be treated as expressions of personality in a way that scientific opinions cannot be. We are presented with the vicious circle:—

There are facts, and true opinions, and knowledge;

All particular opinions, scientific or otherwise, presuppose other more general philosophical opinions;

Philosophical opinions depend in the last resort on the in-

dividual temperament and point of view.

This circle can be broken only if we are able to re-define our terms in such a way as to reconcile the logical, factual aspect of Truth and Reality with its relative and personal aspects.

II

The last April number of the *Journal* contained two papers on the present trend in philosophy, one by Professor Wilbur Urban and the other by Dr. Kohnstamm, which, though otherwise diametrically opposite in outlook and intention, are at one in recognizing that

r Cf. Dewey's Experience and Nature, p. 2.

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in recent years a fundamental change in our modes of thought has taken place, and that to meet this revolution we need "a new evaluation of the human intellect and its logic." But while Professor Urban contents himself with a mere negative polemic against Modernism in all its forms, Dr. Kohnstamm boldly outlines "some of the most essential features of the new philosophy which I hope will be built by the coming generation." The first of these essential features is the recognition of "Personality as a Constitutive Category of Reality"; and he further concludes that "we have to face the problem whether there is only one Truth or a plurality of Truths, perhaps as many as there are types or even individuals in mankind," and that "perhaps the most necessary thing we want in philosophy is to know what is provable and what is not provable."

These expressions of opinion seem to me profoundly significant. Speaking of the Copernican revolution in astronomy, Dr. Kohnstamm remarks that "there came about not a disproof, but a collapse of the older view; it was weighed by an increasing number of experts in the field and found too light." Similar words might be applied to the revolution in scientific and philosophic thought which is taking place to-day. It is no use appealing, as Professor Urban does, to the 'natural light of reason' and to the necessity of a 'rational and intelligible world,' when these conceptions have been already discarded by a large section of enlightened opinion. The time is approaching when the claims of the older types of philosophy will be disputed no longer, but simply ignored. Philosophy must adapt itself to the new conditions as it adapted itself in the seventeenth century to the theories and discoveries of Galileo, and Dr. Kohnstamm outlines in a masterly way some of the essential features of such an adaptation.

But the conclusions which he reaches raise on a wider scale the problem which I have presented in a small, personal way. When he asserts that "the question whether we ourselves will accept this [or that] whole outlook on the world and life cannot be decided on rational grounds alone," we are led to raise the further question: How far and in what sense can any philosophical opinion claim to be rationally valid? If we have to abandon the old absolute view of Truth, it does not seem to me that the pragmatic or 'illusionist' view will provide a satisfactory substitute; and Professor Urban's protest against the modern cult of the unmeaning and unintelligible supplies within certain negative limits a necessary corrective to what might be called the present 'flight from the rational.' We need, not only to restrict, but to consolidate the claims of reason, and to justify philosophy by re-defining its function. Dr. Kohnstamm's article has encouraged me to try to make some contribution towards this task along the lines which he has himself suggested.

338

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III

Professor Urban attributes the present revolt against the traditional ways of thinking to sheer irresponsibility and perversity, but this hardly goes to the roots of the matter. We have to recognize (1) that there has been an 'irrational streak' running through every development of philosophy; and (2) that the present disillusionment is the natural and direct result of the failure of rationalistic philosophy to justify its own professions. Its claim has been to discover and establish 'eternal verities' on strictly logical grounds; but a single error in a process of deduction must render logically invalid every conclusion reached thereby, just as a single mistake in mathematics may produce not only a wrong solution, but one which is the exact reverse of the correct one; and it is indisputable that there is no positive system of philosophy which is free from logical errors. By logical errors I mean such simple things as Equivocation, Amphiboly, and Begging the Ouestion-as, for instance, Hegel's equivocal use of the word Wesen, which lies at the root of his derivation of Essence as the second main moment of the self-determination of Being; or Mill's ambiguous use of the word 'desirable' on which he relies to prove that pleasure is the chief good. Every philosopher has made mistakes of this kind; so that if the value and appeal of systems of philosophy depended on a strictly logical criterion, we should have to dismiss them all as equally unproven. If Professor Urban finds Plato and Hegel rational and intelligible, Vaihinger and Bertrand Russell irrational and unintelligible, that surely is because the former employ a universe of discourse which is familiar and sympathetic, the latter one which is strange and distasteful. But for others the rôles might be reversed.

If we are to justify the claims of the reason we must be at once more modest and more ruthless. We must recognize the inescapable limitations of argument and logic; and this recognition will involve a more radical self-criticism than any attempted by the logic and epistemology of the Classical Tradition. Logical proof is limited to arguments depending on agreed assumptions, is always, that is to say, hypothetical in the same way that a mathematical deduction is. This means that proof must always be relative or 'immanent,' since it depends on our accepting the assumptions on which the argument is based; and there is probably no set of philosophic axioms which every school and individual is prepared to accept. As different systems of geometry can be built up from different sets of axioms, so different points of view in philosophy might conceivably be developed which contradict each other but are not internally self-contradictory. It is of course well known that disputants whose

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points of view differ too radically are unable to find any common ground of argument: they are like men speaking different languages.

It is a question, however, whether even within these limits strict logicality is a practicable ideal, because the difference between individual points of view cannot be expressed in terms of a definite set of axioms or assumptions, but rather permeates the whole field of discourse. Logicality depends primarily on univocal definition of terms, which in philosophical discourse has never been attempted, and is an ideal to which it is probable we can at best only approximate. The degree of approximation is the limit of possible immanent

logicality of any positive system of philosophy.

But if proof must always be relative, disproof can be absolute, in the sense that a logically unsound argument can always be refuted by accepting the assumptions on which it rests and showing that the conclusions do not follow as they are supposed to follow; so that a philosophical conclusion can be absolutely false, though it cannot be absolutely true. This suggests a distinction between Criticism and Point of View which may be a first step towards reconciling the claims of Truth and of Personality. The rôle of philosophy as a 'critique of prejudices' has of course always been recognized, and the most important work of philosophers has often been more destructive than constructive; but criticism has generally been closely combined with constructive argument and used as a means of establishing positive 'truths.' But if a positive theory must always contain certain irrational elements, it follows that the positive and negative functions of philosophy are not only different but disparate, and that in philosophy there can be no proof by exhaustion. Philosophers cannot of course be content with a merely negative rôle, and even purely destructive criticism must have some positive personal basis; but in view of the present tendency to resolve all rational grounds into an expression of personal prejudice, it is perhaps worth while to insist on the negative validity of logical criticism, and that the philosopher here performs a function which the empirical scientist is not always able to perform for himself.

My major conclusion is that for the limited negative sphere and for the wider positive sphere we require two separate definitions of 'validity.' The positive will have to include the negative, but go

beyond it.

IV

The classical logic has been criticized on various grounds, but its most fundamental defect seems to be its misrepresenting the function of language as essentially rational and indicative: it assumes, that is to say, that any sentence which has the grammatical form of a statement must have some definite objective frame of reference.

It may be said that logic is not linguistics, and that any science must of necessity neglect the irrational elements of its subject-matter. But it is just this neglect of the irrational and expressive elements in thought and language which has obscured their presence within the body of speculative philosophy; and it is undeniable that any system of logic involves certain assumptions about the nature of reality itself. The first assumption of the uncritical person (or perhaps we should rather say, of the uncritical modern European) is that every noun he uses is 'the name of something,' and that every statement he makes is a statement of fact: he assumes, that is to say, that Reality is an external system to which all language necessarily conforms. This same assumption lies behind the classical logic and philosophy. Thus meaning is limited to factual meaning. Judged by such a criterion, a large amount of constructive philosophy has to be dismissed as simply meaningless.

We must start by recognizing that both language and philosophy itself express and interpret the whole of our experience, and that the category of fact is only one aspect of the whole. Facts belong to the cognitive sphere of experience, and to what in that sphere is common and indifferent, that is to say, to the more particular and quantitative interpretations of it; since the wider unmathematical interpretations begin to depend on the personality of the interpreter. The boundaries of this sphere are indefinite and variable, and, however they may be extended by the methods of science, must always remain so. Scientific knowledge, however far it extends, can never transcend the human personal reference. Recent advances in science itself have forced the recognition of this limitation, and so brought about the collapse of the older view of Nature as a 'closed system' external to the observer. This conception, as Dr. Kohnstamm points out, underlay equally the quantitative monism of the classical mechanics and the epistemological monism of the Kantian philosophy.

From this view, which assimilates the whole of experience to the perceptive type of it, we escape by recognizing Personality as a 'Constitutive Category of Reality.' The focus of Reality is shifted. The realism (in the Platonic sense) which underlay all attempts to define Reality in terms either of Matter or of Mind or 'Objective Spirit,' which regards Reality as a self-subsistent system transcending in some way or other the individual, has to be discarded. Individual personality becomes focal, which not only perceives but acts, creates, and appreciates. Thus the subject-object relation, which belongs to

It is worth noticing that the word 'Reality' signifies primarily 'thingness' or 'objectivity,' so that the very use of the word in this inclusive philosophical sense tends to prejudice our judgment. The argument might perhaps be better expressed if we used the word 'Being' instead, and said that Reality is only a single phase or aspect of Being.

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the category of fact, is seen within the category of value to be inapplicable, since conduct and moral judgment belong to the active, not to the cognitive sphere of personality; and the opposition between Nature and The Moral Law is reconciled not in some transcendental realm of ideas, but within the experience and character of the individual man. Allowance has to be made both for what in our experience is private, or at least not common to all (there are, for instance, the limits of nation, of class, of family, as well as of the individual), and for what in our experience is public but not factual; and the different categories of meaning have to be distinguished accordingly. A statement of the form 'A is B' may indicate a fact, but it may express a point of view which is not in the last resort reducible to the category of fact; or it may assert a value which has meaning and reference within the sphere not of fact but of conduct.

Both Pluralism and the relativity of all Truths and Values seem to be a necessary consequence of this shifting the focus of Reality. Monism may indeed be a possible point of view among others; but it seems doubtful, to say the least, whether any monistic system could logically adjust itself to such a position. Fichte at the time of his death was intending to write one more book in which the truth of his philosophy should be demonstrated for all time, so that no one could do anything but accept it. That is the true spirit of the absolutist; but in these days such an attitude is becoming more and more impossible to maintain. A Monist who is willing to allow that those who disagree with him may be neither stupid nor malicious is already on the road to Pluralism.

But though the Pragmatists may have the better of their opponents on these two points, they are hampered by their instrumental theory of truth, which deprives their arguments of any sure basis in logic and language. What is needed is not a single particular definition of Truth-since the long labours of many eminent thinkers have shown that any such univocal definition is an impossibility—but a classification of the kinds of Truth. Dr. Kohnstamm indeed suggests that there may be as many Truths as there are types or even individuals in mankind. But while we may insist that Reality varies from individual to individual, and that there can be no Reality lying altogether outside all personal reference, it seems to me that by making Truth private to the individual we run the risk of depriving the term of all meaning and of falling into a self-contradictory solipsism. Plurality of Truths must depend not on the heterogeneity of individuals, but on the heterogeneous phases of the common human experience. There is the practical or instrumental truth that the pragmatists have made so much of; but there is also the factual truth, and the mathematical truth, and the moral truth. Truth must

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be aligned with meaning; and both Truth and Meaning must vary

according to the different forms and levels of experience.

Since philosophy aims at including and expressing every aspect and level of experience, it follows that its validity must be multiplex. In the sphere of facts it must be true factually, in the moral and human sphere it must be morally valuable, in the use of argument and language it must be valid logically. A Point of View will claim to be 'true' not in an absolute but in an inclusive sense. (Or we might say that 'validity' includes 'truth,' but goes beyond it.)

V

By dissociating our idea of Reality as a whole from that phase or aspect of it which is the matter of common-sense perception and of scientific knowledge, and by freeing the idea of Value from an absolute, external reference, we come to revise our notion of philosophy itself, as being in its positive function not so fundamentally representative as it is expressive and constitutive, resembling in this respect all other activities of the individual will. In presenting his Point of View the philosopher is not merely 'stating facts,' nor yet providing for himself or others a 'working hypothesis,' but is rather trying to remould the existing intellectual framework of Reality. If Reality has always a personal focus, then there can be no philosophy which is not personal, and there can be no question of a philosopher 'transcending the limits of personality,' since that would be the same thing as transcending the limits of Reality. It is not a case of contemplating the Timeless: it is a case of creating the future. That has actually been the rôle of all past philosophers. The significance of Plato depends on the fact that we still live in a partly Platonic world: his Point of View has become a common element in the experience of Europeans; so that he ranks historically with such men as Cæsar and St. Paul, and such others as have left the strong impress of their personality on future generations.

So too when we try to solve the question of how the impersonal, logical, and factual elements of thought and language are to be accommodated to the personal element, we realize that the solution itself must fall within the personal frame: that is to say, it will be more like the solution of some practical problem than of some question of fact or of mathematics. Within the limited sphere of fact and of logic there can be no 'inventing the truth,' and any distinction between my solution and the solution is pointless. But a Point of View transcends the limits of objectivity, and the individual framework of Reality only becomes the framework of Reality in

proportion as it is adopted as such by all.

Yet the individual must claim that his Point of View is valid in

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both an inclusive and a rational sense. Inclusiveness and rationality are the extreme terms of any philosophy, and we have to recognize that these terms are to some extent mutually exclusive. Dr. Kohnstamm declares that "the more we approach these deeper layers of the soul, the greater is the need of harmony between verbal expression and sentiment, but the more difficult is its fulfilment." That is an admission, it seems to me, of the necessary limitations of any philosophy. Only in so far as experience is rationalized can it be expressed philosophically, and in so far as it can only be expressed poetically it lies outside the range of philosophy. That is not to say that the ideal of the 'whole man' is necessarily a delusion, and that we must resign ourselves to feeling and speaking in opposite ways on different occasions: it is rather that no one individual can include within himself the whole range of experience or Being, and that in order to achieve unity and harmony the personality can be organized in other ways beside the pre-eminently rational or intellectual way. The artist-philosopher will enjoy (presumably) a fuller existence than the mere artist or mere philosopher; but such a one cannot achieve harmony except by being something less than a full artist and full philosopher—that is, in so far as we identify philosophy with rationality.

Such an identification is becoming more necessary, since Reality itself tends to become more rational and less poetical as we grow older in civilization. There may be loss as well as gain in that; but it is not the part of philosophy to protest against a tendency which is in accordance with its professed aims. The old rationalist standpoint has indeed fallen into disrepute, not, as I have argued already. because it was 'too rational,' but because it was not rational enough. claiming to be rational where it was in practice poetical. So from the Hegelian extreme of identifying the Rational and the Real we have swung now to the other extreme of holding Reality to be fundamentally irrational. But if we make personality the focus of reality, that means that the question of the rationality of the real is simply a question of our own rationality, and the degree of it will vary as between individuals. Therefore he who proclaims the irrationality of the real is trying to persuade us first and last of his own irrationality and love of the irrational. The old notion of man as potentially a purely rational being has indeed gone by the board; but that is no reason why we should deny to ourselves powers which we are in practice constantly claiming to possess. The validity of the reason within certain limits has to be taken for granted in the same way. that we now take for granted the irrational basis of opinion in temperament and education. It is not a case either of identifying or of opposing the Real and the Rational, but of adjusting the place of the rational within the framework of Reality, and at the

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same time the place of all schemes of Reality (philosophies or Points of View) within the framework of the rational.

The limits of rationality mean the limits of fact and of logical thought and language-one might speak of these as the positive and the negative limit. The sphere of fact is neither definite nor self-contained; but no philosopher, whatever his Point of View may be, can neglect the findings of the scientist nor deny their (limited) significance. He may question the more general conclusions and assumptions of the specialist, but he accepts the general body of scientific knowledge as constituting at least one aspect of Reality. On the other hand, the supposed contrast between empiricism and rationalism depends on treating the world of scientific fact as selfcontained, which it is not; and the empirical attitude is itself one among many possible Points of View. Since the sphere of fact has been and still is being extended by the method of Science, it can be said that our modern Point of View has wider rational grounds than philosophic systems of the past. It is in this sense that Reality itself is becoming more rational; and the positivist view of the relation of science to philosophy seems to be so far correct. But however widely the circle of scientific knowledge may be extended, it will always be the circumference to a personal human centre. Knowledge of facts is not knowledge of Reality (in the wider sense of 'Being' or experience), but an aspect of Reality, which is both known and given and created in experience as a whole.

The limits of logical proof and meaning are more vague even than are the limits of fact. Ambiguity and unintelligibility have always been the bane of philosophers, and the case is perhaps worse to-day than ever it has been. There are many reasons for this: perhaps the fundamental one is that Reality, while it is becoming more rational, is at the same time becoming more individual. In past ages there has always been amid all differences and oppositions of opinion a background of agreement upon certain fundamental assumptions: there existed, that is to say, a certain common intellectual framework of Reality. This framework has now collapsed. Persons differ from each other more radically to-day in 'make up' and Point of View than they have ever done in the Past, and between individuals of utterly different ways of thinking there is no discernible common ground whatever. Reality has become more heterogeneous, and that means that the scope of philosophy is more restricted, and intercommunication far more difficult. Nothing is more common in present-day philosophic criticism than the confession and complaint: 'I cannot understand.' For myself I must confess that time and again I have to break off my philosophic reading in a daze of uncomprehension. It is easy of course to point out that profound thoughts are always difficult to grasp, and that what is new requires time to establish itself; but that argument, though true enough as

PHILOSOPHY

far as it goes, does not cover the whole ground. The critic of a recent work of so-called philosophy, after confessing that a large part of the discussion is utterly unintelligible to him, ends by remarking how "each modern prophet has his own private vocabulary; yet he implicitly claims universality for his findings." There one has it—the claim of an individual Point of View to be true in an absolute, factual sense. If philosophy is to progress with the times, this claim, which is based on a mistaken view of the function of philosophy and the nature of Reality, will have to be abandoned.

But this is not enough: we need a new Logic of Meaning, a far more stringent inquiry than any attempted by the Classical Logic into what is logically permissible in linguistic usage. It is of course true that the language of philosophy can never have the ideal accuracy of a mathematical symbolism, since such accuracy is obtained only by the neglect of every element in experience except the quantitative; so that an attempt to express Reality in terms of mathematical logic (which is what, for instance, Mr. Bertrand Russell tries to do) must result in leaving out of the account all that is humanly most significant. Again, whereas in scientific and historical writing there is always a factual reference, the philosophic Point of View transcends, and so escapes, that reference, and the creative function of philosophy seems to involve a personal and creative use of language; for language itself is a constitutive factor of the intellectual aspect of reality. But if the language of philosophers can never attain a strict scientific accuracy and the method of Spinozistic deduction represents an impossible ideal, it is all the more important to decide what is not allowable to a writer claiming to use language logically: just because philosophy transcends the factual reference the question of Meaning is crucial. Unless we have some impersonal touchstone of intelligibility, we shall be unable to distinguish philosophy from the systems of the theosophists, or from the Prophetic Books of Blake: we shall be unable to distinguish profundity from gibberish. This touchstone must be sought in what Professor Urban calls 'natural language and the logic underlying it.' Professor Urban seems to assume that a well-established criterion of logical usage already exists, but the very fact of the present 'confusion of tongues' in philosophy is evidence that this supposed criterion is inadequate. A common 'universe of discourse,' without which contact and argument between different Points of View are impossible, can be attained only by limiting much more strictly the bounds of logically permissible usage, by a more ruthless criticism of vague and undefined phraseology and tricks of equivocation and hypostatization-in short, by a new Logic of Meaning, which would make philosophy itself more rational and less inclusive.

Death and Renewal, by Paul Bjerre. Cf. The Times Literary Supplement for August 8, 1929.

AN OUTLINE OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY ACCORDING TO THE THEORY OF INHERITED MIND

R. F. RATTRAY, M.A., Ph.D.

One of the great difficulties in effecting a synthesis of experience is the contradiction of the apparently mechanical character of the physical universe on the one hand, and the sense of freedom we associate with life on the other. In our own persons, we are told by medical science, or some of it, we are governed by physiological laws which are mechanical, as distinct from vital, in their nature. The best reconciliation of these with freedom, in the writer's opinion, is the philosophy of Samuel Butler. In studying freedom as experienced by human beings Butler pointed out that a large number of practices which are apparently mechanical are really habits that have become stereotyped, and he drew attention to the fact that human actions can be classified as follows:—

I. We are most conscious of, and have most control over, such habits as speech, the upright position, the arts and sciences, which are acquisitions peculiar to the human race, are always acquired after birth, and are not common to ourselves and any ancestor who has not become entirely human.

II. We are less conscious of, and have less control over, eating, drinking, swallowing, breathing, seeing, and hearing, which were acquisitions of our pre-human ancestry, and for which we had provided ourselves with all the necessary apparatus before human history began, but which are, biologically speaking, recent.

III. We are most unconscious of, and have least control over, our digestion and circulation—powers possessed even by our invertebrate ancestry and, even biologically speaking, of extreme antiquity.

Taking one of these functions, breathing, Butler pointed out that it is an action apparently acquired after birth, with some little hesitation and difficulty, but in a time seldom longer than ten minutes or a quarter of an hour. There would seem to be a disproportion here, he says, between, on the one hand, the extreme intricacy of the process, and, on the other, the shortness of the time taken to acquire the practice, the ease and unconsciousness with which its exercise is continued from the moment of acquisition.

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Butler says that it looks like the repetition of a performance by one who has done it very often before, but who requires just a little prompting to set him off, on getting which the whole familiar routine presents itself before him and he repeats his task by rote. Butler's argument is that the baby learnt to breathe in the persons of its ancestors right back in remote biological times; that the baby is one and the same person as each and all of its ancestors, through whom this accumulating personality has gone; and that this person has been repeating the process of learning to breathe whenever he finds himself in the stage in the recapitulation at which learning to breathe is called for; but the innumerable repetitions have facilitated the process enormously—indeed, it is repeated *in epitome* merely.

Learning to breathe is only one of the functions referred to above, and they are, in turn, representative of vastly more. But they belong to a historical sequence. Learning to breathe, for example, is only one incident in the operation of the Law of Recapitulation—the law that each individual living thing in its growth exhibits features which were characteristic of stages in the ancestry, more or less in the order in which they were acquired.

There is a considerable accumulation of evidence—I will make Professor MacBride stand sponsor—that the ovum and spermatozoon carry over an epitome of the ancestral memories of the whole of their ancestries.

An act leaves some trace in the actor. By repetition this accumulates. The trace becomes a tendency. As regards the development of a new organ, the emergence of a character, all we know is that by repetition of the action, the muscle, for example, develops. The tendency can become so powerful that it can anticipate and bring about formation of the structure required before the actual action of the habit appears.

In repeating in our minds in the usual way a series—for example, a list of events in chronological order—we find that there are units or patches that, for some reason or other, stand out. So, it would appear, in the recapitulation of ancestral memories patches stand out. The earlier in the series the data are, they are the more secure and stereotyped because of the greater repetition, and have become unconscious in corresponding degree. The infant becomes conscious as he emerges to less often repeated experiences.

It is readily objected to the memory theory that, if it were true, we ought to remember individual experiences in the lives of our ancestors. But great repetition is necessary for inheritance, and then it is unconscious or nearly so. The individuals in the ancestry have been merged into one: experiences have become experience.

In each generation the primordial ancestor, in its myriad descen¹ See his The Idea of Memory in Biology.

AN OUTLINE OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

dant impregnated ova, begins to pass rapidly and in "unconscious consciousness" along all the mnemic paths made by all the lines of descent from it—through all the earlier stages of evolution, of which there has been vastly repeated experience; but when it comes to those parts of the courses that have been less trodden it becomes conscious; still, however, where the courses are plain, retaining "unconscious consciousness," as in breathing, digesting, etc.

A sequence of individuals, a species, may initiatively solve problems of living or of adding to its life. It may come into a condition of contentment and cease to progress. It is capacity for new adaptations that counts—not so much the new situation as the new

adapting, whether in reaction to environment or initiatively.

MIND AND MATTER

We cannot explain the rise of experience in inanimate matter. Suppose we look at the problem on the hypothesis that mind can use matter, that mind is not dependent on matter for existence. Suppose an act of consciousness (including will, of course) sets up a vibration which is characteristic of, peculiar to, that particular act of consciousness. This vibration is, as it were, a sort of physical reflexion of the psychic phenomenon.

Around (on this hypothesis) are all sorts of organizations of vibrations, on the one hand, with "minds" corresponding to them, on the other. Now let us view the situation of a psychological "organism" with an organization of vibrations corresponding to it. Vibrations come to it from without. If the subject's vibratory organs vibrate to harmonize with the external vibrations, and if the mind is attuned to receive the psychological experiences corresponding to the vibrations, the psychological experience becomes the experience of the subject (although coloured by subjective factors). Suppose there are two entities, A and B, which come into contact. If A or part of it can enter into B and become identified with B, the process that we designate as assimilation has taken place. Identity depends on the power to maintain characteristic phenomena.

Protoplasm, said Samuel Butler, is what it is because, for a comparatively gross mass of vibrations, it vibrates readily, whilst, on the other hand, it is sufficiently consistent to maintain identity as against surrounding phenomena.

EVOLUTION OF MIND

Let us consider the "original" cell of protoplasm. Cytologists now say that the "simplest" protoplasmic cell manifests an organizing power and purposive striving.

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In order that a cell may live, it must assimilate other bodies. Assimilation may be said to begin with touch. Here is the gate through which, physically speaking, the not-self passes into the self.

Amœba has been "fed" with grains of chalk, and, after trying to assimilate them a few times, has rejected them. Professor Jennings has said, "If Amœba were the size of a dog, no one would think of denying to its actions the name of intelligence."

A "simple" cell is dependent on extent of surface of its body for adequate acquisition of food and air. But it is a physical fact that as a body grows larger its surface proportion to bulk diminishes. In the growing cell, therefore, there is increasing bulk to be maintained through a surface which is, in proportion, diminishing. There is, consequently, a growing tension, and there is a working maximum size. Further growth is attained by the cell splitting into two or more parts.²

When two cells unite, this of course hastens the crisis which brings about the splitting.

Aggregation of cells takes place. Co-operation of the cells in aggregation takes place. Specialization of cells in the organization follows. Surely this cannot be understood without the hypothesis of a unified mind operating for the whole with co-operation from groups of minds.

For the purpose of propagation of the organism, "simple" cells are retained in simple form, but imbued with the differentiated functions of the whole organism.

In the evolution of the animal body, organs not only performed their originally acquired functions, but could also be the correlates of other experience. The oldest feeling experiences of our ancestry are connected with the hearts of our bodies.

When we come to the development of the senses, we find that they all evolved from touch. Smell and taste were the first to emerge. Smell it was that led to the evolution of the brain, and it has been often remarked that smell has peculiar power in recalling associations.

Sight began with the perception of *movement*. The first discrimination in vision was probably between warm colour and cold colour—roughly, yellow and blue. The next, probably, was that of the warm colour into red and green. These four are the "primary" colours. Red-green colour-blindness is comparatively common, but blue-yellow colour-blindness is extremely rare—which would argue that the latter was the earlier discrimination.

It would seem that the movements of fish are instigated and guided by separate working of the senses, not by co-ordination of

1 See MacBride, The Idea of Memory in Biology, p. 8.

² Thomson, J. Arthur, The Study of Animal Life, p. 182, quoted by Coe, Nature versus Natural Selection, p. 576.

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them, although the fish concerned can smell, taste, see, and even hear.

Some of the fishes of the time when the Devonian rocks came into existence took to breathing air in part, and they had also evolved the general groundwork of the vertebrate skull, including every one of the twenty-eight bones in it that man retains.

One of the most important powers developed in the evolution of the mind was the power of recalling past sensations. The first sense to attain cerebral re-representation was smell. Smell was for long predominant. Touch, vision, and hearing were merely auxiliary.

It was the "reptile" forbears of the frogs that first among the higher animals learnt to breathe free air, that first developed what was to be the five-fingered hand, that first produced a voice.

Greater bodily activity was developed, carrying the body clear of the ground. Greater heat was produced. The earliest mammals were small creatures: their increased production of heat was therefore accompanied by a relatively large loss of heat, because, it will be remembered, the smaller the body the larger in proportion is the surface. Hence, to prevent this excessive loss of heat, hair was evolved.2 The Eocene Ice Age, says Coleman, was fatal to the gigantic reptiles such as the dinosaurs, and left the world free for the dominion of the vertebrates whose warm blood and fur or feathers enabled them to triumph over the cold-blooded bareskin reptiles.

Our ancestral reptile became a mammal. By that time it had warm blood, a hairy body, and a muscular diaphragm between lungs and liver. Reptiles had developed the habit of living on dry land. An Amphibian pointed the way in the Upper Carboniferous Age. It retained enough of its older habit to return to water to deposit eggs. The young developed in the water. To that amphibian ancestor we are indebted for fingers and toes, true lungs, a wagging tongue, and vocal cords.

An important factor in the evolution of man was the development of the care of offspring. The higher evolved animals have great recapitulations to go through,3 and care of offspring is necessary while all but the latest stages of the recapitulation are in progress. In the earliest stages of recapitulation the offspring is carried in the body of the mother. But, provided the offspring is safeguarded,

The last three paragraphs are based on Ward, Psychological Principles.

² As mammals grew larger they could afford to shed their hair, since their

surfaces were relatively less in extent in proportion to their bulk.

3 There is an evident relation between length of period of growth and length of life. The cat grows for 11/2 years, and lives 8; the dog 21/2, and lives 12 or 14; the horse 5, and lives 25 to 30; the camel 8, and lives 40. All the larger animals live about five times their growing period. (Dorsey.)

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the sooner the offspring can be born the better, in primitive conditions of life especially. There are obvious reasons why birth takes place before the offspring is able to look after itself. Nourishment is provided in transitional form; recapitulation permits of new habits being grafted; in the case of the mammal, milk is pumped into the offspring before the latter has learnt to suck.

An important development that emerged was the continued association of offspring after birth with parent. Thus arose the possibility of education.

It is significant in this connexion that in the mammals a development in the brain, in the pallium, arises somewhat suddenly to importance. At this stage greater responsibility is thrown on the brain to cope with the increased development of intelligence.

It is the surface of the body that is in contact with the external world, and therefore the being is dependent on the surface of its body as means of communicating information about the external world. Thus, firstly, within limits, extent of surface is important. But here again the law of the relation between extent of surface and bulk comes in: as a body increases in size its growth of surface does not keep proportionate to its growth in volume. With rapidly increasing bulk there is only slowly increasing surface area and only slowly increasing brain stem with pallium. Therefore it does not pay to become gigantic. Secondly, however, quality of surface for communicating information about the external world is important And thirdly, of course, the intelligence with which it is used.

In becoming acquainted with the external world limbs are important. Limbs afford not only the positional signs of passive touch, but also positional signs obtained by movement. Hence the most mobile parts of the body have the keenest "spatial sense" and the least mobile the bluntest.

The power of recalling and co-ordinating sense impressions was developed; the organ developed for this purpose was the neopallium. The neopallium is a part of the cerebral cortex; as already indicated, it attains an important functional significance only in mammals. Sensations of sight, hearing, and touch are co-ordinated here, as a result of which we are able to appreciate the various properties of the object which appeals to more than one of these senses; here are compared our present impressions with similar or contrasted impressions from the past.

When our ancestors took to tree-life, scent was gradually diminished; in pallial re-representation it was gradually crowded out. As the snout was gradually used less for smelling and grasping, and sight was used more for becoming acquainted with environment,

¹ Can you remember the scent of violets in the entire absence of any actual scent? Can you dream a scent?

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gradually there developed recession of the snout and procession of the eyes. Through grasping, touch was developed. It is important to remember, in this connexion, that by touching an object, the animal may not only learn about the object, but in the contact may also learn about itself. In grasping, an enormously important development was that of the opposable thumb.

There developed the hand. Because of its specialization as the organ of touch, the hand is the final arbiter of comparative magnitude. In vision the apparent size of an object is relative to its distance from the eye. The eye really sees things in the flat; it is the motion and the hand that determine size and

solidity.

As the hand supplanted the mouth as a prehensile organ, the snout receded and the head became poised more directly above the neck, and thus became more easy to turn. Arboreal life, with the use of the hands as prehensile organs, calls for exact perspective or plastic vision: hence procession and conversion of the eyes. Vision evolved from the periscopic or panoramic vision of the defenceless herbivora, like the hare or the rabbit, whose food is stationary, and most of which herbivora need to beware of enemies on the horizon; through the binocular vision of the carnivora, which need accurate vision at close quarters to adjust their movements instantaneously to those of their prey in front of them; to the stereoscopic vision of the Primates, whose arboreal habits and use of the hands as prehensile organs develop this.

Another of the important changes induced by tree-life was in respect of reproduction. The primitive mammalian stock was very fecund, but a large litter or a long pregnancy is incompatible with arboreal activity. Hence ensued reduction of the family and the tendency to produce very immature and dependent

offspring.2

The Primates were at first a small and humble folk who led a quiet, unobtrusive and safe life among the branches of the trees, taking small part in the fierce competition for size and supremacy that was being waged upon the earth by their carnivorous, ungulate, and other brethren. But all the time they were cultivating the equable development of all their senses and limbs, and the special development of the more intellectually useful faculties of the mind that in the long run were to make them the progenitors of the dominant mammal. It is the wider triumph of the individual who specializes late, after benefiting by many-sided experience in early life, over him who in youth becomes tied to too narrow a calling. It is one of the greatest assets of our stock that no one element was

Ward, Psychological Principles.

² The offspring clings to the mother.

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selected for undue specialization: the changes in hand and eye and brain were co-ordinated into a harmonious growth.

An important element, as we have seen, in the success of the Primates was the development of the hands as means of getting to know the external world, and they also enable the animal to get to know its own body as in the external world. They may feel, examine, and test practically every part of the surface of the body, and the animal can now treat its own body as a novel object and learn about it. The eyes may also examine almost all the body, and the animal then has a picture of its own exterior. This is important in the development of "self"-consciousness.

Only pictured movements are represented through the cortex of the brain. In the central furrow of the brain, in the pre-central cortex, are the centres of motor control, and it is significant that the centre for the control of the muzzle is followed by that of the thumb. What the sensory or post-central area of the cerebral cortex is concerned with is the awareness of the parts of our bodies as projected in space. Movements, not muscles, are represented through the cortex. What the being's hands feel, its eyes can picture. The cortex becomes a storehouse of pictured movements. The rôle of the higher centres appears to be that of inhibition. What the cortex controls is the voluntary muscles. It is a common experience that in learning to swim, for example, the tiro one day realizes that the thing is possible, and having attained the cortical knowledge that he is able to swim, he will never again be unable to swim. The cerebral significance of this is that the action has achieved cortical control.

"From calling up pictures of past associations of pictured movements there is perhaps a step towards constructing conceptions of future movements evoked by hypothetical circumstances." An animal without what is called "neopallial kinæsthetic area" has only internal consciousness. An animal with a kinæsthetic area has pictured consciousness. An animal with a developing pre-frontal association area has in addition the faculty of building up pictures of possible future actions. Here we have three stages of what are commonly called consciousness, conscience, and ideals of conduct.3

The passing from "internal consciousness" to "pictured consciousness" is one of the most important stages in evolution. Consciousness of external things as such is developed. The being emerges in consciousness from preoccupation with the body sensed internally, as

r Elliot Smith, The Evolution of Man, pp. 25-6; Wood Jones, The Matrix of the Mind, pp. 146-7. This paragraph, quoted from them, seems to me to contain one of the greatest lessons of history. The power of adapting oneself, of initiative, and of overcoming difficulties is in the long run to be conserved even at the sacrifice of the most successful specialized adaptation to present conditions.

² Wood Jones, Arboreal Man.

³ Ibid., p. 192 sqq.

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it were. It begins to work in the external world and to leave off the development of new organs. Historically the transition was characterized outwardly by the use of tools. The beginning of the use of tools is found in simians.

The simian or monkey psychology lies at the base of post-natal human life-curiosity, imitation, high emotionalism. With regard to the last-mentioned point, the feeling displayed by monkeys for others of their kind in pain is of the most affecting nature. They also reveal vanity in high degree and corresponding sensitiveness to ridicule. Cases are recorded of monkeys which mocking laughter or

even a single sharp word or glance has driven frantic.

Monkey types also develop social characters of other kinds. Social types of animals belong to the last geological period. This stage in our ancestry may be represented by such animals contemporary with ourselves as baboons. Baboons live in enormous herds, which at night-time sleep huddled together for warmth. There is conflicting evidence on the following point, but it is alleged that they post sentinels. If they are attacked, the whole band sets up a furious roaring, screaming, and howling; the most powerful males throw themselves upon the enemy with terrible rage; they protect the weak and young, and fight valiantly to save them from the aggressors; they bring the wounded into safety and set a rearguard for the old as they retreat. They help, defend, and avenge any member of the troop who is wounded, and rely on each other's assistance.

Baboons are capable of building a shelter of branches. Both the gorilla and the orang-utan can throw stones very straight and roll rocks down a hillside. Apes walk with the help of sticks, and fling stones, boughs, and prickly fruits at the heads of their enemies. With stones, too, they can break nuts. The chimpanzee builds a little hut out of tree-trunks, which is very similar to that of savage

man.

Apes eat not only fruit and nuts, but also eggs and small animals. The taking of animals requires alertness. Some apes hunt even antelope and large bush-buck. So in hunting, our ancestors learnt from their contests with larger animals: hunting and defence led to concerted action. Among apes discipline is maintained by the oldest males in the troop. Language gets at least as far as distinctive sounds, cries of warning, appeals for affection, demands for help, calls for and announcements of food, threats, and other indications of passion, fear, and feeling.

It is said that a gorilla practises a rude sort of music by beating trees with a stick, in addition to striking his chest for the sake of hearing the resounding noise. It is credibly attested that a dead ape is dropped into a hole in the ground, if one can be found, but in any case a great heap of sticks and branches is piled on the body.

Many kinds of apes at the present time, when they descend from the trees to hunt, habitually walk on their hind legs, leaving their hands free.

It was probably in the Miocene that the ancestors common to Man, Gorilla, and Chimpanzee became separated into groups. It is known that by the time our ancestor was on the way to become a gibbon or a man he had definitely parted with an external tail and had begun to acquire such differentiation of the muscles of face, mouth, and throat that he could put "expression" in his face and character in his voice.

This ancestor of man left the trees and took to the open country. The exposed life developed intelligence further, and sight was developed by distance. This new life also developed what is the distinguishing physical feature of man-the feet. But the planting of the feet flatly on the ground was only gradually acquired. "It is the arboreal footpoise which leads children to make holes in the outer sides of the soles of their shoes."2 "The newborn baby has comparatively powerful arms, so that when it grasps a stick it can support its own weight; but it has feeble, short, crooked legs, and so it strongly resembles in its proportions one of the anthropoid apes, which may be regarded as the immediate ancestors of the human race, and this resemblance still persists in the little toddler who has learnt to walk. With curved thighs, weak ankles, and soles that tend to turn inward, the little one resembles in its gait the gibbon."3 The specialization of the legs and feet, as it proceeded, made possible the further specialization of the hands, ridding them of the task of assisting locomotion.

The gorillas that are the nearest relatives of the human race are harmless and peaceable, living chiefly on bamboo roots and leaves. Possibly, when they have the opportunity, they may take eggs, grubs, or even young birds, but they are vegetarian as a rule. They spend most of their time on the ground, although they climb trees in search of food and to make their nests or beds. They live the kind of life that was probably that of the earliest human beings, before the invention of weapons or the use of fire or even of fixed abodes, for the nests are made one day to be abandoned the next. An important character of our ancestors who became men was the social nature of their life. In this connexion it has been remarked by Morris, in *Man and his Ancestor*, that all the strikingly intelligent creatures are strongly social in their habits, and no decided display of intelligence is to be found among species whose individuals lead a solitary life. "As iron sharpeneth iron, so a man sharpeneth the

Dorsey, The Nature of Man, p. 34. Wood Jones, Arboreal Man, p. 205.

³ MacBride, The Idea of Memory in Biology, p. 15.

countenance of his friend." On the other hand, communism has not been biologically successful. One characteristic of communal creatures is that they become mentally specialized. They round up their powers, build barriers of habit, over which they cannot pass, perform the same acts with such interminable iteration that what began as intellect sinks into instinct. The non-communal but social creatures, on the contrary, retain versatility. There is some measure of work for the group, some mutual aid, some evidence of leadership and subordination, but these are confined to a few exigencies of life, while in most of the details of existence each member of the group acts for itself.

The insects—ants certainly, and probably bees and termites—had developed their extraordinarily complex social life, with its precise division of labour among specially adapted classes of the community, many millions of years before man appeared on the earth. Some insects make, and apparently communicate habitually by, sounds far outside the range of our hearing, Some moths seem to excel in acuteness of smell the hound as much as the hound excels us. Insects must at one period have come near to being the dominant form of life on the globe, and many believe that, if for any reason the human race should dwindle, it would dominate again. Nothing in nature is more terrible than the advance of an army of one of the more savage tribes of what are called Visiting Ants-"miniature wild beasts of incredible voracity and fierceness"—in the path of which no other creature, great or small, can stay and live. By what slow processes, through what indeterminable ages their elaborate social systems were developed and the different classes came to be so highly specialized each for its appropriate work-how they acquired their knowledge of the various industries (dairying, fungus-growing, and the rest) which they practise, or, still more, arrived at the perfection of unanimous action without any word of command or imposed authority (the very ideal of a free democracy), together with complete laboriousness and self-devotion, so that every member of a nest or hive gives its life instantly for the common good-how did all these things come to be? All we can say with certainty is that these creatures, millions of years in advance of man's coming into being, attained a perfection of social organization which in many ways man has not yet approached; and that, having attained it, they have stood absolutely still, incapable, apparently, of any further progress, since, let us say, some time in the Oligocene. It has been observed that this has been the fate not only of one species of ant or bee or wasp or termite, but essentially the same course has been followed by a dozen or more quite different groups of insects. All ants seem to have been originally carnivorous or entomophagus. Some still are; but the transition of many species, in the course of their social development, to a milk and vegetable diet, involving the keeping of aphides and fungus-culture, has a curious similarity to the progression of man from a hunting to a pastoral and agricultural life. Forel quotes Espinas to the effect that ants set us the first example of property-owning, in land as in herds and gardens. (This footnote was put together from a review in The Times Literary Supplement.)

Here again we see the vastly important lesson we read above—that the power of adapting oneself, of initiative and of overcoming difficulties, is in the long run to be conserved even at the cost of the most successful adaptation to present circumstances.

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In the case of the solitary forms such new conceptions die with the individual. Though they may exert influence on the development of the nervous system, and aid in the transmission of more active brain powers, they are lost as special ideas, fail to be taken up and repeated by other members of the same species. This is not the case with social animals. Each of them has some faculty of observation and some tendency to imitation, and useful steps of advance are likely to be observed and retained as general habits of the community. New ideas are of rare occurrence: they generally come from the few to the many.

Concerted action among the sub-human ancestors of man developed means of communication. The "speech" of the lower animals is a vowel form of speech. A cry of warning may be so modulated as to indicate to the hearer, "Beware, an enemy is coming!" or something such. Accent or tone is all-important. This level of speech lacks the consonantal element, the characteristic of articulation.

Gesture is anterior to articulated speech. Indeed, true speech originally was and fundamentally is produced by gesture in the mouth, seeking to act that which it is desired to communicate, and breath being emitted at the same time, so that the sound is characterized by the gesture.² Emotions produce "natural" muscular effects, including those affecting the mouth and the throat, and the emission of breath communicates them.

Even in the primitive and aberrant *Pithecanthropus* there was already a noteworthy and highly significant overgrowth of the area of the cerebral cortex corresponding to that of the human brain, interference with which leads to a disturbance or a loss of power to understand the meaning of spoken language.3

The significance of speech is that it provides symbols that are intimate and easily usable, and not only as means of communication between the members of one generation, but also for handing on such accumulated experience as may be. Then there is added the outcome of the attempts to explain and interpret such experience.

This new medium of the development of intelligence led to the increased development of "association areas" between the areas of specialized functions in the brain which characterizes the final stage of brain development, which distinguishes man from the lower animals.

Cerebral activity, as it develops, engrosses attention and much of the energy available for the total vital activity.4

For the last two paragraphs, Morris, Man and his Ancestor, p. 79 sqq.

² Sir Richard Paget, Bart., The Nature of Human Speech, and, more recently, Human Speech.

³ Elliot Smith, Evolution of Man, p. 64.

⁴ Man is less able than lower animals to regrow damaged organs. Prolonged quiescence of cerebral activity renders possible healing and repairing of 358

AN OUTLINE OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

So far as his instincts and emotions are concerned, there is little essential difference between man and the apes. But in virtue of his enormously heightened powers of discrimination and his ability to profit by experience, man has learnt to *control* his instincts and emotions to a greater degree, in the sense of having them in conscious control.

A CROSS-SECTION OF LIFE AT THE HUMAN LEVEL

On the memory theory of heredity consciousness and memory extend to the most primitive forms of life whatever they may be, and the consciousness of man is an inherited fusion of the consciousnesses of his ancestry right back.

In a real sense we are made up of cells, and the deep-seated con-

sciousnesses of the ancestry of cells matter deeply to us.

It is evident that life is motivated by the deep-seated instinct which prompts to maintain the self and to enlarge it. In this process, as we have seen, assimilation is necessary. Now Butler it is who appears to have recognized first the central importance of what I venture to call the Law of Assimilation or the Law of Familiarity and Unfamiliarity: it runs throughout life: To be assimilated heartily a thing must be neither too familiar nor too unfamiliar to the assimilator.

It appears that the self instinct asserts itself, to a great extent, blindly. It takes on successive forms, and these interpenetrate all

those that succeed them.

The primitive hunger is for sustenance. Assimilation by proto-

plasmic cell is fundamental physically.

The splitting of a cell into two or more cells is the foundation of the generations. The new cells are the young; they are youth; they have the respite, in which to acquire, until they grow to the maximum size at which the crisis described above arises.

When two young cells unite they commingle different and yet similar experiences: they assimilate each other mentally and physically. This is the foundation of sex union. The mixture of protoplasmic strains confers advantage—on the principle that two strains with their accumulated experience are better than one.

organs, that may not take place if the being continues "at work." It is not absurd to suppose that by hypnosis remarkable extension of this healing and repairing power may take place. Both in hypnosis and somnambulism the subconscious mind acts with remarkable precision, which may be interpreted by the theory that all the vital forces being grouped round a single idea without consideration or distraction gives a great power and sureness of action. This is what strikes us as "inhuman" in animals, and, in the hypnotic somnambulistic state referred to, there appears to be a curious regression to animality: the subconscious, deprived of conscious direction, seems to recover for the time the sureness characteristic of "animal instinct." (Geley, From the Unconscious to the Conscious, pp. 70, 223, 255.)

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The union of cells makes the crisis which brings about splitting, described above, come with correspondingly hastened incidence.

One type of cell tends more to, and develops the habit of, going out for the satisfaction of union, whilst another type tends more to wait for, to attract the other cell for this satisfaction. This is the foundation of the sexes. Sex-craving comes to be one of the strongest drives towards action, taking second place only to hunger, fear, and pain, which are fundamental to the self-preservative tendency.

In the organism of cells, specialization of function is controlled by the central power in the organism. For the purpose of union, "simple" cells are retained in simple form, but imbued with the differentiated functions of the whole organism of cells—the epitomized memory of their ancestry, indeed.

Above the lowest *metazoa* (*i.e.* multicellular organisms) beings are visibly differentiated in sex. It seems that in an individual one sex may be dominant and the other recessive in an infinity of proportions.

The origin of the separation between plant and animal may be found, as Butler suggested, in the specialization of organisms that go after food as against those waiting for food to come to them.

In the evolution of the animal body, organs not only performed their original or acquired functions, but could also be the correlates of other experience. The oldest feeling experiences of our ancestry are connected with the hearts of our bodies.

In the operation of the sex instinct there is an element of knowing. Here, again, for the experience to be vigorous, the object must be neither too familiar nor too unfamiliar. Sex interest is very much a matter of the unfamiliar, which may be dulled through familiarity. So also in the other instincts there is a strong element of desire for that which is neither too familiar nor too unfamiliar.

The skeletons of men surviving from prehistoric times are not very easily distinguished from the skeletons of women that survive, whereas in the case of modern man the distinction is obvious. This is probably connected with that turning-point in the history of human sex that is marked by the development of the home with woman as the homekeeper. Consistent with the distinction between the sexes of the male going out to seek while the female waits to receive, so the male went out to get food while the female kept home

Man is thus largely motivated by "instincts," which, on the Butlerian theory, are embodied in inherited habits, proclivities, dispositions, memories. Among the chief that may be designated are the instincts to self-preservation; food; sex; possession; power; and the herd instinct.

FROM THE HUMAN STAGE

Sir James Jeans, in *The Universe Around Us*, has given his estimates that life has been on the earth for three hundred million years, 360

AN OUTLINE OF GENETIC PSYCHOLOGY

and man for three hundred thousand. As this would lead us to expect, and for reasons already indicated, in the inheritance of mind it is the mental phenomena associated with the adaptation of the body, whose inheritance is most secure and unconscious. Man, as he became less dependent on hand-to-mouth methods of living, had removed from him the immediate stimuli of physical pain. Any progress he made, therefore, was dependent less on these and more on his own initiative. Tools make possible the socialization of the means of production, distribution, and exchange. An inferior man with a superior tool can, ad hoc, keep off certain physical pains. But if man relieves himself from applying himself, he does not progress, and may deteriorate. Ideas that count arise in the very exceptional individual.

But modern man inherits deep-seated habits acquired since man became man. To primitive man the unfamiliar and unexplained was supernatural. Before it his mind bowed in awe and deprecation. He projected himself into the "spirits" of the things that encompassed him. He believed that certain things were forbidden by the supernatural. Things were spirits with characters suggested to primitive man by the impressions made on him by their forms and apparent actions. Such were animals. In his experience he was naturally deeply actuated by his instinctive hungers, such as for food and sex experiences. Hence his cultus of fertility and his use of sex symbols. The mother knew how to produce life. Water brought fertility. In time of drought a person exceptionally sensitive to coming rain might express desire for rain and the rain might follow. Thus emerged the wizard. He became a person of great power, impressing the mind of the tribe most deeply. Fertility, the success of the tribe, rested on him. Here is the divinity that doth hedge a king. He is the prototype of king, priest, doctor, professor, lawyer, judge. When he dies, he enters into greater power.

Arising out of these ideas came the belief in magic. Magic was based on the instincts for repetition, rhythm, hypnotism, illusion, suggestion. They were all connected with emotion that called forth great excitement and suggestibility: hence fetishism, the magic use

pwords and language, poetry, sacred writings.

Race appears to be due to the habits ingrained, physical and mental, among people who have been segregated (as against intermarriage) for a long period. Such habits, once ingrained, are, by the same token, very persistent. The longer a group of people remain politically united, the closer does the "physiological unit" become, and the more quickly and thoroughly, within the stipulated limits, does it assimilate alien elements. The narrower the territory, so does relationship mount to the hundredfold and thousandfold.

Crossing appears to follow the Law of Familiarity and Unfamiliarity, not only in living things in general, but in man. Mating that

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is neither of the two similar (inbreeding) nor of the too dissimilar is good, but if the cross is too violent or of the too similar, harm or sterility results.

Adversity that is responded to by superior application produces character. "Family," in the sense of a number of successive generations of persons who have lived well, "counts."

Sex inheritance is not exclusively of one sex or the other, but one sex is dominant and the other is recessive. Sex instinct was modified importantly by the establishment of the home with woman as home-keeper. One consequence of this was that the male, going abroad, was stimulated more by greater variety of females; on the other hand, woman was by her domestic duties kept closer to some of the realities of life. Woman is more primitive, childlike, conservative, superstitious, conventional. Man is more venturesome, unconventional—for evil and for good; there is more crime, for example, among men, but, on the other hand, there are more geniuses.

The sex instinct is so strong that it creates illusion. Sex passion is more widely distributed in the lives of men, but is in women, on their occasions, stronger. Large and central tracts of "art" are occupied with "love," although its real place in life is other. Much of what appeals to a man as beauty in woman is not beauty as such, but marked feminine characters that appeal to him as a male. When a woman thinks of her lover it is as the father of her children. In the sub-human world of life it is the male that specializes in ornament; in the human world it is the female who does so: she has passionate interest in dress and decoration.

But although one sex may be dominant physically, the mental characters of the other sex may be dominant or recessive in varying degrees.

Ideas that count arise in the very exceptional individual. Some years ago a President of the British Association said:—

"Annul the work of a few hundreds—I might almost say scores—of men, and on what plane of civilization should we be? We should not have advanced beyond the mediæval store without printing, chemistry, steam, electricity, or surgery, worthy the name. . . . To improve by subordinate invention, to discover details missed, even to apply knowledge never before applied, all these things need genius in some degree, and are far beyond the powers of the average man of our race; but the true pioneer, the man whose penetration creates a new world, as did that of Newton or Pasteur, is inconceivably rare. But for a few thousands of such men, we should perhaps be in the Palæolithic era, knowing neither metals, writing, arithmetic, weaving, nor pottery."

¹ Quoted by Spurrell, Modern Man and his Forerunners, p. 149.

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True as this is, how true is it also of profound truth, goodness, beauty?

The generations of the past are closer to us than we commonly think. 2" is the total number of anyone's ancestors for a given number of generations. Every man alive to-day had about the year 1000 a milliard ancestors. "Reckoning back to the Norman Conquest," it has been said, "I find myself provided with 67,108,864 great-g

The generations are nearer to us, in another sense, than we usually think. There are ten thousand or so generations between our ape-like ancestors and ourselves. Reckoning three generations to a century, again, we find that there are only some sixty between us and the generation of Julius Cæsar, or some nine between us and Shakespeare. If we imagine one representative of each generation standing next to one representative of the immediately preceding and of the immediately succeeding generation in a row, we see that we are not widely separated.

MENTAL INHERITANCE AND THE INDIVIDUAL

In the individual development of the child, the epitomized series of the acquirements of the ancestry is gone through. The subconscious consciousness may follow various elements in the accumulated heredity. The infant becomes self-conscious as it arrives at stages with which, in recapitulating, it is less familiar, and at which depends more on external stimuli. Growth in each generation, thus according to the Law of Recapitulation, new experience and added the while—as it were on top.

It has been claimed that the baby likes to experiment; the child of three to four to imitate; children of six and seven like to play at hunting or fighting; children from seven to nine are said to be fond of competing with others; and children of twelve and over go in for co-operative play. The characteristically human long leg is not fully developed until late in childhood.

In each being there is a subconscious controlling consciousness. In the depth of subconsciousness are all the infinitely multifarious

Dr. J. Reaney, Lecturer in Hygiene at Furzedown Training College, in a lecture given during "Education Week," 1929, reported in *The Times*.

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and yet unified experiences of the ancestry; especially potent, of course, are the vastly repeated ones, the ancestral habits, in pro-

portion to their repetition.

But inheritance is not only within the mind. During the history of mankind there has grown up a cloud of traditions and beliefs, to the influence of which every human being is exposed from the day of his birth and throughout his life. It is this almost wholly artificial intellectual and moral atmosphere which colours his outlook on life and provides him with the ready-made apparatus for interpreting his own real experience. The range of true judgment is, in fact, extremely limited in the vast majority of human beings. Instincts, emotions, the unconscious influence of the environment in which an individual has grown up—these play an enormous part in all his decisions, even though he may give a rational explanation of the motives for many of his actions without realizing that they were inspired by causes utterly alien to those which he has given—and given without any intention of dishonesty—in explanation of them.¹

The symbolisms which man has evolved are most inadequate. "Language," for example, as R. L. Stevenson said, "is but a poor bull's-eye lantern wherewith to show off the vast cathedral of the world." This is true, although every word we speak and, in even greater degree, every sentence involves a complex symbolism and various shades of meaning determined by the emotions and personal experience of the speaker. Language is, of course only one example of symbolism, which, again, is a form of convertion. The herd instinct operates with enormous power. The inertial of tradition or public opinion, and the lack of courage to defy them when evidence fails to conform to them, seem to be potent to blind all but the ablest and most fearless of men to the most patent face. Courage of the kind indicated is the rarest of human virtues.²

Note.—The writer wishes to acknowledge a special to Wood Jones, Arboreal Man, which he has been unable to indicate in the text.

Elliot Smith, Evolution of Man, p. 65. 2 Elliot Smith, Human History.



PHILOSOPHY IN FRANCE

COURNOT AND RENOUVIER

THERE are, I imagine, five considerations that will serve as a point d'appui to the future historian of our century's philosophy, aiding him to interpret with fair adequacy the working faith and working postulates of one large and influential group of present thinkers. The members of this group, he will point out, however much they differ in other respects, accept in common and act upon this five-fold assumption, namely, that progress in philosophy depends upon (i) it abandoning its traditional claim to being systematic and final, in favour of "more modest" attempts at the piecemeal solution of particular problems; (ii) these piecemeal attempts being conceived as essentially co-operative undertakings, calling for assistance from men of science no less than from philosophers, so that (iii) the character of philosophical research is broadly not very dissimilar to that of scientific research; that this, in turn, necessitates (iv) an abandonment of the claim to, and the search for, "necessary" and certain knowledge, and an acceptance of knowledge that is probable as rationally sufficing; from all of which it follows, lastly, as something very like a corollary, that (v) philosophers can deal profitably only with "hypothetical questions," seeking to discover, from certain things provisionally taken as true, what other things may or must also be true. It is by these methodological convictions, by some declared, by others not, that much of the best work in Britain and America during this first third of our century has been inspired. And it is in harmony with the first four of them that the finest work in France on the "philosophy of the sciences" has been conducted throughout a period twice as long. Those methodological ideas are too often regarded in this country as being wholly original and brand-new innovations on the part of a certain few British philosophers still living. But I surmise future historians will show with little difficulty that this imputation is excessive, and will make due correction when the story of this cortemporary movement is read as an episode in the account of interaction esetween science and philosophy during the last hundred years. For that four of those five proposals were advanced and illustrated very effectively some seventy years ago in the works of that exceedingly 'modern' mind. Antoine Augustin Cournot. His natural proclivities, training and philosophical conclusions, his insistence on the intimate connexion between the sciences and philosophy, explain indeed precisely why his work encountered almost complete indifference during his own times (when the somewhat inflated 'eclecticism' of the Cousin school was flourishing) and why it should claim the sympathetic interest of present philosophers, who will at the outset be attracted rather than discouraged by his programme and the scheme of 'philosophic reform' it introduces. In the first half of the nineteenth century Cournot was esteemed almost wholly for the manner in which he discharged his official function of Inspecteur-Générale de l'Instruction Publique. Mathematics were his preferred studies in early life. They led him to the doctorate in science and to his first publications on the theory

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of functions and the calculus and on the theory of probabilities, the last of which Czuber ranks with the classic works of Laplace and Bernoulli. His later renown, however, derives entirely from three somewhat massive philosophical works of unusual brilliance, the Essai sur les fondements de nos connaissances et sur les caractères de la critique philosophique (1847; republished 1912), the Traité de l'Enchaînement des idées fondamentales dans les sciences et dans l'histoire (1861; republished 1922), and Matérialisme, Vitalisme, Rationalisme (Paris: 1875), in which the whole is resumed. Though, as M. Lévy-Bruhl tells us, Cournot's fortune was a peculiar one, for his works, like Hume's, "fell still-born from the press," time has redressed the indifference. Negatively, they were a bulwark against the excesses of Comtist empiricism; positively, they have furnished the orientation for much of even most recent epistemology, as well as suggestive discussions of many frontier issues in science and philosophy.

That the present worth of Cournot's writings is in the main unimpaired and his lessons as yet but incompletely assimilated is plainly the inference to be drawn from the delightful volume of studies by that careful and erudite scholar, the late Gaston Milhaud of the Sorbonne, who was, like his subject, mathematician turned philosopher, and a mind, one suspects, singularly like Cournot's. His six chapters deal with the development of Cournot's thought, his doctrines of Reason, of Chance and its relation to the Aristotelian conception, his final views on Science and Religion, and his attitude vis-à-vis "contemporary scientific pragmatism." Some of these topics are also treated in a further volume by M. F. Mentré, who has chosen to handle his material in a much freer manner than M. Milhaud. Cournot's writings are not prolix like Comte's, but so compact, that Renouvier declared that two volumes would be necessary to give anything like a fair account of them. So, not to attempt the impossible, I shall confine myself to a few observations on several salient matters discussed by Milhaud and Mentré that are likely to be of current interest.

Cournot's Essay, his principal work, insists from beginning to end on the intimacy of the connexion between the sciences and philosophy. The last is understood as a criticism of the general results reached in the particular sciences, therefore as essentially epistemological. To assess the worth of accepted knowledge and define the limits of our cognitive competence is possible only by examining the most general interpretative concepts that humanity has actually used and developed in the history of its sciences. Cournot's analysis is directed, not to establishing a set of fundamental categories, but to eliciting, from scientific knowledge acquired, the most general principles ingredient in it, which are to be accepted as ultimately valid and already guaranteed by their pragmatic success, and therefore open, not to rejection on any metaphysical ground, but only to clearer formulation and correlation. Science thus inevitably leads to philosophy, for every science contains "a positive part" (susceptible of direct verification by empirical facts that are subject to experimental control) and a part that is "theory," in which facts are apprehended in relation to certain principles that are interpretative of them. To disengage, formulate and render harmonious such conceptions, principles or bodies of "theory" is essentially a rational occupation, and the proper business of philosophy. Now such idées fondamentales as those of number, force, matter, life, etc., are very variously analysed by

Paris: Beauchesne. Pp. 244. 20 fr.

¹ G. Milhaud, Etudes sur Cournot. Bibliothèque d'Histoire de la Philosophie. 1927. Paris: Vrin. Pp. 151. 15 fr.

² F. Mentré, Pour qu'on lise Cournot. Bibliothèque des Archives de Philosophie. 1927.

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different thinkers, but this diversity in no way affects the laws established through employing those ideas in the sciences. "The intimate union and yet primitive independence of the philosophical element and of the positive or properly scientific element in the system of human knowledge shows up clearly in mathematics in the remarkable fact that while the mind cannot proceed with regularity in scientific construction without adopting one or another philosophical theory, nevertheless the progress and certainty of the science does not at all depend on the solution given to the philosophical question." Philosophy, then, is concerned with the sciences at two junctures: initially, to criticize their primitive working conceptions and postulates; later, to comprehend and correlate their eventual findings, and to treat any problem they may have raised by the way and abandoned because its resolution does not fall within their purview. These diverse though complementary efforts have a common inspiration in motives radically philosophical. And the problems science 'raises,' but leaves to philosophy for settlement, should be treated by methods as similar as possible to those used in science, so that as high a degree of probability may be secured for their solutions. Philosophical criticism so conceived becomes what M. Mentré calls a "probabilisme rationnel," which, when certainty is unattainable, is content with approximations and probable results. "We must be satisfied," he says, "with high probabilities in the conclusions of philosophical problems, just as we are satisfied with them in the results reached in physics, history and daily life." So, in his penultimate chapter, when he examines the systems of Plato, Descartes, Leibniz and Kant in relation to his own probabilisme, all are censured for aspiring to demonstrative certainty where, from the nature of the case, only "philosophic probability" is attainable.

Cournot distinguishes two sorts of probability, "mathematical" and "philosophical." The conditions under which knowledge of the former is possible are rigidly restricted, so the philosopher must usually have recourse to the latter. Both sorts of probability are intimately connected with 'chance,' and it is to Cournot's valuable analysis of this that one of the best chapters in each book, Milhaud's and Mentré's, is devoted. Chance does not deny causal connexion but emphatically presupposes it. Natural events are so connected as to form series, and these intersect one another. Some are series of events which one conditions another, in other series the events are "indepen" ht" in that the character of none is causally conditioned by any other. Those situations we call "fortuitous happenings" or "chance effects" are brought about by the meeting or intersecting of two such independent linear s ries, in each of which all the events are causally connected. The "inte esiction" or "meeting" is accidental in the sense that there are given two happenings each of which is causally independent of the other, though causally connected with anterior members of its chain. Thus "chance occurrence" expresses, not our present ignorance of some causal nexus, but a non-causal situation objectively realized in nature. And the idea of chance is as necessary as that of cause for interpreting the behaviour of natural bodies: science is as powerless to extirpate the one as the other. "Our causal science might develop to such a point as to exhibit cosmic theory as nothing but a mathematical theorem without that development ridding it of the idea of fortuity and its rational consequences." Chance however is not restricted to the domain of natural occurrences: an analogous situation arises with "rational series" as with causal ones (cf. the "irregular series" of decimals generated in calculating the value of $'\pi'$). The notion of 'independence,' however, so vital to the theory, Cournot defines only extensively. and it is one of M. Milhaud's many merits that he does much to clarify it.

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distinguishing it from contingency and replacing it by "positive variability." "His conception of chance," writes M. Milhaud, "is never divorced in his thought from the idea of a variability which enables us to foresee a series, finite or infinite, of possible meetings, all of which are, at least a priori and subjectively, equally possible. . . ." This conception in fact forms the basis of the calculus of probabilities for both Cournot and Renouvier. The probabilities that attach to inferences by analogy and induction are totally different from mathematical probabilities. The former escape precise computation, yet they are accompanied by a conviction that precludes any reasonable. doubt, and are based on rational preference for an alternative which seems best to satisfy conditions of simplicity, generality and system. The regulative idea by which rational interpretation proceeds is precisely the contradictory of chance, irregularity and disorder, and one which straightway rules out Kant's Copernican hypothesis, since "if there were no concordance between the order of perception (de réception par nos facultés) and an order in the objects so presented, there would be but an infinitely small probability that the two orders would so fit in as to produce a regular connexion in the order of representations." Thus, the purpose of Cournot's analysis of chance and irregularity is mainly negative, viz., to throw into relief by contrast what is involved in the conception of an objective regularity, dependence or "rationality" that is compatible with an equally objective irregularity and independence among facts. The essential explicative conception is "order," but this Cournot unhappily never analyses in any detail. Like Renouvier, he holds that the idées fondamentales cannot be brought into any systematic unity, analogous to that of the Kantian categories. Analysis of our knowledge yields a certain number of heterogeneous and "discontinuous" principles: there is no logical passage from our notions of time and space to those of force and matter, nor from the latter to those of life and organism, nor again from these to the idea of society. Lack of space forbids us to dwell longer on this notion of rational order, on the many contexts-in natural and biological science and history-in which its presence is disclosed, or to consider the interesting inferences Dr. Ruyer has recently drawn from them; concerning the political and religious future of humanity.

Renouvier, a contemporary of Cournot, was the outstanding of aceth representative of Neo-Kantianism, and though it is tolerably certain saat some of his cardinal theses are untenable, there remains an impressive amount of his work on phenomenalism and the theory of personality which is of more than historical interest. Few nowadays are likely to encounter Resouvier's massive tomes, and that excellent philosophical publisher M. Vrin deserves thanks and congratulation for having issued two masterly critical expositions of Renouvier by MM. Milhaud and Hamelin. Milhaud's volume2 is a series of lectures given at the University of Montpellier (the birthplace of Renouvier and of Comte), the latter3 a more extensive and elaborate course delivered at the Sorbonne. As it is impossible to indicate in a brief notice the detail of these examinations and their many excellences, I shall limit myself to a few points which both authorities agree are central. Like Cournot, Renouvier renounced the hope of working out an adequate synthetic view of the universe that is both systematic and final. Both recognize an element in all science

¹ R. RUYER, L'Humanité de l'Avenir d'après Cournot. 1930. Paris: Félix Alcan. Pp. 150.

³⁰ fr.

2 G. Milhaud, La Philosophie de Charles Renouvier. 1927. Paris: Vrin. Pp. 161. 15 fr.

Publié par P. Mouy. 1927. Paris: Vrin. Pp. 1 3 O. HAMELIN, Le Système de Renouvier. Publié par P. Mouy. 1927. Paris: Vrin. Pp. vi. + 454. 45 fr.

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that is irreducible and rationally incalculable: Cournot called it "hasard," Renouvier "liberté." Both conceive epistemological criticism to be the proper business of philosophy, but, unlike Cournot, Renouvier takes this to involve the elaboration of a set of ultimate interpretative categories, and so begins by critically investigating Kant's. All experience is of, all knowledge about, what Renouvier calls representations or phenomena, and these are all complex, consisting of a representing factor (répresentatif) and a represented one (répresenté). A representation involves nothing that is not an element of itself, there is no order of things-in-themselves. As connected by certain regular and pervasive forms of order, representations are called phenomena: their order is expressed by their laws. The novelty of Renouvier's account of these types of order centres in five criticisms which lead him to revise the Kantian list of categories. Kant (i) should have made the category of relation central, for it is the key to all the others, (ii) he wrongly distinguished the forms of sense-perception from the categories, and (iii) should have replaced the distinction between sensibility, understanding and reason by a distinction between categories. He should have (iv) included a category of 'personality,' and (v) regarded 'finality' and 'becoming' as categories. Remouvier next turns to the 'functions' of representations, and in particular an analysis of human functions. The mechanical functions of the human body can be interpreted by the separate categories of number, position, succession and becoming, and its physico-chemical functions by the former categories plus quality. Biological functions presuppose all the previous categories and those of causality and finality besides, while consciousness (which appears with sensibility), though requiring as its precondition all prior types of organization, cannot be explained without remainder in terms of them. And the step from sensibility to understanding is not analogous to that from biological functions to sensibility, for the latter is representative and so far cognitive. So distinctions between the categories are correlated with distinctions between various functions or ways of behaviour in organisms, e.g., to 'relation' corresponds the function of comparison found in animals and men, but accompanied by attention and reflexion among the latter; to 'position' corresponds imagination, and to 'succession,' memory, etc. To the six categories of relation, number, position, succession, quality and becoming, correspond the functions of understanding or intelligence, whilst to the renainder—causality, finality and personality—correspond the functions of emotion, feeling and will. Each of these categories, which Renouvier reaches lay analysis of empirical fact and not by an a priori dialectic, comprehends three factors which stand to one another in the relation of thesis, antithesis and synthesis, so that really the notion of 'relation' is the most genaral, being presupposed in all, and so stands to each in a quite different connexion from that in which each stands to any other. Thus all our knowledge is 'relative'. What, it seems, we know are, strictly speaking, relationships, though these can be exhibited only in complexes, as ingredient in sensible or 'irrational' materials: hence the need of representations. There are no substances: a material object is no more than a group of representations connected by certain relations such as may be interpreted through the categories. The self is not a substance but a complex of related representations of a different kind. This relativist view of knowledge does not, according to Renouvier, involve a vicious regress, for factual termini to the possibility of infinite analysis are imposed by certain irreducible syntheses we encounter in the répresenté. Nor is the theory solipsistic, for our knowledge or science, though reached by particular persons reasoning each from his own representations, is nevertheless not about only those representations,

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but about all of like kind, *i.e.*, representations in general. All that exist is composed of representations, and these of one common 'stuff.'

In conclusion, we may notice briefly two topics on which Renouvier thought he had made important and undeniable contributions: his famous "law of number" and his conception of liberty. The idea of an actual infinite or of a group or collection having an infinite number of elements is, he argued, self-contradictory. Empirical evidence warrants our affirming all collections to be finite. The notion of an infinite number (which he regards as the final term in the series of natural numbers) is contradictory because it would have to be greater than any given number. The assumption seems to be that were there such a number it could be "given." Hence the contradiction, for, being given, it would not be greater than itself. From this, which seems to be substantially his argument, it follows that the world is not infinite in space or time, therefore it must have had a beginning, and the series of natural occurrences also must have some definite number that is finite, even though we do not know what that number is. (Milhaud does not think Renouvier makes good his position here, and possibly his critic's suggestion as to how the "illusion" can be "dissipated" would hardly find favour among present philosophers who are mathematicians.) However, since, as Renouvier thinks, absolute beginning in time has been shown possible, and a preferable hypothesis to any other, the way is now clear to introduce the conception of human liberty. For what is this but the power to begin? Our liberty is our potentiality to initiate the succession of actions the end of which we will. All acts of freewill are uncaused acts through the occurrence of which absolute beginnings are realized:—"the fact of liberty consists precisely in this, that some order of events other than those which ensued was possible."

This extremely abbreviated summary of Renouvier's conclusions on Number and Liberty admittedly does him scant justice, though on these, his favourite doctrines, I fancy contemporary philosophers would consider him a precarious, or even fallacious, guide. This however would not destroy the value of the rest of his work, and the fact that so brilliant a thinker as Hamelin should, in large measure, have based his own system on Renouvier's, is sufficient to show that Renouvier built for longer than his own lifetime.

S. V. KEELING.

PHILOSOPHY IN GERMANY

Summary: This survey deals with five books: (i) Ethical Questions, by Moritz Schlick; (ii) Significance, Genuineness, and Love, by Paul Feldk ver; (iii) Neo-Kantian Tasks, by Kurt Sternberg; (iv) Kant's Ethics, by Arthur Liebert; and (v) Contemporary Philosophy of the History of Art, by Walter Passarge.

One welcomes a book on ethics from the Viennese school of scientific philosophy. Moritz Schlick, as was to be expected, regards ethics as a branch of psychology. But he claims that his book, *Ethical Questions*, is philosophical as well. The statements which it makes are all psychological, but they are intended also to contribute to philosophy by increasing the reader's insight into the moral judgments of daily life.

The main business of ethics, according to Schlick, is to show why we perform moral actions—those actions which, in the view of the average man,

1 Fragen der Ethik. Vienna: Julius Springer. 1930. Pp. vi + 152.

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conduce to the happiness of society. Schlick's own view is that we always do what promises the most pleasure, and this applies to moral actions no less than to others. Moral actions give pleasure because they satisfy our social impulses. We often directly desire the welfare of other people, and so the procuring of their welfare gives us pleasure. (Schlick subscribes to the common view that the egoist—the man who is inconsiderate of others—is immoral, but he holds that such men are much less common than some moralists suppose, and that they are always abnormal in the sense that their social impulses are abnormally weak.) That actions prompted by the social impulses give us pleasure is important, because we tend to repeat only those actions which actually yield the pleasure they promise. Moral actions have a secure foundation, because the pleasure they promise is not illusory. Indeed, the satisfaction of our social impulses is the source of our greatest pleasure, for it increases our capacity for pleasure, whereas the satisfaction of 'lower' impulses undermines it. Schlick concludes that capacity for happiness (maximal pleasure) is the central ethical concept, and that this capacity is increased by moral actions. Experience shows that the virtuous—those who perform actions which, in the view of the average man, conduce to the happiness of Society, are usually happy. They are not, of course, always happy, because everyone's happiness largely depends on uncontrollable circumstances. But the virtuous man is always more prepared for happiness—his capacity for pleasure is greater—and so his chance of happiness is higher than that of other people. Schlick believes that the knowledge that the social impulses are the source of moral actions together with psychological knowledge of the ways in which social impulses can be strengthened should have practical consequences, enabling us to make evil men good.

Such, in bare outline, is Schlick's main argument. But four views which he incidentally develops deserve to be stated. (i) He believes that when we seek to discover in what goodness consists we must be rigidly empirical. We must first collect together those mental states and actions which are regarded as moral or good, and we must then discover their distinctive characteristics. For Schlick there is no antithesis between a norm and a fact. A norm is a fact, and an ethical norm is a fact about mental states or actions to the effect that only when they possess such-and-such characteristics are they regarded as moral or good. At the outset he admits that theoretically there may be no common characteristic which distinguishes all moral actions from others. But, as the result of his own empirical inquiry, he concludes that in fact there is at least one distinctive feature of all moral actions—they are all regarded by the average man as conducive to the happiness of society. (ii) Schlick holds that every value is relative to someone evaluating. Similarly, every demand is rel vive to someone who demands. In his view, Kant was right in believing that moral prescriptions are demands, but Kant's concept of an 'absolute demand' involves welf-contradiction, if 'demand' be used in its ordinary sense. The ethical demand is relative to society. "You ought to do so-and-so" means "Society demands that you do so-and-so." He criticizes at some length the view that values are objective, and urges that it can provide no standard by which to test the truth of value-judgments. He distinguishes five different attempts to provide such a standard-among them the contention that ethical judgments have the same a priori necessity as logical or mathematical judgments. His answer to this contention rests on the view that logical and mathematical judgments, being tautologous, can have no affinity to ethical judgments. (iii) In Schlick's opinion, many moralists have a prejudice against pleasure. They exhibit an irrational distaste for the view that value depends

on pleasure, and that we behave morally only because such behaviour is

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pleasant. He thinks that their prejudice is mainly due to their education. Education aims at strengthening certain impulses and weakening others. It can do this either by making the idea of certain actions pleasant or by making the idea of certain other actions unpleasant. Actually it nearly always chooses the latter alternative. It nearly always restrains and forbids; it inflicts painful punishment for wrongdoing instead of conferring pleasant rewards for merit. Consequently, an association is established between moral precepts and the idea of displeasure or pain. And by a natural, though illogical, process the impression arises that if a thing is pleasant it is bad. The prejudice against pleasure is also due, Schlick believes, to the value which is attached to sorrow. Overlooking the distinction between sorrow and pain (the only antithesis of pleasure), people are misled into thinking that, since sorrow can be valuable, pleasure cannot be the only standard of value. For Schlick, sorrow is valuable because it contains pleasure. (iv) Schlick maintains that the 'problem' of freewill is not an ethical problem at all, and is only retained in ethics as a result of misunderstandings. All sciences, including ethics, presuppose the principle that every event is causally determined. Ethics is concerned, not with freewill, but with moral responsibility, and moral responsibility, so far from being incompatible with determinism, requires it. We are free in the sense that we can sometimes do what we choose—a sense of freedom which is quite consistent with determinism. We are not free in the sense that our desires and choices are undetermined, and, if we were, neither ethics nor moral responsibility could exist.

PAUL FELDKELLER'S Significance, Genuineness, and Love, though very different in both its views and its tone from Schlick's book, resembles it in maintaining a subjective theory of values. It is based on Paul Hofmann's analysis of significance, which, according to Feldkeller, provides the only remedy for the present spiritual crisis. In the past men fixed their hopes on another world and valued life in terms of some external standard. The modern man has no faith in any world but this. He believes that there are no gifts in store for him beyond those which are available here and now. This conviction needs a theoretical background—a theory of value which guarantees the significance of life. Theories and practices have developed which depreciate the individual. But only the individual has significance, and all values depend on the self. The modern man requires an analysis of this fundamen'tal fact, and Hofmann has provided it.

Feldkeller agrees with Hofmann that value is felt, not known. Consequently, those contemporary theories according to which we intuit values are as inadequate as those which hold that values are divinely revealed. In describing moral value Feldkeller frequently, and with approval, quotes Nietzsche. Morality is personal. The moral man is not guided by general rules and the demands of his environment. His motive is not obedience to anything external, be it person or principle. His activity is spontaneous. The formulation of general rules and dogmas results from the evil of objectifying one's valueexperiences. Genuineness (Echtheit) is the fundamental ethical concept, and it cannot be defined. One can, however, describe it in many ways-one can say, for example, that it involves truth to oneself, that it is more than mere naturalness and more than self-realization.

Feldkeller devotes many pages to love, which occupies an important and special place in Hofmann's theory. He steers between the sensualist and idealist views. In his view, love has two important qualities: it involves desire

z Sinn, Echtheit, Liebe nach Paul Hofmann's Sinn-Analyse. Berlin: Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft. 1931. Pp. 130.

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for another's good, and it involves the expansion of one's own personality. The individual we love has the power to increase our own mental activity. Love contains its own justification. All aspects of its nature reveal its fundamental genuineness. It can give boundless satisfaction even when all material circumstances are unpropitious; it is completely spontaneous and completely indifferent to external sanctions; it is the summit of morality; it is not just one tendency among others, but underlies and influences them all.

The Pan books on philosophy form an interesting series which is still being continued. The sixth, on Neo-Kantian Tasks, is by Kurt Sternberg, who, like Feldkeller, is concerned with the present spiritual crisis, but from a neo-Kantian viewpoint. According to him, the present age, demanding a new culture and a new philosophy, attacks the established philosophy, which is neo-Kantianism. Will this philosophy survive? Sternberg does not doubt that its main thesis—the necessity of the critical method in philosophy—is of permanent value. Philosophers will be using the critical method though neo-Kantianism be no more (or even less) than a name. The schools that have spring up with the present crisis—the phenomenologists and the advocates of philosophies of life—have nothing to contribute which does not presuppose the supremacy of thought. Intuition, though undoubtedly important, depends on discursive thought for its objective validity. But Sternberg is not without hope that much more of neo-Kantianism than the critical method will survive. He surveys the various objections brought against the neo-Kantians and, while he believes some of them to be justified, he regards none as unsurmountable. He entirely repudiates the charge that neo-Kantianism reduces philosophy to methodology, and indulges too much in formalism and logistic. Its emphasis on method is its glory, and method is no mere matter of technique. Each age, it maintains, faces the same problems, but formulates and solves them in a different way. Truth is not given (gegeben) but set as a problem (aufgegeben). Philosophy is the study of the methods by which problems are formulated and solved. Sternberg agrees, however, that neo-Kantians are unduly hostile to metaphysics—they have wrongly extended condemnation of certain metaphysical theories to condemnation of metaphysics in general. The desire for metaphysical speculation is permanent and must be satisfied. The basis of sound metaphysics is the recognition that its ultimate aim is ethical. Neo-Kantianism has nothing to fear from the natural sciences. It maintains that certain a priori principles are involved in all scientific knowledge, and it in no way depends on particular scientific results, which it uses only as examples. But it has not recognized psychology as it should. Psychology is an established science, and the business of critical philosophy is to discover the basis of its validity.

Sternberg's conclusion is that neo-Kantianism must develop if it is to satisfy the needs of the age. It is no bad sign that its schools are breaking up, for this will enable it the better to broaden its activities. For Sternberg, as for other neo-Kantians, philosophy does not occupy a watertight compartment. It is a cultural activity which determines the general mental outlook. The ultimate aim of neo-Kantianism is to bring to life the harmony which it at present lacks. Its fate depends on its success here—and this success can well be achieved even if its schools and its very name be forgotten.

ARTHUR LIEBERT also stresses the cultural value of philosophy in his book on philosophical teaching,² which advocates the importance of philosophy in

¹ Neukantische Aufgaben. Berlin: Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft. 1930. Pp. 84. RM. 3.50.
2 Die "Bestimmung" des philosophischen Unterrichts. Berlin: Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft. Pp. 32, RM. 1.80.

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a general education. And his excellent book, Kant's Ethics, is primarily intended, not for specialists, but for all who desire an introduction to the main principles and general character of Kantian ethics. His presentation is clear and illuminating. Like Sternberg, he is concerned with the crisis threatening neo-Kantianism and defends Kantian ethics from the charges levelled against it, in particular the charges of formalism and rigorism. He completely disagrees with naturalistic views. The distinction between what is and what ought to be is irreducible, and Kant's clear recognition of this fact has provided ethics with its necessary basis. Liebert also lacks sympathy with any attempt to make knowledge less abstract—to make it share in the concreteness of life. Knowledge, in his opinion, is necessarily formal and abstract. He believes, however, that Kant is much less formal and rigoristic than his critics maintain. He points out, for example, that Kant emphasizes the difference between natural and ethical laws—the latter being self-imposed demands. Thus it is unfair to accuse him of mechanizing moral life. It is also unfair to criticize the categorical imperative on the ground of its emptiness. The good motive is the basis of Kantian ethics, and a motive is always directed to a concrete end; but to catalogue these different ends is the business of casuistry, not of moral philosophy. Liebert makes two points concerning the alleged rigorism of the Kantian distinction between inclination and duty. In the first place, he claims that Kant is drawing a scientific distinction and has to emphasize distinguishing characteristics even though the two things thus distinguished may be present together. In the second place, Kant believed that conflict was necessary to human life. Ethical thinkers, Liebert maintains, can be divided into two groups. There are those, like Aristotle, who believe that our desires and our duties are fundamentally harmonious. Thus Schiller conceived the idea of the "beautiful soul," the man whose natural inclinations are at one with his duty. On the other hand, there are those, like Kant, who believe in an irreconcilable dualism, who regard human life as a tragic conflict between nature and morality. The distinction is deeply rooted and shows itself in many fields.

Junker and Dünnhaupt are publishing a series of little books on contemporary work in different branches of philosophy. The first of the series is by WALTER PASSARGE on Contemporary Philosophy of the History of Art.2 This subject is intermediate between the theory of art, which deals with general principles, and the history of art, which deals with individual cases. Its purpose is to find general principles under which æsthetic styles can be subsumed. It is accordingly concerned with individual works of art and actual stylistic periods, but it studies them in order to reach generalizations. Passarge is concerned only with German writers. He both emphasizes main tendencies and gives brief expositions of many different theories. His book, which includes a bibliography, would form a very useful introduction to a more intensive study. To the English reader it reveals how enthusiastically the subject is pursued in Germany.

Passarge distinguishes between three main types of theory.

(i) First he considers the group of writers who believe that æsthetic development is purely or mainly internal. They regard form as the essence of art, and believe that formal differences are developed from within and are independent of differences in ideas, culture, race, and so on. The impetus to this, as to so many other movements, was given by Alois Riegl, who explains all formal

Kants Ethik. Berlin: Pan-Verlagsgesellschaft, 1931. Pp. 56. RM. 3.50.

² Die Philosophie der Kunstgeschichte in der Gegenwart. Berlin: Junker and Dünnhaupt. 1930. Pp. v + 101. RM. 4.50.

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development in terms of a distinction between 'tactile' and 'optical' periods. The distinction applies to spatial organization. During a 'tactile' period the artist organizes his space in terms of touch—objects, for example, are presented as flat and near at hand. In an 'optical' period sight predominates—consequently, depth and distance are introduced. Heinrich Wölfflin was the first to give central place to formal analysis. He believes that changes of style are determined by changes in the artist's mode of seeing and analyses the differences between classical and baroque art from this point of view. From this analysis he obtains five fundamental pairs of distinctions which he takes to be fundamental categories for the history of art. Wölfflin has stimulated many critics and many followers. Of the latter, Paul Frankl is described as the most important.

(ii) Passarge then considers the opposite type of theory, according to which stylistic differences are determined by some external factor. Different writers select different factors. Some are interested in correlating artistic style with general outlook. They regard meaning as prior to form, believing that a particular kind of meaning requires a particular kind of form. Thus, according to Hermann Nohl, the painter's outlook is not expressed by the subject-matter of his picture, but by its formal construction. Ludwig Coellen combines this type of view with detailed formal analysis, correlating different types of spatial organization with different metaphysical outlooks. Other writers have emphasized factors such as race, culture, climate, and so on. Oswald Spengler. for example, believes that each of the three western cultures which he distinguishes has produced its own distinctive style, and that every style passes through the phases of organic development: childhood, youth, maturity and age. Several writers have interested themselves in sociological studies on the art of the people, which has naturally led to interest in geographical conditions. Kurt Gerstenberg divides Europe into zones and correlates stylistic characteristics with each zone. Thus, for example, in the northern zone, which mainly contains England, Normandy, Norway, and Iceland, the agitated line predominates; in the zone which contains Flanders, Holland, Denmark, North Germany, and the Baltic countries, there is deficiency of plastic sense, but very fine feeling for colour effects and representation of light and air. Max Dvorak believes that a period should be abstracted from its historical context in order to be understood as an individual phenomenon. He applies this method to the development of mediæval art, which he believes to be determined by the tension between ideal and actual. In the early periods overwhelming stress is laid on the ideal. Later the actual is recognized and interest is taken in corporeal forms, not however for their own sakes, but for the sake of their spiritual expression. Cohn-Wiener and Dagobert Frey are among the writers who have been interested in the universal history of style as distinct from the styles of selected periods. The former tries to explain the entire history of style as a rhythmic alternation between 'tectonic' and 'anti-tectonic' stylesthe former being designed for use and popular, the latter divorced from purpose and aristocratic. Frey stresses the distinction between successive and simultaneous presentation and regards the development of art as the conquest of the former over the latter. In Gothic art, for example, successive events are presented as though they were simultaneous, and there is no distinction between word and picture, poetry and painting.

(iii) Passarge finally considers a third and very recent type of theory. All the writers so far considered have made generalizations which apply to works of art. But there is a growing interest in the nature of creative personality, and there are writers whose purpose is to obtain generalizations which apply artists rather than to their works. A. E. Brinckmann believes there are

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"typical changes" in the artist's development, and he correlates them with stylistic differences. Wilhelm Pinder is concerned with the cycle of generations, with the opposition between father and son, and the return of the grandchild to the grandfather. He maintains that the style of any period is mainly determined by the simultaneous activity of its different generations, complicated by other factors such as the age and culture of its artists.

HELEN KNIGHT.

NEW BOOKS

Gestalt Psychology. By Wolfgang Köhler, Ph.D. (London: Bell & Sons. 1930. Pp. xi + 312. Price 15s. net.)

The English edition of Professor Köhler's very important book was preceded by an American edition a year earlier, and the book is perhaps written primarily for an American public, if one may judge from the illustrations and examples given, and to some extent the forms of expression employed. Though the paging is slightly different—which is unfortunate—there does not

appear to be any essential difference between the two editions.

This presentation for the first time in English garb of the fundamental postulates of Gestalt psychology, and of the experimental data upon which its contentions are based, in the form of a systematic development of the Gestalt point of view, cannot fail to receive the heartiest of welcomes from English psychologists. The author too is to be congratulated on his admirable English style. Only here and there is there any suggestion that the book has been written by a foreigner. On the whole the style is beautifully clear. There are difficulties of course, but that is a consequence of the nature of the subject-matter and the character of the argument, not the fault of the author.

How are we to regard this new point of view in psychology? How far are the Gestalt psychologists making a valuable contribution to psychology? A review of Köhler's argument may perhaps enable us to answer these questions.

Of the ten chapters in the book, the central chapters are the fourth, fifth, and sixth, and again the tenth. These are entitled respectively: "Dynamics as Opposed to Machine Theory," "Sensory Organization," "The Properties of Organized Wholes," and "Insight." The earlier chapters are devoted to destructive criticism directed against current psychologies, and those between the sixth and the tenth to the application of the Gestalt conceptions in fields

other than sense-perception.

The book begins with a trenchant criticism of the behaviouristic position, to which the nirst two chapters are devoted, although the author returns to the attack several times in the course of the other chapters. The general trend of the argument against behaviourism in the first chapter is that the behaviourist, in attacking the method of introspection—an attack with which the author in great measure sympathizes—and in his enthusiasm for objective methods in psychology, has committed himself to views regarding 'direct experience,' which would destroy the scientific basis of the physical sciences, as well as introspective psychology. Observation in physics, as in psychology, involves observation of 'direct experience.' The behaviouristic attack on introspective psychology, indeed, which is in itself an attack from an epistemological point of view, ends in "a one-sided and impractical purism in science," with which Köhler will have nothing to do.

In the following chapter the attack on behaviourism is continued, the methods of the behaviourist, as well as the point of view, being challenged. This is really the most damaging part of the criticism. Köhler rightly argues that qualitative observations must precede quantitative experiment in all sciences, and that it is absurd to apply the methods of a developed science like physics in a young science like psychology, to the exclusion of those

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qualitative observations, which must define the problems to which quantitative experiment can be applied. Physics as a young science had to proceed in that way, and so must psychology. It must be noted further that the living organism is an incomparably more complex system than any systems investigated by the physicist. In actual fact the blind superficial imitation of physics has led the behaviourist to conceive of the organism as a simpler and cruder system than is the system even of a soap-bubble, which exhibits "functional properties" more varied and more interesting than the "monotony of reflexes and conditioned reflexes."

The author next turns his weapons against those he calls "introspectionists." Who these introspectionists are he does not say, which is very unfortunate, because it would interest not a few psychologists, who are neither behaviourists nor *Gestalt* psychologists, to know whether the views attacked are intended to be their views. If they are so intended, the travesty is such that few of these psychologists will be able to recognize themselves. It would seem as if Köhler had some kind of emotional complex associated with what he calls "meaning," and the violence of his emotional reaction against the "meaning explanation" tends to distort his usual sane outlook. By "introspectionist" does he intend to refer to Titchener, or Stout, or Ward, or James?

In any case the views he criticizes are a travesty and a caricature.

'Introspection' Köhler takes as the procedure whereby we "learn to approach actual sensations in such a way that their qualities and laws may be discovered in their true form." What an extraordinarily narrow and perverted view! The great majority of introspectionists, including most of the 'philosophical' and 'rational' psychologists, regard sensations as an abstracted aspect of experience, pretty much as Köhler himself would probably regard them. An illustration of the method of introspection for obtaining pure sensory experience, according to Köhler, is verifying the laws of geometrical optics as regards the size of the retinal area stimulated by objects at different distances, by exposing the objects momentarily by means of a tachistoscope in a darkened room! The observation of "genuine sensory experience by way of introspection," as described by Köhler, seems to exclude any introspection, as understood by everyone else. The idea that illusions have to be corrected rather than explained by introspection is surely very strange, and stranger still is the "introspective" method which is used in this correction. It very soon becomes clear that what Köhler is combating is not introspection as understood by most psychologists, but certain experimental results obtained by certain introspectionist psychologists, and the conclusions based on them. To this point we shall return later. It may be granted that much of Köhler's criticism is well founded and valid, when directed against the meaning theory' that he is attacking, and most of it is sound enough, when directed against a sensationalist psychology, but it is entirely irrelevant to a discussion of introspection as a psychological method.

The first indications of the lines along which the Gestalt psychology is to be developed become apparent in the fourth chapter, though the polemic against behaviourism, introspectionism, and the 'meaning theory' is still continued. This fourth chapter is entitled, "Dynamics as opposed to Machine Theory," as was indicated above. Its argument runs somewhat as follows: Two kinds of factors determine physical events, dynamical factors involved in the processes themselves, and the conditions of the events laid down by the properties of the systems in which they occur. Organic functions in animals and man have, since the time of Descartes, been explained solely in terms of the second kind of factors, that is, special topographical or anatomical conditions. Both behaviourist and introspectionist, so far as their physiological principles

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are concerned, agree in adopting this conception as the basis of their theories. They assume that what happens in the nervous system depends upon 'machine arrangements,' inherited or acquired. Sensory experience, therefore, will be completely determined by the conditions of local stimulation, and if conduction between receptor and effector is determined in the same way, an adequate formulation of the psychological problem will be that of the behaviourist—to find what stimuli produce what responses in the effectors. Both the mosaic theory of sense-experience and the stimulus-response theory of behaviour agree in excluding dynamic factors. Both, however, fail to account for the phenomena they set out to explain. In the case of sensory experience organization of the field is a typical fact. In place of local process everywhere corresponding to stimulus we find everywhere evidence of dynamical interaction, which is excluded by the mosaic theory. Hence 'dynamical self-distribution' must be added to topographical arrangements, inherited and acquired, to explain the order and distribution in the sensory field.

This principle of 'dynamical self-distribution' in the sensory field is then the first principle of *Gestalt* psychology. One of the illustrations cited by Köhler is simultaneous contrast in vision. This suggests that the 'dynamical self-distribution' in the case of vision may be an affair of the retina. Such a reading of Köhler's meaning, however, seems inconsistent with views expressed later, which seem to imply that it is a function of the nervous system.

Criticism may be postponed, but this point must be kept in mind.

'Dynamical self-distribution' introduces the problem of sensory organization, which is discussed in the following chapter. This is the result of 'dynamical self-distribution' in the sensory field, and this at least is to be regarded as the characteristic achievement of the nervous system. The psychologist of an older generation would have said that this is a characteristic achievement of 'mind,' but it is not usual to speak of 'mind' in psychology nowadays. The important point for the psychologist is undoubtedly in the first instance that sensory organization takes place. The explanation must wait on the ascertained fact. The insistence on the fact of sensory organization in all sensory fields and at all times is one of the chief contributions of the Gestalt psychologists to psychological theory. It is perhaps their most characteristic contribution.

In its main lines Köhler's argument is very convincing, so long as we interpret it in terms of sensory dynamics. In most visual fields certain contents belong together, appear as units or wholes separated off from their surroundings. This phenomenon cannot be explained as due to learning from experience. If that were an explanation, wholes would only be separated off so far as they were recognized as known objects. This is not in accordance with facts. We frequently find ourselves asking the question: what is that? about some object in the field of vision, which is not known or not recognized. Numerous examples of this spontaneous grouping in the visual field are given by Wertheimer, who has made an extensive study of the phenomena. The phenomena have also been clearly demonstrated by Hertz in experiments with birds. The phenomena in fact can be taken as definitely established. The general correspondence of the wholes organized by sensory dynamics to things is by no means difficult to explain. Things are either made by man or products of nature. Things made by man are naturally given a form which will make them clearly visible. This means providing clear contours. In the case of natural objects clear contours are due to the fact that there is discontinuity of properties at the boundary separating an object from surrounding objects.

¹ Psychologische Forschung, 1923.

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It must be emphasized, Köhler repeats, that the light rays do not bring the forms ready made into the organism. The rays of light are quite independent of, and indifferent to, one another. Each local stimulus in the retina is therefore an independent affair. The retina is in fact a mosaic of indifferently related spots. The organization is the work of the nervous system. In the light of this fact the misuse by behaviourists of the word 'stimulus' ought to be carefully noted. An object is frequently called a stimulus. This misuse implies an entire failure on the part of the behaviourist to see the problem of organization. This criticism is a very important one.

From the problem of sensory organization Köhler passes to the consideration of sensory qualities which are the properties of organized wholes-Gestaltqualitäten. In the early part of the sixth chapter he shows how the Gestalt problem arose in psychology from the examination of the qualities and properties of sensory fields which are necessarily passed over in the analysis of the sensory fields into sensations. Von Ehrenfels first called attention to these qualities. They depend not on single local stimuli, but on several stimuli "having a specific effect in a certain area as such." Qualities like 'turbid,' 'rough,' 'simple,' 'complicated,' 'regular,' 'slender,' 'angular,' 'clumsy,' and the like may be taken as illustrations. These are in fact properties of those segregated wholes which result from sensory organization. They are 'formqualities'-Gestaltqualitäten. And here we come upon a point which requires closer examination, and to which we shall return later. Some of these segregated wholes have concrete 'form' or 'Gestalt' as their most characteristic property. Not all of them! "Real form" presupposes segregated wholes, which in turn depend upon "dynamical self-distribution" in the sensory field. This is the case when we are dealing with perception. But 'Gestalt' is much wider than sense-perception. It is characteristic of the whole mental life. Wherever it appears, however, it is the product of dynamic factors, not mechanical conditions; it is a property of a dynamical whole.

The above is a brief account of the manner in which the fundamental conceptions of Gestalt psychology are developed. Before passing to a critical consideration of Köhler's views we may mention two further points of considerable interest and importance. In the seventh chapter, which bears the title "Behaviour," but has little to do with behaviour as understood by the behaviourist, an interesting point of view is developed, and some of its implications worked out. Briefly the argument is this: All properties of a visual field depend upon physiological processes in the brain and their properties. Whatever is experienced has physiologically a dynamical basis. Relative position, and geometrical relations generally, in the visual field will be represented by corresponding dynamical relations in the aggregate of cells and fibres constituting the brain. Köhler goes farther than this, and maintains that, in some cases, there is direct correspondence of spatial relations in the brain to spatial relations in the visual field, but this is really more than is necessary for his argument. It follows that in the brain, as a physical system, there will be processes corresponding to the bodily members like the arm, the foot, and generally the body as experienced in the visual field—the experienced 'me'-and these processes will be of the same order as the processes corresponding to physical objects in the field, and dynamically external to such processes. It is impossible, therefore, that things should be experienced in 'me' as experienced, any more than that my hand should be experienced as in a pencil or in a book. As far as direct experience is concerned things are 'before' and 'around' me, not 'in' me. From this Köhler passes on to consider how we come to ascribe to others experiences similar to our own, and argues that there is no need to trace this to inference based on analogy, since our

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objective experience of the behaviour of others shows us directly something similar to their mental life. In part the argument then becomes a polemic once more against the 'meaning theory.'

The other point is developed in the final chapter. This chapter is entitled "Insight," and is of fundamental importance. The use of the word 'insight' by Gestalt psychologists has given rise to a great deal of difficulty, and not a little misunderstanding. This is partly due to the fact that the word is employed in a rather unusual sense, partly to the fact that its use seems to involve a purely intellectualistic psychology, and partly also to the fact that it seems sometimes to carry a meaning which is not consistent with other aspects of the Gestalt psychology. It cannot be doubted, however, that so far as Gestalt psychology is to be regarded as explanatory, rather than merely descriptive,

the concept of 'insight' is fundamental.

Let us see what the teaching is. Köhler begins by contrasting the view of the ordinary man, that he has direct and immediate experience of why he has one attitude at one time and another at another, why he does one thing at one time and another at another, with the view of certain psychologists that attitudes are taken up, and courses of action pursued, because certain nerve paths are more permeable than others. Gestalt psychology, he says, takes the view of the ordinary man. An attitude is always "experienced as depending on something definite." Or, in other words, there is always a real felt relationship between an attitude and its sensory basis. The attitude is felt as "obviously and naturally produced" by a certain experience. "Fright is experienced as jumping at us right out of the nature of certain definite events." The feeling of something naturally depending on something is a feeling of dynamical dependence, and this is what Köhler calls 'insight.' It is not altogether easy to grasp his precise meaning, and it is notorious that several psychologists have entirely missed it. 'Insight' appears to have two aspects, one of which would correspond more or less to 'noetic' process, as understood, for example, by Stout, and the other might perhaps be best characterized as, or designated, 'relevance. 'This second aspect is the one generally emphasized, and it enables Köhler to extend the notion of 'insight' so as to cover emotion, attitude, and action. 'Insight' is experienced determination of this by that, of my feeling as due to a certain configuration in the sensory field, of my action as directed towards, and appropriate to, a certain situation, and so on. Hence in 'insight' we have, as it were, that final consummation of organization which characterizes, according to Gestalt psychologists, our whole mental life. Dynamical self-distribution, spontaneous grouping, concrete 'form', experienced determination in a context, or 'relevance' —these are the phases of experience which the Gestalt psychology emphasizes, or the fundamental principles of Gestalt psychology, if we care to put it that way. It might be added that again in the case of 'insight' Köhler returns to his polemic against the 'meaning theory.' He denies that it is possible to explain 'insight' by learning or by the conditioning of the extreme behaviourist.

The precise significance of Gestalt psychology as a whole is not very easy to estimate. So far as it professes to be a descriptive analysis of objective experience as such, it undoubtedly makes a strong appeal to the non-behaviourist. The reply to an extreme behaviourism appears conclusive. At the same time it must be noted that the findings of Köhler are, as it were, merely the obverse of the findings of Lashley, as presented in his address to the Yale International Congress. The distance from behaviourism is therefore not so great as it at first seems to be. Köhler and Lashley are in fundamental agreement, though 1 Psychological Review, 1930.

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they appear to speak in entirely different languages. Both arrive at a description of the functioning of the nervous system, the one starting with an analysis of the phenomena of objective experience, and the other with a study of the phenomena of animal behaviour, and, as regards the functioning of the nervous system, the phenomena they find are strikingly consistent with one another. They seem in fact to be working at the same problem from different sides. This agreement cannot fail to make us take the findings of Gestalt psychology seriously. At the same time it makes imperative an examination of the exact place of the Gestalt theories in a systematic psychology.

Lashley rightly emphasizes the fact that psychology is a more fundamental science than neurology. At the present time, and for many years to come, the neurological description can only apply in the most general way to psychological phenomena. The limitations of Gestalt psychology, as developed by the school to which Köhler belongs, are equally obvious. Let it be acknowledged at once that their problems are fundamental problems, at least as far as perceptual experience is concerned. At the best the solution of these problems, interpreted as Köhler interprets them, can never give us more than a descriptive psychology of objective experience. So long as this school adheres to the view that psychology is simply the science which seeks to describe objective experience, which is apparently the view held, no explanatory principles can ever emerge. Objective experience is not even the whole of experience. The psychology of the behaviourist, at any rate by implication, is wider than this, and does not exclude the development of explanatory principles. Gestalt psychology, from this point of view, appears merely as an introduction to a systematic and complete psychology, which has, as it were, cut itself off from such a complete psychology. If the analysis of objective experience is to lead no farther than the understanding of the structure of objective experience, if it is not going to point the way towards the understanding of animal and human behaviour, we may well agree with the behaviourist that the game is not worth the candle.

The whole tendency of Gestalt psychology is towards a narrowly intellectualistic psychology-some might even say an epistemology. This is an almost inevitable result of the emphasis on perception in the first instance, and more fundamentally of the limitation of the scope of psychology to objective experience. There does not seem to be any valid reason why we should decline, even in a young science, to extend our investigation to experience as a whole. The nature and conditions of experience, the phenomena of feeling, emotion, desire, volition, clearly come within the scope of a science of psychology. If this is admitted, it is evident that introspection has a place

in psychology more important than that assigned to it by Köhler. There is also something to be said regarding Köhler's attitude towards 'meaning.' The mental life has two essential aspects. The one we call 'consciousness'; that is, the inside view of the event; the other we call 'intelligence'; but 'insight,' as understood by Köhler, would suit equally well—would suit even better if we extend its meaning as Köhler seems inclined to do. These two aspects are distinguishable, but not separable. All experience involves both. As experience it involves 'consciousness'; as organized in whatever degree, it involves 'insight.' It would follow that such 'real form' as is present is a manifestation of 'insight.' This at once raises a question that has been already referred to. Is dynamical self-distribution in the sensory field a phenomenon of the same order as 'real form,' Gestalt in the strict sense? Are segregation and organization one and the same phenomenon? Putting the question in this second form seems to leave no alternative to a negative answer. In the case of local stimulation in the retinal field, as by a patch of colour for

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example, the effect produced is not confined to the area of the retina directly stimulated. As a result of sensory dynamics the whole retinal field may be affected. This result may be due to the functioning of the nervous system, but is the phenomenon of the same order as the organization of the sensory field into 'figure and ground'? Similarly with the segregation of wholes arising from definite contours. Is this phenomenon of the same order as the perception of an object or situation? It seems as if there were a considerable gap in the Gestalt theory at this point, and it is a gap which can be filled by the conception of 'insight' or some theory of 'meaning.'

Köhler's constant polemic against the 'meaning theory' reminds one very forcibly of Pavlov's continual polemic against psychology in general. In both cases the polemic is justified up to a certain point—against a particular 'meaning theory' in the one case, and against a particular type of psychology in the other. But Köhler's assumption that 'meaning' is necessarily and entirely a product of learning is entirely gratuitous. What if 'meaning' is just that

'relevance' which is the characteristic mark of 'insight'?

In an article published some little time ago in this Journal, the present writer wrote: "The organism does not apprehend sensations. It apprehends a situation, with a certain form or configuration, and this situation has a certain quale, which is its 'meaning.' To the question: What is the nature of this 'meaning'? the only possible answer seems to be that it arises in the form of a felt relation of the situation to the organism. This felt relation appears in the experience itself in the shape of what we call 'interest,' and such form as the situation presents can be explained only as deriving from the same source." In the same article it was argued that 'meaning' arises primarily on the affective aspect of the mental life. There is more than a suggestion in his final chapter that some idea of the same sort has occurred to Köhler. However that may be, the limitations he places on himself effectually prevent its development. He says he has no use for the concept of 'instinct' except in the sense of a chain or pattern of reflexes. Are there no congenital impulsions or 'drives' in animal and human life? Are there no congenital attitudes to which certain situations are 'relevant'?

The general finding would seem to be, on the one hand that the *Gestalt* theory presents a point of view which is in many respects a valuable, though limited, one, and, on the other hand, that *Gestalt* psychology, in proportion as it is consistently adhered to, is merely an introductory chapter in a complete,

systematic psychology, as we have already indicated.

JAMES DREVER.

The Philosophy of Art. By C. J. Ducasse. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. xiv + 314. Price 12s. 6d. net.)

The function of art, relatively to the artist, is to express feeling; relatively to the spectator, its function is to impress upon him the same feeling which it originally expressed. Expression here means objectification or objective self-expression: that is, the creation of an object—whether a "real" object or an "imaginary" object, does not matter—capable of "yielding back the feeling of which it was the attempted expression." Moreover, it is a deliberate and conscious activity; not a random objectification of feeling, but an intentional and self-critical objectification. This is the main contention of Professor Ducasse's book, in obvious relationship to such views as Tolstoy's conception of art as communicating feelings and Croce's intuition-expression theory. To

"Meaning as Affective," 1928.

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make this clear, these theories are reviewed in the early chapters of the book, together with certain other conceptions of art, connecting it with the Freudian wish, imitation, play, and so forth. These chapters are not critical expositions of Tolstoy, Croce, Schiller, and the rest; they are stepping-stones towards the author's own point of view, and therefore we need not linger over them. beyond saying that they are always clear and concise, and play their part in the book admirably.

The author's grasp upon his own conception is firm, and it is a pleasure to see him applying it to such questions as whether a sigh or a photograph is a work of art; whether the people who read novels for the pleasure of "vicarious adventure" are in the æsthetic frame of mind; whether "empathy" is connected with art; in short, to all cases of the question whether a certain thing is or is not a work of art, whether a certain activity is or is not æsthetic. And the merits of the conception are plain from the justice with which questions of this kind are solved; for they are not solved, as they often might be, by mere deliverances of the author's common sense, they are solved by reference

to the theory he is propounding.

Up to a point, then, the author has made good his thesis. In some sense it is true that art is objective self-expression. But there are difficulties which, in my opinion, he has not removed; and the firmness with which he grasps his own theory, and the lucidity with which he has stated it, bring these difficulties into a clearer light. In the first place, what does art express? Not meanings, for then it would be prose instead of poetry, the scientific as opposed to the literary use of language, or in the author's terminology "lectical" instead of "asthetic art." Not volitions, for then it would be invention, the creation of instruments or means to an end ("heuretic art"). These two things share many of its characteristics with "æsthetic art," being two other species of the same genus; but its differentia lies in the fact that it expresses feelings. Now, the term feeling is harmless, even beneficial, when it is merely an algebraical symbol for "that which is expressed"; but when it takes on a positive meaning of its own, the result is a theory of art whose emphasis lies wholly on emotion; and the corollaries proper to any such theory are accepted without flinching. Sensual pleasure is æsthetic pleasure, and the term beautiful should be applied to Château Laffitte 1870 in exactly the same sense as to the Torso Belvedere; judgment is reduced to taste, which can indeed be modified by experience, but "whether it is then to be described as an educated or as a perverted taste is itself a pure matter of taste"; criticism, except as a mere expression of personal and momentary predilection, vanishes; and the feeling of any given individual, at any given moment, about any given work of art, is an ultimate court from which there is no appeal. Now-it is impossible to argue the matter in a review-these corollaries cannot be accepted without serious reservations. Even Professor Ducasse at times seems uneasy about some of them, for he states them with a passion so unlike his usual cool persuasiveness as to suggest that he is under the necessity of convincing himself against his better judgment, or, at least, that he knows he is preaching paradoxes. For example, he has much to say about the cult of "design" that is characteristic of modern art. So far as this is an exaggeration, he criticizes it effectively; yet in the last resort his criticism fails, because, by his emotionalistic theory, he has deprived himself of the right to criticize at all, except by declaring his emotions, which is not criticizing. He tells us that modern painting invokes the old masters in vain, because what gives the old masters their supreme place is "very obviously their dramatic aspect, and not their design aspect. Here "very obviously" is bluster; it will convince nobody; it merely arouses a suspicion (probably a

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quite unworthy suspicion) that he does not appreciate composition. He is indignant because people who claim to understand these things insist upon the supreme importance of design, and assume that those who disagree with them are wrong. His theory makes it impossible for him to refute them, so he can only abuse them; and the term of abuse which he invents is a neologism so nauseating that it only serves to demonstrate the breakdown of his literary taste under the strain of a situation which, if his theory were true, could never have arisen, and with which, because his hands are tied by the theory,

he is unable to cope.

In the second place, what is meant by expressing? The author rejects Croce's view that to express our feelings is to intuit them, to arrive at illumination concerning them; he holds, if I understand him, that first (a) we have a feeling, then (b) we express it, e.g. in writing, and only then (c), by reading what we have written, do we come to see what the feeling was. Croce would agree that we do not know what we have to say before we say it; but for Professor Ducasse this is not enough; it is not speech that illuminates our minds to themselves, it is subsequent reflexion on the things said. To me, this seems incorrect in fact, and based on insufficient analysis of the relation between "having something to say" and "knowing what it was that I had to say." Two views on this matter seem to be struggling for supremacy in the author's mind: first, one according to which we begin by not knowing what it is we have to say, and secondly, one according to which we begin by knowing it, but knowing it less clearly. There also seems to be an uncertainty in his mind as to whether we really have feelings before we express them: passages occur which imply that we do, but in one passage at least it is said that we do not, for the feeling "develops with the expression" of it. These questions must be settled before we can understand what expression means; and from his treatment of Croce-who, after all, has grappled with them-one doubts if Professor Ducasse realizes their urgency.

A third problem over which the author has perhaps passed too lightly is the relation between art and beauty. Art, he tells us, is not an activity aiming at the creation of beauty, for "we meet with many objects which are undeniably works of art, but which are none the less very ugly." So far, this is like saying that law courts do not aim at doing justice, because many decisions on record are unjust. But, he goes on, we cannot argue that the ugliness proves the failure of the art, because the artist "might well admit the ugliness." He might; people have been known to admit intercourse with the devil; but such admissions are not evidence. Beauty, according to the author, is the pleasantness of the feelings obtained in contemplating an object; and the essence of the æsthetic activity is the contemplating, so that even if the feelings obtained therefrom are painful (i.e. the object is ugly), the æsthetic end is still achieved. If that follows, so much the worse for a hedonistic theory of beauty; but does it follow? Does the author think that a specific activity can achieve its proper end without the occurrence of any pleasurable feelings? And if, as surely must be the case, there is a pleasure proper to the æsthetic activity—a pleasant feeling that we are successfully contemplating something—does not this feeling correspond with his definition

of heauty?

These criticisms are not intended to cast doubt upon the value, and in the best sense of the word the originality, of the book. It must remain as an admirable example of what can be done with an emotionalistic theory of art by a clear-headed and well-equipped writer; and although there are problems, and important problems, over which its argument seems to break down, it is no small service to the advancement of thought to have worked a theory out

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so completely, and to have stated it so lucidly, as Professor Ducasse has done. The text of his book shows that he was making no empty professions in his preface, when he quoted the maxim citius emergit veritas ex errore quam ex confusione, and promised to welcome whatever criticisms he should draw down upon himself by an attempt to avoid at all costs "the vagueness and logical looseness which have been the bane of philosophy."

R. G. COLLINGWOOD.

Morals and Western Religion: A Discussion in Seven Dialogues. By John Laird, Regius Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Aberdeen. (Arnold & Co. 1931. Pp. v + 232. Price 7s. 6d.)

[In asking me to review this book, the Editor of Philosophy, by way of persuasion, referred to its brevity. Short though it is, it is as full of matter as an egg is full of meat, as a glance at the titles of the Dialogues-Concerning Western Religion, Concerning Ethics, Sacred and Secular, The Sufficiency of Humanism, The Problem of Evil, The Law and Grace, The Metaphysical Aspect-was sufficient to show; and I was finding it uncommonly difficult to give a correspondingly short account either of its spirit or contents. Luckily, when I was on the verge of despair, I heard that two of the characters who appear in the Dialogues, namely J. L. Fixby, Esq., Fellow of Gloucester Hall, Oxbridge, and Dr. G. Munro, Professor of Moral Philosophy in the University of Leuchars, Scotland, had, like "The Persons of the Tale" in R. L. Stevenson's Fable, got out of the book, started home from the scene of the Dialogues in California, and begun on the way to compare notes (it was obviously only a beginning) of their impressions of the results. Why! (I thought), if they could talk, they might also be able to write, and one or other of them might have jotted down some notes of what was said. On inquiry I found that this was so, and that the writer had no objection to my using them to get myself out of a scrape. It only requires to be explained, for the benefit of anyone who has not read the book, that the other characters referred to in these notes are Mrs. Anastasia Hacopian, a high-browed Hegelian, Miss Lettice Gotto, a charming Berkeleian, Dr. David Wilson, a Professor in Canberra University, Dr. T. Elder Bowie, Professor of N.T. Exegesis McCheyne Seminary, Dairsie, N.S., and P. R. Duff, Esq., Editor of the Journal of Metaphysics, whose strong family resemblance to the Editor of the Dialogues the friends of the latter will hardly fail to recognize. The scene of this reported conversation is the deck-lounge of the s.s. Aquitania on the first afternoon out from New York.]

Fixby. Well, Munro, we haven't had a chance in that hectic race across America to catch our boat of a talk about these Dialogues. What did you think of them?

Munro. Dialogues! Dialogue means talk—the kind of thing you and I used to have into all hours of the night and morning in your old rooms in the back quad at Balham. That was talk—conversation, if you like. These weren't conversations; they were conferences. They seem to have lost the art of conversation out there; and I doubt if we'll keep it long with all this organizing—rationalizing the economists call it—rationing would be more like it.

Fixby. Right you are! But if you've done grousing about the form of the

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things, we can get on to the stuff. What did you think of that? Bully, I should call it, as our Californian friends would say.

Munro. Yes, bully in more senses than one. A lot of it more like permican. Fixby. At any rate, it was washed down with lots of good wit for lack of wine. They're a bright crowd. Mrs. Anastasia was somewhat of a trial with her Hegelian stilts, but Lettice was delightful on her "soothing magnalities"—a flapper if you like, but a flapper of the higher order. It was too bad of Duff to get down on her beloved Berkeley, and that in his own University of Cloyne. But he's sometimes like that—a load of bricks.

Munro. Reinforced concrete!

Fixby (continuing). At other times I was a good deal impressed with what he was saying—not of course convinced. Our Author took pretty good care that none of us should show any signs of that. I should never have forgiven him if he hadn't. To be robbed of one's opinions in a book would be more than one could bear. But it's all right to be impressed. I had been reading his books before I went out, and, as you know, he has been bringing Moore and Perry and the whole camdoodle of so-called realists down about his ears over this axiology of his. For so 'cute a critic of other people, I had found his own conclusions somewhat hesitating and hazy "towards a conclusion," as he somewhere says, like the French trains "directing themselves vers Paris" rather than booked to arrive. I was all the more curious to hear what he had to say on the subjects set down for discussion, chiefly on ethics and metaphysics, and I thought that I got a move on both by way of clearness and modified agreement.

Munro. I was "impressed" as you call it, and thought I got a move on too, but it was in the opposite direction. Isn't the whole thing rather in a muddle with your "so-called realists"? It's bound to make one think there must be something after all in the old "so-called" Hegelians. They knew at any rate how to hang together to save themselves from hanging separately. But let me hear what you thought you got from him. We've just time before tea comes round.

Fixby. To begin with, I thought that he brought out pretty clearly what he meant by his "deontics", though why he shouldn't be content with old Bentham's "deontology" for a name I don't know-perhaps a bit of his Scotch economy. Leaving that, he wants ethics to be only a part of axiology and not the whole of it, as Moore makes it. On the other hand, he was perfectly right in the dressing down he gave to Wilson, with his "aretaics", that would lift the Sermon on the Mount out of ethics altogether to goodness knows where. Law no doubt, in Wilson's sense, he would agree "be damned." But the Sermon on the Mount doesn't abolish law. It only puts it inside: "Be good" for short instead of, or as well as, "Do good." There's no contradiction, as some of my friends in Oxbridge have been trying to make out. in telling people to cleanse their thoughts and improve their motives. The Jesuits knew that in their doctrine of "directing the intention." The way they applied it was damnable, but their psychology was right, as it almost always was. I liked too what he said at the same séance about grace. It rather threw a new light on what people say about his cynicism. He wants grace. But again it isn't to be something coming in from outside. It's the best of a man coming to the top. You may remember what he said to the effect that "a man, high or low, is all that he is," and morality claims "the whole man." Grace comes by a new insight into what experience gives us. But he admitted that it comes in all sorts of uncovenanted ways. I was grateful to him for not quoting the "fancy from the flower-bell" and the "chorus ending from Euripides." He had, as usual, telling illustrations of his own, that, for

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instance, about new ideals "rising at our feet like a startled bird on the moors." I don't think you can get beyond that with all Bowie's theology. Then at the end on "The Metaphysical Aspect." I thought him rough on Lettice, but he seemed to me to be talking common sense when he said that the one answer to the metaphysical problem of the spiritual nature of the world was contained in "the moral struggle theory," and that Berkeley's idealism, by putting the obstruction inside us, didn't help us there. The question was ethical, not logical or metaphysical.

Munro (after a silent interval of puffing). I agree that he cleared up the doubts that some of us had as to where his books (as Miss Gotto would say) dumped us down. But he also confirmed the suspicions I had as to whether he had not dumped us down at a place where nobody wants to go, or at any rate where nobody wants to stay. I am all with him about ethics and the will, though, as he admitted, the will may be a much bigger thing than is commonly supposed. "The mind is the man," and as far as ethics is concerned the mind is the will. And as we have the making of our minds as well as the exercising of them largely in our own hands, so we have the making as well as the exercising of our wills. Our chief job here is in fact to turn them out as good as they are made. But granted Kant's "good will," there is also the question of exercising it—deontics in the narrower sense of doing the right thing or what one ought to do. Duff's axiology, if it means anything, must mean here that what we ought to do is prescribed by what is good to have—what he calls values, and intrinsic at that: so far agreeing with Moore and his Camford followers. But your Oxbridge friends won't hear of that. They tell us we can't get beyond the ought. You can't in the end define the good except as that which you ought to have. And so you are in for a ding-dong fight—a kind of University boat-race, with equal odds on each.

Fixby. Why a fight? Why not two independent standards? There are lots of independent things in the world—that porpoise, for instance, out there

and your pipe. Why not right and good?

Munro. Yes! That might be all right from the point of view of an outand-out pluralism. But that's not what Duff says. He sees it won't work. We want to do what's right. We don't need to be saints to want that. But it's not always so easy to say what is right; we want some rule or principle to guide us, and the only one that can be given is Bradley's (which Duff quotes), namely to do the best we can. Unfortunately this doesn't carry us very far. What do you mean by the best? and how do you know what you can and what you can't do, till you try? In both you have to start with estimating consequences, and these are always merely probable. But probable or certain, you still have to ask consequences for what? It is here that Duff's intrinsic values or dignities come in. We have to realize "certain states of mind," "excellences" as he elsewhere calls them. But he sees that "intrinsic dignity" (for example, in the case of truth-telling) isn't enough, and he brings in as a second string to his bow the "welter of confusion" that would result if we couldn't believe what anybody said. Besides, then, these intrinsic or independent values we have to bring in "relational values," such as "continuity with former acts," justice to others, and the like. He even suspected that this may be the root of the matter, and that "the great majority of duties are of this relational kind." I said at the time that he was like the magician who had made the water flow and then couldn't stop it, and that he had drowned his ethics in an ocean of values. What I ought to have said was that he had drowned the intrinsic, independent values he started out with in an ocean of relationships, and that there is nothing now left to be done but to

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fish out the corpses and consign them to Christian burial. Once admit relations as the essence of the business, and you have to admit in ethics as in physics a "framework of reference"—the idea of some whole within which the relations hold. Barring her pomposity, it was this that Anastasia had at the back of her mind in her talk about "integral totalities" and "patterns of the spirit." Apart from something of the kind, you may have some makeshift ethics, but you won't have a moral philosophy. Duff is too much of a philosopher not to feel the tow of what Meyerson or somebody has called "the natural metaphysic of the mind," and somebody else "the spirit of totality." He shows it in all he says about the relatedness of our duties, but he also shows it, if I am not mistaken, in what you quoted from him about grace. We call a thing the work of grace when it is the work of what is best in the "whole man." But where do you find the whole man short of the whole to which he belongs? "Either be a whole or join a whole," Goethe tells us, but nobody knew better than Goethe that you couldn't be a whole without joining one, and that there was none short of the whole as something "good and fair," Deus sive natura, that could give us what we want. Get into touch with this, have an ear for what it has to tell you of the things of real worth in it, and take that for the law of your life: this is the sum and substance of any genuine axiology. It is no answer to say that these high-sounding generalities are of no more use in telling us what we are to do about a thing, than generalities about the meaning of truth are of use in telling us what to think about it. Even in practice there is more to be said for the maxim "widen and order your thoughts about it" than is commonly believed. But in philosophy we are out primarily for understanding, not for acting. Axiology asks us to understand from the side of the idea of "good," and if the first thing that strikes the axiologist is the multitude of goods, just as the first thing that strikes the ontologist is the multitude of existences, that is only what we might expect. But he can't stop there any more than the other can. An ontology that knows its business must be on the hunt all the time for the ens realissimum, and an axiology that is to get us anywhere must be a hunt for the bonum realissimum. Whether when they get to understand each other better they will come to see that they both are really talking of the same thing is another question. Plato certainly, and I believe also Kant, held that they will. You would notice that Duff refused to come to grips with this, the real "metaphysical aspect," of all our discussions. Instead of that he side-tracked the issue, set up a bogey Berkeley, and rode off triumphant with its scalp to hang in the editorial office of the Journal of Metaphysics. That was why I thought that the whole thing, instead of being "towards a conclusion," left us nowhere at all.

Fixby. I think you are hard on Duff. What he wanted to show was that in the end you have to take your stand in "any future metaphysic," to quote your own Kant, from certain independent, autonomous values which don't need any help from exploded ontologies. Value in fact is one thing, being or existence is another, and so far as I am concerned *Ça me suffit*, or as Lettice

put it Sam Suffi.

Munro. Exactly! My answer is, Ca ne me suffit pas, and I doubt whether it has ever satisfied or will ever satisfy anyone else that you or others, including Duff, have any respect for as philosophers. But I see that they are bringing round tea. Value and existence, sometimes at any rate, praise the Lord, come together. Perhaps I'll be in a less cantankerous humour after it. Like you, I certainly owe a lot to Duff.

J. H. MUIRHEAD.

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Cosmic Problems: An Essay on Speculative Philosophy. By J. S. MACKENZIE; Litt.D., LL.D. (London: Macmillan & Co. 1931. Pp. ix + 122. Price 6s.)

Professor Mackenzie is one of the dwindling few whose presence prevents us from regarding English Hegelianism as a closed chapter. It would be a misfortune if the chapter were to close; neither our need of it nor its own problems are at an end. Its own problems may have been settled in outline, but the solutions still require to be made intelligible and convincing to the non-elect and to be brought into connection with the recent changes in scientific knowledge. And our need of it, or of something like it, is becoming urgent: the "scientific" philosophies now in vogue here are so patchy and prosaic that we ought for our mind's good to keep open before us the vast, coherent, and humanly serious pages written under the influence of Kant and Hegel.

Not being myself an Hegelian, I cannot indicate Professor Mackenzie's position in the school. He maintains that to make the conception of a universe intelligible one must postulate a universal mind. Such a mind would be a system of universals. Since we postulate it to account for the existent world we must allow it creative power. This creative power is really the power to produce at the level of existence a set of particulars correspondent to the antecedent universals. The whole process, which occurs in time, is to be regarded after the analogy of the creative imagining of an artist, except that it is ruled throughout by the idea of the Good. Particular minds are at once the constituents and the expression of the absolute mind, and the attainment of the Good is partly dependent on their initiative and effort. Here arises the question of the compatibility of a determining cosmic plan with human freedom, which is curiously answered by the contention that freedom is the end, not the condition, of a finite mind's progress.

I must apologize for the sketchiness of the above outline, but the book is sketchy. Indeed, I am seriously at a loss to know why the book was written. It is far too wide in scope and short in treatment, and much too allusive, to be intelligible to a beginner, and I can find in it nothing for more advanced students. The admirable plan of the table of contents is an empty promise: even the sections on the newer developments in physics (to treat which is one of the chief purposes of the book) are nothing more than trivial. Trivial too is the frequency of quotation in so very small a book; even for the casual remark that philosophy has no steady development Professor Mackenzie adduces the support of Bosanquet and cites the *locus*. The best idea I can give of the essay is to print the entire section headed "The Objectivity of Value":—

"Some modes of valuation may be held to be purely subjective, though very few are wholly so. There is nearly always some objective ground for the value that we attach to any particular thing or complex situation; and this is emphatically the case with 'the Good' as conceived by Plato. It is not merely something that we think good. Even what is intrinsically bad may no doubt be valued—as in the declaration of Milton's Satan, 'Evil, be thou my good.' The paradox in such a saying might, of course, be somewhat mollified by substituting what, I suppose, would be its equivalent, 'Malevolence, be thou my source of Joy.' This would help us to see that the paradox is due to different senses of Value. But the important consideration here is that the sources of valuation are always, in some degree, objective. They are not purely subjective, at least in the sense in which subjective implies arbitrary choice. There are always some real grounds for our preferences, though the grounds may often be obscure or inadequate."

To comminute 119 pages into 66 ambitiously headed sections covering most of the wide field of philosophy is obviously a fruitless enterprise. I

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suppose most teachers will share my gratitude to Professor Mackenzie for having provided us with a clearly mapped introduction to ethics, but I fear that neither they nor their pupils will feel a like gratitude for his new book. For a worthier contribution to the stately tradition of idealism they will turn back to his large *Elements of Constructive Philosophy*.

T. E. JESSOP.

Locke, Berkeley, Hume. By C. R. Morris. (Oxford: The Clarendon Press. 1931. Pp. 174. Price 6s.)

Mr. Morris has given us in this little book a careful and useful analysis of the course of English empiricism in its three greatest figures. The simple directness of his argument and the ease and fluency of his style should commend him to a wider circle of readers than those whose especial interest is the history of English philosophy. His sections on Locke and Berkeley both in exposition and in criticism are unexceptionable. The arrangement in both cases is well devised to reduce the incoherence and repetition of Locke and the scattered writings of Berkeley to a single continuous argument, with just enough critical comment to distinguish what is of lasting value from what is inadequate or peculiar to each philosopher. One point of detail may be queried. Mr. Morris seems to equate "reflection" in Locke with "mental process," or more narrowly with "reasoning"; he complains, for instance, that in perception there is comparison and distinction, and Locke should admit that these are processes of reflection. But "reflection" in Locke means introspection, and his view is that we can compare and compound the simple ideas given us by sensation or reflection (introspection), but that this activity of comparing is neither sensation nor reflection. If we attend to our comparing, then we are reflecting. This misunderstanding to which our modern use of "reflection" renders us liable is worth pointing out, as it is a trap in other philosophers of the period besides Locke. I find students of Butler often saying "Butler is a rationalist," and quoting "Conscience is a principle of reflection," to confirm this. Here also, however, it is surely clear that reflection means introspection—a faculty as direct and intuitive and non-rational as smell—but one whose objects are mental states and not physical things.

Hume presents greater difficulties, and it is here perhaps that Mr. Morris and his readers are less likely to see eye to eye. Hume is presented as a dogmatic psychologist so convinced of the success of his psychology that he will sacrifice to it not only physical science but also common sense. Mr. Morris suggests that Hume's difficulties about causality can be met by rejecting his account of the origins of belief; but the problem of induction is still the scandal of philosophy, and Hume remains the locus classicus for the problem. Even if his solution is inadequate, he first made clear the issue, and his solution itself is surely more than a psychologist's blunder. For, stripped of its psychological accoutrements, it is just that very "descriptive theory" of science which is the favourite theory of scientists themselves down to the present day, and has attracted such followers as Huxley, Mach, and Russell. We feel heartened in our opposition to Mr. Morris on this point when he says that Hume's contributions to logic are a passing reference and a single footnote. The frontiers between logic, metaphysics, and psychology are notoriously debatable, but logic on any view must surely include the presuppositions of induction. Would it not be truer to say that Hume's psychology, like Berkeley's spiritualism, belongs to the old clothes department of philosophy, but that his logic and his metaphysics must be bone of our bone if we are to be

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philosophers at all. In this question, however, Mr. Morris is representative of the post-Hume tradition, that sees in him either a sceptic or a subjectivist whose main merit is to plunge in final darkness the English "way of ideas," and so render more dazzling by contrast the dawn of Kant and Hegel. What is still wanted is a critic to expound the positive side of Hume which gives him a good claim to be the greatest logician and metaphysician this country has produced. On a point of detail I should like to suggest an explanation. Mr. Morris quotes: "By the term of impression I would not be understood to express the manner in which our lively perceptions are produced in the soul, but merely the perceptions themselves." He says Hume is distinguishing perceiving from what is perceived, the act from its object. I have always supposed that he is really guarding his readers against taking the word "impression" literally and using the argument that there can only be an impression when there is something that impresses. He is not distinguishing my act of perceiving from what I perceive, he is distinguishing what I perceive from the illegitimately supposed external object (which "impression" might seem to imply).

The only general criticism which suggests itself is a regret that Mr. Morris should have devoted even the few pages he does to the moral and political theories of these authors. For, while Locke and Berkeley can be so dismissed without injustice, their negligible contributions in these fields should not be

compared with the brilliant and influential moral theory of Hume.

J. D. Маввотт.

The Animal Mind. By C. LLOYD MORGAN, D.Sc., F.R.S. (London: Edward Arnold & Co. 1930. Pp. ix + 275. Price 12s. 6d.)

The Animal Mind is dedicated to the Gentle Reader. To this accommodating person Professor Lloyd Morgan ascribes all the questions which he wishes to answer and all the arguments which he wishes to refute. It is an ingenious way of maintaining a dialogue, but by the end even the very Gentle Reader is likely to complain that he has had all the kicks and none of the ha'pence.

Professor Morgan's aim is to present in a conversational form his views with regard to the characteristics of animal mind. He gives a wealth of illustrations of animal behaviour, including many of his own observations, which were published in his earlier works, and also observations from a wide range of other workers. He discusses a number of problems in his dialogue with the Gentle Reader, and makes clear to him the methodological problems involved in the study of animal psychology, and he treats of several psychological topics in relation to animal behaviour, e.g., Association, Trial and Error, Memory. All this is, however, somewhat by the way. The matter that he has at heart is obviously the old problem, so much discussed between him and his critics, of the relation between instinctive and intelligent behaviour. In the preface Professor Lloyd Morgan says: "In some respects my attitude now differs from what was my attitude then." The view in his earlier work that was most criticized by psychologists was that the first performance of an instinctive activity is purely reflex; that consciousness of the activity comes as a backwash through which improvement occurs on repetition. Stout said: "According to the theory" (Lloyd Morgan's), "intelligence first comes into being only when the instinctive action is repeated on a new occasion with adaptive variation of behaviour determined by past experience. But it is not on the subsequent occasion that the animal first learns the lesson. It is only then that it begins

¹ Animal Life and Intelligence, 1889; Habit and Instinct, 1896; Animal Behaviour, 1900.

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to profit by what it has learned. . . . It follows that, if learning by experience is itself an intelligent process, the intelligence involved in instinctive activity cannot be purely an after-effect of learning by experience."

Has Professor Lloyd Morgan modified this view in his present work? It is not easy from the mazes of his communings with the Gentle Reader to extract evidence on this point. The following quotations are the most crucial for the subject.

"In so far as behaviour is the observable expression of so-called organization in body and mind, its three stages are instinctive, intelligent, and rational. And with them are co-related three stages of mental organization, percipient, perceptive, and reflective" (p. 167).

He includes within instinctive behaviour

"awareness in behaving, strongly felt urge, subtle nuances of emotional state, swiftly changing percipience,"

but not

"retrospective reference to what has gone before nor prospective reference to what is coming *some time ahead*" (the italics are the reviewer's).

He holds that there are distinct stages in behaviour, instinctive and intelligent, respectively:—

"This difference" [in the behaviour of young birds during the first week of life] "is such as to lead me to infer that at some time during the week there is a radical change in mentality; that under observation, there is an advance from instinctive behaviour to intelligent behaviour; and that under imputation there is a co-related step upward from percipience to perception" (p. 137).

It appears from these quotations that Professor Lloyd Morgan has to some degree met his critics. He only denies prospective reference to what is coming some time ahead. He thereby allows by implication that there is the prospective reference for which Stout argued. He speaks of "strongly felt urge," whereas formerly he questioned the presence of true conation in instinctive behaviour.2 It is, of course, possible that he would draw a distinction between this strongly felt urge and "true conation." To the reviewer it does not seem that these concessions help much when Professor Lloyd Morgan still makes a radical cleavage between instinctive and intelligent behaviour and thinks of the latter as supervening at some stage upon the former. Stout's old query is as relevant as ever, and data are at hand which make it more cogent than when he propounded it. For Pavlov found in his work on conditioned reflexes that the animal only "learned" to give the reflex to the conditioning stimulus if he had the "what is it" attitude. Mere performance of the reflex to the original stimulus with which occurred the conditioning stimulus did not lead to the establishment of the necessary links, in the absence of what Pavlov calls the investigatory reflex. Indeed, the whole trend of recent work is to make us question the legitimacy of thinking of any action (apart, perhaps, from the most fundamental organic rhythms) as purely reflex in the sense in which the term was applied in the early days of the instinct-intelligence controversy.

Now that Professor Lloyd Morgan allows the presence of prospective reference and felt urge in the first performance of the instinctive action it may be

¹ Stout, Manual of Psychology, 3rd ed., p. 350. ² Instinct and Intelligence, p. 43, Methuen, 1912.

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that the controversy between him and Stout would amount to little more than a logomachy, Lloyd Morgan denying that these factors imply intelligence, Stout saying that they are just the elements which he regards as essential for intelligent action. VICTORIA HAZLITT.

Reason and Nature: An Essay on the Meaning of Scientific Method. By Morris R. Cohen. (London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. 1931. Pp. xxiv + 470. Price 21s.)

The author is to be congratulated on the remarkable lucidity of this book, which makes it a very good conspectus of philosophy in relation to the sciences and one of great interest for all students whether elementary or advanced. In handling problems he shows a sound and balanced judgment and a sense of the essential. One feels, however, that there are cases where clearness is secured by lack of depth, and that many highly controversial and complicated subjects are treated over-lightly. No doubt the author considered that it would be unwise to extend the length of the book any farther, but it seems to me that it would have been better to deal with certain topics more fully, even at the cost of reserving for a later book discussion of some of the remainder. The sub-title given hardly does justice to the scope and range of the work, which includes such wider philosophical questions as rationalism v. irrationalism, indeterminism v. determinism, vitalism v. mechanism, purpose in evolution, the question of the soul, the distinctive features of the social sciences as compared to other branches of knowledge, natural rights and positive law, and the possibility of a scientific sociology and a scientific ethics. The author is indeed concerned very little in this book with the details of scientific method or any specialist research into the methods of physical sciences, but almost entirely with such greater philosophical issues as those mentioned above.

The wide range of the book itself makes a summary within reasonable limits of space quite impossible. Professor Cohen defends a position of "moderate rationalism," but it must be admitted that his criticism of the modern anti-rationalist tendencies, though very able, is too sketchy to be at all adequate. He also seems to me unfair to W. James in treating him as a pure empiricist and ignoring his doctrine of a priori principles as working postulates, by which he radically modifies and limits his empiricism; and he causes much confusion by treating Kant's pure "intuition" as though it were a kind of mystic knowledge and not rather of the nature of sensuous perception. In my opinion the sense in which Kant uses the term "intuition" is so different from that in which it is usually employed by English writers, especially those of anti-rationalist views, that the attempt to treat both together should not have been made, since Kant's view of "intuition" in the sense of Anschauung has nothing in common with, e.g., the Bergsonian appeal to instinct as against intelligence. Professor Cohen's much-needed defence of the view that mathematical inference is synthetic, not analytic, and his explanation of the difference between induction and deduction as psychological rather than logical call for the attention of all logicians, as does his ingenious attempt to reduce induction to the syllogistic form-A cure for X, Y and Z is a cure for all pneumonia patients; serum A is a cure for X, Y and Z; therefore serum A is a cure for all pneumonia patients. The issues connected with the terms vitalism, behaviourism, determinism are discussed with great skill. The author himself defends the view of mind and

body as a single unit, neither side of which must be reduced wholly to the other. He is prevented, however, from being fair to the interaction theory by his unjustified assumption that this necessarily implies the view of the soul as a substance in a rather old-fashioned sense of the term. It is difficult to state, or even to ascertain, his own exact position in regard to determinism, for while his separate pronouncements on the subject and his criticisms of other views are clear enough, it is rather hard to fit them together into a whole. He is not satisfied with the arguments for vitalism, and meets them with some very able strictures, while recognizing that the mechanistic view is only an ideal and very far from having been established. He attacks with great skill a number of fashionable views, including the conception that there are unconscious mental processes, and the assumption that nothing is explicable except in terms of its history. His account of the social sciences is specially able and worth reading. He also gives a very interesting account of the possibilities of ethics as a science, but the value of his positive conclusions here is impaired by the absence of any detail. In an appendix he makes a timely attack on the vague eulogistic use of the terms life, experience, reality. Finally, I can only repeat my statement at the beginning that this book is an admirably clear and broad account of some of the chief issues of philosophy. It would be very desirable, however, if it were followed by a more detailed and intensive handling of some of the principal problems discussed.

A. C. EWING.

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396

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CORRESPONDENCE

TO THE EDITOR OF Philosophy.

THE ERRORS OF SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON: A DEFENCE.

SIR.

In No. 22 of this Journal Mr. Norman Campbell has published a series of objections in which he attacks Eddington's concept of modern physics. He performs his intention in such a clever and fair way that the difference is taken away out of a personal sphere and transformed into an objective matter. It is this turn to an objective matter which leads me to take part in this dispute-I myself being one of those who are endeavouring to form a philosophical interpretation of modern physics. I am far from agreeing with all particulars in Eddington's conception, but I must confess that his way of seeing modern theories seems to me to fit experiences so much better than Mr. Campbell's interpretation, that I want to give a defence of Eddington-a defence which indeed much more concerns modern physics than the interesting personality of that prominent English astronomer, who indeed is not attacked by Mr. Campbell, and needs no defence at all.

At the beginning of his criticism Mr. Campbell makes a distinction between physical theory and physical law. I cannot agree with him altogether here, as the difference between these two things seems to me only a matter of degree, and gradual transitions appear at all points. The two principles of Thermodynamics are called physical laws: Thermodynamics is called a physical theory. Classical thermodynamics, however, does not contain essentially more than these two laws, from which all other results are deduced. Usually speaking, a theory is a synopsis of several laws into a system; but as the number of propositions is no definite concept (as according to the way of speaking the same fact may be expressed by one or several propositions), there is no strict frontier between theory and law. Generally speaking, a theory is a system of laws which is not so well guaranteed as laws in a more narrow sense. But remembering that the most primitive laws already contain more than mere observation, it should be recognized that here only a difference of the degree of probability is concerned, and not a matter of principle.

More important than this question are the particular objections which Campbell addresses against Eddington. There are first the well-known illustrations of relativity by application of its concept of time to living beings. Campbell thinks such trains of thought impermissible, as their premises cannot be realized; living beings, for instance, cannot be moved with such velocities as are required in the imagined illustrations given. Therefore it would not be permissible to say what these people would see on such a journey. This argument is unconvincing. We very often make such generalizations, and they have a good sense, because they neglect only some non-essential factors and bring to a clear understanding the essential ones. If you want to describe the influence of a gravitational field on a human body, it is very instructive to relate the story of the man on the moon who emptily jumps like a giant; it is unessential and may be neglected, that men really cannot jump on the moon because there is no atmosphere. Besides, I must confess that I do not think we are entitled to speak of an absolute impossibility. Why one day should not men jump on the moon, enveloped in a rubber-armour and with air-boxes on their back? And why should they not one day fly through the universe in space-vessels and reach velocities at which Einstein's time-dilatation becomes observable? I think we should leave this possibility to the engineers; for science there is a good sense in describing what these people would observe in their strange positions.

But I suppose that Mr. Campbell has other motives in attacking such imaginations. I suppose he is not convinced that living beings would share in the changes which, according to Einstein, atomic watches undergo. Perhaps Campbell does not think it permissible to say anything about this question before such experiments are

398

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performed. But it is to be remembered that it would be a vague hypothesis which assumed that physiological processes were governed by another time than the atomic processes on which they are based. For a fuller exposition I must refer to my book, *Philosophie der Raum-Zeit-Lehre*; surely the much more substantiated hypothesis is that which believes physiological processes parallel to physical processes in their general qualities.

Corresponding answers are to be given to Campbell's objections against Eddington's conception of atomic proportions. Why is it not permissible to say that the interior of matter is comparable to the universal space, as it is indeed not more densely occupied with rigid nuclei than space with stars? Campbell says that "distance" in inter-atomic domains is something otherwise than "distance" between stars, because it is measured otherwise. But this is untenable. We may measure terrestrial distances in many ways without getting different sorts of distance. For instance, the distance between two mountains may be measured by placing rods end on end; or by aiming at the tops with a theodolite from the two ends of a base; or by an aeroplane-photograph which undergoes complicated optical transformations. But it is always the same sort of distance which is measured there. In this sense distances between stars and distances between atoms are of the same sort.

If Campbell further says that matter in the ordinary sense must be represented as solid as is customary, I think Eddington will not object to him. He will only add that this solidity is a rather crude concept, and ought to be represented in a more precise way as the collision of two clouds of dust in which only a few particles enter into the other cloud, and that in the whole repelling forces push the clouds away from each other. Why is it forbidden to say so? It is only maintained by this view that some macroscopic phenomena are better pictures of molecular processes than the usual conception of a continuous matter; and this fact, I think, cannot to-day be

seriously denied.

Finally, as to Heisenberg's relation of indetermination, I must say that Mr. Campbell does not see the essential significance of this discovery. It is true that it was not possible for classical physics to determine both the position and velocity of an electron precisely; but the idea was held that improvement of determination to any chosen degree was in principle possible. Heisenberg says that this view is not true, and that there is an objective limit to improvement of exactness. It is unquestionable that our concept of causality receives a shock by this. In substantiating this statement I may refer to the fact that some time before the use of quantum-mechanics I gave a generalization of causality just in the same way and wrote about its philosophical consequences. Heisenberg's discovery appears to me, there fore, as the realization of a philosophical position which is to be drawn quite independently of all physical experiences.²

It may be admitted that several popular expositions of modern physics overstep the necessary bounds in figurative interpretation of physical results; but Eddington's expositions do not belong to these, at least in those points which Campbell puts forward. On the contrary, nothing seems to me so urgently required in the present philosophical situation as an unprejudiced interpretation of modern physics. The first necessity in pursuing this aim is a really earnest interpretation of the results of science, and the evaluation of their direct signification for the real world. It is not permissible to call modern physics a world of mathematical concepts which have a sort of mathematical life of their own, remote from the world of physical facts, which may, in the best instances, serve as reckoning aids for experimental physicists. On the contrary, we should know that our world really is structured otherwise than naïve experience believes. As one of those who are earnest in this true interpretation of modern physics, I esteem Dr. Eddington.

Yours faithfully, HANS REICHENBACH,

Professor of the Philosophy of Physics at the University of Berlin.

399

May 1931.

¹ Berlin, 1928, de Gruyter, §30. ² Die Kausalstruktur der Weit und der Unterschied von Vergangenheit und Zukunft, Ber. d. bayr. Akad. d. Wiss. math. phys. Kl., München, 1925, S. 133. Cf. H. Reichenbach, Ziele und Wege der heutigen Naturphilosophie, Leipzig, 1931, F, Meiner, and some contributions to Erkenntnis, Annalen der Philosophie, Leipzig, F. Meiner.

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PHILOSOPHY

TO THE EDITOR OF Philosophy.

THE RIGHT AND THE GOOD.

SIR.

I have been reading that very excellent book, The Right and the Good, by Dr. W. D. Ross, and the review of it by Professor W. G. de Burgh in the April number of Philosophy.

On pp. 4, 5, 6 Dr. Ross seeks to prove (by an argument a fortiori) the proposition that "morally good" does not mean the same as "that ought to be done" by trying to prove that nothing that ought to be done is ever morally good. The latter proposition he thinks follows from the proposition that only acts from a good motive are morally good together with the proposition that action from a good motive is

never morally obligatory, i.e. action that ought to be done.

For this last proposition he has two arguments. Of the second of these Professor De Burgh writes as follows: "Dr. Ross's second argument is a reductio ad absurdum. If the sense of duty is to be my motive for doing a certain act, it must be the sense that it is my duty to do that act. If, therefore, we say 'It is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty,' this means 'It is my duty to do act A from the sense that it is my duty to do act A.' And here the whole expression is in contradiction with a part of itself. The whole sentence says, 'It is my duty to-do-act-A-from-the-sense-that-it-is-my-duty-to-do-act-A.' But the latter part of the sentence implies that what I think is that it is my duty-to-do-act-A simply (ibid.). Are we not here again faced by the antinomy which we said was inherent in all moral experience? No particular dutiful act, A, is adequate to express the principle of duty universal which is the moral motive.'

The antinomy in moral experience manifests itself here, I gather, in the combination of the two facts, that (1) Dr. Ross's conclusion that action from a good motive is never morally obligatory seems unplausible, while (2) his argument seems impeccable.

To suppose that an antinomy is involved here seems to me to be an instance of the philosopher's habit of turning puns into problems. Dr. Ross's sentence "action from a good motive is never morally obligatory" may mean (a) It is never true of an action both that it was caused by a good desire and that it ought to be done, or (β) Such a sentence as "you ought to comb your hair because of a good desire" never expresses a fact, i.e. the characters in respect of which an action is a person's duty never include the character being caused by a good desire. Not every character of an action which I ought to do is a character in respect of which I ought to do it. I ought to go to a meeting forty minutes from now. The character in respect of which my action forty minutes hence will be what I ought to do is the character of bringing me to a meeting at 4.30 p.m. The action will in fact have also the character of increasing my pulse rate to between 80 and 90 beats per minute. But this is not a character in respect of which it is my duty.

It seems to me that (i) "prompted by a good desire is never a character in respect of which an action ought to be done" is true, i.e. that proposition (a) above is true; that (ii) Dr. Ross's arguments prove (i); that (iii) Dr. Ross's final conclusion that "morally good" does not mean "that ought to be done" does not follow from (i); that (iv) his final conclusion does follow from his arguments for (i); that (v) "prompted by a good desire is never a character of an action which ought to be done" is certainly

false, i.e. that proposition (β) above is false.

It might be argued that Dr. Ross might prove his final conclusion indirectly and via (i) in the following manner: First define the sense in which one character of a thing can be said to be dependent upon another. The beauty of a picture may be said to be dependent upon certain other and first order characters, e.g. having parts coloured this way and arranged that way, in respect of which the picture is beautiful. Let us say also that the goodness of a state of mind and the oughtness of an action depend upon those characters in respect of which the one is good and the other ought to be done.

But let us say also that if a thing is beautiful, then that fact about it is dependent not only on its having the characters in respect of which it is beautiful, but also upon its having the characters, if any, which make up the definition of beautifulsay causing appreciation in the beholder. Its beauty then depends on its having

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those characters in respect of which it is appreciated, and also upon those characters having their due effect on someone.

Similarly the oughtness of an action depends upon those characters which either (a) are characters in respect of which it ought to be done, or (b) are characters which make up the definition of ought.

If now prompted by a good desire is not a character upon which the oughtness of an action depends, it is a fortiori not the definition of ought.

But this argument is in a sense circular. Since "C depends on C'," means "Either C' is part or the whole of the definition of C, or if x has C, then it has it in respect of C'." And Dr. Ross would, so it seems to me, have done better to proceed directly from his ultimate premises to his final conclusion.

The confusion of these two forms of dependence has caused havoc in Ethics. Two fundamental questions for Ethics are (1) the analysis of goodness, (2) the providing of a list of characters in respect of which things have goodness. (2) is not the problem of what characters in fact accompany goodness, *i.e.* of characters having a correlation of + 1 with goodness, as wrongly asserted by Moore in the *Principia Ethica*. " ϕ is a character in respect of which things have goodness" may be defined as follows. Consider the fundamental sense of "good" which applies to states of affairs or facts. If, for all x, ϕx entails that that fact, ϕx , is good, then ϕ is a character in respect of which things have goodness. For example, *loving* is a character such that if x loves, then there must be something, namely, the very fact that x loves, which is good.

Yours, etc., John Wisdom.

THE UNIVERSITY,
St. Andrews,
April 29, 1931.

THE INTERNATIONAL HEGEL CONGRESS.

Readers are invited to participate in the International Hegel Congress to be held in Berlin from Sunday, October 18, to Wednesday, October 21, 1931, to commemorate the centenary of Hegel's death. There will be lectures, social gatherings, and excursions. The fee for participating in the Congress is R.M.10, which will be halved for members of the International Hegel Society and for students. Rooms in hotels from R.M.4 per day. Those who wish to attend the Congress are asked to communicate with Dr. Helfried Hartmann, Berlin-Britz, O.-Bräsigstrasse 34.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

The syllabus for the Session 1931-2 is in course of preparation, and copies will be sent to all members in due course.

The Session which has just closed has again been successful; the lecture courses and evening meetings have been well attended and much valuable work done. Members are asked to do what they can to extend the influence of the Institute by introducing new members for next session.

A Reception of members and friends will be held at 35 Porchester Terrace, London, W. 2, by the kind invitation of Sir Herbert and Lady Samuel, on Wednesday, July 22nd, from 4.30 p.m. to 5.30 p.m. The Reception will be followed by the Annual Meeting.

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CONTENTS

_	DEDDECEMENT TO THE PARTY OF THE			PAGE
1.	REPRESENTATION: Professor J. L. Stocks		•	405
II:	INTERACTION AND COSMIC STRUCTURE: PROFESSOR	J. :	E.	
	BOODIN	•	•	422
111.	DEFINITION OF VALUE: H. OSBORNE, M.A		•	433
IV.	SPINOZISTIC SUBSTANCE AND UPANISHADIC SELF:	M.	s.	
	Modak, M.A., Рн.D	•	٠	446
v.	CAUSE AND GROUND: F. E. ENGLAND, M.A., PH.D	•		459 '
VI.	REALITY IN HISTORY: HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.LIT.	•	•	472
VII.	THE CONSTANT AND THE CONTINGENT IN HUMAN THO	UGI	IT	
	AND LIFE: A. E. GARVIE, M.A., D.D.	•	•	485
VIII.	PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY:			
	PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY			49_
	PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA			g's
				ers
IX.	NEW BOOKS			tive
	. CORRESPONDENCE		1	ould
Α.	. CORRESPONDENCE			vote
XI.	INSTITUTE NOTES			'For
				at is
				ould
		A CHINESON OF		n on
				s for
The second	on	stiti	ute	the
	sover	nme	enu	. ne
	ay; bu	t He	5 51.	louid
*	is subjective sense—se	. W	ide	that
	allowed to	יאי כ	nss	ess a
	tour de fo	rce	Th	omas
	solute ruler,	au	tho	rized
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35	of common concern, as the			
	with their authority, and			
				405
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402

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PHILOSOPHY

THE JOURNAL OF THE BRITISH INSTITUTE OF PHILOSOPHICAL STUDIES

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REPRESENTATION

PROFESSOR J. L. STOCKS

T

In these days, when, if the words of constitutions can be trusted, sovereign Parliaments based on manhood or adult suffrage are rapidly extending their sway over the greater part of the world, there is surely no conception more deserving of the attention of the political theorist than that of Representation. There was a time when government for most men meant monarchy, when ruler meant king or king's minister. To-day for most men ruler means Parliament or ministers responsible to Parliament, and government means representative government. In those former times the political theorist would naturally take the king or prince for his centre-piece, and devote himself to expounding the nature and attributes of the office. "For from the prince, as from a well spring, cometh the flood of all that is good or evil upon the people" (Sir T. More). In our own day he would perhaps do well to devote himself first and mainly to reflection on the meaning of this term representation, standing as it does for something which is taken by general consent to constitute the distinctive feature of the normal modern type of government. He may run the risk of speaking merely for his own day; but he should at least be sure of remaining near the centre of his subject.

Representation may be taken in a very wide sense—so wide that any and every form of government must be allowed to possess a representative character. By a characteristic tour de force Thomas Hobbes enabled himself to describe his absolute ruler, authorized once for all in the original contract, and endowed with plenary powers to decide for ever every matter of common concern, as the representative of his subjects. He acted with their authority, and

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they took his act as theirs. But whatever the justice of this conception may be, it would include far too much for the purpose of the present discussion. The term must be limited more narrowly, and it will be restricted. I think, suitably to our ideas of representative government if we impose a double limitation. Presuming that the body represented is a people, and that the representative is the government (or part of the government) of that people: (1) the representation must be multiple, so that there is a representative body consisting of a number of persons, each of whom is a representative; (2) the relation between the representative and the represented must be such as not to be exhausted in the bare statement that the representative has been authorized to act by the represented; or, positively, the representatives collectively and individually must feel themselves to be in some degree dependent on the good pleasure of those whom they represent. By these two limitations the Hobbesian sovereign is excluded. The first alone would merely exclude his king; but the second excludes also his Assembly, for it excludes the possibility of once-for-all unlimited authorization. The provision by which in constitutions such dependence is legally secured (so far as it can be legally secured) is that of the terminable representative mandate. This secures indirectly that the representatives shall feel themselves dependent on popular opinion; and without this there would be no obvious point of connection between representation and democracy.

The central question for me is that of the precise nature of this second limitation. This is the question on which I want to concentrate the present discussion. My reason is the reason already suggested, that we have here the link, if there is one, between representation and democracy. Now it is in the name of democracy that the modern world is asked to accept representative government; and if there is no such link, the modern world is grossly deceived. In that case it must seek for other forms in which to embody its democratic ideals. But with possible alternatives I am not here concerned. I wish to confine my view to the representative parliament, the generally accepted basis of government in modern Europe, with a view to discovering in what its representative character consists, in the hope of diminishing or removing some of the confusions which beset modern politics, and especially those confusions which attend the use in this connection of the term democracy and its cognates.

As to the word democracy itself, I would make one preliminary observation. It would, I imagine, be quite possible and legitimate to give the word a precise legal or constitutional significance. Government, one might say, is democratically organized so far as it is directly and constitutionally dependent on the acts of the general body of adult citizens. In this sense of the word typical democratic 406

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provisions are those for the election of a president by popular vote, or for the submission of a law, which has received the assent of Parliament, to the citizens generally for endorsement in what is known as a Referendum. But the share which the citizen body can take in the work of government by these and other devices is very limited, and can never be sufficient by itself to justify the description of any government as generally and fundamentally democratic. It is best, therefore, to empty the word of all constitutional significance, and to make it stand rather for an end or ideal with reference to which constitutional arrangements may be assessed and adapted. The end need not be accepted; there may be other ends which temporarily or even permanently have precedence over this; but there is this end, to which, at least since the eighteenth century, men of all countries have persistently and often passionately devoted their thoughts and energies. It is the idea of a nation which is master of its own fate, which manages its own affairs. This is not a constitutional notion at all, though it has at various times tended to identify itself with certain special kinds of constitutional provision. It involves certainly the notion of the people as sovereign, but not necessarily in the sense which the constitutional lawyer gives to that term. The kind of sovereignty claimed, or hoped for, is more ultimate and more axiomatic, constitutive of the constitution itself, and penetrating into the farthest dim detail of government. Such sovereignty cannot be secured, though it can be furthered, by appropriate constitutional provisions.

Thus my question as to the relation of representation and democracy is not a question as to the mutual relation of certain constitutional features, but as to the serviceability of a certain type of constitutional provision for the end of self-government, in the name of which it is commonly recommended.

II

Let us now collect and compare some influential opinions as to the meaning to be attached to representation. Round the roots of Parliaments, stretching far back into the Middle Ages, we find the ground scattered with traces of recurrent controversy as to the status of the representative. The question was, how far was he free to commit those who sent him and in whose name he spoke? It seemed reasonable that the delegants (to borrow the French word) should have the right to bind their delegate by definite instructions. Both in England and in France we find kings, incommoded politically by this practice, exerting themselves to secure the maximum freedom for the representative. The growth of the legislative responsibilities of Parliament, in England at least, exerted pressure in the same direction. In the

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eighteenth century the freedom of the member of Parliament to decide any matter that might come up at his unfettered discretion was amply established. In 1774, when Burke made his famous speech at Bristol, the King's writ might still confess to a doubt on the point by asking that burgesses should be given unrestricted powers; but in fact Burke was correct in saying that "authoritative instructions" and mandates binding on the member were "unknown to the laws of this land" and foreign to the "order and tenor of our constitution."

This conception of what the Continental textbooks of the present day often call free representation (as opposed to tied representation) found classic expression in a number of decisions reached not without opposition by the French Revolutionary Assembly and Convention of 1789 and the following years. In the form then given to it, it has become a foundation-stone of modern parliamentarism. The French Constitution of 1791 laid it down that "the representatives elected in the departments will not be representatives of a particular department, but of the whole nation, and they may not be given any mandate." Similarly the German Constitution of 1919, repeating with an unimportant variation a provision of the Constitution of 1871, states: "The deputies are representatives of the whole people: they are subject only to their conscience, and are not bound by mandates" (an Aufträge nicht gebunden). More bluntly the Swiss Constitution of 1874 says: "The members of the two Councils vote without instructions." More bluntly still Czechoslovakia in 1920 ordains of members of Parliament that "they shall not receive orders from anybody."

It will be noted in these examples that so far as a reason is given or suggested for the prohibition of instructions, it is one typical of French revolutionary sentiment. Instructions are feared, not because they might impede or delay the work of government, but because they might threaten the unity of the nation. But that this was a commonplace before the French Revolution began is proved by Burke's speech at Bristol, in which this very point is made with what might even seem unnecessary emphasis. Whatever the source, however, the tenor of the principle is plain: the unity of the nation precludes that section of it which is a constituency from tying its representative by definite instructions.

In the French revolutionary debates, from which this principle emerged triumphant, an alternative view was advocated, in avowed connection with Rousseau, for instance by Pétion and Robespierre. They argued that the member of Parliament is the agent or mandatary of his constituents, and is therefore subject to the will of those who give him his commission. On this ground Robespierre in 1793 urged the right of recall not merely for members of Parliament, but 408

for all public officials, as a formal recognition of their continuous "physical" responsibility. "A people," he said, "whose mandatories are responsible to no one for their conduct has no constitution . . . if this is the meaning of representative government, I accept all the anathemas which J. J. Rousseau pronounced upon it." The principle behind this is, of course, the idea of self-government as a condition of freedom. "In a free state," wrote Montesquieu in 1748, "any man who is considered to possess a free soul ought to be governed by himself: therefore the people as a body ought to hold the legislative power. But this being in large states impossible, and in small states in many ways inconvenient, the people has to do by its representatives whatever it cannot do by itself." Montesquieu goes on to ask that the representatives shall receive only general instructions, but he asks this in the name of expediency, because of the delays and postponements which detailed instructions would necessarily entail.

This opposed view did not speak in the name of democracy, because that word was commonly taken to stand for the direct democracies of antiquity, and representative government was therefore conceived as a substitute for it. It spoke in the name of popular or national sovereignty, and argued that the decision of Parliament cannot be the decision of the people unless the behaviour of the member of Parliament is controlled, at least in general, by the constituents to whom he owes his membership of Parliament. To them the high-sounding phrase, that he is to consider himself the representative of the whole nation, is a mere evasion. Burke said to the Bristol electors: "You choose a member indeed; but when you have chosen him, he is not a member of Bristol, but he is a member of Parliament." To which the obvious reply is that the antithesis is false. The ordinary description of members of Parliament, current in Burke's own day, is sufficient to show this. The Rt. Hon. Edmund Burke would naturally be described as Member of Parliament for Bristol. A special relation to a part does not necessarily hinder or preclude service of the whole; and in any case it is Parliament as a whole that is entitled to speak of itself as representing the nation, not any individual member of Parliament. The contention is that this special relation involves, or ought to involve, some degree of dependence on the side of the representative.

In modern times the opponents of free representation have never been silenced. Few responsible theorists have given their cause any countenance; the weight of learning and experience has indeed been thrown heavily in the scale against them. But in spite of this they have gained ground in practice, and experienced observers like Bryce note with regret the tendency for the representative to become more and more of a delegate. Their practical successes have not been in the direction foreshadowed by Robespierre—that of tying the

individual member more closely to his constituents by defining the terms or diminishing the length of the mandate, or by providing opportunity of revocation; but rather in the direction of securing a greater responsiveness on the part of Parliaments generally to extra-Parliamentary opinion, and this less by any legal enactment than by the increasing prevalence of certain practical conventions. The increasing popularity of the Referendum is the chief legal development which comes into question here, since the demand for annual Parliaments collapsed; but the Referendum has not yet secured a footing in England, and far more important than the Referendum for the future of representative government is the increased tendency of the English House of Commons to look to "the country," as manifested in general elections, by-elections, petitions, or the public Press, for general instructions as to the work that needs doing and the manner in which it should be done. Our elder statesmen have again and again protested and shaken their heads. In the early years of the twentieth century Conservatives and Liberals and Constitutional Lawyers united in deploring this "modern theory of the mandate." But nevertheless each party in turn has found itself obliged to make concessions to it; the protests have now ceased, and it has become a generally accepted convention of Parliamentary Debate that, though the individual member may be as free as air, Parliament as a whole is, not indeed legally constrained but morally obliged to conform in all important decisions to the wishes, or as is sometime said to the will, of the people, so far as this can be ascertained. In this form the general thesis that the representative relation requires a certain subordination of the will of the representative to those he represents has succeeded in establishing itself as a principle of practical politics.

Meanwhile other voices have made themselves heard. Disappointment with the fruits of Parliamentary government has naturally led to fundamental criticism of the principle of representation itself. Mr. G. D. H. Cole's criticism will serve as a specimen of this line of thought. "The idea of democracy," he tells us, "has become tangled up with a particular theory of representative government, based on a totally false theory of representation. This false theory is that one man can represent a number of others, and that his will can be treated as a democratic expression of their wills." To this he objects, that "no man can represent another man, and no man's will can be treated as a substitute for or representation of the wills of others." But it turns out that he has nothing really to put in place of representation. The real vice of the situation for him is the omnicompetence of Parliament, with its corollary that a representative is a representative for all human concerns. Divide these concerns up along

¹ Social Theory (1920), p. 103.

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the natural lines of division and appoint separate representatives for each; make representation, as he puts it, specific and functional instead of general and inclusive, and the vice of representation will disappear. "It is impossible," he says, "to represent human beings as selves or centres of consciousness: it is quite possible to represent (though with an element of distortion which must always be recognized) so much of human beings as they themselves put into an associated effort for a common purpose."

In view of such arguments as this we must add to the questions requiring an answer this fundamental one—whether and in what sense it is legitimate to speak of persons as represented at all?

III

Mill starts his discussion of the functions of Parliament from the question, "What kinds of business a numerous body is competent to perform properly?" This too frequently neglected question is really the fundamental question for democratic theory. The question should not be confined to Parliament, and the word "properly" is unnecessary. It should be asked at each and every stage of delegation, the ultimate delegant being conceived as the people or general body of voters, from which in the last resort all authority is held by delegation. The word "properly" is not wanted, because it tends to complicate primary with secondary issues. The first question is what such a body can do. What it cannot do itself, it must, as Montesquieu said, arrange to have done otherwise. Thus under this head we might hope to show that certain kinds of delegation are necessary, i.e. are inevitable if government is to exist at all. If we ask what things such a body is "competent to perform properly," we introduce the further question whether certain things which it can do itself would not be better done otherwise, and here we are apt to find ourselves baffled by a surd in the democrat's belief in the intrinsic value of self-government. It is best to postpone that question, and even to assume at the start, at least for the sake of the argument, that whatever the general body can and will do for itself, it should do for itself and not delegate to the more restricted body. Some such presumption as this seems to be characteristic of the democratic attitude, and the best procedure is to accept the principle in its simplicity and see where it leads.

When I call the act by which authority is constituted an act of delegation, I only mean to assert the principle that the general social body, the community, is the source of all authority within it; that the body or person enjoying authority, however it may in fact be appointed, considers itself to be empowered finally by and responsible finally to the general body of citizens. A king, for

instance, like ours, who owes his position historically to complications of tradition, conquest, and Acts of Parliament, is properly conceived not in terms of such derivation, but in his dependence on the attitude of the community in which he holds office; and it is this dependence which the word delegation is intended to mark. It will be observed, further, that much of what is most commonly called delegation is excluded by the terms of the question above propounded. Many, if not most, of our delegations empower other people to do things which we are legally and otherwise competent to do ourselves; but the delegations referred to above empower the delegate to do only what the delegants themselves cannot do. In the one case authority may correctly be said to be passed on or handed over from delegant to delegate; in the other case it cannot be. Much confusion of thought is caused in political contexts, in which delegation is normally of this second type, by the use of terminology proper only to the first type. Thus Lord Brougham sees the essence of representation in this, "that the power of the people should be parted with and given over for a limited period to the deputy chosen by the people, and that he should perform that part in the government which, but for this transfer, would have been performed by the people themselves." This is wholly artificial. What is this power of the people. and when was it, or could it be, used? Plainly the institution of a Parliament is the *creation* of an authority which did not exist before.

After these preliminaries, let us now confront ourselves in thought with our problem in its simplest form. Here is this British population of about 48 million men and women and children living unevenly dispersed on its north-westerly island. What, we have to ask, can it do for itself? Its mere size dictates the answer, nothing. The members of such a multitude cannot even, except in the most confused and superficial way, become aware of the multitude of which they are members. Yet, as we know them now under government, their unity is a pretty solid fact, of some weight in the world, and expressed for themselves in a multitude of complicated activities, touching the lives of every individual inhabitant in innumerable ways; and they would tell you, if you asked them, that in the main they govern themselves, that the general distribution and character of these activities is not settled for them by benevolent outsiders, but settled by them in the light of their own wisdom and with reference to their own interests. How has this miracle happened, and how is it maintained? How is this unwieldly mass, incapable in itself of any action whatever, converted into a living, active, self-organizing social body?

The device on which we mainly rely for the maintenance of this standing miracle is the device of the representative assembly or

Parliament. The principle of the device is simple. By division into more or less artificial smaller groups, each of which has the right of sending one or more delegates to a central assembly, the 48 million inhabitants (or rather the 29 million adults) are induced to express themselves without remainder in a body of some 600 persons, on which thereafter the main responsibility for all affairs of common concern rests. No one is left out; everyone has his spokesman in this general assembly. The assembly is large, but not so large that all may not be able to see and hear anyone who speaks to it, nor so large that each member may not have a reasonable chance of saying what he may wish to say. In it the multitude is incorporated, achieving unity by representation; it becomes now, though only by a fiction, a single body, a people capable of decision and action. For the decisions of this assembly are not the decisions merely of the persons who happen at the time to be members of it, nor even merely of the body of which they happen to be members, an ancient body, perhaps, with ancient and powerful traditions of its own. The decisions are conceived by those who take them as taken in the name and on behalf of the community as a whole, and the public outside accepts them in this sense. It is not just Parliament which so ordains, but Parliament as spokesman of the speechless multitude— Parliament, in short, in its representative character.

There are two points here to which I want specially to direct attention. First, it is fundamentally erroneous to think of a people as possessing a unity which political institutions merely express and register. There are, of course, numbers of different unifying principles at work in any given geographical area, but neither separately nor in combination will they produce political union, or determine its limits and extent. The relevant unity in every case is produced and maintained by the institutions in which we describe it as expressed. Secondly, the situation necessarily involves a fundamental fiction which no agility of metaphysical analysis and no intensity of political life can finally expel. The people of England is taken to be present in Parliament, where it is plainly not present, and the decisions of Parliament are taken as its decisions, whereas there is plainly no guarantee that anyone outside the walls of Parliament has devoted a moment's thought to the question at issue at all.

I want to say a little more about these two points, which seem to me to be fundamental. If all that happens at a general election—and in whatever other activities there may be by which Parliament is constituted and maintained—is that feelings or thoughts or wishes or other vital phenomena already in being in the obscure masses of the population are recorded and brought to light, the result may be instructive and interesting. One can imagine, for instance, that it would be exceedingly helpful to a wise ruler with policies of his

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own, who wished to pursue them in ways acceptable to the population committed to his charge. But the creation of a political authority, of a body or person authorized to take decisions on behalf of the population as a whole, would not be brought any nearer. The election would not be a contribution to government as such. Actually an election is a lively interchange, marked by give and take on both sides, between two disparate forces and activities. On the one side are governors and would-be governors with national policies which they recommend for acceptance; on the other side are the mass of the governed, willing to be governed, and choosing between these policies in the light of their needs and desires and of the pressure of daily circumstance upon them.

Consider the Parliamentary constituency, which is the basis of political organization on a national scale. Its normal size on a basis of equal single-member constituencies is arrived at easily by dividing the total number of adult inhabitants by some such number as 600, this being about the largest practicable number for an effective deliberative assembly. For Great Britain this gives a constituency of about 40,000 men and women. This group has only so much unity, cohesion, and corporate life as its legal function of returning a member to Parliament enables it to develop. No individual in it has more than a fraction of his attention to devote to political issues. The summons to record a vote comes at rare intervals, and takes most voters by surprise when it comes. Left to themselves, invited merely to record an opinion, these 40,000 voters, with insignificant exceptions, would be wholly at sea. Some few hopes or grievances or demands would agitate them vaguely; but, if these were stated, analysis would probably show that they largely cancelled one another out, and mostly rested on demonstrable errors of fact. But the voters are not left to themselves. Devoted and enterprising agents of organized groups of would-be governors clamour for their attention, besieging their eyes and ears day and night with explanations and promises, developing the germs provided by these chaotic hopes, fears, and wishes into something resembling a coherent plan of action. And these agents have in view the whole field of political action, not merely the portion of it in which they happen to be operating. They are essentially parliamentary groups, with programmes devised in view of parliamentary actualities and possibilities. They are therefore compelled to work on a national basis and to frame proposals which are likely to win as much support as possible in any and every constituency.

So far as this organized collision between the Parliamentary rulers and their faithful subjects is genuine and intense, so far it is bound to be fruitful. The Act of Parliament—and here I come back to the fiction of representation—the Act of Parliament is the act of Parliament.

ment, and expresses the will of Parliament, if it expresses any will. Ask a scientist, as Bishop Barnes invites us to ask a scientist about the wafer used in the Communion Service: he could give no other answer. But yet this will, like all will, is the child of desire, and the desires on which the deliberations of Parliament turn are not those merely of its members; they are rather those of the masses whom its members represent. It is true that the desires of the mass of citizens, or of groups among them, cannot be truly said to pass into will and action through Parliament by any genuine continuous process like that by which the desire of an individual becomes eventually the principle of his action. There is a break. The decision and the first step towards execution are freely taken by Parliament, and hence the element of fiction must always remain. It is true also that the desire and opinion to which Parliament appears to submit are evoked by the Parliament which submits to them. But if there is genuine contact between the voters and their representatives, it will be fruitful in providing material for the deliberations of Parliament; the constituencies will provide, to some extent at least, the matter to which Parliament gives political form. To the extent to which this happens, the fiction that the people is present in Parliament, and that the decisions of Parliament are its decisions, ceases to be a mere fiction. In regard to major issues, at least, the fiction may become merely the slight exaggeration of a fact.

The reason why I labour these points is this, that in my view the chief vice in arguments about democracy, both in those which defend and in those which decry it, is their tendency to proceed on the assumption that democracy involves complete passivity on the part of those invested with political authority. Any government, of course, has to govern, and in that aspect the most democratic authority will be expected to act forcibly on those committed to its charge. But there is a tendency to assume that if the government is genuinely and completely democratic, in such action on the governed it will be merely transmitting a force which it has received from them in their capacity of active citizens. Against such a view I argue that the activity of the citizen is not and cannot be a simple fact, existent in its own right; but that it is something requiring to be evoked, and that it cannot be evoked except by a correlative counter-activity on the part of the political authority, or of those who seek to have a share in it. Democracy depends on the fruitful collision of two forces, one being of the type of a responsible public official with a policy which he wishes to recommend, the other of the type of a private citizen with domestic and other interests which he wishes to safeguard and develop. Pure receptivity on the part of the constituted authority is so far from being the ideal of democracy that it is demonstrably unattainable in a body of any considerable

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size, and clearly pernicious in any body small enough to make it

possible.

If this contention is admitted and its significance fully appreciated, the chief practical effect would. I think, be an increased hesitation to adopt certain typically "democratic" constitutional devices, such as the election of officials by popular vote, proportional representation, the referendum and the initiative, the right of recalling the representative. I do not suggest that my argument has proved these devices to be pernicious. In its place any one of these devices may in fact be valuable. But I do claim that in the light of my argument most of the pleas put forward for these arrangements are shown to be, at the very least, inconclusive, because they fail to attend to the crucial problem of democratic government, that of transforming the chaotic impulses of masses of men and women into a coherent policy of common action. This problem is not peculiar to the representative system; it exists equally in organizations in which a direct democracy is aimed at. But increased numbers make it more difficult, and the interposition of the representative body makes it more visible

IV

In conclusion, I come back to the representative and to the problem of his relation to the represented, which I stated at the outset. We saw that the orthodox view maintains the principle of free representation; it therefore excludes anything of the nature of binding instructions from the constituency to the representative, and it is very unsympathetic to proposals for giving constituencies the right to recall their representatives. On the other hand, in practice, Parliament tends increasingly to emphasize its dependence on public opinion, especially as expressed, or construed as expressed, at the polls. It does not claim absolute freedom; on the contrary, its organized groups "seek a mandate," as they often put it, for this or that; and a Government is nettled by the taunt that it has no mandate for a major legislative proposal. Mr. Baldwin in 1923 arranged a general election with a view to securing a mandate for fiscal protection. Despondent critics see in these practical developments a slippery slope, likely to end in full surrender of the principle of free representation: they fear a future in which the prestige and responsibility of Parliament will be destroyed because its members will have become the mere delegates and dependents of the electors.

Opinions on both sides are advanced with some heat, but it is often hard to be sure how far the difference is merely one of interpretation, and how far it is of practical significance. There was not in Burke's day in England, and there is not in our own day, any considerable body of opinion in favour of imposing legal restrictions on the

416

freedom of the representative. And if legal restrictions are excluded, the issue is apt to seem unreal. Hume's words, from an essay published in 1742, referring to a similar contemporary dispute, are very much to the point. "The present political controversy," he said, "with regard to instructions is a very frivolous one, and can never be brought to any decision, as it is managed by both parties. The country party pretend not that a member is absolutely bound to follow instructions, as an ambassador or general is confined by his orders, and that his vote is not to be received in the house, but so far as it is conformable to them. The court party again pretend not that the sentiments of the people ought to have no weight with every member, much less that he ought to despise the sentiments of those he represents. . . . And if their sentiments be of weight, why ought they not to express these sentiments? The question then is only concerning the degree of weight which ought to be placed on instructions." He goes on to say that this is a question which in the nature of the case cannot be settled precisely, and that in a national Parliament it is further complicated by the different importance of different localities. "Totness," as he puts it, ought not to have the same weight as London.

All this is true and to the point. And yet I feel that the issue, in the form in which we have inherited it, is a substantial one, an issue of practical importance, on which, just because fundamental questions of interpretation are involved, political theory should be capable of throwing light. I submit the following considerations:—

- (1) The meaning of the term Representation has sometimes been appealed to as providing a conclusive argument for one side or the other. This it cannot do, for its necessary implication is only this: that the decisions of a small body, appointed by a great number of persons, are to be taken as equivalent to the decisions of that great number. A representative assembly is a select body which by a legal fiction stands for a whole community from which it is selected. The further implications of the term will be different in different contexts, varying according to the actual relations which obtain between the conduct of the representative body and the conduct and opinion of those whom it represents; but under the stress of the democratic demand the tendency is always for the representative body to recognize certain moral (not legal) limitations on its freedom of decision, and to claim at least a general harmony between the line of policy adopted by the representatives and the desires of the represented.
- (2) While every form of government must rest ultimately on the consent of the governed, representative government is distinguished as asking for the express consent of the governed. Even if the voters were as inactive and unenterprising as the shareholders are in a

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normally successful and prosperous limited company, of whom few attend to the policy of the directors at all, yet the political governing body could at least claim with a show of justice that in each periodical reappointment they receive authority to continue in the line that they have hitherto pursued. In fact, however, attempts are energetically made, largely by means of party groupings inside the representative body, at effecting more than this. Attempts are made to offer the electors a choice between rival developments of policy, and the actual policy adopted in the name of the community not only takes its general colour from the reception of this offer, but is also continuously influenced by contemporary evidence as to the attitude of the electors to the detail of the programme as it works itself out.

(3) Such a relation between the representative body and the represented does not, as we have seen, imply passivity on the part of that body. However receptive Parliament is to the desires and complaints of the citizens, the responsibility remains with it to formulate a national policy relative to these. The private citizen may and should criticize the adequacy of the policy to the situation, but can only do so from outside, as an irresponsible layman or outsider. To such criticism, again, the representative body is sensitive. Of this also it must take account; but it is not called on to surrender at discretion. It has to face its own responsibility and rely on its own wisdom. In the last resort the public will in good time have a legal opportunity of making their resentment effective and reversing the direction of policy.

(4) Though some writers, especially in France, seem to think it possible to assert a general dependence of Parliament on public opinion, while denying any similar dependence of members of Parliament on the public opinion of their constituencies, this combination does not seem to me to represent a workable or durable political convention. A Parliament is a representative body in which every member is himself a representative, and the inevitable tendency is to construe representative in the two cases, so far as possible, in identical terms. The identity clearly can only be partial; for while it is indubitable that Parliament has the right to decide for the nation, it is far from clear that the member of Parliament has in the same sense the right to decide for the constituency. Parliament is a deliberative body which discusses before deciding, and its work would be stultified if its decisions were merely the registration of a number of separate decisions already taken in the constituencies. Any claim by the constituency to give its representative binding instructions is a claim to decide the national issue to the extent of its fractional power. Such a claim is proved illegitimate by the simple fact that the constituency cannot hear the voices of the other constituencies.

REPRESENTATION

These considerations justify the exclusion of the imperative mandate; but it is a question whether the imperative mandate should not also be excluded in considering the proper relation of Parliament as a whole to the nation generally; and in any case they do not justify us in rejecting roundly all dependence of members on their constituencies.

- (5) Allowing for this fact that Parliament decides, while the member of Parliament is merely a contributor to the decision, I should argue that the representative rôle of the member is in principle the same as the representative rôle of Parliament. For him, as for it, representation does not mean the mere expression of something already existing. What he brings to London is not a certified replica of his portion of the provinces. He went to the constituency as a responsible official, seeking support for a policy in which he believed, and to which in general he was already committed. It was not his policy alone, but that of a Parliamentary group to which he belonged. His contacts with the constituency should be productive on both sides: for the voters, in transforming sporadic desires, projects, and grievances into widely accepted plans of action; for the member, in suggestions for detailed modifications and extensions of the proposed policy, and for the relative emphasis and urgency of its several items. In his constituency the member proves his representative character by seeking the fullest contact with it and evoking the maximum activity from it, by patience in listening to all sections of opinion, and ingenuity in devising means of satisfying them. In Parliament he proves it, by making the most of the fiction that in his person the constituency is present, by placing the material he has there collected at the disposal of the national council, together with his suggestions as to the best way of dealing with it. He may voice his constituents' desires, though he does not vote at their order.
- (6) The proper fulfilment of this rôle by the individual members, as by Parliament generally, requires, I believe, a high degree of legal freedom. General elections at intervals of one year would, for example, be fatal to its proper discharge. The interval must be sufficient to give a policy a chance of working itself out in some detail, but also not so great that the country feels impotent against a majority in Parliament and goes to sleep between elections. Provision for elections at maximum intervals of three to five years is in these circumstances the natural provision, on which most modern constitutions agree. England is probably wise in refusing to qualify the freedom of Parliament and its members by providing for the referendum or the recall, or for dissolution of Parliament on popular petition. But in giving the voter only the right of declaring a preference as between candidates once in five years, or possibly rather more often, English

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practice gives the citizen more restricted opportunities of overt action than any modern constitution, even that of France, gives him. France at least guarantees an election once in four years.

(7) This legal freedom is necessary as the formal declaration of the full responsibility of Parliament and its members for national decisions. In accepting limitations on the use of this freedom, as by the mandate doctrine discussed earlier, Parliament does not and cannot divest itself of its responsibility. Limitations of this kind the individual member accepts in two main forms. First, there are the pledges he has himself given at the time of his election, which form, as it were, in his mind the terms of his appointment. Secondly, there are the influences which reach him during his membership of Parliament and his reactions to them, out of which occasionally new or qualifying obligations arise. Of these two kinds of commitment the former, the electoral pledge, is far the more prominent and familiar. Its nature has been a good deal discussed, and critics have often pointed out its dangers. J. S. Mill, as a candidate for Parliament, refused to give any pledge, except to follow generally the policy of which he submitted an outline. This may be an impracticably heroic course of action, but it seems to be correct in principle. When the interest in proceedings in Parliament is genuine and widespread, contemporary influences giving rise to obligations of the second type tend to encroach upon, and even at times to overshadow, those arising from the electoral pledge. And this is probably a development to be welcomed. For though it is clearly necessary that a politician shall declare in advance the line of policy which he proposes to follow, and though it is right that he should regard himself as morally bound to act in the sense of that declaration, it is also essential that Parliament should preserve its freedom to deal with emergencies as they arise. The principle of democracy refutes itself if it asks Parliament to act with reference to the situation as it was at the time of the last election, and not as it is to-day; and representation refutes itself, if it excludes all influence on government policy except what can be forced through the narrow passage of the ballot-box.

Finally, in answer to those who object to representation in principle, or who, like Mr. Cole, see a fundamental vice in general political representation, I would say this. I would ask them whether they are not forcing on to the word some predetermined meaning and then condemning the facts because they do not conform to this. Representation is a political device, and the main evidence for what it can do is what it does. We have no business to force an analogy with artistic representation, and on that ground claim that its essential aim and test must be the degree of resemblance between the representative and the represented bodies. Equally groundless is the appeal to map-making or cartographical representation, which

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assures us that the House of Commons is intended to be a map of the country on the scale I: 40,000. Mr. Cole's argument seems to rest on some such unavowed preconception of the meaning of the term. "To represent me" means only in this connection "to take political decisions with my express authorization on my behalf," with the further complications that I am only a fractional part of the represented, that he is only a fractional part of that which decides, and that the overriding problem, to which all else is or should be subordinated, is the problem of creating by means of such authorization a democratic political authority, strong and flexible, and infinitely responsive to the hopes and fears of those subject to it. It is no doubt arguable that the responsibilities of Parliaments are too wide, that some subdivision may be advisable; but I cannot see that experience justifies the assertion that representation is in fact more effective in organizations, such as Trade Unions, in which common concerns are more narrowly limited. In any case there must be some ultimate power of decision in any community which has to operate on the widest possible reference; and a Parliament of representatives elected on a geographical basis is in this present age the generally accepted device for constituting such a power. The nature and purpose of this device has been my subject in this paper. I do not claim that it is the last word of human wisdom; only that there is nothing impossible in its aims and nothing unsound in its conception, if these are properly understood.

INTERACTION AND COSMIC STRUCTURE

PROFESSOR JOHN E. BOODIN

It is a momentous venture to attempt to frame an hypothesis of the universe. But if we reflect upon the meaning of life, we are forced to make such an effort. The only way we can escape the responsibility is to be guilty of the great refusal—the refusal to think. If we frame an hypothesis, it should be such as to assign the proper significance to all the facts of human experience—not merely the physical facts, but the biological and mental as well; not merely our scientific interests, but our æsthetic, ethical, and religious interests as well. And it should do so in the simplest possible way. It would be futile and impossible to examine all possible solutions. Henri Poincaré proved long ago that if there is one explanation of a class of phenomena, there are an infinite number of explanations. We must follow the example of science and work out from the significant efforts in the past. We must try to discover the hypothesis which is most probable. In general we may say that the theories of the universe fall under two fundamental types. One type starts with the assumption that the world is a shifting heap of elements, which arrange themselves by external relations. This type of theory denies any guiding whole, whether in the small or in the large. The opposite type of theory presupposes that the events in the universe are guided by form or pattern. In a broad sense it assumes that the universe is in some sense organic, i.e., that the activities of the parts have reference to one another and to the whole in such a way as to supplement one another and to promote the continuity and harmony of the whole.

We may assume the doctrine of evolution "in the broader sense of the continuity of the physical universe throughout all time, and the orderliness of the processes of change which go on unceasingly. Every physical unit which we recognize in nature—electrons, atoms, crystals, cells, stars, galaxies—has at some time come into existence, and at some time in the future will pass out of existence; and furthermore, the manner of their coming and going is quite orderly, and, within certain limits, is even predictable." But we must keep in mind that nature is not just one evolution "from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous, with the corresponding dissipation of motion," as Herbert Spencer conceived it, and as it has been the custom to conceive it. Even S. Alexander, in his Space, Time, and Deity, thinks

¹ Professor W. D. MacMillan in A Debate on Relativity, Open Court, 1927, p. 118.

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of evolution as one process, where everything, including Deity, emerges from an original matrix of Space-Time. Alexander's God is an earth-born God. To conceive of evolution as one process is to think of it as a finite drama, where the curtain is rung up on an original distribution of elements—however they be conceived—and is rung down with the dissipation of the available energy. This leaves the beginning and the end in the dark. Evolution as science conceives it, on the basis of the available facts, is multiple. There are an indefinite number of cosmic histories at various stages of integration. In some way these histories must sustain a give-and-take relation to one another, so that the available energy is kept constant. For we do not conceive of the cosmos as running down, though we know that individual parts run down. The cosmos must be conceived, not merely as a dynamic equilibrium, but as a living equilibrium of such structure or "curvature" that the loss of available energy in one part is compensated for by an equal increase elsewhere. This conception of equilibrium must apply to the organization of energy as well as its intensity. Energy apart from organization is an abstraction. There is not then just one evolution, but an indefinite number of local; evolutions, with compensations amongst them. This is implied in our conception of the universe as a going concern.

The real question then is not, What does evolution in general mean? The cosmos, as a whole, does not evolve. The question is, What does local evolution mean? And the local evolution of which we are a part, viz. the evolution of our earth, has naturally a special interest for us. The theory of "strict emergence" holds that new forms, characteristics, events, arise from a state of affairs in which these novelties did not exist; and this happens without any guidance whatsoever, immanent or transcendent. According to the probability of chance, if you shuffle certain elements, any combination can occur in infinite time. To be sure, science does not allow infinite time for the cycles which it studies. On the contrary, evolution in any one cycle, including an astronomical cycle, takes place in a finite and calculable time. But the emergenist points to the fact that the configurations in question, with their novel characteristics, have occurred. On our earth such configurations as possess the characteristics of life and mind do exist. All we need to do is to examine what sort of configurations give rise to such properties as life and mind. In this respect emergence is merely descriptive. It must be owned that if we take a local point of view, the history of our earth, the theory looks plausible, but it is not possible, I think, to account for the order of emergence on the basis of accident.

The theory of emergence need not commit itself to any special conception of world-stuff. It may, like W. K. Clifford, start with mind-stuff. It may assume with Haeckel that the simplest matter is

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endowed with soul. But the emergence theory now in vogue calls itself "materialistic emergence," which means that everything emerges from "configurations of matter." This theory owes its precision to the fact that it assumes the nineteenth-century conception of matter and mechanism. Just now it would not be so easy to say what is meant by matter and configurations of matter. It is certain at any rate that the billiard-ball model of the seventeenth century is no longer applicable. "It is absurd to speak of a mechanical explanation of life and thought when we have found ourselves in such difficulties that we no longer know what we should mean by a mechanical explanation of phenomena not involving life." But, as Hegel with great sagacity observed, when philosophers arrive on the scene, the owl of Minerva has taken its flight.

We may say that "materialistic emergence" owes its plausibility to the fact that it is built on an antiquated science. The conception of the world which is implied in the science of to-day gives the lie to the idea that the world as it is can be accounted for on the probability of chance. On the contrary, it makes necessary the conception of cosmic control or cosmic structure. The quantum of radiant energy is absolutely measured. The electron carries a constant charge throughout the cosmos. The shifting of an electron from one energy level to another is constant for the various elements. Hence the identity of the spectra of the various elements wherever observed. The organization of matter is the same everywhere. The atoms have the same patterns and fall into the same natural order everywhere, when the conditions permit. The only difference (aside from mass) between our earth and the sun, and between our sun and other stars, is a difference in temperature, permitting the organizing process to take place. Matter, moreover, has no privileged character. Matter and the patterns and laws of matter emerge in the various local histories. But there is correspondence amongst emergent histories, and such universal correspondence cannot be accounted for on the probability of chance. The postulate of the uniformity of nature may be predicated throughout, from nebulæ to the most advanced types of organization, such as human intelligence. Any ad hoc hypothesis which violates the law of the uniformity of nature must be treated as suspect. But the uniformity of nature is possible only because of a universal cosmic control. Moreover, if the stages of nature, which we are able to observe, are universal, we are justified in holding that this uniformity of nature holds for evolution at all the stages, though · we must allow for variations due to local conditions.

Our information in regard to the structure of nature outside our earth is scanty enough. We have established the law of the uniformity of nature only within the realm of inorganic matter. We have no

¹ Professor R. D. Carmichael in A Debate on Relativity, op. cit., p. 148.

direct evidence of the appearance of life outside our earth, unless it be on Mars. But the implications of the evidence, which we do possess, are far-reaching. The universality of the structure of matter, within the limits of our scientific observation, shows that the cosmic control which we must postulate operates as mathematical genius. This means that the laws of logic hold for our entire universe. The human intellect is at home in nature. "Even inorganic matter," to quote Trystan Edwards, an artist, "is everywhere subject to the laws of logic which are essentially intellectual." Moreover, the architecture of nature is such as to give æsthetic satisfaction. The principles of æsthetics, whatever they are, may be said to be universal. Cosmic control operates not only as mathematical genius, but as æsthetic genius. A scientific hypothesis, to be acceptable, must satisfy not only the demands of convenience, but our æsthetic demands as well. Art has its claims as well as logic, and indeed possesses a logic of its own. While the human mind is a local emergence, it finds that its structure is universal, i.e., it applies not only locally but everywhere. This is no accident. The emergence of mind locally is due to temperature conditions, but its relevance is universal. Hence we must conclude that it owes its character to cosmic genius. We are justified, I think, on the basis of present science in ruling out emergence by accident, i.e., without cosmic guidance, as impossible. The uniformity of the constituents of matter and of the structure of matter could not result on the probability of chance.

If we assume guidance in the evolutionary process, we must try to see how this guidance operates. We need not here consider fiat creation, such as has been attributed by theologians to the first chapter of Genesis, since such an hypothesis cannot be regarded by philosophers as a living option. There are two types of hypothesis of interest to us—one is that of preformation, and the other that of creation by interaction. Strict preformation means that the structure of a process in its actuality, as Aristotle would say, i.e., in its complete stage, must be present somehow in the process from the beginning, in order to guide the development towards the observed outcome. Preformation, like emergence, takes a local view. It fastens its attention on the particular history and holds that the form or structure of the final stage must have been immanent throughout the history. The philosohper, who is usually regarded as the author of the hypothesis, had in mind exclusively embryology. For Aristotle, species are eternal. Evolution, therefore, means individual genesis or ontogeny. Even here individual characteristics emerge in the process. It is the formative impulse which is present from the beginning. Aristotle is not a strict preformationist even in embryology. Hans Driesch has tried recently to revive the Aristotelian conception by holding that we must assume an entelechy as

guiding the genesis of the embryo. Driesch, like Aristotle, limits the hypothesis to embryology. He is no clearer than Aristotle as to how the individual entelechy originates, though of course in some way it has reference to heredity. Preformation, as a special scientific hypothesis, must be fought out in the realm of science. We are interested in the emergence of structure. This means the relation of the emergence of structure in the individual to evolution generally, not merely the origin of species and other structural characteristics of life, but the emergence of life from matter and the emergence of matter itself as we know it.

Is it possible that the whole evolution of life, with its branching and radiations and its progressive manifestation of structure, is latent in the first life-compounds, and not only in these but also in inorganic matter back to its conditions? The Stoics were the only consistent preformationists in ancient times. The seeds or germinal reasons are latent from cycle to cycle, when everything returns to fire and emerges from fire again. But they do not show how the seeds could be latent. Leibnitz in modern times developed a thoroughgoing preformism both in cosmology and embryology. But in cosmology he required a deus ex machina to make his theory possible; and in embryology the microscope has refuted the presence of a homunculus or miniature man in the early stages of embryological history. A recent vitalist, Henry Bergson, has unintentionally, I think, offered a suggestion of universal preformation: "Life," he says, "does not proceed by the association and addition of elements, but by dissociation and division." Everything is thus present in the original vital impulse. It is like a rocket shot up in the air, which, owing to the resistance of matter, splits up into its manifold inherent impulses, thus giving us the display we see. But matter for Bergson is not real. It is the mere downward trend of life. Reality is fundamentally life and consciousness. Bergson, however, has not seemed to see the implication of his theory of dissociation, or he would have seen its inconsistence with his idea of evolution as creative synthesis. The solution is probably to be found in his pantheism. In a later statement he professes "the idea of a God, creator, and free; the generator at once of matter and of life, whose creative efforts as regards life are continued through the evolution of species and the constitution of human personalities." 2 Bergson has not yet shown us how he would account for evolution on this basis. What is the relation of God to the evolutionary process? Does God emerge? If so, the theory has all the difficulties of the theories of materialistic emergence. No guidance is provided. If God is eternal, what is his relation

¹ Creative Evolution, p. 89.

² Letter from H. Bergson, in the *Nation* (London), January 4, 1913. Quoted by Sir Francis Younghusband in his beautiful book, *Life in the Stars*. 426

INTERA Cight Techyn Arya Arnaj Foundation Chennal and eGangotri SMICSTRUCTURE

to evolution? It was easy for Hegel to say that the absolute is present in the beginning, wherever you begin, because reality is fundamentally a system of dialectical implication, and hence eternal. But that does not account for evolution.

We may say, I think, that there is not at present a theory of strict universal preformation, *i.e.*, a theory attempting to account for real evolution from nebula to man on the basis of a structure latent somehow in the process from the beginning and only waiting to be called forth under specific conditions. Even if we could conceive of such preformation in individual histories, we should still have to account for the intersupplementation of such histories into a cosmos. Leibnitz, who did conceive of reality as made up of an infinite number of preformed individual histories (every history having its own entelechy or inner principle of development), was obliged to add the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony to account for the correspondence of these histories. God, like a clock-maker, constructed the monads so that they would run in unison. But such an appeal to God to make good our failure in scientific theory is out of fashion now.

The theory, which I have advocated, is that of creation through interaction under cosmic control. I view the cosmos as a sort of superorganism. The conception of reality as an organic whole is not new. It was advanced by Plato in a mythological fashion in the Timæus, and in a simpler and more dogmatic way in the tenth book of the Laws. It was stated by Aristotle in terms of a teleological hierarchy, which is also an astronomical hierarchy, in which God is the supreme and final cause. Aristotle's cosmological scheme was revived in scholasticism and formed the framework of Dante's Divine Comedy, but its astronomy has given place to the Copernican theory, and its rigid hierarchy of forms has melted into Darwin's origin of species. It does not meet the demands of the epoch of evolution. În modern idealism the essential wholeness of reality has indeed been emphasized. But the wholeness contemplated is that of an eternal, inclusive psychological ego. Modern idealism has been afflicted with psychologitis, and in spite of its great contribution to the interpretation of human institutions, has failed to connect with the main current of modern thought. We cannot banish the galaxies of stars and their space-time relations by retreating within our own subjective world and declaring matter, time and space to be mere appearances. So far as I know, I am the first one to try to state the meaning of an organic whole in terms of modern science. No daydreaming can undo the fact that we have emerged in the history of

¹ Paper on "Cosmic Evolution" read before the Aristotelian Society, March 7, 1921, and republished as Chapter I, Cosmic Evolution, Macmillan, 1925.

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the earth, which in turn is part of the sun, which in turn is a member in one of multitudinous galaxies of stars. If we are to understand the meaning of our existence, we must understand it in terms of the whole of which we are a part. And if reality is an organic whole, the unity involved must be as wide as the galaxies of stars; and it must show the interrelation of the multitudinous cosmic histories, in one of which our life figures.

An organic whole requires both a control—a genius of the whole and interacting parts. To illustrate an organic whole, we may use the human organism as a type. In the human organism we have a hierarchical organization of levels of control in which the lower levels are subject within limits to a dominant control. Through this control the parts of the organism are regulated so as to serve one another and the whole. This wholeness of the organism is made possible by the interaction of the parts under the guidance of the dominant control. This interaction is effected through two kinds of "messengers" or energy patterns—neural patterns and chemical patterns-which carry determining influences from part to part. That neural currents communicate patterns of behaviour to the various parts of the organism has been known for some time. Chemical patterns are carried by the hormones, probably through the blood, to regulate the growth and stimulate the energies of parts consistently with the life of the whole. But a human being is not merely a physiological organism. It is an organism endowed with mind. Its actions are in part meaningful or purposive, not merely mechanical. This means a whole-control by mind. The development of mind in turn involves a milieu of social relations—the interstimulation of individuals by means of language and other signs. The environment of mind is a social organism. Within this there is an overlapping of generations, so that the new generation may develop its life under the nurture of older generations. This is admirably provided for in the family. There is also the contact of various cultural groups with their varying advance and varying quality of culture. In human life, therefore, there is a level of spiritual control as well as various levels of organic control. And this spiritual control is made possible by the communication of energy patterns—determinate social influences to which the individual responds. The response, in the case of interaction on any level, depends not merely upon the character of the stimulus which is communicated, but also upon the organization and plasticity of the responding individual. The response is a synthesis of the communicated influence and the character of the responding individual. The control in society consists partly of the consolidated structure of custom, but also involves, at a higher level, the criticism of the social sanctions in the light of reason. The relation of the individual to society is not a INTERACTION AND COSMIC STRUCTURE

closed control, but is open through reason to revision from a broader relation to the genius of universe.

Now let us think of this vast starry world as a superorganism of some sort, with a dominant control and with the interrelation of parts by means of interaction. The interstimulation from part to part, in the cosmic, as within the physiological and social organism, must be by means of energy patterns carrying determinate influences from part to part. These determining influences have to do with all the levels—material, vital, mental, spiritual. So far as the universe is one, it must be one by such intercommunication. Every part sends out characteristic impulses to the other parts in space under the control of the whole, and no influence is really lost, though the motion at the other end is determined in part by the state of affairs at that end. Thus, while the correspondence between the various cosmic histories seems absolute on the level of atoms, the correspondence must become more generic and variant as the degrees of freedom increase. This we find illustrated in the more complex reactions on our earth, and especially in human interactions. I am taking for granted that, when energy is communicated from part to part of the cosmos, it is not just energy in general that is communicated—this is meaningless—but that characteristic or patterned energies are somehow communicated. The energies we are able to observe from other parts of the cosmos are specific types of material energy or of radiant energy. And within the earth-field of communication we know that the communication of energy is always the communication of patterned energy, whether in material or spiritual communication. This I have already shown to be the case in the human organism and in society. So spiritual patterns, as well as material patterns, are broadcasted over the ether and contribute to the steering of things in space-time.

We must get over the false notion that unless we are cognitively conscious of the communicated patterns they cannot be real. Neural messengers and chemical messengers do their work whether we know it or not. It is not long that we have known of neural messengers, and it is only within a few years that we have known of the existence of chemical messengers. Within the psychological realm suggestion may operate all the more effectively when we are not attending to the stimulus. Moreover, since spiritual influences are energies, they must produce effects in the steering of matter even though there is no organization to respond to them in kind. The patterned impulse of sound has a characteristic effect on matter, even though there be no one to understand its meaning. As it is by hearing good music that one becomes musical, so it is by responding to stimuli of a higher level that a lower level eventually becomes tuned to them. As it is through the influence of air-waves that the organism is

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brought to construct an ear, by means of which we may respond by hearing sound instead of merely getting its electrical impact, so one part of the cosmos is stimulated to advance by the influence of other parts upon it, though it cannot become conscious of these influences in kind until the proper organization has been perfected for the specific response. And even then we may not be intellectually conscious. For intellectual communication a common medium of signs is necessary.

All this may sound like poetry. But conceptions need not be less true because they are poetical. I challenge any one to form a conception of the universe as an organic whole in any other manner than I have stated. Cosmic control there is, and it must operate through the interaction of parts. In the part of the world of which we know most, cosmic genius is mediated by the interaction of parts—in chemical synthesis, in the origin of a new individual, in the cultural development of individuals. I believe that this is the way in which development is mediated in the life histories of stars and of galaxies of stars. And here, too, as in the earthly relations, the response is due to the character and initiative of the responding agent as well as to the stimulus.

The possibility of distant parts influencing one another has been made clearer to us through the quantum theory. The radiations sent out by means of matter over the ether are communicated as quanta or constant finite pulses of energy. They act as the same quanta over any distance when there is no interference. The number of quanta depends upon the wave-length, or rather constitutes the wave-length. Each individual impulse, when it strikes matter elsewhere, exerts its original force. A particular impulse of soul may occur at a distance of a million light years, and yet exert its energy undiminished when it strikes matter in any stage of organization elsewhere. We have no idea of the penetrative character of mental radiations. We do know that the power of a mental impulse in social communication is not affected by the sense medium. If it passes the threshold of sense at all, it effects its characteristic results. Good news or bad news has its characteristic effect, though the sound be weak. We do not know the effect upon our mood and attitude of all the spiritual influences which we do not sense. Here lies the real power of the Weltgeist. In the curvature of cosmic space no influence is dissipated. The quality as well as the quantity of energy is conserved. This is what the law of conservation of energy means in the last analysis.

What is the nature of the whole-control? May it not be merely the automatic result of interaction? Of late great emphasis has been placed upon the function of the ductless glands, especially the pituitary and thyroid glands, in regulating the growth, proportions, 430

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and tone of the organism. It has been assumed that the secretions of these glands furnish a sufficient explanation. But the growth, proportion, and health of the organism cannot be merely the result of the automatic interstimulation from part to part within the organism. There must be a control by the whole which regulates the production of glands with their secretions and their rôle in the whole. Else how can the glands know how to grow, what amount of secretion to send out and where to send it? In the material universe there must be a control which determines the size of the quantum of radiant energy, the charge of the electron, the organization of electrons into atoms, of atoms into molecules, of molecules into crystals. The whole cosmic situation with its dominant pattern is a factor, though ordinarily a neglected factor, in every transaction. There must be the genius of the whole in all creative synthesis. In our attempt to comprehend nature, this genius must be conceived as mathematical and æsthetic. The history of science shows that the hypotheses, which are most effective pragmatically in the prediction and control of nature, are also the most beautiful.

The hypotheses of cosmic control and of compensatory interactions between the parts do not conflict, but on the contrary imply and supplement one another. We cannot account for the constituent elements of nature or their structure without assuming cosmic control, nor can we account for the behaviour of nature without assuming a plurality of individuals. On the level of matter it is the electro-magnetic field which proximately determines the constancy of the electric charge, and also prescribes the levels at which an electron can appear. These levels are statable as integral numbers. But we cannot predict absolutely at what level the electron shall appear, though it must appear at one of the levels prescribed by the field. It is clear that there is both determinacy and indeterminacy in nature—a certain determinacy of structure and a certain indeterminacy of individual "preference." This duality of determinacy and indeterminacy holds throughout nature. There is a determinate pattern of relations according to which we must live if we want to live healthfully and efficiently. But we need not obey this pattern even when we know it. We cannot say that nature is indeterministic microscopically (i.e., on the primary levels of nature) and deterministic macroscopically (i.e., on the complex levels of nature). This misconception has arisen from the fact that macroscopically we deal with nature by the method of statistical averages, as we do in insurance tables. But statistical averages are not normes of nature. They are merely conveniences for dealing with large numbers where we cannot follow the individual transations.

We may think of the cosmos as a hierarchy of fields. We are familiar with such a hierarchy in the human organism. There are the fields

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of the lower centres of the nervous system; there are also the cerebral fields and the psychological fields. The cerebral fields give definiteness and organization to the lower neural fields, as we see in the difference between precise and quantitative reactions when the cerebrum is in control and the indefinite all-or-none reactions when the cerebrum fails. The cerebrum with its habits in turn is controlled by dominant interests which give direction and purpose to our activity as contrasted with the chaotic reveries when psychological control is weak. In the cosmos we must suppose a far greater range of fields—electromagnetic fields, gravitational fields, chemical fields, organic fields, psychological fields-and over and above them all the supreme spiritual field, which prescribes the architecture of all the subordinate fields-each with its variant individual factors. The measure and structure, which we find in matter, is not due to matter alone. Matter, by itself, would be as chaotic as the old mechanistic theories pictured it. But it is no longer possible to picture the material world as a world of chance. It is a work of genius. We must not, however, make the ridiculous mistake of looking for this genius in the amorphous background of nature, call it ether or what you like. The genius of nature must not be sought in its raw material. It is somehow akin to the spiritual activity, which we know as creative genius in man, but vastly nobler. The beauty of matter and the beauty of art are intimations of its activity, but it is beyond these-ever and everywhere present in activity and essence to create and to heal, but passing in quality all that is created.

God is the spirit of the whole, which, in the words of Clement of Alexandria, "gives spiritual tone to the universe." For moral and religious purposes we need a cosmic Presence which answers our craving for companionship and communion. This the æsthetic conception of Aristotle did not do, and therefore it must be redefined to meet the aching need of the human heart. The God we discover as cosmic control, as mathematical and æsthetic genius, is also a God to whom we can pray and whom we can worship. He must be capable of giving love for love, and be willing to pity and pardon our failure. No other idea of God will serve. A universe, which meets our intellectual demands, shall not fail us in meeting our moral and religious demands. We must remember, however, that this organic conception of the universe places a momentous responsibility upon us for the influences we send out. Even now, by sending out noble impulses, I may help to save a soul somewhere in the Orion—not to mention

someone nearer.

DEFINITION OF VALUE

H. OSBORNE, M.A.

Any attempt to construct a philosophy of Value must presuppose some general understanding of what Value is. And so it might seem natural to begin with a precise definition of the concept we are about to investigate. What, we might ask ourselves, is the characteristic peculiar to all those situations in the description of which we are accustomed to use the word "value" or its cognate terms, and distinguishing them as a class from all those situations to which we do not apply the word? Proceeding empirically in this way, from an inspection of the "field of application" of the word "value" we might reasonably hope to discover a "highest common factor" of all the data, which would be the required definition of the concept "Value." But we should be met at the outset by radical differences of opinion about the scope of the relevant data. Some writers have thought that there is no state of affairs that may not under appropriate circumstances acquire value, or even that there is no state of affairs that is ever entirely neutral in respect of value. Others have held that only states or qualities of human persons, or concrete situations containing such states as constituents, can be appropriately assigned an index of value. And there are wellnigh innumerable stages of opinion ranging between these extremes. All such delimitations of the field of application of "value" presuppose a specific definition of the concept Value, because it is impossible to discuss where any word may, and where it may not, be appropriately applied, except on the basis of antecedent agreement as to its connotation. The only alternative would be to accept every application which "value" has in everyday and non-philosophical language.

In operation, therefore, the empirical method will at once lead us into a dilemma. Either we must distinguish among the actual uses of "value" as right or wrong, philosophically appropriate or inappropriate—and that is to abandon empiricism; or, if no discrimination is made, our study will be purely philological. And in the case of a word which has come into accepted use in so many and various contexts—from mathematics and logic on the one hand, to religion, art and economics, on the other—any common content that may be discovered would be likely to prove so general and abstract as to be quite useless to the philosopher. The more varied the denotation of a word, the poorer will be its connotation. Since its introduction into philosophy by Plato, the method of verbal definition by the inspection

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of concrete instances has been invaluable for the illumination of unrecognized differences of opinion, and quite barren of constructive results.

Philosophers have therefore been forced to adopt a compromise between arbitrary selection among the data and loyalty to the empirical method at the expense of insignificance in the result. Mr. Perry has expressly defined the purpose of a "General Theory of Value" to consist in the identification of a common principle underlying all special spheres of value. By this means the social sciences, theory of knowledge, æsthetics, philosophy of religion, together with the particular "values" of everyday life and social intercourse, are to be "unified and distinguished." His general concept is "biological interest." But Mr. Perry has limited his "field of application" to objects standing in direct relation to animal or human "interest." He makes no mention of the uses of the word "value" in mathematics, logic, chemistry, or that relation between any two existents called by J. Laird (after Francis Bacon) "natural election," or Professor Whitehead's "prehension." Thus his definition is really latent in the selectivity of his data. Meinong,2 again, has attempted a philological classification of the applications of "value," in which he includes its mathematical sense. But the intellectual contortions by which he extracts therefrom a common underlying notion are more interesting as a philosophic curiosity than as a genuine contribution to knowledge—as, indeed, he himself implicitly admits, by his immediate return to a more concrete conception of Value. And finally, the "experimental method" (i.e. the word-test) was introduced into the philosophy of Value from experimental psychology by Th. Haering.3 It is superficially obvious that the psychological definition of Value which he professes to have proved experimentally depends either upon his own subconscious assumption of that definition in arranging his tests, or upon the uncritical verbal habits of his subjects, or upon a combination of these factors. It is impossible to prove any philosophical doctrine experimentally; and in this case no more could be proved than that "value" is widely co-ordinated with interest, desire, pleasure, etc.—which no philosopher would wish to deny. It is bad science and bad philosophy to hold an experiment valid of negative results, unless it could also have shown positive results.

And a further and more serious danger attends the empirical method of definition in the case of anything known to exist at different levels, or in a variety of forms which are admitted to

² Zur Grundlegung der allgemeinen Werttheorie, 1923.

¹ General Theory of Value.

³ Untersuchungen zur Psychologie der Wertung (Archiv für die gesamte Psychologie, 1913); cf. W. Gruehne, Neuere Untersuchungen zum Wertproblem.

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constitute a hierarchy. For we are necessarily driven to define in terms of the lowest and most rudimentary grade, and a formula which will fit all instances must preclude any principle that might enable us to interpret and understand the higher grades. Mr. Perry, endeavouring by universality to avoid the sin of arbitrariness, has given his consent to a biological definition of Value. Having therefore adopted and established this definition on the grounds of generality of application, and yet being unwilling simply to reduce the "higher" values such as those presented in religion, æsthetics, or social obligation to physiological attraction and repulse, he is condemned by the strict logic of his position to a stupendous camouflage. For the simple and universal principle of biological reaction can "explain" none of the more complicated activities of human personality except by reducing them to complications of biological response; it cannot generate a new principle or give birth to a new grade of reality. In the preliminary account of the scope of his work Mr. Perry writes: "It would be the task of such a theory of value first to bring to light the underlying principle common to these sciences [scil. the sciences of the special fields of value], and then to employ this principle for the purpose of arbitrating between them." Such a profession naïvely foreshadows the fundamental inconsistency of his method. A "minimum definition" can neither sufficiently describe nor arbitrate between the members of an hierarchy, and a common principle cannot be a principle of discrimination. Hence the levelling tendency of those "naturalistic" theories of Value which start from

The preliminary problem in Philosophy of Value is, then, to discover agreement about its subject-matter, and not, as has been thought, to circumscribe and define a concept about the locus and function of which all are agreed. In so far as definitions of value are arbitrary and dissimilar, Theories of Value are concerned with different things, and their only source of contact is the common use of one set of terms to which they severally ascribe different meanings. Argument between theories thus initially separated cannot advance beyond persuasion, and discussion becomes objurgation. From the habitual presumption that the use of a common set of terms implies a common content of ideas—the confusion of verbal with conceptual definition—derives in large part the "trostlos Bild" of Value-philosophy to-day.

A glance at some of the scattered definitions and epitaphs upon Value and values will amply illustrate the maelstrom of current theories. The science of Value, we are told by the more conservative, embraces, while at some points extending, the field of traditional

435

The phrase is used by W. Strich, Das Wertproblem in der Philosophie der Gegenwart.

Ethics. "Value" is synonymous with "good and evil," and to be preferred because of its freedom from the theological and transcendental implications of those words in the older philosophy.2 More broadly, values are ideals; and the Absolute Values are the Absolute Ideals of Truth, Beauty, and Goodness.3 From ideal, the definitions advance along the path of generality to "purpose," and thence to that vague and vagrant word "meaning." With more definiteness we get a group of "psychological" definitions. Value is "satisfaction," "enjoyment," an "attitude taken up towards an object which is valued." Whole theories have been built up upon the definition of Value as the property of "being an object for feeling, or conation, or affective and conational disposition." Distinct from such individualistic conceptions is the group of "social" definitions. falling roughly into two sub-classes: either, Value is the object for socially approved ideals or purposes; or, it is conduciveness to the prosperity of society. Intellectually entirely unrelated to the foregoing are the metaphysical definitions such as Whitehead's, which conceive Value to be the concreteness of sensible as opposed to conceptual existence. And finally, the Realists think Value to be undefinable and unanalysable—a simple and intrinsic quality of things.

And confusion is worse confounded by a laxity of language such as must long ago have been held up to public shame for an intolerable scandal in any other branch of science or learning. With the bewildering virtuosity of a conjuring trick, "Value," "values," "spheres of value," and the rest, undergo in each single writer successive metamorphoses of meaning, from adjective to substantive, from substantive to relation, and from relation through mental

activity back to adjective.

We hear of "natural values" and of "Ideal Values," although I am unaware that anyone has yet advanced a principle of discrimination by which they could be contrasted as species without being isolated as unrelated genera. The plural, "values," must denote indiscriminately subordinated species of the summum genus "Value," differentiated groups of objects which are severally asserted to possess Value, or particular "bearers of value." We are not told whether economic values, religious values, truth values, social values, etc., refer to sections of Reality in which the same general property

Bosanquet, Some Suggestions in Ethics, p. 46. "Value, worth, and goodness seem all to be names for the same character of objects."

² J. S. Mackenzie, Ultimate Values, pp. 15, 93.

J. C. Smuts, Holism and Evolution, p. 107.

¹ Sorley, "The Philosophical Attitude" (Int. Journ. Eth., vol. xx, p. 159, 1910). "General theory of value might, perhaps, by stretching the meaning of an old term, be called Ethics; or a new term, Axiology, might be used for.it."

³ W. P. Montague, Ways of Knowing, p. 25. "Theory of value is concerned with the nature of ideals and with the way they may be made actual."

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inheres, as pillar-boxes, pictures, and politicians may all be "red"; or whether we are meant to understand a reference to so many determinate qualities under one determinable, as red, blue, and green fall under the determinable "colour." Even after a clear-cut relational definition of Value has been propounded and defended, the reader will be certain to find the word "value" applied not only to the relation in question, but frequently to both terms of that relation. Distinctions simple and obvious enough, in all seeming, at the origin are turned into snares for the unwary by the singular linguistic fatality that dogs the Philosophy of Value. So "actual and potential," "intrinsic and instrumental," become specifications of the superordinated characteristic "Value." But why "instrumental value," when all that apparently can be meant is conduciveness to the production of things valuable?

We return to the imbroglio of Value-theory. If we were asked soberly to believe that all the presumptive definitions or indications of the nature of Value which are to be met with in the writings of serious students endeavour to define or to indicate the same thing, we should be involved in a veritable philosophical nightmare in which nothing was itself rather than another thing, and anything might seem to be anything at all. It is as phantastically irrational to suppose that the same object should be taken by so many observers to be the relation between a desiring person and the object of his desire, social aspirations, and a simple non-relational property, as it would be to suppose that three men confronted with the same object would describe it severally as a four-legged mammal, a rack for the drying of clothes, and a nursery toy. In order to preserve our mental sanity we must accept the obvious conclusion that the theories of Value are about different things, and not, as they profess, about the same thing. And this conclusion is put beyond doubt by the consideration that the various writers have not only given different and apparently unconnected definitions of Value, but detect its presence in as widely different fields If two men looking in opposite directions describe differently the contents of their fields of vision, it is comparatively unimportant that they should employ the same word to indicate the totality which they observe. Whence then the discord? And how is it to be solved?

Theories of Value carry with them immediate implications about the nature of Reality. Indeed, they are primarily asseverations about the nature, or an aspect of the nature, of Reality, and only secondarily concerned to define and locate "Value." This is the centre of contention. The word "Value" has strong and widely ranging emotional associations from which philosophers are no more exempt than any other class of men. And although emotional considerations should be strictly banished from objective science, they inevitably exert a

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powerful, and sometimes a decisive, influence over the choice of vocabulary. Hence the philosophers have not been "philosophical" enough to waive the terminology while insisting upon the content.

Fortunately it is no longer necessary or useful to build up a theory of Value *ab initio*. Existing theories may be classified into a few main types according to the conceptions of Reality which they involve. And from the basis of such a classification and comparison a new theory should emerge, unless one or another of those which have been advocated seems satisfactory.

If the principium divisionis is to be the essential implication of Value theories for Weltanschauung or theory of Reality, one must commence from Dr. Broad's bifurcation of ethical theories into naturalistic and non-naturalistic. In his own words, "The first and most fundamental problem of pure ethics is whether these characteristics are unique and peculiar, in the sense that they cannot be analysed without remainder in terms of non-ethical characteristics. ... Those theories which hold that ethical characteristics can be analysed without remainder into non-ethical ones may be called Naturalistic Theories; those which hold that they cannot may be called Non-Naturalistic Theories." For Value Philosophy, that is the question whether "Value" connotes a concept which is unique and sui generis, or whether it does not. The importance of our choice between these alternatives in determining the kind of metaphysics we must adopt can hardly be over-estimated, and will not be entirely without distant reverberations in the practical arrangements of life. The differences of opinion on this issue, whether latent or overt, have been a predominating source of discord and mutual denigration among the pilosophers of Value.

Professor A. E. Taylor has demurred from the exclusive importance assigned to this distinction on the ground that it may become ambiguous in application.² Both Plato and Spinoza would assent to the definition of virtue as the efficient performance of the "activities of the species to which you belong." And nevertheless, Spinoza should, and Plato could not, be classed as a "naturalist" in respect of Value, if the distinction between naturalist and non-naturalist is to retain any significance at all. But the ambiguity lies not in Dr. Broad's distinction, but in the definition of virtue, which in Spinoza's case is meant to be understood biologically, and when used by Plato would imply reference to an absolute and non-analysable ideal of Good. No classification could hope to be superior to the ambiguities in the definitions which it is intended to classify—which does not detract from its usefulness as a classification.

We are now in the position to pick the bone of contention out

2 Review of the above in Mind.

Five Types of Ethical Theory, p. 257.

DEFINITION OF VALUE

from the ambiguous dust-heaps of axiological literature. If the Naturalists are right, it follows that the Non-Naturalists are talking about an Unding—something which does not really exist at all, but which they have mistakenly supposed to exist. "Value" is in their mouths a meaningless term, their value-theories simply emotive noise. If, on the other hand, the Non-Naturalists can justify their contentions, the Naturalists have failed to detect a particularly important characteristic of Reality, and have constructed their theories as though no such characteristic existed. Either they will be convicted of axiological colour-blindness, as it were, or the Non-Naturalists are the subjects of a peculiarly virulent delusion which unfits them for the task of metaphysics. This is the essential meeting-point around which debate should centre, and apart from it the two types of theory have no point of contact. We will take as an example the psychological theory of Value as it is propounded by Professor Urban. "Value" is asserted with the minimum of argument to be the property of being an object of the non-cognitive mental act which he calls "Valuation." His book is a profound and intricate explanation of the psychological ramifications and development of Valuation. If his initial conception of the nature of Value is right, his theory of Value is all that could be desired, and the Non-Naturalists are in fact deluded. If, however, they have discovered, and are calling attention to, a real characteristic of things, then Professor Urban's theory remains good psychology, and may be admitted to be good philology nine-tenths of the way; but his metaphysics of Reality resulting therefrom would be flagrantly fallacious, because they would neglect the important aspect of Reality with which theory of Value should be concerned. And hardly the most desultory attempt is made to show that this is not the case. For once a definition of Value has been assumed, there is no way of justifying the assumption by elaboration upon it, and no way of proving it by the consequences which may be deduced. Every writer is bound by his initial definition, and the issue between Naturalism and Non-Naturalism must be faced directly. Professor Sorley has complete justification in his protest against the philosophic hustling in which the Naturalists are fain to indulge: "The method of psychological inquiry is misconceived, and its results are misinterpreted when these are allowed to take the place of an independent investigation of value. The experiences and judgment of value are undoubtedly mental facts, and psychology may trace their rise and history; but it does not touch the question of their validity, any more than the validity of mathematical judgments is affected by the history of their formation."2 Unless, therefore, the issue between

¹ Valuation, Its Nature and its Laws.

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Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic theories has already been decided, the elaboration of the consequences of a theory belonging to either class runs the risk of being proved to be irrelevant—Non-Naturalistic theories of being mere word-play and about nonentities, and Naturalistic theories of talking about facts which might equally well be described without having resource to the terminology of Value, while neglecting the realities with which theory of Value has to do.

As many of the less careful writers have the habit of introducing a definition of Value implicitly into their presuppositions before allowing it overtly to intrude into the argument, it has been easy for the protagonists on both sides to give to their conclusions something of the factitious obviousness of the truism. The Naturalists tend to describe circles with the inevitability of children on the roundabouts. While the Non-Naturalist, preferring the swings, indulges in recapitulated assurance, hoping to gain by importunity

that which he is unable to prove by reason.

The Naturalist has to prove that the concept of Value sui generis is an unwarrantable inference from the structure of language, or else that it derives from antecedent metaphysical presuppositions which are false. Practical thinking, it is well known, tends to identify personal conviction with objective validity (hence the argumentum baculinum so common in theological and political debate); and language is accordingly incurably "objective." And certain philosophers have been systematically trained to mistake the grammar of language for the grammar of Reality. Indeed, it cannot very well be denied that, despite the grammatical form of the proposition which attributes Value objectively to the object of the proposition, the great majority of the value-judgments in common speech are simply records of personal and private reaction to objective situations. And the ready acceptance by most philosophers of such a phrase as "instrumental value" hints in the same direction. For if the valuejudgment attributes an intrinsic property "Value" to the object, "instrumental value" is an absurd misnomer, the origin of which could not easily be explained. Something which is conducive to the coming into existence of valuable situations may be also valuable in its own right, but its "conduciveness" is not a new species of valuableness. Nor do we call money "instrumentally pleasant" because it is conducive to the acquirement of pleasure. On the other hand, the "transference" of an emotion from the object upon which it was primarily directed to the "instrument" is a well-known psychological happening.

But the same arguments cannot be applied with any direct cogency against Naturalistic definition of the "values" of goodness and beauty. McTaggart's stricture certainly applies to many of the

less careful thinkers. But the confusion to which he directs attention is by no means inherent to the Naturalistic position as such. The definition of Value, for instance, as the "property of being an object of desire" may imply a failure to perceive an aspect of Reality which is of paramount importance (that has to be argued), but it is not logically ambiguous. The relativity and conflicts of judged values and the fluctuations of valuation constitute a strong a priori bias towards Naturalism, which has already been pressed to breakingpoint. And yet even in the turmoil of varying valuations of everyday existence there is discernible a principle which demands explanation from the Naturalist. In æsthetics I recognize that my judgments of beauty are not worth so much as those of the trained and gifted artist; his are more "right" than mine. As Dr. Tennant has put it, (good or bad) Taste is not the same thing as personal tastes. And I should not think myself conceited to assume that my ethical judgments are on the whole more "right" than those of the untutored savage. Is the "social" theory of Value competent to account for this discriminating principle of "rightness"? Or is that principle a collective delusion depending upon a combination of social snobbery and the tendency to assign universal "validity" to the most cherished reactions of one's own personality? Are all subjective valuations really on a level?

The first and most fundamental problem in the theory of Value is, then, to decide between Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic definition. And that decision is inseparably connected with metaphysics of Reality. Value theory cannot be made separable from speculative Weltanschauung. The attempt to discuss it in isolation has been one of the prime causes of the present confusedness and misapprehension which seem to preclude solid advance. Until the possible alternatives shall have been clearly envisaged and professed, discussion can but defeat its own purpose.

Some Non-Naturalists, in turn, have professed to think that Naturalistic theories depend upon a rather elementary logical confusion between the following two propositions: "(a) The ethical characteristic E synthetically entails and is entailed by the non-ethical characteristics N_1, N_2, \ldots ; and (b) The ethical characteristic E is analysable without remainder into the conjunction of the non-ethical characteristics N_1, N_2, \ldots " McTaggart has written: "It is generally admitted that it is impossible to define good and evil in terms of anything else. Any assertions that this is possible are due, I think, to a confusion between definition and a universal synthetic proposition about the thing defined." In other words, it is asserted that the would-be definitions of Value do not really define, but refer to

¹ Broad, op. cit., p. 238.

² The Nature of Existence, vol. ii, p. 398.

some other characteristic which is always associated with Value.

And that is a very different thing.

There is, I think, a logical confusion inherent to those "prag-/ matic" theories of Value which, while defining Value naturalistically, hold that Truth is "a value." F. C. S. Schiller attributes value to a situation or object as a result of that practical attitude or "active taking up of a position," which he calls "valuation." Valuation is a practical orientating of the mind to its objective environment or to some situation in its environment. He would then argue that "truth" and "fact" and "validity" are simply terms of Value. "All truths are values, or, if by 'truth' we mean truth-claim, value-claims." "Facts" are also "values." It is incontestably true, as Professor Sorley has said, that the apprehension of truth and the knowledge of facts are valuable states of consciousness. It is also true that all thinking is directed and therefore the result of purposive and selective psychological attitudes. But selection is controlled by, and thinking is directed towards, an ideal of truth which is independent of the purposiveness of the psychological process of getting to know. The notion of a "normative" science—and Schiller admits that logic, ethics, and so on, are "normative" sciences-implies a "norm" which is itself outside and unconditioned by the subjective and individual "valuations" which are "evaluated." If "fact" is "value," it will follow that the fact that "I value this" corresponds to an "attitude" in some person's mind; and that fact will demand a third attitude; and so on with no end. And so with Truth. Thought in its very nature entails an ideal of absolute truth transcending the psychological processes of knowing. The behaviourist who asserts that thought is conditioned reflex movement in the laryngeal region virtually contradicts himself. For his own assertion, equally with the opposing assertion of the traditional logician, is the result of such conditioned reflexes. Nor has he left himself any principle of distinguishing one reflex from another in value. And these assertions in turn result from conditioned reflex movements in the writer's

Both Naturalistic and Non-Naturalistic theories are of many varieties, seposed by disagreement on minor, or sometimes upon issues of far-reaching, metaphysical importance. The numerous divisions and subdivisions of Naturalistic theories are all of minor philosophical import. In general they serve to express and to emphasize the writer's antecedent attitude towards the empirical world. A thinker of behaviouristic tendencies will define "Value" as a biological principle, and extend that principle to include all professed instances of valuation, thus calling attention to his conviction of the continuity or identity, as the case may be, of psychological with

Logic for Use.

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physiological phenomena. One who is convinced of the uniqueness or importance of consciousness (human consciousness or the social factor in human consciousness), while admitting genetic continuity, will emphasize and express his conviction by limiting his use of value-terminology in an appropriate way. In a word, philosophers have introduced Value at that point in their systems which seemed to have particular significance and to be in need of a certain emotional underlining. Thus Professor S. Alexander, after some wavering, seems to have employed "Value" to indicate the emergence of a new "quality" or level of existence. Professor Whitehead uses it of the "concretion" of the abstract into the particular, etc. These differences are, then, linguistic and not significant to the philosophy of Value. Where there is real philosophical difference, whether about interpretation of fact or about emphasis, that is primary and independent; so-called "value-philosophy" is secondary, lending emotional colour and persuasive force.

There are, on the other hand, two main types of Non-Naturalistic theories, divided upon an issue of far higher metaphysical significance. The division is based upon their interpretation of the fundamental value-concept as a pure quality or as an a priori relation. In order to avoid the cacophonous jargon of saying "Relational or non-Relational Non-Naturalistic theories," I propose to call the former "Idealistic" and the latter "Realistic" theories about Value. Realistic theories, then, hold that Value is a non-natural property of natural and existing states of affairs. The significance of "nonnatural" is explained with exceptional lucidity and precision by Professor G. E. Moore. Value is a pure or non-relational property, the specific value of any state of affairs depending solely upon the intrinsic properties of that state of affairs and not upon any relation in which it may stand to anything else in the universe. But though the value of anything is in fact determined by its intrinsic properties, value differs from other intrinsic properties in being logically separable without destroying the identity of a thing. From the value of things derives a normative relation to moral agents, in virtue of which any moral being ought always to act in such a way as to produce a valuable rather than a non-valuable, and a more rather than a less valuable state of affairs. There are thus two ultimate and irreducible concepts, "Value" and "ought," and a necessary synthetic relation between them.

Idealistic theories, on the other hand, acknowledge only one ultimate concept "oughtness," in terms of which "Value" is defined. "Oughtness" is an absolute and underived factor in the structure of Reality, such that some things are more "fitting" or "ought rather"

In his essay "The Conception of Intrinsic Value" (in Philosophical

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to exist than others. And where their existence or non-existence depends upon the voluntary action of a moral being, he is morally obliged to further the existence of that which is most "fitting" or "ought most" to exist. When a thing is said to be *valuable*, that means simply that it *ought* to be valued, or its existence ought to be desired, by moral beings. A thing is absolutely valuable when its existence ought under all circumstances to be desired by any moral being.

The distinctness of Idealistic from Realistic theories should be as apparent as it is important. In the one case "Value" is defined; in the other it is ultimate and indefinable. Idealistic theory acknowledges only one ultimate notion in Value-Philosophy, viz. "oughtness to exist," from which derive ethical obligation in respect of those things, the existence or non-existence of which is in the power of human volition to influence, and "ideal value" or "oughtness to be desired to exist." Realists need at the least two ultimates, neither definable in terms of the other. With them a particular quality is primary; the idealists start from the notion of ethical obligation which they make absolute and integral to the constitution of Reality. The history of the Philosophy of Value, however, has worked against the explicit recognition of this division. I believe that it has not been made before in so many words, and I know of no "Idealist" who has not also spoken as though he were a "Realist." Two reasons may be adduced. In the first place, Idealism and Realism have been compelled to present a united front against Naturalism, and in the manner of constant allies have become oblivious to their own differences. And secondly, a pure Idealism has not often been held distinct from Realism owing to a tendency of those who would otherwise have been pure Idealists to indulge in high abstractions which have led to a sort of Transcendental Pragmatism. The notion of "Ought" is not only ultimate in the sense of being indefinable and unanalysable, but it is the highest abstraction and the first Reality from which all other concepts derive. The confusion is in essence the same as that noticed in connection with Pragmatism on the Naturalistic plane. Selection, valuation, appreciation enter into the process of getting to know; and the acquisition of knowledge is guided by an absolute norm of rightness; our conception of the nature of Reality is necessarily coloured by our valuations in some sense. But that does not warrant the assumption that the notion of Reality is secondary to, and derivative from, the notion of "Ought." Pragmatism, whether psychological and Naturalistic, or whether it advances to the transcendental plane, is specious only so far as it can conceal the substitution of ordo cognoscendi for ordo essendi upon which it relies.

Basing our analysis upon ontological differences, and leaving on one side questions of epistemology and philology or linguistic appro-

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priateness, we have discovered three main types of Value-theory demanding attention. They were Naturalistic theory and Non-Naturalistic theory, the latter subdividing into Idealistic and Realistic (Relational and non-Relational). And we have argued that as these metaphysical or ontological issues are of fundamental importance, so they must occupy the attention of Value-Philosophy explicitly and consciously. Only upon this fundamental basis can different types of theory about Value find any common ground upon which to exchange arguments. Once definitions of Value belonging to different types of metaphysic have been accepted or assumed by two philosophers, they are thereby debarred from exchanging anything more important than insults or witticisms. The advance of the Philosphy of Value from its present parlous confusedness depends upon its tardy recognition of this fact.

SPINOZISTIC SUBSTANCE AND UPANISHADIC SELF:

A COMPARATIVE STUDY

M. S. MODAK, M.A., Ph.D.

THE Upanishadic thinkers arrived at the conception of the Atmanthe self—through psychological reflection. By an analysis of consciousness, they concluded that the self was the primary reality. Further, they discovered that it was the same primary reality—the same principle—that formed the basis of the Universe. In this capacity the self was called the Brahman. This psychological approach to the problem of ultimate reality is characteristic of the Upanishadic philosophy. It is interesting to note that the writers of the Upanishads have also offered cosmological speculations which led them independently to the positing of absolute existence. A passage in the Taittiriya Upanishad says, "that from which all these beings come into existence, that by which they live, that into which they are finally absorbed, know that to be the eternal verity, the Absolute." ¹ The writer of the Chandogya ² Upanishad expresses this conception by means of one word, "Tajjalan," which means "that it is from the Absolute that the world has sprung, it is into it that it is dissolved, and it is by means of it that it lives." "It is indeed the power of the Brahman which manifests itself as the motion of the Soul in us and bethinks itself," 3 says the Kenopanishad. This Absolute existence posited by the Upanishads is identical with pure consciousness, which is the Atman. The identity of consciousness and existence from the point of view of pure reason is the most fundamental fact of the Upanishadic Philosophy. Absolute existence is Being which knows no determination. Vedanta starts with the concept of indeterminate Being in the solution of the ontological problem of reality. The philosophy of Spinoza also starts with the concept of indeterminate Being. The cosmology of the Upanishads is not a systematic and rational attempt towards the construction of the Universe. This task has been accomplished in greater details by writers of later Vedantic books. The Upanishadic thinkers were bold speculators, who lived in a free atmosphere.

4 Kena, III. iv.

A part of a chapter in the writer's thesis on Spinoza and the Upanishads, approved for the Doctorate degree by the University of London.

² Taittiriya, III. 1 (Yato vā imāni Bhutāni jāyante, etc.). ³ Chandogya, III. 14. 1.

SPINOZISTIC SUBSTANCE AND UPANISHADIC SELF

To them, creation out of nothing seemed an impossibility. Theirs was not the age of science. Yet the doctrine of creation of the Universe appeared to them to conflict with rational thinking. For Spinoza, too, the idea of creation out of nothing seemed absurd. His thoroughgoing rationalism would revolt against such a notion. The Upanishadic conclusion was that the Absolute was the source of the Universe. The indeterminate Being, which is absolute reality in Spinoza's system, was the substance which is self-dependent and unconditioned. All things depend on this Absolute. The manner of dependence of all things on substance and on the Upanishadic Absolute will be considered later on. Both the Upanishadic thinkers and Spinoza start with the conception of the self-dependent unconditioned Being which is the reality, and as such the ground of all things. What is this indeterminate Being? How is it related to the world? In what sense is it the source of all things? The possibility of an external creator being ruled out at the very outset, the explanation of the problems raised above, is given by Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers by making reality immanent. To Spinoza reality is all-comprehensive. It is the cosmic system itself.

The Spinozistic conception of cosmic Unity has a grandeur about it. It is not the grandeur of poetic fancy. Spinoza's conception of reality as "one organic cosmos" has its roots in the mystic vision, which, far from being hampered by scientific conceptions, was mainly based on them, especially on certain conceptions in physics and mathematics. He conceived "Reality as one organically interconnected Universe in which everything is and happens according to law and order, and not as the result of mere chance or mere

Whatever was real was within the cosmos. The Upanishadic thinkers conceive reality as both immanent and transcendent at the same time. The reality in their view is not only immanent in the cosmos but at the same time also transcends it.

Although self-dependent and unconditioned Being was posited both by Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers, the former conceived it as a Universe systematically interconnected within itself, while the latter conceived it as the underlying principle—in man and the Universe.

"I maintain that God is . . . the immanent cause of all things, but not the transient cause. Like Paul, and perhaps also like all ancient philosophers, though in another way, I assert that all things live and move in God. . . . However, those who think that God and Nature (by which they mean a certain mass or corporeal matter) are one and the same, are entirely mistaken."2 With such an explicit

Journal of Philosophical Studies, Vol. II, p. 5, "Spinoza," by Professor

² Vide p. 343, Correspondence of Spinoza, A. Wolf.

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statement from Spinoza, the exact sense in which he can be called a pantheist cannot be misunderstood. God is not merely matter. Spinoza was a pantheist in the sense that "the one-and-all is God and God is the one-and-all"; and the one-and-all is the cosmos which our intellect truly perceives as extended and as thinking. Pan, i.e. all, taken as the unique completeness of Being was God to Spinoza, not that "All" in the sense of every individual thing, was God. This conception of one-and-all was a positive one. It is a Being completely real and hence indeterminate. It must be conceived through itself as it is self-dependent. Things in this world are seen to depend on many other things, and these in turn depend on many another. The primary Being which must be self-dependent, and which could not have been created, must have also an eternal existence. Eternity is in fact existence itself.

One of the features of pantheistic thought is the positing of an impersonal reality. The God of pantheism is not conceived after human values. Spinozistic substance and Upanishadic self are both conceived impersonally. The popular human attributes of God, viz. love, power, greatness, etc., cannot characterize either. Not that either of them is lacking in any positive being. That cannot be, for they are perfectly real. They are impersonal in the sense that they are supra-personal. When Spinoza says that God is the immanent cause of all things and not transient, he accepts another feature of pantheistic philosophy. But let it be understood that this is higher pantheism. He does not equate matter with God. He does not deify nature, understood in the popular sense. Nature, in the sense of cosmic system whose attributes are extension and thought, i.e. physical energy and mental energy respectively, is God, and there is nothing real beyond the cosmic system. Hence God is not the transient cause of the world. Upanishadic position in this respect is different. The Self is both at the same time the immanent and the transient cause of the Universe. These two aspects of the Self, viz. immanence and transcendence, cannot be separated.

In Spinoza's philosophy we have seen that the one-and-all is God and God is one-and-all. This one-and-all is a system. The Upanishadic position is that the all, i.e. the cosmos, indicates the presence of the One, i.e. the self behind it. This One cannot be ("phenomenalized") reduced to many. For it is the presupposition of the "all." The presence and operation of the One are necessary to connect the "all" to it. And the "all" which is not of equal reality as compared to the One is, however, inseparable from the One. And as the One cannot be entirely reduced to many, Sankar, like Spinoza, says that it is wrong to identify individual things with Brahman.

The Brahman was not merely an empirical concept. It arose out 448

SPINOZISTIC SUBSTANCE AND UPANISHADIC SELF

of a perception of "the manifold of the world" and "the diversity of Soul-functions," both of which indicated the Unity underlying them. The material world was conceived by the Upanishadic thinkers as filled by spiritual presence, as in fact "a manifestation of Brahman." The vexed question of the relation between matter and spirit did not, therefore, arise for the Upanishadic thinkers. The concept of Brahman, which is the all-pervading and all-producing Absolute, solves the problem of the relation between matter and spirit. This duality of matter and spirit was the stumbling-block of the Cartesian School. It was overcome by Spinoza more or less in the same way as by the Upanishadic thinkers. For the concept "substance" or "God" is also an all-pervading and all-producing Absolute.

The first notion of Brahman is that it is Existence. Since ultimate reality is existence, we cannot conceive the absolute as limitation of existence, for limitation is determination and determination is negation; Being and non-Being are utterly contradictory conceptions. Hence Being is Truth. True Being, therefore, is Absolute Being. It excludes all relativity. It denies all dependency. It is absolutely positive, *i.e.* without the slightest possibility of negation or limitation which would cancel absoluteness. With Spinoza also the first notion of substance is that it is existence. For Existence pertains to the essence of substance. Substance cannot be conceived unless as existing. It is, therefore, self-existent. And as its essence involves existence, substance is all being. That is to say, it is so completely real or positive that it cannot be determined by any other thing, for determination implies negation. It is, therefore, indeterminate Being.

Again, absolute Being or existence must transcend time. It is therefore eternal. This is the Upanishadic position. Spinoza understands "Eternity to be existence itself in so far as it is conceived to follow necessarily from the definition of an eternal thing." For him Existence and eternity were identical conceptions. Eternity to both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers was not indefinite duration. Both have conceived the ultimate reality as transcending the conception of time altogether.

Further, if Being is Absolute, it must be one, for the very conception of a multiplicity of absolutes is self-contradictory. For the positing of a Second Absolute negates the very essence of the absolute itself. Therefore Brahman is one and Brahman alone is. Spinoza, differing radically from Descartes, asserts that there can only be one substance. Substance being absolutely infinite, a plurality of Substances cannot be conceived. "In the nature of things," says Spinoza, "there cannot be two or more substances of the same nature or attributes. For if the substances are distinct, they must

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differ either in their modes or states or in their nature or Attributes. But a difference in Attributes is excluded ex hypothesi. And if they differ only in their modes, then they are really the same, i.e. the same in their permanent nature, the same qua substances." The agreement here really depends upon the relation between substance and Attributes, as has been pointed out by Professor

Toachim.1 The Upanishadic Brahman is not a system. It is the integral substance—a subtle and unmanifest essence underlying everything that is manifested. It is consciousness, for it is identical with the Atman or the self. It is the eternal subject of knowledge. It is not a thinking being, but thought itself. Spinoza conceives substance as a self-dependent Being whose essence is Thought and Extension, and upon whom the modes are made to depend. This Substance, therefore, is the "Unified totality of Attributes" with modes entirely depending upon it. Substance, of course, is conceived through itself; but that does not make the modes unreal; for substance must exist in a state of itself, and this gives a certain reality to the modes. Though the idea of substance is entirely self-dependent, the idea of a mode involves the idea of substance, "because the reality of a mode involves the reality of substance." Substance therefore is a reality that exists as the system.

At this stage the doctrine of causality in Spinozism and the Upanishads would have to be considered. What is the immanent causality of Spinozistic Substance? God is the immanent cause of all things, and Spinoza categorically rejects the view that God created the Universe or that God is the transient cause of all things. We have seen that the Upanishadic thinkers reject the theory of creation of the Universe. Creation out of nothing seemed absurd both to Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers. A self-subsistent Being is the only and the one Cause. So far the agreement between the two systems of thought is complete. When substance is stated to be the immanent cause of all things, the relation implied between substance and the modes has to be determined with due regard to the nature Spinoza ascribes to substance. Critics who interpret the immanent causality in Spinoza as indicating a geometrical relation between substance and modes have overlooked this consideration, and consequently, as Professor Wolf has pointed out,2 Spinoza has been misunderstood. The frequent use Spinoza makes of geometrical figures to illustrate his philosophical conceptions seems to have misled these critics. The proposition that the three angles of a triangle are equal to two right-angles can be deduced from the very nature of the triangle,

A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, p. 38.

² Vide Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1927.

and Spinoza often uses this metaphor in support of the propositions he wants to deduce, as obvious from his fundamental philosophical conceptions. This has led to the supposition that for Spinoza there was only one kind of relationship in the Universe, namely the purely rational or logico-mathematical relationship. But nothing can be further from such a supposition, particularly when we take into consideration Spinoza's conception of matter. This is where he differs from Descartes, and differs so fundamentally that he cannot be called a Cartesian in any material sense. To Descartes matter was inert, and as for Motion, he brought in God to explain it. Spinoza's conception of matter is essentially dynamic. Matter was not inert. Matter which he termed as extension was physical energy expressing itself in the infinite mode of motion and rest. Substance or God, therefore, was a dynamic conception, not static. As Existence, so action too is the essence of God. "The more perfect a thing is, the more reality it possesses, and consequently acts more." Substance being a dynamic conception, its immanence in all things—the immanent causality of substance—cannot be taken as merely expressing a logico-mathematical relation. Substance or God as the active or efficient, the dynamic cause of all things, is immanent in them. Further, even the use of geometrical figures to illustrate his philosophical conceptions does not support the view that for Spinoza, only one relation, viz. the logicomathematical, existed in the Universe. "The idea or definition of the thing should express its efficient cause." The really adequate definition of a circle therefore is that it is "the space which is described by a line of which one point is fixed and the other movable. Since this definition expresses the efficient cause, I know that I can deduce from it all the properties of a circle, etc."2 It is clear from the above definition of circle that "Spinoza regarded geometrical figures as effects produced by certain movements."3 The immanence of God in all things is therefore dynamic and not logico-mathematical.

The Brahman, which is both the immanent and transcendent source at the same time, of all things, is also conceived dynamically in the Upanishads. Sankar insists that the immanent and the transcendent aspects of Brahman as the cause of all things must not be taken separately. Brahman is both the efficient and material cause of the Universe (Abhinn-nimitta-Upādana-Karanam). It is obvious, therefore, that the Upanishadic conception of reality is dynamic. "If logical account is permitted, then we may say that the Brahman of the Upanishads is no metaphysical abstraction, no

3 P. 60, vide supra.

Ethics, Part V, Prop. 40.

² The Correspondence of Spinoza, Professor Wolf, p. 301.

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indeterminate identity, no void of silence. It is the fullest and the most real Being. It is a living dynamic spirit, the source and con-

tainer of the infinitely varied forms of reality."

Why is it that men fail to see the Reality—to know the Truth—which, as both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers have made out, is so very obvious? The Isopanishad tells us that truth is veiled in this Universe by a vessel of gold (Hiranmayen Patrena Satyasyāpihitam mukham).² The Kathopanishad ³ says that people live in ignorance and yet think themselves wise—blind leading the blind—they would have easily seen the reality had they "lived in know edge" instead of in ignorance. The Chandogya Upanishad ⁴ declares that knowledge is power, while ignorance is impotence. The Brihadaranyaka ⁵ compares unreality to non-Being. It is in these passages that the origin of the doctrine of Maya could be traced. Actually the word Maya is used in the Upanishads in more than one sense. In the Prasna and the Swetaswatara Upanishads the word Maya is used in the sense of illusion.

In the Swataswatara, again, Maya is used in the sense of "power." It was used in a similar sense in a passage in Rigveda quoted by Brihadaranyaka Upanishad. Maya in the sense of *power* or "fields of Force"—God being described as having produced all things by His "powers"—very nearly approaches the Attributes of Spinoza as interpreted by Kuno Fischer. These two senses in which the word Maya has been used in the Upanishads have been pressed into the service of their own theories by writers on vedanta. Gaudapada, the forerunner of Sankar, maintains that the world was not created at all!

He argues, "If there were a Universe, then only a question might arise whether it would hide from our view, but the Universe is not; duality is only Maya, i.e. illusion. Non-duality is the only reality." For Gaudapada, therefore, there are no degrees of reality, since the world does not exist at all. In trying to explain the Universe, he arrived at a position where the world itself was explained away. The knotty problem of the one and the many does not arise for him. To Sankar the world is real, but not sub specie æternitatis. The important distinction that Sankara draws between the "Pāramārthika" noumenal- and Vyāvahārika-phenomenal views of reality must not be lost sight of. The doctrine of degrees of reality is throughout implied in Sankara's philosophy. The world is real in the relative sense. Since it cannot be conceived independent of Brahman, it cannot be real in the sense in which Brahman is real.

¹ P. 172, Indian Philosophy, Vol. I, Radhakrishnan.
² Isa. 15.
³ Katha. 1–2. 4. 5.
⁴ Chandogya I. I. 10.
⁵ Brih. I. 3. 28.

⁶ Vide Professor Wolf's paper on Spinoza in the Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, 1927; Ranade, Constructive Survey of the Upanishadic Philosophy, p. 227.

SPINOZISTICO SUBSTANCE AND CHANISHADIC SELF

Nor can it be said to be absolutely unreal or (a total illusion), since it is inseparably connected with Brahman. Sankara does not deny the existence of the world as such. He only maintains that it cannot be treated as separate from Brahman or as something self-existent and independent. It is an "illusion" to think that the world is an independent entity. It is entirely dependent on the underlying reality, and further is inseparable from it.

Maya in the sense of "power" of Brahman closely resembles the attributes of Spinoza. In a letter to Oldenburg, Spinoza writes: "There exists in Nature an infinite power of thought." In the Short Treatise the attribute of thought is spoken of as "thinking power." The attribute of Extension is also considered as a power in Nature, which produces Motion and Rest —effects which necessarily depend on the attribute of Extension. Attributes therefore are "powers," "lines of force"—in substance or Nature. So also Brahman, by its power (i.e. through Maya), produces all things which necessarily depend on its Maya. There is, however, a fundamental difference between the relation of the attributes to Substance and that of Maya to Brahman. Attributes are essentially related to Substance.

In some places Spinoza has used the words Substance and Attribute in identical sense. In a letter to De Vries3 Spinoza writes: "By Substance I mean that which is in itself and is conceived through itself, that is, whose conception does not involve the conception of some other thing. I mean the same by attribute, except that it is called attribute with respect to the intellect which attributes such and such a nature to substance." In Ethics, however, he distinguishes attribute from substance. The former is only one aspect of the latter. That aspect, it must be noted, is real and ultimate. The Attribute is defined in the Ethics as "that which the intellect perceives of Substance, as constituting its Essence." Since, according to Spinoza, the intellect leads us to the knowledge of the real, the attributei.e. that which the intellect perceives of substance—is a real and ultimate aspect of Substance. Not that it is what only appears to our intellect, but is not in Substance. This interpretation after Kantian terminology is inapplicable to Spinoza's attribute. Substance is known by intellect as it exists in itself, as it really is. The unified totality of attributes—the togetherness of attributes—is substance. "Attribute, as the what of Substance, is not excluded from Reality." Attribute can be said to be the essential nature of substance. The relation between Brahman and Maya is not one of essence. We shall first see what the Upanishadic position is in this respect, and then proceed to Sankara's view.

¹ P. 212, Correspondence of Spinoza, A. Wolf.

² P. 120, Short Treatise, A. Wolf.

³ P. 108, Correspondence of Spinoza, A. Wolf.

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The Upanishads, as we have seen, use the word Maya in two senses, viz. (i) illusion and (ii) Power. The latter sense of Maya is predominant so far as the Upanishads are concerned. The world they explain is the effect of Brahman's "power" or Maya. Brahman, though an immanent cause of the Universe, is not identical with it. For Brahman is at the same time the transcendental cause of the Universe. When the transcendental aspect of Brahman as the cause is considered, Maya in the sense of "illusion" is made to explain the appearance of the many. Though immanent in all things, Brahman must not be identified with the Universe, and though it transcends the Universe, the latter must not be separated from Brahman. This can be said to represent the Upanishadic view. And although the Universe cannot be separated from Brahman, it does not mean that the relation between them is one of essence. Brahman is an independent reality. Its power, i.e. Maya, which is responsible for the appearance of the universe, is not essential for Brahman's reality.

From the point of view of logic, the Upanishadic position in this respect seems unsatisfactory. Sankara's view of the Maya doctrine is much the same. Only when pressed to explain as to why Brahman should have this concomitant of Maya, Sankar says "it is inexplicable" (Anirvachaniyam). "It is inexplicable because it is neither absolutely real (Sat, i.e. Brahman) nor unreal (i.e. something absolutely different from Brahman), and therefore it is inexplicable"

The world, therefore, is inexplicable.

Substance necessarily expresses itself in infinite attributes, but Brahman is not bound by any such necessity. Brahman is the source of all things both immanently and transcendentally at the same time. All things are effects of its power, but Brahman is not resolved into these effects, for it has transcendental existence also. Hence its "power" to produce all things, i.e. Maya, cannot con-

stitute its essence, though it inseparably goes with it.

Spinoza's reality cannot exclude the attributes, since they express its essential nature, while the Upanishadic Brahman has no essential relation with Maya. The reality of Brahman is quite independent of Maya or the power (which is responsible for the appearance of the many). If the cosmic system is the reality for Spinoza, what is the position of individual things in Spinoza's reality? Individual things or modes depend upon substance. They are included within the reality. It is their relation with substance that we are now considering. The relation between Maya, i.e. the world, and Brahman, and that between modes and substance, afford an interesting comparison. We will thus know how the world of individual things is deduced from ultimate reality both in Spinoza and in the Upani-

¹ Vide p. 136, Adwaita Philosophy, K. Sastri.

SPINOZISTIC SUBSTANCE AND UPANISHADIC SELF

shads. "Spinoza works on the hypothesis of modification as the Vedanta works on the theory of Maya." The appearance of finite things, Spinoza takes as a fact much in the same way as Sankar looks to the fact that the world does appear. How it comes about that there is a world of finite things is "inexplicable," says Sankar. The inexplicability lies in the fact that the world is neither absolutely real nor is it absolutely non-real. Spinoza does attempt to explain the relation or dependence of things finite on substance.

The purpose of Spinoza's hypothesis of modification is the same as that of the Vedantin's theory of Maya. Both have the explanation of finite things in view. How does substance as the cause work?

Substance is the free cause of itself and of all things. It is a free cause because it is a necessary cause. It is necessary in the sense that it is the nature of substance to act. Its essence has action with it. Substance as the free causality of itself and of all things is Natura Naturans. It is the eternally-active absolute power that is acting in (infinite) all ways. And as the necessary consequent of its own free causality, substance is natura naturata, an ordered system of modes following with coherent necessity from Natura Naturans. Natura Naturata—God as the consequent of His own free causality—is not merely the world of sense-perception. God viewed as the eternal system of modes—a necessary consequent of His free causality—is Natura Naturata, and viewed as a free cause of itself and of all things is Natura Naturans. But Finite things, according to Spinoza, owe their coming to be and their persistence in being to God. That is God, the immanent and first cause is both the efficient and essential cause of all things. How does this causality of God work? God as Natura Naturata is not merely the world of individual things, world of sense-perception. There must be some way, therefore, by which the dependence of finite modes on God is explained. Substance as Extended and Thinking has to account for finite things. The infinite has to link the finite with itself, without losing its essence, and at the same time the finite must not be pushed out of the circumference of reality, for the finite is entirely caused by the infinite.

Spinoza links the finite to the infinite, the modes to the Attributes, by means of the conception of *infinite modes*. The corresponding conception in the vedanta, that attempts the linking of the finite with the infinite, is that of Maya. It has already been pointed out that Vedantic reality does not negate the world. The world is not an illusion. It is not false. It is relatively real. That is at least the Upanishadic view. And even Sankar cannot be interpreted to mean that the world is an illusion. Mr. Kokileshwar Sastri, in his book

1 Vide p. 12, Spinoza, by Sorley.

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on Adwaita philosophy, has shown that the falsity of the world was not maintained by Sankar. The realistic element in Sankar is very well brought out in the book which quotes original passages from Sankara's commentaries. The mediating link between the one and the many is Maya in the Upanishads and infinite modes in Spinoza. Spinozistic attributes of extension and thought would be also covered by Maya. The Upanishadic One, unlike Spinoza, was not conceived with attributes as its essence, and hence Maya covers the ground that is covered in Spinoza's philosophy by both the attributes and the modes. But in Spinoza the position between the attributes and modes is that between infinite and finite, and the mediating link of the infinite mode can therefore be said to correspond to the conception of Maya.

A direct product of an Attribute of Substance carries with it the character of infinity and eternity. This product, though a modification of the Attribute, is the immediate modification. Consequently it shares the nature of attribute in so far as it lies within the attribute's field. Motion, for instance, is an immediate infinite and eternal mode of the attribute of Extension, because it follows directly from Extension. There cannot be anything extended which is not in motion. All the modes of extension, therefore, are linked to the Attribute of Extension by the infinite mode of motion. When this attribute of Extension is modified by an infinite mode, anything that follows from the attribute under this modification must also be infinite and eternal. For "its being and its existence will be coextensive with motion and rest, and so far with the Attribute."1 This mode, therefore, though mediate, is eternal and infinite.

"The face of the whole Universe"—Facies totius Universi—is the mediate infinite eternal mode.2 In the Scholium Lemma, VII, the idea is clearly explained. To conceive "the whole of nature to be one individual whose parts, that is to say all bodies, differ in infinite ways without any change of the whole individual," is to conceive the face of the whole Universe. The immediate modification of Extension is motion and rest, from which follows the conception of the whole of Nature as one individual. Both these immediate and mediate modes are eternal and infinite in so far as they lie within the attribute "Extension." We have now reached the stage of finite modes. Spinoza has so far prepared the ground for their explanation. The causality of God works through the mediation of these infinite modes; its consequences, therefore, must themselves be eternal and infinite. Individual things, therefore, which all are the effects of God's causality, are infinite and eternal—in a sense.

"Their reality in that dependence (on substance) is timelessly

Vide p. 75, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, by Joachim.

² Vide p. 308, Correspondence of Spinoza, A. Wolf.

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actual; their essence in and through the modal system or the attribute involves their existence; and in and through the modal system their essence is complete or infinite." Individual or particular things, in so far as they are viewed under their modal system, are infinite and eternal. "Their timeless actuality, eternity, follows inevitably from the substance in which the essences of all particular things are sustained." This view of particular things as infinite and eternal can be put in another way. We can say that all things are in God in so far as their essences partake of God's essence. This is not to identify God with all individual things. For not individual things but the cosmic system is God.

This real—infinite and eternal—aspect of particular things is, however, not generally comprehended. Things are taken out of the modal system, and we imagine that we shall thus understand them best. That is the reverse of truth. Particular things—when thus viewed—are finite and transitory. Not that the world of sense-perception is an illusion. Our imaginative experience is partially true. It must be realized that although the essence of particular things inevitably has to assert itself, that does not mean that particular things abstracted from their modal system can claim the same reality which would belong to them when viewed under the modal system.

The world of sense-perception is real according to Spinoza, for things are modifications of the original reality; but they appear to us as finite because of our partial understanding of them. If we overcome this defect in our understanding, there is no danger of our misconstruing them. The world, therefore, is no distortion of reality. We must understand things in the right perspective. The relatively real is a true modification of the original reality. We think it as relatively real because we tear it off from the modal system, and view it as substantial entity. If it is viewed from its proper place within the modal system, it is infinite and eternal.

What does the relative reality of the world in the Upanishads mean? The Upanishadic Brahman, we have seen, is not a cosmic system. It is both immanent and transcendent as the cause. One must therefore penetrate beyond the world of sense-perception to attain the real. Particular things, therefore, are real in so far as they depend upon Brahman. To view them as independent of Brahman is to err. They are the modes of Brahman, produced by its power—Maya. But Brahman cannot be identified with them, nor do they form part of Brahman, for Brahman is absolutely real and independent. The substance of Spinoza, though self-dependent, has to include within itself the modes, for it is a system. This is

2 Vide supra.

Vide p. 76, A Study of the Ethics of Spinoza, Joachim.

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not the case with Brahman. Therefore the infinite and eternal, being attributed to particular things by Spinoza is inapplicable to them in the Upanishadic philosophy. The essences of particular things in Spinoza are sustained in substance, and only in this substance they are infinite and eternal. The essence of particular things according to the Upanishads is one and the same, that is. Brahman, which underlies them, and at the same time transcends them. The Upanishads do not regard the world as a mere human presentation by the genuine reality. It is objective and independent of the finite individual. The Kantian view of the world of ordinary experience is rejected both by Spinoza and the Upanishads. The relative reality of particular things is therefore admitted by both Spinoza and the Upanishadic thinkers. But the causality of substance being thoroughly immanent, Spinoza's reality becomes a system that has a rightful place for particular things, and, in this light, a certain infinity and eternity attaches to these particular things. Here there is divergence between Spinoza and the Upanishads. The latter lay down a doctrine of causality which is both immanent and transcendent at the same time, and particular things therefore do not receive that importance which they receive in Spinoza's philosophy. The Upanishadic view taken here is the same as Sankar held later on. There are passages in the Upanishadic literature which declare that all this is Brahman (Sarvam khaluidam Brahma). It will be wrong to identify Brahman with all things on the strength of this expression. Sankar expressly warns us against any such interpretation. Individual things do not constitute the Brahman. The causal reality is not identified with its effects. For the real nature of the cause is transcendental (Kootastha) in the system of Sankar, although the cause underlies all its products. Therefore the particular things (the world of sense-perception) are not given the same position as they are given in Spinoza when viewed under the modal system.

1 Vide Adwaita Philosophy, by K. Sastri.

CAUSE AND GROUND

F. E. ENGLAND, M.A., Ph.D.

It is the true function of thought, Lotze said, to show "how absolutely universal is the extent, and at the same time how completely subordinate the significance, of the mission which mechanism has to fulfil in the structure of the world." I do not propose to discuss the problem of mechanism *versus* teleology, but rather to point out and emphasize the importance of a distinction, drawn alike by Plato and Kant, between a narrower and a wider kind of determination, and to indicate the subordinate character of the former.

I

It is interesting to follow the way in which the antithesis involved in the notion of mechanical causality on the one hand and that of teleological causality on the other presented itself to Plato. Without acquiescing in the violent severance set up by the Eleatic thinkers between appearance and reality, he nevertheless regarded as fundamental the opposition between the perceptible world and the realm of Ideas. The Eleatic antinomy, which led him to the formulation of his own doctrine of Ideas, may be expressed in this manner: A real plurality is impossible without real units, and therefore admits no unity. We are accordingly compelled to regard either the plurality or the unity as mere semblance of reality. It seemed to the Eleatics that the doctrine of a plurality of reals was far more heavily encumbered with absurdities than the doctrine of an absolute unity. To Plato, on the other hand, it seemed that the antinomy was not incapable of solution. Ultimately, without doubt, the ideas of unity and plurality are incompatible; one cannot be many, nor many one. But in the world of sensuous things it is otherwise. Since the things of sense may have different qualities according to the relations in which they stand, a sensible thing may be in one sense one and in another sense many. In the Parmenides the relation between the world of sensible things and the realm of Ideas is conceived in terms of participation ($\mu\epsilon\theta\dot{\epsilon}\xi\iota s$). The world of sense exists by participation in the self-existent and separate Ideas. In the course of reflection, however, the notion of $\mu\epsilon\theta\dot{\epsilon}\xi\iota_s$ is developed in terms of resemblance, the participation consisting in this, that the transient sensuous thing is an imitation (μιμήσις) of the Idea. From this point of view the Ideas are regarded as eternal patterns or archetypes (παραδείγματα).

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The question immediately arises as to their mode of being. Plato is alive to the danger of asserting their complete self-containedness and their separation from the world of sense, while at the same time maintaining the dependence of the sensuous world upon the realm of Ideas. The general upshot of the discussion in the *Parmenides* seems to be that if the procedure of thought is valid, it is necessary to recognize Ideas as the permanent and pervasive elements of reality, and not as absolutely separate and self-contained. The conception is that of a unity which exists and manifests itself only in that multiplicity.

The general line of argument in the Sophist and the Timæus indicates also that Plato did not regard the Ideas in so transcendent a sense as to preclude participation in them on the part of sensible things. Sensible things are said to contain no definite and permanent characteristics of their own, but are to be regarded as appearances or reflections (φανταξόμενα), which presuppose Ideas as their ultimate ground. In the Timæus, where Plato essays a theory of the natural world, he comes to the problem with a clear-cut distinction between being (οὐσία) and becoming (γιγνόμενα). The former is conceived as the timeless self-identical realm of Ideas, apprehensible only by thought with the aid of reason. The latter consists of imitations or copies of the Ideas, continually changing, and apprehended by opinion with the aid of sensation. What, we may now ask, constituted, for Plato, the nature of empirical things? Starting from the elements which the earlier φυσικόι regarded as constituting the original substance of things, Plato argues that it cannot be said of fire, water, air, or earth that it is a "this" (τοῦτο), for it is in a state of continual flux and has no permanent being. It is only a "such-like" (τοιοῦτον). As such, the four elements cannot be the fundamental principles of things, but require a "this"—a relatively permanent element by which the Ideas find ingression, as Whitehead would say, in an actual entity. For this purpose Plato conceives the necessity of what he figuratively calls "a nurse of becoming." By a now famous illustration from plastic art he shows that during a continual process of remoulding, the question "What is this?" could be answered only in terms of the material used. The shapes and forms would, in the course of making and remaking, change while they were being defined. "Even so is the nature which receives into itself all corporeal things. It is always the same—never departing from its function which consists in receiving all things into itself. It never takes on any form at all like the altering things that enter into it. As plastic material, such as soft wax or molten gold, it remains unaltered, and it is only informed by the entering shapes, and, owing to them, appears different from time to time."1

1 (50 A).

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The altering shapes which pass in and out of the receptacle are none other than the transient semblances of the eternal archetypes. But what is "the nurse of becoming"? It is described as a receptacle (ὑποδοχή), and it is distinguished as the permanent in contrast with the transient εἰσιόντα καί ἐξιόντα. But Plato's conception is not, of course, that the $i\pi o\delta o\chi \dot{\eta}$ is something "into which" qualities come and "out of which" they go as water passes in and out of a reservoir. It is simply that wherein the γιγνόμενα emerge and vanish; and Plato's own simple designation of it is Space or Place. It has often been regarded otherwise. Because Plato expressly refers to it as a "this," as plastic material capable of being moulded into forms and of receiving patterns into itself, and so forth, it has been contended from of old that Plato meant a kind of stuff or material. But this view can be held only by pressing Plato's illustrations (meant to be mere εἰκότες λογοί) beyond the point of their relevance. Careful scrutiny of his argument shows that in the use of the term "this" (τοῦτο) he is merely contrasting the permanent with the changing, and in the figure of the "plastic material" he is simply referring to that "material" in its capacity for taking up what is new while itself

remaining unchanged.

So far, then, we have two principal modes of being, viz., the timeless Ideas and the changing γιγνόμενα, together with a third entity, Space or Place. We are now in a position to examine Plato's teleology. The central feature of the material world is its coming and going, and in its "becoming" or passingness it in some way represents that which eternally is. But now the world is not wholly rational. The copies are not identical with their originals. Participation is never complete. Moreover, chaos preceded cosmos; out of disorder the demiurge brings order. And the teleological activity which Plato conceives as ever guiding the γιγνόμενα to the best end is not the only kind of causality. There is an element of necessity (ἀνάγκη) in the world, subservient indeed to vovs, for otherwise disorder would be greater than order in the world, yet withal concomitant with νοῦς. This conception of ἀνάγκη has sometimes been set over against vous as an opposition of mechanical and teleological causality. But such, I think, was not Plato's real meaning if the term mechanical carries with it the notion of the inevitableness of the effect. But let us have Plato's own statement: "The generation of this universe was a mixed creation by a combination of ἀνάγκη and νοῦς. But whereas $vo\tilde{v}s$ governed $ava\gamma\kappa\eta$ by persuading $(\pi\epsilon i\theta\epsilon \hat{v})$ her to guide the greatest part of created things to the best end, on such conditions and principles, through ἀνάγκη overcome by reasonable persuasion, this universe was fashioned in the beginning. If, then, we would really declare its creation in the manner whereby it has come to be, we must add also the nature of the errant cause (πλανωμένης αἰτίας)

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and its moving power." Here, as A. E. Taylor says, the function of the ἀνάγκη is that of an indispensable under-workman of νοῦς in the production of a good world. And although not herself purposive, she is responsive to intelligent purpose, since we hear repeatedly of νοῦς "persuading" ἀνάγκη. Furthermore, ἀνάγκη, being an "errant cause," is by no means to be regarded as the equivalent of scientific necessity. It describes not the necessary but the contingent element. It is not to be conceived as blind mechanism, but as a form of causality which is subordinate to vovs. We must distinguish, Plato says (69 A), two kinds of causality, one $dva\gamma\kappa\alpha\hat{\imath}o\nu$ and the other $\theta\epsilon\hat{\imath}o\nu$, the "necessity exists for the sake of the divine" (or rational). He further adds that without the former kind of causality, the latter could not operate. That is to say, ἀνάγκη is conceived as a subordinate causality requisite for the attainment of higher effects. We meet the same contention in 46 D and E, where Plato, dealing with the physical and physiological processes involved in vision, dream-presentations. etc., says that "all these things are among the secondary causes (συναίτιαι) which God uses to serve him in achieving the best so far as is possible. 'Ανάγκη represents, then, neither rigid mechanism nor an element of randomness working on its own account in the universe. What Plato intends is that it is an element, which, if left to itself, would produce causal effects (τὸ τυχόν), a supposition which is rendered untenable by reason of the superior control of vovs, which "persuades" ἀνάγκη.

II

Turning now to Kant's treatment of the problem, we are impressed by certain striking affinities with Plato's doctrine. Kant, too, in so far as his inquiries were metaphysical, viewed as antithetical the realm of temporal phenomena and the mundus intelligibilis. In his earlier writings he uses a terminology closely akin to Plato's in describing (a) eternal essences or notions (idea pura) cognized in and through the usus realis of the intellect, these notions constituting a kind of pattern (Perfectio Noumenon) which serves as the common measure and intelligible ground of all realities; (b) the phenomena or things as they appear to sensuous cognition; and (c) the notion of universal absolute space as that which renders possible the existence of concrete things.

Furthermore, at the outset of his metaphysical investigations Kant recognized those features of contingency and purposiveness with which Plato was concerned. "The things of the world, which reveal themselves to our senses, show clear marks of contingency as well as of order and purposive arrangement." In the preface

² Beweisgrund.

¹ Von dem ersten Gründe des Unterschiedes der Gegenden im Raume.

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to the Allgemeine Naturgeschichte he declares that on the one hand "the general laws of nature are fruitful of their own consequences," and on the other, that matter, while determining itself by the mechanism of its own forces, "brings forth appropriate effects which appear to constitute the scheme of a Supreme Wisdom." He will not allow that the "natural procedure" by which matter is determined admits of any arbitrary interference. He is not prepared to admit that exiguum clinamen, by which Lucretius, after the manner of Epicurus, sought to leave a loophole for freedom in a mechanically determined world. The slight deviation of the atoms is explicable, he maintains, in the light of the Newtonian force of repulsion. But, like Plato, Kant argued that to suppose that chaos could develop its own order is to derive reason from the irrational. The element of order or "necessity" in matter presupposes the ultimate government of reason. "There is a God (or rational principle) just because nature, even in chaos, cannot proceed otherwise than regularly and according to order."

Kant here explicitly recognizes the two types of causality designated by Plato, νοῦς and ἀνάγκη respectively, but their express treatment was long delayed by the emergence in Kant's mind of the critical problem in its epistemological aspect, and the almost complete eclipse of the metaphysical issues. The manner in which the critical problem dawned in his mind predisposed him to devote himself primarily to the consideration of the phenomenon of connection from the side of the apprehending mind. The given presentations must be accepted for what they are, for we cannot go behind them to discover whether or not they are produced by concealed realities. They are brought into unity by the judgment, but judgment is not to be considered as a single process of bringing subject and predicate together, for the very problem of knowledge arises from the difficulty of justifying any assertion by linkage between subject and predicate. The ultimate principle of unity is the Synthetic Unity of Consciousness—a transcendental unity, i.e. a unity which must be posited if knowledge of objects is to be rendered explicable. It is the Unity of Consciousness that alone constitutes the relation of presentations to an object, and constitutes, therefore, their objective validity. It is not merely a condition that I myself require in knowing an object; it is a condition under which every intuition must stand in order to become an object for me (B 138). All objects of our knowledge are determined in and through one or more of the categories or ways in which the transcendental unity of apperception expresses itself in relation to the given material in space and time.

Now the problem of causality is, for Kant, a problem as to what is involved in the fact of succession. Objective succession involves a determination of the order of temporal contents in accordance with

a universal and necessary rule or law of causality. That is to say, objective succession is a sequence which is necessary and universal. and such sequence is rendered possible because phenomena follow one another in accordance with the law of causality. All changes take place according to a law of necessary connection, and no event is a possible object of knowledge for intelligence such as ours unless it be determined in time by reference to causal connection. Kant's doctrine of causality is thus an application to temporal sequence of the general doctrine that objectivity means no more than necessary conjunction of the manifold in intuition and consciousness of such necessary conjunction. He declared Hume to be right in his contention that in all cases of what we recognize as causal relation we ascribe necessity to the relation, but he disputed the adequacy of Hume's subjective explanation of such necessity. He pointed out that in order to explain the subjective feeling of necessity Hume assumes that very objective connection for which the subjective feeling of necessity is called into account. Kant challenged Hume's right to the assumption of a knowledge of objective sequence. Hume failed to ask the question, How is knowledge of sequence (subjective or objective) possible? Kant's own answer is that consciousness of objective succession presupposes the principle of causality, that principle being a transcendental principle without which knowledge is not possible.

In reference to the actual nature of the causal connection, Kant vacillates. From his more subjectivist point of view, according to which presentations are "states of the identical self," those presentations are devoid of causal efficiency. Causality, from this point of view, is in no sense dynamic; it is merely the thought of necessitated (as contrasted with actual necessitating) sequence. Causality in the dynamic sense can be looked for only in the noumenal sphere. The phenomenalist view, on the other hand, according to which the objects apprehended are regarded as having an existence independent of the apprehending mind (a view implied rather than definitely stated), is that the causal relation involves genuinely dynamical activities in the objects apprehended. But it is one of the difficulties of Kant's position that he never renounces one view in favour of the other. Even in the Third Analogy, where the law of thoroughgoing reciprocity among substances is laid down, the substances in question are, of course, only phenomenal, and the question is left open whether or not their Gemeinschaft involves actual dynamical interaction. When Kant approaches the question of the ontological implications of his transcendental theory, the influence of his earlier metaphysical notions is clearly to be seen. According to the Nova Dilucidatio, the commercium of finite substances is due to their being "maintained by the common principle of their existence, namely, by 464

the divine intellect." This is practically the view of the Dissertation. Here the mutuum commercium of the many substances is said to imply the concept of totality. But except to say that the concept of totality is one of the idea pura inherent in the intellect, Kant at this stage attempted no clear formulation of the problem of the relation of the unconditioned to the many finite substances. From the critical point of view the question of the ground of this commercium (an analogy of experience) is one that could not consistently be raised. But in the Dialectic, when the wide metaphysical problem comes to view, Kant recognizes that the apprehension of objective coexistence, involving as it does a Verstandesbegriff of reciprocal determination, likewise demands for its explanation the conception of a wider and more adequate ground of explanation. But as I have shown elsewhere, Kant's formalism here led him sadly astray. With complete disregard of the thoroughgoing changes which the whole of the subsequent development entailed, he conceives the problem in precisely the same terms as in the Nova Dilucidatio, and finds the desiderated ground of explanation in a logical notion of ens realissimum conceived almost after the manner of Wolff. The discussion of the Antimony of Pure Reason does little to elucidate the relation between the contingent phenomenal world and the intelligible world in which the conditioned is grounded. The significant feature for our present purpose is Kant's resort to the distinction between phenomenal and noumenal causality. He argues that while the category of causality holds good for all phenomena, so that things belonging to the world of sense are throughout contingent, yet the phenomenal series may in its entirety rest upon an unconditional being, though, in his view, such Unconditioned would be merely intelligible and not knowable.

This conclusion is taken up into the Critique of Practical Reason, where the doctrine of a twofold causality is extensively developed. The determined sequence of phenomenal events does not, Kant contends, preclude the possibility that it itself may be grounded in a supersensuous noumenal realm. Indeed, the difficulty of finding either a logical or (on the subjectivist view) a dynamical connection between causally connected phenomena made recourse to an intelligible ground in the noumenal realm natural. The search for such supersensuous ground is rendered all the more necessary by the facts involved in the consciousness of moral obligation. Moral obligation implies freedom, and freedom involves a causality other than phenomenal determination. Moral acts are subject to causation of some sort (for to think otherwise would be to import an irrational lawlessness into moral action); yet they are not determined by prior events (for that would abrogate freedom). The acts of the self, so far

^{*} Kant's Conception of God (Allen & Unwin, Ltd.), Chapter VI.

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as the self stands under the conditions of time, are governed by phenomenal necessity. But determination through phenomenal causation does not exclude determination by noumena as ground. The acts of the self as noumenal are determined noumenally. The former kind of causation is described by Kant as causation without reason. The latter (freedom) is "causation by reason"; it is "a mode of causality of living beings so far as they are rational." We have no clear statement of the precise relationship of the two types of causality, but Kant evidently meant that the events of the empirical self, standing as they do under the rule of necessary sequence, are in their totality grounded in the "intelligible character" in the noumenal realm.

III

The two kinds of causality, phenomenal causality of a "mechanical" type and noumenal freedom, the one involving temporal succession, the other grounded in a timeless realm, remained, so far as the treatment in the first two Critiques goes, radically sundered. Kant could not long rest in such a dualism, and a significant feature of his treatment of the problem in the Kritik der Urteilskraft is the recognition of a type of causation (in the living organism) which is neither mechanical nor externally purposive. The self-developing, self-regulating organism is an instance of an entity whose parts are not externally determined (either by mechanism or by design), but owe their unique character to a principle of inner purposiveness. The elucidation of what is implied in this principle of purposiveness brings to light some of Kant's ripest thought on the problem we are investigating. It is not, he maintains, a principle of knowledge, but a maxim of appreciating (Beurteilung). An object cannot be determined as purposive, but can only be judged to be such. The characteristic feature of the organism is that it exemplifies a material purposiveness of an inner kind—"material" because it must be judged as purposive in virtue of its existence, and "inner" because its existence has no other end or purpose than itself. Nature, we are obliged to conclude, has produced it not by mechanical causes, but by causes which are purposive in their operations. Thus in the growth of a tree (Kant's own example), in the production and maintenance of its parts, we are presented with a natural phenomenon which is both cause and effect of itself. Everything in nature has its cause, and its causation is either mechanical (i.e. entirely due to external factors) or purposive; either causa efficiens or causa finalis. Kant's way of interpreting purposive causality is through the notion of the relation of parts to whole. The cause is here determined through the idea of the effect, and this idea is the notion of the whole, each part being determined through that notion, and owing its possibility to 466

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its relation with that whole. Every single part is connected with all the other parts in the notion of the whole. They give rise to the whole reciprocally, and they therefore stand in reciprocal causality with one another; that is to say, they stand to one another in the relation of community (Gemeinschaft). Moreover, since each part exists not only by means of the others, but for the sake of the others, their relation is that of a purposive community (Zweckgemeinschaft). Further, because the several parts reciprocally produce one another, we must judge the phenomenon to be a self-organizing entity. The organism as a self-organizing entity must be judged, in accordance with the principle of inner purposiveness, to have arisen through ideal causes, for otherwise "we have no guiding thread for the observation of a species of natural things which we have thought teleologically under the concept of natural purposes."

But how are we to conceive these purposively operating forces? Kant is aware of the dangers looming on opposite sides. On the one hand, to conceive them as resident in matter is a hylozoism which is "the death of all natural philosophy." On the other hand, to set them outside matter would involve us in an equally fatal supernaturalism. Kant maintains that our only course is to restrict the teleological principle to our observation or interpretation of nature, while leaving the ultimate nature of the purposively operating forces an open question, and in this respect, he urges, we are in the same position as in the case of mechanical causality; for Kant never departs from his conviction that the ultimate character of the causal nexus eludes human comprehension. When the attempt is made to pass beyond the "reflective judgment," or Beurteilung, to the metaphysical question of the way in which bodies originate and are produced, we are involved, he maintains, in antinomy. All that we are entitled to affirm is that only the mechanical origin of material things is knowable. In affirming this, we do not affirm the actual mechanical origin of all bodies, nor the possibility of knowing all mechanical objects. It might well be the case that there are certain bodies the mechanical origin of which is unknowable, and this is the case with organisms. What the thesis does involve is that any mode of origin other than mechanical (for example, their production through final causes) is unknowable.

Kant's well-known distinction between the determining judgment and the reflective judgment, or between constitutive and regulative or heuristic principles, becomes somewhat strained at this point. Maintaining, as he did, that knowledge in the strict sense is confined to the material of sense as determined in and through the *a priori* categories of the understanding, he had radically separated the spheres of natural science and metaphysics respectively. Accordingly,

1 § 66; cp. §§ 70 and 72.

in regard to the notion of "natural purpose" he contends that that notion remains a stranger (Fremdlung) in natural science, and yet it is a notion which we are compelled to bring to bear upon our experience of organic phenomena. We must judge organic bodies to be purposively constructed. So far as natural science is concerned. 'physics, keeping within its own bounds, abstracts itself entirely from the question whether natural purposes are designed or undesigned, for that would be to meddle in an extraneous business, namely, metaphysics." The term design "expresses only a principle of the reflective, not the determining judgment, and so introduces no particular ground of causality, but simply adds for the use of reason a kind of investigation different from that according to mechanical laws, in order to supplement the inadequacy of the latter even for empirical research into all particular laws of nature." The principle is one which we are obliged to use in our investigation of the organized products of nature, and as such it is "an absolutely necessary maxim for the empirical use of reason." Moreover. "once such a guiding thread is admitted and verified, we must at least try the said maxim of judgment in nature as a whole," and since "we can form no conception of the possibility of such a whole save by thinking, in respect of it, a supreme cause working in accordance with design," we have no alternative but to adopt the principle of "designing causality" as a necessary principle for our reflective judgment. The same principle is "the highest formal unity of things"; it is the type of formal unity which things would be expected to exhibit if they sprang from the design of a supreme reason. It cannot be an object for the understanding, because it cannot be "given" to us in sensuous intuition. It is impossible to find any scheme in the intuition for such systematic unity. Our mode of apprehension is, according to Kant, to subsume intuitions under notions. We have no direct intellectual apprehension. Our notions without senseintuitions are empty. Accordingly, the only way in which our understanding can apprehend a whole is as a complex of parts. And if an understanding such as ours should be compelled to posit a whole as the producing principle of the parts, i.e. as preceding the parts, it could never be a real whole, but only an ideal whole, or an idea of the whole. When our understanding is compelled to posit an "ultimate teleological unity" as the ground of explanation of the particulars, such unity is therefore no more than analogous with a scheme of sensibility; it is "idea," and not an object of knowledge in the strict sense. Kant thinks that for an intuitive understanding the mechanical and teleological modes of explanation would doubtless fall together. He further declares that an understanding different from our own might form a representation of such a unity as is

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implied in the idea of a teleological whole without also making the idea a producing cause. That is to say, to view the systematic unity of nature as a teleological system does not necessarily involve that the idea of such a teleological unity is its producing cause.

Towards the end of his treatment of the problem Kant throws out his most mature suggestion, and it is substantially the same as Plato's. Supposing we regard empirical things as things in themselves. In that case the only unity which could serve as the basis of the possibility of natural formations would be the unity of space. But space is not a real ground of the generation of things, but only their formal condition. But if we may regard the phenomenal world as being grounded in a supersensible real (though for us unknowable) ground, then everything in the phenomenal realm would be judged or estimated in accordance with mechanical laws, "while Nature in its entirety as a system we should estimate in the light of teleological laws. Thus we should estimate nature by two kinds of principle. The mechanical mode of explanation would not be excluded by the teleological as if the two principles were contradictory" (§ 77). Furthermore, Kant is convinced that the two principles could not both enter consistently into one and the same survey of nature did they not cohere in some single higher principle—a view that comes very near Plato's conception of νοῦς persuading ἀνάγκη.

IV

Plato and Kant come, then, to very similar metaphysical views of the twofold nature of determination, the one a mechanical or quasi-mechanical mode, to which every empirical event is subject; the other not a determination of part by part, or event by event, but a determination of the parts by the whole. The distinction is a distinction between causality (in a narrow sense) and ultimate ground. The recognition of the relation indicated by the term ground and consequent is an expression of the demand for intelligibility with which we set out on the business of interpreting experience. It expresses our conviction that the multiplicity presented in experience is capable of reduction to a systematic unity. In it is implied the notion of a system of interconnected parts, each part being determined by its place within the whole. The consequent may be pressed backwards and outwards through other members of the system, but it is only fully appreciated when it is recognized as not simply a part but as a part related to and conditioned by the whole. So conceived the principle of ground and consequent is a principle of "reason in her most exalted mood," guiding her work of connecting all the items of experience into one intelligible whole.

The relation of cause and effect is a narrower relation. Its recogni-

tion, too, arises with the general demand for intelligibility and unity. What is the feature that differentiates it from the wider relation of ground and consequent? Kant's way of conceiving the relation of cause and effect involves the notion of an order in which one part is determined by reference to some other part—the notion of a connected system of interrelated parts, of which no one has any claim to existence on its own account, but exists solely as a member of the whole. It is true that Kant regarded temporal sequence as essential to both the causal relationship and the subject's consciousness of its own position in the phenomenal realm, and he was led into no little inconsistency thereby. It can scarcely be maintained that temporal sequence is the essential ingredient in causal connection, and it is obviously not in virtue of temporal relationship that events are connected as cause and effect. The differentiating feature may perhaps be said (following Lotze) to be that the relation of cause and effect expresses one form of the connectedness of things, namely, their connectedness as concrete existences. Lotze drew clear distinction between connectedness in our interpretation or representation of things and connectedness among things. The latter, the relation designated by the term cause and effect, implies reciprocal action on the part of related things. What we designate respectively the cause and the effect are not actually independent entities existing in isolation from each other. So to represent them would be to involve the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" and to render the fact of duration unintelligible. Nor is it possible to conceive of a predicate or quality separating itself from one subject A, and passing over to another B, for if on the one hand A and B are independent of each other, such "passing over" is impossible, and if on the other hand A and B are not absolutely independent, the "passing over" is unnecessary because their reciprocity implies (as Lotze argues) their common dependence upon an ultimate ground. The separation of cause and effect does not correspond with any actual separation in the realm of reality. Our apprehension, for its own convenience, discriminates certain qualitative differences and denominates them cause and effect, but for reflective thought it is impossible to discover any actual separation or break in what is fundamentally continuous. Cause and effect are phases of one unbroken whole of process.

I do not propose to follow Lotze's further contention that the ultimate whole must be defined as mind or spirit. That step, as Lotze takes it, seems to involve great difficulty. What these lines of consideration seem to me to indicate may be stated summarily after the following fashion. The systematic whole, which to our processes of discrimination and comparison appears in phases and parts, is the ultimate ground upon which all causal connection ultimately rests. The connections we discern among the parts, because of their

restricted and fragmentary character, cannot forthwith be taken to be final; their complete interpretation entails an ever-widening conception of the whole to which they belong. The "mechanism" and "necessity" which characterize the parts are left in mid-air, save as it is brought into relation with the whole, which is the rational basis of the interconnected parts. The causality of the parts is not the same as their ultimate ground, which is the whole; and although the nature of the whole is beyond our thought, since we, too, are parts within the universe, yet without a "limiting notion" of the whole as a rational system our interpretation of the parts will be vitiated by the fallacy of taking those things to be separate and distinct, which, in reality, are phases of one interconnected system of reality. And if the importation of purpose into natural science is the death of that branch of knowledge, so the importation of mechanism and necessity into the idea of the whole would probably be the death of metaphysics. In Plato's language, νοῦς persuades ἀνάγκη. In Kant's language, the phenomenal connections are grounded in an intelligible supersensuous realm. In the words of Lotze's Microcosmus, "we granted the authority of mechanism unreservedly in so far as concerns the examination of the relations between finite things and the origin and accomplishment of any reciprocal actions whatsoever, but we as decidedly denied its authority where it claimed acceptance as a final theory of things." Again, "We do not set up mechanism in opposition to the mind of the Infinite as an independent hostile power which it must needs subdue; on the contrary, we see in mechanism the means by which its ends are accomplished in the phenomenal world."

REALITY IN HISTORY

HILDA D. OAKELEY, M.A., D.LIT.

THE treatment of history by philosophers seems to have entered upon a new phase, as regards the questions both what kind of knowledge we are dealing with and what is the relation of the historic experience to reality. As Professor Guido de Ruggiero pointed out in the April number of the Journal, this interest in the problems of history has not received much recognition in English thought at present. It is the purpose of the argument of the present article to maintain that whilst there are two methods of approach to reality, the one through knowledge and speculative thought, the other through history and practical experience, a philosophical interpretation is necessary to the understanding of history, though philosophies of history as usually conceived are not possible. The dualism of experience to which reference is here made is not identical with the dualism with which Professor de Ruggiero is concerned. The contrast for him is between thinking as orientated towards the problems of natural science and as concentrated upon the problems of history. It appears to be a dualism within knowledge—the same categories are used by both science and history, but in different ways. The fact for history is "something thought, something brought within the universal relations of thought." This seems to imply a rationalistic view of history. There is, as Professor de Ruggiero argues, a way of looking at the universe sub specie historiæ which is equally valid with the conception of it through the categories of scientific thought. With this position I should entirely agree, but not that the two opposed forms of thought "must end in a final reunion." For there are two aspects of experience as history which appear to preclude the possibility of any type of rationalization which accords with the type required by natural science. The one is the infinite in the individuality of history, the other the creative nature of the historic advance. And this conditions the irreversibility of the time series.

Our experience, then, it is argued, is fundamentally an experience of beings who are both historic and contemplative—members, namely, of a process of change which is historic through the activity of persons, and of a world which we contemplate as object of knowledge, and which is timeless as required by the knowing mind.

¹ The present article was all but completed before I had seen Professor de Ruggiero's important article.

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That the two aspects are equally essential is revealed in the experience of value, since it arises in both and demands both for its interpretation. The transition between the temporal and the eternal seems indeed a condition essential to value. If, as M. Meyerson conceives, reason cannot be satisfied without an explanation which resolves all differences into identity, the task of the thinker is ever frustrated, by the irreducible element of the irrational. But he is also member of a historic process, and as such compelled to admit a reality which cannot be fully rationalized as a system of relations for the logical understanding. On the other hand, the tragedy of experience as history, its resistance to all attempts at complete ethical interpretation of its course, is relieved by the consciousness that we can at any moment of the changing process think the eternal and the perfect.

Now, when philosophy has directed itself to the explanation of human experience, as involved in a ceaseless flux, in which the multiplicity of things and variable inconstancy of events are incapable of resolution into the systematic forms demanded for rational knowledge, it has, at least in some of its greatest exponents, inclined to the interpretation of this experience as something, if not unreal, possessed at best of only a low degree of reality. Such interpretations, however, either ignore the essential reality belonging to the temporal process as experience of persons, or treat it together with every other aspect of the process as such, as a shadow, or distorted reflection of the timeless nature of existence. Thus in the orthodox Hegelianism of Bosanquet, finite beings or persons are not in the end real, whilst in the transformed Hegelianism of McTaggart, for whom reality consists in the experience of selves, their whole experience in time is involved in misperception. Yet a consideration of the results which speculative thought can reach in complete abstraction from the historic experience seems to show that either it can only present a system of intelligible forms and relations of propositions true for all possible worlds, or it must include principles which have their original source in experience in its fundamentally historic form. Except in the case of the mathematical and pure logical ideas, the forms even of Plato's ideal world depend on experience for the occasions of their discovery, and, in respect to certain of the types, the whole of their significance. The metaphysic of McTaggart, as he himself recognizes, does not rest on a priori principles alone, but admits characters introduced from experience, values which are first found in the life of persons.2 "Philosophy," observes Professor Whitehead, "always does violence to that immediate experience, which we express in our actions, our

² The Nature of Existence, vol. ii, bk. v, chap. xxxvi.

¹ Cf. Identité et Réalité, and De l'Explication dans les Sciences.

hopes, our purposes, and which we enjoy in spite of our lack of phrases for its verbal analysis." And his reference to the universal "interplay of the static vision and the dynamic history," as also the general tenor of his whole book (Process and Reality) in regard to the relation of the temporal and the eternal aspects of experience, show a more sustained effort than is found, perhaps, in any other modern work, to state the inseparability of these two modes. together with the irreducible distinctness of our experiences in respect of them.

The aspect of reality as historic experience, constituted by the activity of mind in finite beings, has then its own type of reality, or noumenal nature, which resists all attempts to translate it into a system of knowledge in which time and change as such do not count. History in this view must be idealistically conceived. This holds good whether we think of history in the usual significance of the term for the historian, or in a more universal and subjective sense, as meaning the experience of individuals in their relations with each other, and with the material of events, indifferent to value, qua unrelated to mind. For this experience is only history in so far as value and disvalue are found in it by the human agents. Otherwise stated, it becomes a process which is real for minds through the meaning they both bring and find in it. History involves a relation between events and persons; its actuality depends on the forms of good and evil which thus arise. It may be said that all individuals who act in the consciousness of freedom are taking part in the construction of history in this sense. The personalities whom we rightly regard as great are those whose lives are most constantly pervaded by the apprehension of meaning in the succession of events, so that no part of the process is indifferent to them, valueless. But this is because they are themselves creative of value. That spiritual quality, which they find in experience, it is the function of the real self or person to bring.

It does not follow that those epochs or concatenations of events which are regarded as historic in a great or special sense are always or usually those in which such personalities have been numerous, or recognized as dominating. The creative personality may be that of the historian. Whatever the meaning for humanity of the events of the Peloponnesian war, it is from the point of view of Thucydides that they have been informed with the greater part of that value which has made them a "possession for ever," an everlasting object of human memory. Also, as will be argued, our ignorance of the true historic process is too profound for any very sure insight into the dramatic moments, the real "turning-points" of history, and whether

2 Ibid., Part II, chap. vii, sect. v.

Process and Reality, Part II, chap. i, sect. v.

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they are discoverable in those fragments or "rags" (Dilthey's ex-

pression) of the past which have floated down to us.

An interpretation of history, to which that suggested in this article has some similarity, was expressed by Professor Radl of Prague at the International Congress of Philosophy, held at Oxford last September. The main contention of his paper, entitled "History without Evolution," was that "History and civilization, which is a product of history, cannot be reduced to nature." The concept of the "event" he treated as "fundamental in history—something done which cannot be undone, an island thrown up in the stream of eternal process and standing there fast, events and dates which are essential to them, but not to any theory of evolution-refer primarily to an idea, something which can be understood, but cannot be grasped by the sensuous organs." This seems essentially true, but it is further important to examine the nature of this fundamental historic fact, termed event. Another term is perhaps needed to express the primary historic object, that into which the active self has put the value which is personal and unique in him, and which the genius of the true historian finds again. "Event" hardly seems sufficiently to indicate the product of personality, it does not declare itself to be the thing of the person, its substance created by his act. The term "deed" might better fulfil this purpose. It is nearer than event to the agent, suggests more intimately his work. In the Greek drama or deed (δράμα), absorbing into itself the deep significance with which history and tragedy have informed it, the word seems to stand for the profoundest meaning of the deed, the irretrievability which has immediately upon action descended upon the free creative act.

The idea of value in the interpretation of history is used in various ways by different thinkers. Rickert (quoted by Professor Radl) signified by values what would be termed by certain others historical categories, "state, religion, science, morality, economy, war," etc. It is evident that very diverse historic ideas or forces are here brought together. It has already been suggested that originally, and prior to the interpretation of history by categories such as these, which should be distinguished as the objective view, the historic experience in which we find one great type of reality must be thought of as essentially subjective. It is therefore not directly communicable. Signor Croce's famous dictum that all history is contemporary is illuminating in connection with this position. There is a sense in which the history of which the historian writes seems truly conceived in this way. Leaving aside the vast region of the prehistoric, and the problem of its reconstruction by the

Theory and History of Historiography, Part I, sect. i, translated by Douglas Ainslie.

modern mind, even in relation to historic times, reflection shows the extraordinary fragmentariness of the data on the basis of which the historian weaves an artistic whole of events. For every well-conceived history is a work of art, even though it produce an over-powering impression of confusion and variety, lack of all discernible moral or rational meaning. This effect itself is art; the impression that there is no significance in a passage of life can only be for the mind whose nature it is to seek value everywhere.

We may think of recorded history as a theatre in which the historian presents personages who are unconsciously acting for posterity. But it is not in the green room behind the stage that they have attired themselves or learned their parts. It is posterity inspired by the historian that bestows upon these shadowy figures some substantiality, and hears them speak words appropriate to the plan of action assigned to them. At best the actors enact on the stage episodes in general brief, and even insignificant in relation to the real life they lived beyond these scenes. And the indefinitely

greater mass of humanity were never on the stage at all.

The historic reality cannot be expressed in the pages of the historian, the written records with their often obscure significance. We are given by the historian a great panorama, drama, or collection of dramas which have an interest different in quality from the dramatic, because we perceive these events as occurring in the same universe of temporal and spatial existence as that to which our present experience belongs. We attribute existence to the personages, they do not merely "subsist," to use the logical distinction. Yet in respect to the meaning of their thoughts, feelings, deeds, the question of truth as historic reality, and not merely as an intelligible system of events conceived through categories, the inner truth and not alone the coherence, depends upon the thought of the historian. This is in part determined by the indefinable changing factor we term the spirit of the age, in part by the whole of his own spiritual experience. He endeavours, as Croce says, to re-live past experience, but he cannot make this to be more than an experience of his own, unless we allow the possibility of a special historic sympathy and intuition, by means of which he can share the point of view of the persons with whom the narrative is concerned.

Now, from the standpoint of the reality of history in its source in the experience of subjects, individuality seems all in all and infinite. Historic interpretation would be immensely simplified if we could agree with Croce that we ought to leave alone "that infinite which grows bigger the moment we first touch it." He argues eloquently from the impossibility of knowing more than a fraction of the histories of the past, Greek and Roman civilizations for instance, and the uncertainty of the interpretation of even those fragments.

476

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Passing from great to little histories, what can be known even of any one individual? We must then, he insists, concentrate on that particular point which "constitutes living, active history, contemporary, and regard the lost and irrecoverable history as "the eternal

phantom of the thing in itself."1

We may endorse Croce's view that the endless detail is unknowable as detail, without accepting his interpretation of this fact. This infinite nature of historic experience is not unreality, a spectre to be exorcised if we would make history intelligible. Such a view ignores the truth that history is unintelligible except as proceeding from the creative activity of persons, and that it is in the nature of personality that this infinity lies. Croce, however, conceives of history as the development of the one spirit. The infinite of history would on this view be a phantom called up by the false assumption that history is a chronicle of the past, consisting of a multiplicity of experiences. Since the spirit is for him all reality, he cannot allow to history that reality by which it is surely constituted, the individual processes of finite minds. The doctrine of history as the work of the universal spirit, of which individuals are manifestations and instruments, seems-not less than Hegel's philosophy of history (the a priori method of which Croce condemns2)—to empty of significance the whole drama of humanity. His remarkable attempt to unite history and philosophy cannot escape the insuperable difficulty attending on an attempt to combine the philosophies of the one and of the many in the sphere of history. For neither is history made intelligible nor does knowledge attain unity and completeness, since "The work of the spirit is not finished, and never will be finished." A similar problem arises for the philosophy of Signor Gentile, which has affinities with that of Croce.3 The paradox which results, if the reality of the process and the categories of practice are retained, together with rejection or subordination of the reality of the many individuals, is even more evident in Gentile's system, because he conceives the one mind as "transcendental ego," and ascribes to it the ethical functions of the individuals whose reality is resolved into this.

In these philosophies of the Italian Idealists we have then impressive, but as it seems necessarily unsuccessful, attempts to combine the concept of the spiritual process as the reality of history with the inherently distinct concept of universal mind. The truth, on the other hand, which is brilliantly revealed in these types of historic idealism is that the primary and essential reality of history is

Op. cit., Part I, sect. iii.

3 Theory of Mind as Pure Act, translated by H. Wildon Carr.

² What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel, Part V, translated by Douglas Ainslie.

almost, if not wholly, incapable of presentation as object of knowledge in the historian's narrative. The ground for this may be found in the nature of historic experience, as consisting in the creative activity of selves. For since the self is always subject, there is no direct knowledge of that which proceeds from its inner life, the substance of its deeds. (In Croce's view, the reason is differently conceived, since it is not in the finite individuals as such, but in that which is universal in them that lies the source of history.) As regards the self that we conceive ourselves to know as object. we do not know this-even our own ego-by "acquaintance" but by construction. Space does not permit of a statement of the grounds for rejecting the view defended in recent metaphysics by J. E. McTaggart¹ that we do know in present imperfect experience or appearance one self, our own, by acquaintance, and in reality we have direct knowledge also of other selves. In the case, indeed, of self-knowledge there does exist a unique intimacy between subject and object, due to the fact that the object constructed is primarily a projection of the subject, elaborated and intellectualized, unconsciously and consciously, by constant reflection on the generalizations we make concerning the other selves also constructed. An analysis of the nature of autobiography would be found to support this interpretation of self-knowledge. It could be shown that the autobiographer is actually working from two points of view unconsciously combined. From the one he is treating his theme mainly as an object which he is peculiarly well fitted to know. From the other, the subject is universally present as fount and origin of that which constitutes the object. He is the source and very activity of the events or deeds both now as he thinks them and then as he acted them, and as having endowed with value truly or falsely the data of the natural process. He is the "I think," but also and originally the I make.

As regards other selves, a fortiori they are not known as subjects, except in so far as we allow the possibility of that understanding through historic genius, which would resemble æsthetic intuition. To this would correspond that knowledge of our fellow-beings which is possible for all through love. Since then even the selves of present experience with these rare exceptions cannot be in their reality directly known, how should such a knowledge—even without taking account of the fragmentariness of the records—be handed on in purity through the reinterpretations of successive generations and historians to a later age?

There is, however, a secondary form or type of truth which can be attributed to written history, and to the achievement of which it appears to have a claim similar in kind—though the standard is

¹ The Nature of Existence, vol. ii, bk. v, chap. xxxvi.

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more difficult to reach in history—to the claim of the natural sciences to truth in their systems of laws, their correlations of data, and the ascription of reality to that which can be measured. Quantitative measurement, indeed, is not appropriate to history, and the human sciences in which it is applied are subject to the most abstract of the historical categories. But as the universal is the object of science, and the discursive method traces the interrelations of objects, the inner nature of which it cannot lay bare. so may history proceed in its treatment of the more general characters of human events, and arrangement of a mass of data under some one principle or category. The categorial treatment of history, though not always recognized as such, has appeared both to historians and philosophers to be its justification as a great department of knowledge. In the philosophical interpretations this does not, any more than in that of historians, necessarily involve denial of the ultimate reality of time, and the treatment of special forms of the process as reducible to logical forms, though such denial and reductions may seem to be the goal to which they point.

We may regard primarily as categorical all those methods in which history is treated as the theatre in which laws, principles, movements are manifested, the rise and fall of empires, nations, constitutions, the evolution of guilds, trade unions, and so forth. At their lowest degree of truth such explanatory categories are comparable to the slogans of political life, in their abstraction of some one facet of truth, where truth has innumerable facets, i.e. in so far as they treat this abstraction as though it corresponded to the whole actuality of the individuals from whose activities the history proceeds. At their highest they are near to the direct expression of these subject selves. The personages themselves, however, of categorical history are in a manner types, laws, categories in relation to the other persons in the background. For the narrative suggests that the meaning of an age or the rise or fall of a nation is summed up in them, their lives overshadow or interpenetrate the rest which appear as minor accompaniments, so to speak, to a symphony played by those personages, and have little other significance; their unique points of view and experience are lost.

In Gibbons's Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire a vast mass of the fragmentary materials that have reached us, from the records of a considerable period of history, is surveyed under the concept drawn from a striking impression of the essence of the process. The category seems to provide the structure of a complete picture. However fractional in relation to the real experience of the human beings of those centuries, the history seems completely to fill the concept, the Roman Empire in its decay stands before us. The category has, in fact, enclosed within clear-cut limits something which in its nature is infinite. Or, rather, in attempting this it has allowed the limitless reality to escape, and what is presented to us is a great work of art, which possesses also a secondary truth. But the human experience has vanished except in so far as it may be brought on to the stage, as contributory to the illustration of the idea. On a still more majestic scale this is the method of Hegel's philosophy of history, though here the idea completely dominates, and the empirical element is much less in proportion. The weakness of philosophies of history in general results from their treatment as their basis, of those categories which form the structure of the type of history which has a secondary truth as object of knowledge.

The search for one most universal category, the motive of which lies in our striving as knowers for a single uniting principle, seems incapable of termination in a valid historic concept. This was recognized by Wilhelm Dilthey, who appears to be regarded in Germany as the greatest historian in the sphere of history of the mind since Hegel. Reality as it is he finds "in the inner experience of given spiritual facts," whilst "nature presents herself to us as a mere shadow, cast by a reality hidden from us," and "The elements of the historical world are individuals." He regards philosophy of history in Germany, and sociology in England and France (meaning sociology as conceived by Comte), as sciences which claim to be a knowledge of the whole of the historic actuality on the basis of the study of individuals in all their relationships. The error in both lies in the presentation of the singular and individual as mere raw material for the abstractions on which these sciences are based. The task of finding "a final simple word" corresponding to the true meaning of history seems to Dilthey meaningless, for it would involve the resolution of an immeasurably complex whole into its elements. From the standpoint of this article his view is undeniably just. The idea of a philosophy of history in the sense in which he rejects its possibility is invalid, for it signifies the application of the concept of the world as knowledge, pointing to the ideal of the non-temporal unity, to the aspect of the world as the process of creative personalities in time. In the domain of history as experiences of persons we cannot look for an ultimate unity, in the meaning that the whole process manifests the operation of a single idea. The only universal principle that is conceivable in this sphere would be found in the nature of personalities, since these are the sources of history.

From this point of view the meaning of history consists in the fact that it is a necessary condition for the creation and experience of value, or its manifestation in living beings. Thus that which, apart from the experience of value, is a process of nature becomes

¹ Gesammelte Schriften, I Band, p. 86.

Digitized by Arya Samai Foundation Chennai and eGangotri $R \stackrel{.}{E} A L I \stackrel{.}{I} \stackrel{.}{Y} \stackrel{.}{I} \stackrel{.}{N} H \stackrel{.}{I} \stackrel{.}{S} \stackrel{.}{T} O \stackrel{.}{R} \stackrel{.}{Y}$

history. Out of the values which emerge in the course of history there arise those that we think of as having an absolute character. For in spite of the seeming relativity of forms of value to changing purposes and historic situations, it is the demand of the individual in the transience of his experience for the absolute and eternal which is the source of his striving for value. Without this he is nothing-no self but a thing of nature. Therefore, since we are capable of the experience of knowledge we transfer our values to a timeless world, and find there reflected the experience attending on every moment of insight into the higher values, namely, that there is in it something that transcends change. If instead of history, in its characteristic form, we could possess genuine biographies of all those individuals, fragments or fleeting impressions of whose lives enter into the generalized accounts or large-scale narratives of some social or national episode, we should understand the passage from the essential experiences of their lives to the ideas of the great values, we should perceive how love, beauty, truth, become from subjective and inter-subjective experiences objective ideals of humanity. This indeed we do perceive in unwritten biographies, in ordinary lives at those moments when either some crisis or a slight seeming incident enables us to see the whole life from a certain point of view as it is seen by the true biographer.

The categories, on the other hand, belonging to history in the usual sense of written lastory, with its secondary form of truth, arise mainly from the attempt to treat history as object of scientific knowledge. The most important of them, however, are not without a basis in original experience. Thus when the history of a nation is written, the idea of nation is used as a category, since this history cannot include the real experience of all the selves referred to as constituting the nation. But the object we think of as nation is nearer to the reality of the individuals than the object we term, for instance, economic organization of society. The construction of the object is in one respect due to the need of the mind in making history intelligible. But the fact is already there before we think of it as nation, if only in inchoate form. It has arisen in the process in which the individuals demand some value in the events and doings to which they are first driven by life-needs, and which involve

many complex forms of interrelation through co-operation.

A brief reference must be made—though the subject cannot be fully discussed in this article—to the bearing of this view of the reality of the historic experience upon the ethical value, the primary value of experience as history. Ethical theory appears to have suffered on account of the abstraction of its study from that of history, which has on the whole led to an over-simplification. The incomplete recognition of the real distinction between the two

aspects of experience, experience of the world as object of knowledge or intelligible system and as historic process, has led to an over-rationalistic concept of the ethical facts and principles. Abstracted from history, they are viewed under the form or category of some ideal system, analogous in the world of practice to the scientific system for knowledge. Such is Aristotle's concept of the pursuit of ends which again become means to further ends until the pursuit rests in the attainment of the highest end or chief good. From the standpoint of actual life, we may ask why must the movement rest in achievement? This is not true to the nature of human striving. But Aristotle cannot admit the notion of a pursuit which goes on without limit. It is inadmissible on logical grounds. In the history of finite minds, however, the law seems to be an unending striving towards a goal which ever recedes, an end which is never contemplated with the tranquil acceptance of the intelligible object of knowledge. This seems to be the principle of human nature, not discoverable, perhaps, in psychological analysis, nor by means of such types of ethical inquiry as probe the question whether the moral faculty is a kind of sense, or rational intuition, or reflective generalization, but exemplified throughout history, biography, and practical life. Without the postulate that there is in man's nature some principle or force which drives him to transcend his limits, human history in its greatness and littleness is unintelligible.

But the operations of this principle cannot be fully rationalized. A remarkable illustration is seen in Kant, the moral philosopher who has most profoundly stated the belief that reality is to be found in the practical life. It is in the consciousness of duty, the "ought," that he finds the fact whose certainty is so great that all the postulates required to justify it, God, freedom, immortality, must be admitted. But he can give no account of this reality, excepting by transferring it to the intelligible or transcendent realm, and thus creating for himself the insoluble problem of the relation of a timeless being to the temporal world in which all his actions take place. It is difficult, indeed, to understand how, endowed as he was with so intense a consciousness of the fundamental moral facts, Kant failed to perceive that ethics is inseparable from the condition of the irreversibility of the temporal order which cannot be represented in the intelligible world. It must also be admitted that Kant's lofty conception of the moral idea as the fulfilment of a law self-imposed does not fully satisfy the moral demand for creative morality, a pioneering advance towards further moralization of the historic process. Many other ethical systems seem to be weakened by too static or insufficiently dynamic a conception of their principles, and this is explicable as due to the undue influence of the unhistoric method.

The static standpoint in ethics is illustrated in some of the con-

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siderations of the problems of right and good, which have been much debated in recent ethical discussions. Professor W. D. Ross argues that an act may be right which is not morally good, because its rightness is to be judged in abstraction from its motive. Also it is not right unless the precise duty it is to perform is in fact fulfilled, however perfect the performance of his part by the agent. Frustration by unforeseen circumstances, over which the agent had no control, takes away its rightness. Such circumstances might be the breakdown of a train, the carelessness of a postman. This suggests the question whether there can be an absolutely right act, good under all circumstances. If we substitute for the post and transport facilities the general environmental conditions of the particular age, its machinery for practice, social intercommunication, etc., it results that the act which is right in one age and society is not right, because not possible, in another. No doubt it may be said that such conditions are external to the rightness of the act simply or universally considered, but they become in one form or another, according to the de facto instruments for performance, internal to the rightness of some one act. Such qualifications, however, open the door to a relativity which may affect the ethical content of the act so long as the separation between the right and the morally good is maintained. What is completely right in one situation is not so in another. In this example is revealed the difficulty of dealing adequately with the problem of moral conduct as a whole, if the rightness of particular acts is investigated apart from the question of the moral quality of the motive. Looking at the action as a whole, the act will be ethically right if it proceeds from the essential quality of the self rightly adjusted to reality.

How would the greatest moral problems of life be met on the principles of Professor Ross's method? It seems that any act in connection with these can only be judged in relation to the whole nature of the agent, conditioning the contribution he can make to the value of existence. Will it be better, for instance, to follow the impulse to play a missionary, reforming rôle in some direction in which there is scope, or to fulfil all the usual duties of the normal life if these alternatives are mutually exclusive? Not merely the understanding of himself and his social relations is required for an answer, but the sense of history and perception of what has been done for mankind by the men of "Leistung," who have a sense of a dedicated life.2 Are their attempts worthless if they have failed? Or is there a value, and even one of the highest, in the fact that such men have shown what man can attempt, or widened the limits of human endeavour? A study of ethics, in closer relation with history,

¹ The Right and the Good.

² So characterized by Max Dessoir in his Æsthetik.

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it is argued, would support the view that moral value proceeds from the principle of personality. In the severance of the subject from history a certain aridity seems to attach to many of the ethical discussions of the present as of earlier times, and a somewhat negative attitude as to the possibility of moral progress.



THE CONSTANT AND THE CONTINGENT IN HUMAN THOUGHT AND LIFE

A. E. GARVIE, M.A., D.D.

I. THE business of philosophy is "to think things together," so far as the reality of things and the capacity of thought allow. That reality presents many contrasts, physical, ethical, metaphysical, light and darkness, life and death, good and evil, right and wrong, the One and the many, the Infinite and the finite, the Eternal and the temporal, and what we mention as last, but not least, for our immediate purpose, Being and Becoming, the Constant and the Contingent. The contrasts need not be regarded as contradictions, negations one of another, as thought the Eleatics with their emphasis on Being, or the Heraclitics with their preference for Becoming. To our immediate scrutiny all stands and all flows may be irreconcilable oppositions; but Einstein is teaching us that there is relativity in all our interpretations of reality. We need not with Indian thought declare Brahma alone real, and all else Maya, illusion.

When we come to examine human thought and life we are confronted with the constant and the contingent; there is human nature, there are human experience and character. There is a constancy in the capacity of the human mind, there is a contingency in its contents. It is not wisdom with the realist to consider only phenomena, nor with the idealist to ignore them; for the constant is expressing itself in and is affected by the contingent. It seems worth while to

follow out this relation in details.

2. When Comte formulated his law of three states or stages, the theological, the metaphysical, and the positive or scientific, he fell into this error of phenomenalism, and failed to recognize that these are not contingent phases, but constant factors of human thought and life. When under the influence of Clothilde de Vaux, he added in his own judgment of himself the rôle of Paul to that of Aristotle, and placed his Positive Polity alongside of his Positive Philosophy, he did recognize that there was more in heaven and earth than he had at first dreamed of in his philosophy. When further, to get his social ideal going, he invented his Religion of Humanity, he recognized in the contingent theological phase a constant factor of human thought and life. Just as it is now generally accepted that the positive or scientific explanation does not exhaust the significance, and still less appraises the value of total reality, but that philosophy is necessary as a complementary interpretation, so do many thinkers still hold

that the final illumination can come only from theology as rendering explicit the implicit intellectual content of religion as faith in God. Even Herbert Spencer, on the basis of science, tried to formulate a synthetic philosophy; he could not ignore religion, but he tried to rid himself of any interference from theology with his philosophy of the Known, by relegating religion to the vaster but less substantial and satisfying region of the Unknowable. So deep rooted, so firmly fixed, so widely spread is religion in the constancy of human nature, that in recent years there have been several attempts at religion without God, religion without revelation, religion in which man enthrones himself as self-sufficing and self-satisfying, as all the god he can or need know.

3. While, to write frankly, the main motive of this essay is to claim for religion a place in human thought and life as a constant factor, and not a contingent phase only, the general purpose is wider, a quite untechnical examination of the constant factors, and their relation to the contingent phases, in human evolution. There are two caveats which at the outset may be offered. I do not accept either the biological assumption that man is to be explained mainly by his animal ancestry or the anthropological assumption that the savage of to-day shows us what primitive man once was. I have dealt with the conception of man, to which I have been led by reflexion and study in both of my recent books, The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead and The Christian Ideal or Human Society, so that I need not here discuss the matter in detail. On both these points I am glad to find myself in substantial agreement with so eminent a man of science as Dr. J. Arthur Thomson, who assigns to instinct a far more restricted function in human life than does Dr. McDougall, and who refuses to regard the primitive state as being as low as that of some savages. Only this need now be said. It seems to me we should use the word instinct only when there is a direct and constant sequence of impression, affect, and expression without any deliberation or decision. Man has inherited animal appetites, passions, impulses; but his treatment of them, as in sex and parenthood, is so varied, and so different from that of the lower animals, and the result in his experience and character so far removed, that it can cause only confusion to apply the same term to his conduct as to animal reactions, even when some intelligence and some volition therein may be conceded. What man has become in culture, civilization, character, society, institutions, morals, and religion is so far removed from what the lower animals have remained, that it is unreasonable so to magnify the significance of the raw material which appears common to man and other animals as to depreciate the value of the finished article which is so entirely different. Without denying the descent of man from an animal ancestry, the ascent of 486

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man to human personality and all its discoveries and achievements has been such that we are justified in believing that in the evolution there emerged (to use the current term) something original and unique as man's natural endowment, so that the savage is a degenerate and the civilized a developed primitive man.

4. That there has been development goes without saying. Very lowly, crude, and rude were the beginnings, as far as we can trace them, of all man's capacities and relations. There was a childhood of the race, but how far we have travelled on the road to maturity only he could tell who saw both end and beginning of human history. Because the working of man's mind in some peoples is so different from ours does not justify Lévy Brühl's assumption of a different mentality; for a sympathetic reflexion can rethink these thoughts, and see a "method in their madness" as it may appear to a censorious critic. We cannot highly regard the man who ridicules the ways of the child; and even so, it is a mistake and wrong to try and discredit the constant factor in religion because the contingent phase in the less developed faiths have now been superseded.

(a) An illustration may here be given. Leuba distinguishes three types of behaviour, the mechanical behaviour, the coercitive behaviour or Magic, the anthropopathic behaviour, which includes religion. He adds: "If science is to be provided with an ancestor, and only with one, it should be this first type of behaviour rather than Magic." He desires to preserve the credit of science, and to discredit religion as well as Magic. What is common to all three must not, however, be ignored; man recognized power or powers in nature, for his own good he desired to gain control of them. In regard to some phenomena, he discovered that he could have direct control; others, the unfamiliar, unusual, unexpected, he sought to control by formulæ or rites in the case of magic, by prayer to spirits or gods in religion. As his knowledge extended, much that had led to coercitive behaviour passed over to mechanical behaviour. What did not so pass, as beyond the natural order, might go over to religion, as concerned with what lies beyond nature. Magic was thus an intermediate sphere between science and religion, when their provinces were not yet defined. With science magic has in common the belief that there are causal relations, and that man can control these. With religion it had in common that it did not regard the mechanical behaviour as adequate to meet all human needs. It pointed to something beyond human knowledge, but as yet not beyond control; in religion that is recognized which is beyond human control. There is something in religion which has survived magic, because it is a constant factor, whereas magic was a contingent phase.

(b) Religion is not a knowledge of with a view to control over

¹ The Psychological Origin and the Nature of Religion, p. 12.

natural phenomena; it has been profoundly mistaken when here it has set up as a rival to science. It is a recognition, coming down from earliest times, of a reality beyond and above natural phenomena; and its lowly beginnings, no more than those of science, discredit the subsequent development. Of religion, as of science, the just judgment is not how it began, but what has it become. Yet it is the almost invariable practice of scientist or philosophers opposed to religion to identify its nature with its beginnings, or its rudest and crudest forms, in the present day. The path of science is strewed with discarded hypotheses; at the present moment science is busy, as such a book as Eddington's The Nature of the Physical World, or Jeans', The Universe Around Us, shows, with revising its fundamental conceptions; but who would think of discrediting science because Einstein has compelled a reconsideration of Newtonian physics? And philosophy, too, has gone down side-tracks and been brought to a cul de sac, as was Locke's theory of knowledge in Hume's scepticism; it has got again on the main road of advance in Kant. But who would bar its onward march? It is to theology alone that some thinkers would never allow a place of repentance for the sins

of its youth.

5. What, then, are the constant factors, often most inadequately expressed in their contingent phases, of human thought and life? For our present purpose we may begin with the three generally recognized ideals, Truth, Beauty, Holiness, or Goodness; but we must add, if we are to recognize the facts of human history, utility at one end (the lower) and religion at the other end (the higher). (a) As is well known, Croce has placed economics beside ethics as activities of the practical reason, and I think him right. While there cannot be the same uniformity in the supply of bodily needs as in the pursuit of any of the ideals, yet human thought has rightly in recent years concerned itself about human welfare in the widest sense, and the corporate as well as individual obligations it imposes. And this constant factor should have a place in study and reflexion proportionate to its practical importance. (b) As regards the ideal of truth it seems to me we ought, as has already been suggested, to recognize as complementary the explanation of science and the interpretation of philosophy; but no defence of such a contention should be necessary in these pages devoted to philosophical studies. One thing I must add, a great deal of philosophy seems to me to be too intellectualist, basing metaphysics too exclusively on science, and not recognizing adequately the approaches to reality in morality and religion. A philosopher who aims at a complete interpretation of reality has no right to ignore these data, so great has been the part they have played in the thought and life of man. If he does not allow them to influence his conclusions, he is bound at least to show adequate

reasons for the course he is taking. (c) As regards morality, I maintain that it must be accepted as a distinctive, original datum of human personality. There is a categorical imperative, only gradually disclosed, and in its application conditioned by the actual and the desirable. I cannot agree either with the positivist, who treats moral customs, standards, institutions, as only facts, inevitable products of a process of social evolution, or the utilitarian, that the obligatory is to be identified with the desirable as desired by man. There is no space now to justify this conviction. (d) The standards of Beauty are less variable than those of utility, but also less rigid than those of morality. But I am not prepared to subscribe to the judgment, De gustibus non disputandum. Is there not a constant factor as well as contingent phases of man's appreciation of Beauty, whether in Nature or in Art? Beauty is a constant feature in Nature, although the recognition of that beauty is not a constant feature of human culture. Art schools come and go, and it is the manner of the devotees of these schools to show their exclusive piety towards the fashions of the hour by arrogant disrespect to the fashions of a previous age. Nevertheless, there are masterpieces of Art that hold their unshaken

sway over the æsthetic sense of many generations.

6. What development there is in any of these responses of the human spirit to the world around, which provides the environment which evokes them, is accepted not as a condemnation of the earlier by the later phases, but as a necessary and desirable advance from age to age. Why should religion then be made an exception, and the convictions of the modern Christian, who has no quarrel with the progress in any sphere of human activity, but has learned to take account sincerely and candidly of all in the thought of to-day which demands a restatement, be discredited as on the same level of intelligence as the savage, haunted by the fear of demons and ghosts? Religion, as a recognition of reality beyond and above nature and man, goes back to the very beginnings of human history; it is found among all races and in all ages. Individuals may feel no need of it, and hail their emancipation from it; but it has had so general and permanent a function in human society that it has an equal claim with these other facts of man's evolution. It has also the same right as these to adopt its expressions in creed and code, ritual and polity to the total conditions of thought and life in any place at any time. It is true that the exponents of religion, and even of the Christian religion, have been only too prone to identify its permanent content as a relation of man amid the temporal to the eternal with its transitory forms, and in an ignorant and unintelligent conservatism to oppose these transitory forms to the inevitable changes, intellectual, moral, social. The critics of religion are not justified, however, in seizing hold on these exponents as typical, and disregarding those who have

recognized the duty of harmonizing religion with other human

7. The conclusions with which I desire to end this article are: (I) that religion, no less than science, philosophy, art, morality, as spontaneous responses of the mind of man to his environment, is a constant factor in human development; (2) that as in these other factors the contingent phases, partial and defective as they are, should not be used to discredit its enduring value; (3) that as there is a common human nature and one world as its environment, these factors are not in any necessary antagonism to one another, and that, where their phases are opposed to one another, a deeper scrutiny can disclose a reconciliation. Religion is not a substitute for, or rival of science, philosophy, or any other aspect of human activity. It relates man to what is above and beyond the world, with which these other activities are concerned, and even man himself, although the reality with which it is concerned is one that man can believe to be akin to what he knows to be highest in himself and even within all in which his reach of aspiration exceeds his grasp of achievement. As religion in its development anthropomorphises that reality, it recognizes no less its transcendence of than its immanence in the human. In a previous article in this Journal I tried to show that religion needs God, an object of faith, worship, devotion, in which man sees in infinite and eternal reality his ideals of truth, beauty, holiness; and if it rises to the level of Christian faith, so intimate a communion of God with man, and man with God, that it can add the ideal of love, perfect personality in God communicating itself to and finding its satisfaction in imperfect and yet progressive personality in man. Such a belief, while it must needs be a personal faith, may become a completion of all the other factors of human development. Accepting frankly and fully the conclusions of science, not necessarily of men of science, who have strayed into philosophy, it may give a personal meaning to the energy, all pervasive, to which physics is leading; it challenges no account of evolution as emergent, when it prefers to use the noun Creator for the adjective creative, as the power which can alone account for the process. No moral ideal is narrowed or lowered, when moral perfection is conceived as eternally real. What for the soul, hungering and thirsting for God, is the supreme value, is also the conservation of all other values. Man thus can be not an exile, but at home in the Universe, because akin to its Source and Goal above and beyond itself and him.

PHILOSOPHICAL SURVEY

PHILOSOPHY IN ITALY

GENTILE has published a book whose title promises much more than it actually fulfills. It entices the reader with the promise of a history of Italian philosophy, which it then limits by a sub-title in smaller type to the period from Genovesi to Galluppi. Even with this restriction the promise is not carried out in the text, which resolves itself into a collection of critical and erudite researches on Neapolitan philosophers of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. These researches had already been published by Gentile, about thirty years ago, under the more modest and appropriate title From Genovesi to Galluppi, Historical Researches (Bari, 1903). In the preface to the new edition he justifies the change of title in a strange enough manner, saying he was led to do it partly because he was "encouraged by the success of the first edition," partly because, outside the Kingdom of Naples, "the other regions in Italy during the century that divides Vico and Rosmini had no thinkers of sufficient vigour to be considered as carrying on the historical evolution of speculative thought." This is an extremely rash and arbitrary affirmation. In the period studied by Gentile, Northern Italy had thinkers such as Beccaria, Romagnosi, Verri, of far greater importance, and who have at any rate made a far more widespread impression on culture than have such thinkers as Melchiorre Delfico or Pasquale Borrelli, to whom Gentile devotes almost the whole of the first volume of his researches. The work does not carry out its undertaking even within the limits of a history of Southern thought, for it has crossed with one bound the whole of the Neapolitan encyclopædic movement, which had famous representatives such as Filangieri, Pagano, Galante, etc. To claim to give a history of the philosophy of the eighteenth century, and to omit illuminism, the acme of the period, is a somewhat strange pretension.

But leaving aside the unfulfilled promises, let us pass on to examine what the book actually does give us. As I have pointed out, it is composed of erudite researches, held together by the more or less extrinsic bonds of space and time, without the slightest attempt to reconstruct the intimate genesis of the Southern mind, after the style of Croce, for example, in his History of the Kingdom of Naples. Each author stands by himself, and since they are almost all of minor importance (except Galluppi and Colecchi) the interest of the book very often flags; the more so that Gentile with scholastic pedantry expounds their thought and imparts to each one a lesson in philosophy, discussing their mistakes like a conscientious pedagogue with his advanced pupils. It is an antiquated method of writing the history of philosophy, used and abused by Gentile in all his works. It has some pedagogic usefulness for those who are beginning the study of philosophy, but for those who are interested in the history of the human mind it has the serious defect of overlooking the intrinsic reasons for the separate orientations of thought and their relations with the feelings and exigencies of the time, and of centring all the attention on a monotonous dynastic succession of systems, succeeding

¹ GIOVANNI GENTILE, Storia della filosofia italiana (dal Genovesi al Galluppi). Milano, Treves, 1930, 2ª ediz., 2 vol. pp. xv, 272, 270.

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one another without pause, the last one being-for Gentile, Hegelian as he is—at once the measure of the value of the preceding ones and the temporary

goal of the historical future.

Gentile's researches begin with Antonio Genovesi, better known as an economist than as a philosopher—and with good reason, for as an economist he founded in the Kingdom of Naples a branch of study, much neglected there but flourishing in the rest of Europe during the eighteenth century. If the economic doctrines of Genovesi were not very original, at least they helped to diffuse throughout Southern Italy the ideas of the French Physiocratic School, only with such modifications as the particular conditions of Neapolitan economics suggested, altering certain aspects of the Physiocratic teaching which were too radical. From Genovesi a large army of economists derived their spiritual origin, economists who illustrated with the spirit of realism, open to exigencies of reform amd renovation, the conditions of agriculture, commerce, and industry in the Kingdom of Naples. This side of Genovesi's work is not touched by Gentile, who confines himself instead to the more technically philosophical side, which incidentally is the side of secondary importance. In philosophy Genovesi was a disciple of Locke, and even here his own teaching left some trace. Empiricism and sensism were to some extent the official trends of Neapolitan thought during the second half of the eighteenth century and the beginning of the nineteenth, until the eclecticism of Cousin introduced, with the new spiritualistic fashion, some hint of German philosophy. Writers such as Delfico, Borrelli, Bozzelli, to whom Gentile devotes chapter after chapter of extenuating prolixity, have no other importance beyond that of being a mouthpiece of foreign doctrines: an importance which, at the same time, must not be neglected, because at that period Italy was trying to insert herself in the great currents of European thought from which the Counter-reformation had cut her off; trying thus to regain possession of the original motives of the Renaissance, which, immaturely suppressed in Italy, had for the last two centuries been largely nourished by European thought.

The first fruits of this long and obscure labour of initiation matured in the first half of the nineteenth century with the philosophical work of Pasquale Galluppi (1770-1846), where, although traces of an incomplete assimilation are still easily recognizable, one can discern an effort towards fresh personal elaboration. Galluppi held himself to be a professed empiricist and firm adversary of the philosophy of Kant; and taking him literally, we must have considered him an epigone of eighteenth-century thought. Spaventa, however, had already shown that the indications were otherwise, that Galluppi's real contribution to Italian philosophy was something else, that beneath his supposed empiricism there lay in gestation a criticism not very different from that of Kant. Viewed thus, his professed and ostensible hostility towards Kant showed that Galluppi himself was unconscious of his speculative position, and that therefore the new mental exigencies proceeded spontaneously from the body of his empiricism. Gentile, taking Spaventa's thesis, has documented with minute care the presence of these spontaneous Kantian motives, and shows that Galluppi's criticisms of Kant, far from diminishing them, reconfirm them by the very fact that they are founded on misunderstandings, common enough at that time, of the Kantian Critique. In a word, Galluppi was defending himself from a false Kant in the name of exigencies which, without his being aware of it, were analogous to those of authentic Kantism. A recognition so reluctant was doubtless worth more than a servile adherence; but at the same time it carried with it the danger of all historical misunderstandings, that of isolating from one another two

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analogous mental positions, and thus of impoverishing and rendering sterile the one which would most have needed the support of the other. From Galluppi, to Rosmini, to Gioberti, this defect of isolating, with its consequent rarefaction, went on increasing; and thus there was created in Italy in the nineteenth century that curious state of mind which in politics had its symbol in the motto, "Italy will act for herself," precisely when, in politics as in everything else, Italy was not acting for herself, or only for herself. Here is the root of the provincial nationalism from which, even to-day, Italy is struggling hard to free herself. In point of philosophy the path of freedom had long ago been shown, to begin with Spaventa, who, studying the philosophy of his predecessors, Galluppi, Rosmini, Gioberti, showed what they had lent, in spite of all claims to the contrary, to European thought in general, and explained that true originality does not consist in shutting oneself off from others, but in opening oneself out as much as possible, to find oneself again in a fuller and richer world.

With plenty of philosophical apparatus, but with little experience of art, this same Gentile has brought out a treatise on æsthetics, with which he would supplant that of Croce. Running through his recently published volume, on each page one falls in with some acrimonious polemic argument, which, however, finds no justification in the effective novelty of the discoveries which he would substitute for those of Croce, and he explains himself only by extra-philosophical and passional arguments. Indeed, the very fierceness of the polemic reveals at first sight that Gentile is always, in spite of himself, dependent on Croce, like those dismissed servants who vent abuse against their masters, deluding themselves that thus they are free from subjection, in the very act which most patently shows it. To constitute the newness of a mental position, it is not enough to take pre-existing theses and handle them in a different way—the actual problems must be presented in a changed form. Now in Gentile's æsthetics you only find the problems of Croce's æsthetics, and there is not the very least trace of a new question arising from a direct and personal experience of the argument. There is nothing new in it except some philosophical denominations and the systematic arrangement. Of this last Gentile makes a great point: in his opinion Croce's æsthetics are merely descriptive, empirical, classificatory, devoid of rigorous deductions, and he himself would set on them, on his own account, the seal of a deduction in the Hegelian style, which should make things spring up as though by touches of a magic wand. It is an old conjuring trick, which hitherto had seemed to be relegated to the old iron of the "pure philosopher's" trade. The empty scheme of self-knowledge is taken, with its moments, subject-object-synthesis, in so far as they develop one from another through a position, a negation, and a re-affirmation, and to each stage of this process a familiar name is given: to the pure subject that of art, to the object that of religion, to the synthesis that of philosophy, and thus you are thought of necessity to have demonstrated and deduced art, religion, and philosophy. In reality nothing has been deduced but a scheme to which you can give some meaning or other (though only by approximation). Gentile, for example, gives us the meaning which his Crocian reminiscences suggested: thus the pure subjectivity of art is by him interpreted as a state of the simple and elementary spirit, prior to self-conscious reflection, as dream, form, pure sentiment, etc. At every step one of these new determinations sprouts out, through a processs no different from that used by a conjuror who causes a number of birds to fly, one at a time, from an empty cage.

GIOVANNI GENTILE, La filosofia dell'arte. Milano, Treves, 1931, 8°, pp. 377.

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But if we approach a little nearer to Gentile's long artistic equations (art = subjectivity=form=nature=sentiment=...) we find that they are all lost in the same fog, which recalls the Hegelian maxim that in the darkness all cows are black. How there can ever be a pure feeling which by itself is already form, subjectivity which is nature, etc., are things which can only be affirmed by emptying these names of all the meaning which they have in our concrete experience and considering them as indistinct and evanescent schemes.

One point in which Gentile means substantially to differ from Croce is that which makes art identical with feeling, while for Croce it is the expression of a feeling, that is, a theoretical contemplative act, in which passional feeling becomes quiet and serene. Even here Gentile must juggle with the term feeling, to justify his deduction, but even then he will never succeed in convincing anyone, for example, that to fall in love and to sing of love are not two different things. Gentile speaks diffusely of catharsis, but since for him art is surpassed by philosophy—by the very fact that the pure subject only exists in the synthesis of self-consciousness-the cathartic moment ought for him to be extraneous to art as such and belong to philosophy. For the rest, it is useless to demand from Gentile precise concepts; for him everything is lost in the fog of inconsistent dialectics, as may be seen in the following extract: "In thought feeling becomes conscious of itself: it becomes ego which is beauty, but it is also thought which analyses the beautiful, knows it and theorizes, and thus reassumes and completes the being in its absolute reality. But nature is feeling alone, apart from thought. As pure feeling it is inactual; its reality is in the thought, in the ego. But in its inactuality, as feeling, far from being deprived of beauty, it is beauty itself; for it is the nature of the spirit, moved and stirred by the dialectics of the spirit, like that feeling in nuce which each of us finds within him" (pp. 261-262). There one sees that the same entities appear reduplicated, once in the self-consciousness, once outside it. What meaning and what value could be owned by a nature, a beauty, outside consciousness? And to which of the two beauties ought our critical judgment to be deferred? These are questions for which it would be difficult to find a plausible answer.

GUIDO DE RUGGIERO.

(Translated from the Italian by Constance M. Allen.)

PHILOSOPHY IN RUSSIA

Nothing of interest so far as philosophy is concerned seems to have happened in Russia during the last six months. The vague symptoms of something like a philosophical awakening have been successfully suppressed—for the moment, at any rate. Losev, whose work has often been mentioned in these Surveys, and Shpet, one of the few pre-war philosophers still left in Russia, have been exiled to the far north. Cruel as their fate is, it is nothing to wonder at, since they are both men of real philosophical culture and attainments, entirely out of sympathy with the Marxian creed; the wonder is, indeed, that they have not been put out of the way sooner. But a totally unexpected fate has befallen the accredited 'red' philosopher, the leading exponent of dialectical materialism—Deborin. All his life he attacked with

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the most exemplary zeal 'idealistic' thinkers of every description-and now he is himself accused in the Soviet Press of a tendency towards idealism! The campaign against him was conducted so vigorously that poor Deborin has had a mental breakdown and been put into an asylum. To be accused of idealism after having always championed the cause of the crudest materialism must certainly be very disconcerting, but however sorry one may be for the victim of such an injustice, it is only fair to say that Deborin's collapse is no loss to philosophy in Russia.

The most interesting event in the Russian philosophical literature abroad is the publication in Paris of Professor Lossky's book on Value and Existence.

It is worth while to give a detailed account of it.

Lossky begins by saying that value is all-pervasive, determining the meaning of the world as a whole, of every person, every event, and every action; the smallest change introduced into the world by an agent has an aspect of value and is undertaken on the ground and for the sake of something that has value. All that in any sense forms part of the world not merely is but is justified or not justified in being what it is: we can say of everything that it is good or bad, right or wrong, that it ought or ought not to exist, and so on. Just because the characteristic of value is omnipresent, it is extremely difficult to differentiate it from other aspects of reality, and it is only natural that in most theories it should be confused with some characteristic which does not really form part of its content, and that there should be many conflicting conceptions of value. To illustrate this, Lossky gives a brief summary of the views of Ehrenfels, Kreibig, Meinong, Heyde, M. Scheler, N. Hartmann, and Gurvitch, and then proceeds to examine more closely the 'psychologistic' theories according to which values are purely subjective. After repeating the usual arguments against hedonism, Lossky points out that the same criticism applies to all theories which identify value with the feeling of appreciation, with desire or striving, with the consciousness of ought, and so on. They all mistake the psychological processes involved in the awareness of value for value as such. Thinkers like Heyde, who maintain that value is a relation between the object and the subject's appreciation of it, also make value dependent upon subjective feeling, since obviously, if there were no feeling of appreciation on the part of the subject, there could be no value. In truth, however, value is something over and above the subjective processes involved in the apprehension of it, and though it certainly does stand in a certain relation to the conscious subject it cannot be identified with that relation.

Passing to the consideration of theories according to which values are objective, Lossky examines M. Scheler's view that values are a special kind of qualities, and points out that qualities such as 'noble, lofty, good, wicked,' etc., cannot be detached from the bearers of them: it is the actual existents taken in their concrete wholeness that have value. The esse is not merely 'being' but also value. All being is a positive value as compared with nonbeing. But non-being is merely a limiting conception, and cannot be given in experience; there can only be a greater or lesser approach to it. So that in considering the value of any given existent we must think of it not in relation to non-being, but rather in relation to the absolute fullness of being, and ascribe positive value to it in so far as it approaches that ideal. A concrete entity, A, may be destructive of other existents, and thus tend to impoverish the world; in that case it will be a negative and not a positive value. Leibniz

was right in distinguishing between bene esse and male esse.

The absolute fullness of being is not a merely limiting conception: in religious experience it is revealed as God. It may therefore be said that positive value is existence in so far as it approaches or leads to the divine fullness of

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life, which is absolute perfection—something that not merely is, but deserves to be. It is the Good not only in the moral but in an all-embracing sense—the principle which Plato called $\tau \delta$ $a\gamma a\theta \delta r$: there is in it no division between existence and value. The only way we can define good is to point to the Good itself. It is absolute positive value, and there is no going beyond it. All the small derivative goods are good only through participating in It. In so far as they share in the Good they deserve to exist, are justified in existing. This positive value finds expression in an endless number of positive feelings—pleasure, delight, hope, and so on. All that hinders the realization of the perfect fullness of life does not deserve to exist, and is accompanied by negative

feelings of pain, disgust, fear, etc.

The truth of this view is confirmed, Lossky thinks, by the fact that no other conception of value can be thought out consistently. Briefly reiterating the argument of The World as an Organic Whole, he points out that relatedness, apart from which there can be no existence, presupposes a creative source of events and relations, and such a source can only be conceived as a substantival agent, a concretely-ideal, supra-temporal, and supra-spatial entity. The existence of a number of such agents necessarily involves the thought of their Absolute ground or God. Being endowed with freedom, they can choose either to remain in loving union with God and be members of His Kingdom, or to break away from Him, striving for unlimited self-assertion. In doing so they give rise to the realm of enmity or the psycho-physical world, in which, through a long series of experiences, they learn at last that the true fullness of life means a return to the Kingdom of God. Each member of that Kingdom exists for the whole, and the whole exists for each; indeed, each member is the whole viewed under some particular aspect of it, and is unique and individual.

God and His Kingdom are the source and condition of all values: everything that exists has positive or negative value according to whether it furthers or hinders the realization of the absolute fullness of life. Value cannot be subtracted from existence, but is an integral aspect of it. It is always related to a subject, since subjects, i.e. substantival agents, real or potential individuals, are the only reality; all other contents of the world—abstract ideas and events-are either their characteristics or the results of their activity. But this does not mean, of course, that values are subjective: they are conditioned by the relation of the subject to that which transcends all subjectivity, namely, to the absolute fullness of being. Values may be absolute or relative: the first are self-justified, good from every point of view, in every respect for every one; the second are good in some respect for some subjects only, while in other re pects and for other subjects they are an evil, or at any rate are necessarily (mnected with evil. Relative values are only possible in the psycho-physical world, the members of which are in a state of mutual conflict and opposition. In proportion as the conflict is overcome in and through the process of spiritual evolution, the relative values are gradually replaced by the absolute.

In a series of extremely interesting chapters Lossky discusses the relation between the different kinds of value, showing that our conflicting standards are not an argument against the existence of absolute values, and that the subjective processes of valuation are simply the means of discovering that

which is objective and universally binding.

The book would have gained had it been longer: its hundred and thirty-five pages do not give the author a chance of developing in full his contention that values must have their source in God, and that no other conception of value can be consistently thought out. Through lack of space many of his assertions

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inevitably sound rather dogmatic. It is to be hoped that in time Professor Lossky will have an opportunity of working out in greater detail the profound and illuminating ideas contained in this little book.

Two interesting books on the history of philosophy have been published recently, one in Paris and the other in Prague—G. Florovsky's The Eastern Fathers of the Church in the Fourth Century, and D. Tchizhevsky's Sketches of the History of Philosophy in the Ukraine. Florovsky's book is a scholarly and able exposition of the line of thought pursued by the great Christian thinkers of the fourth century, who had to grapple with some of the fundamental problems of metaphysics. Florovsky shars that so far from being of merely theological interest their ideas form a mategral part of many philosophical systems of later day, and cannot be riessred by any serious student of the history of human thought. The Fathe dolf the Church have worked out, in some cases with great depth and clear ds, the conceptions of the 'Divine Nothing,' of consubstantiality, of perselt sty, of qualitative multiplicity, of the non-spatial nature of the soul, of care tion in time as distinct from nontemporal dependence—and a great deal in dueir treatment of these ideas is of permanent philosophical value. fro

D. Tchizhevsky's book is a spirited a an mpt to make something out of nothing, or, to put it more mildly, out of lat v little. The fact is, there is no such thing as Ukrainian philosophy. Some at not do men of philosophical attainments were born in the Ukraine, but they we so much part of the spiritual and intellectual life of Russia as a whole the root is so much part of the spiritual and intellectual life of Russia as a whole the root is simply childish to treat them as representatives of a national school, thought. The author is so hard pressed for 'Ukrainian philosophers' that if the actually includes among them the great Russian classic Gogol (native good he Ukraine), who certainly was in his later years deeply interested in mora of the religious questions, but could not possibly be called a philosopher in an idefinite sense of the term. Tchizhevsky's book is a typical instance of the part of the very least of an Ukrainian separatist, and its political bias mars what most than the valuable contribution to the cultural history of Russia.

NEW BOOKS

The Religion of Man. By RABINDRANATH TAGORE. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 239 Price 7s. 6d. net.)

The interest of this volume of Heve ert Lectures for 1930 is mainly personal, world-wide reputation, but many parts for not only is the author a poet wi of it are frankly autobiographica mere does not claim to be a scholar or a philosopher (p. 90); but he is the phoupresenting his own personal experience, "his deepest thoughts on human li Orga its relation to the divine," and because of this human approach "his ow, beginnal ideas concerning the nature and being of God." There is a back sound of wide culture-modern science, industry, secularism, internationy-idm are all touched. The presentation has necessarily been affected by Incher culture and religion; but the philosophy or theology, implicit in this recd of of a human soul in search for God, is not characteristically Indian. Ther ovie passages which might give an impression that the author is a humanisomnd finds in the world nothing beyond and above man; but there are o'o the in which he confesses himself a theist. His approach to God, however, ong lways through man; the individual man, on his personal as contrasted was a his animal side, is a manifestation of universal Man. This conception seem themetimes to be hypostatized, but the relation of Man to God is left in somevieubt. I have felt the same difficulty in following relation, as I have in studying Green's Prolegothe author's treatment of mena to Ethics in regard arche reproduction of the spiritual principle in the individual consciousness sithe author is, however, no pantheist, as his emphasis on the value of hulian personality precludes such an absorption of the human in the divine, ater his description of the relation of man to God as love includes him amore those "whose prayer is for dualism, so that for them the bond of devotion wiy, God may continue for ever" (p. 202). In this respect he is not distinctively edian, but shows the influence of the West, although nowhere is any indebindness to Christianity confessed (the Index contains one reference to Christ which, however, I have failed to find). I believe that I have stated his general position accurately; but what is one to make of a sentence like this? "M religion is in the reconciliation of the Super-personal Man, the Universal human spirit, in my own individual being" (p. 225). It must be admitted that the exposition is not altogether consistent, and suffers at times from vaguen/is. As the volume does not present a close-knit argument, it is not necessary to attempt a summary of its contents; but some characteristic statements may be selected. The world around man is a Universe, that is, it discloses amid all its variety a unity. "Whatever name may be given to it, and whatever form it symbolizes, the consciousness of this unity is spiritual, and our effort to be true to it is our religion" (p. 16). In this unity man is central. "The idea-of the humanity of our God, or the divinity of Man the Eternal, is the main subject of this book" (p. 17). Are God and Man identical? In giving his personal experience, the Vision which came to him, he does make a distinction. "To this Being I was responsible; for the creation in me is His as well as mine. It may be that it was the same creative Mind that is shaping the Universe to its eternal idea; but in me as a person it had one of its special centres of a personal relationship growing into a deepening consciousness" (p. 96). To this Being he addresses one of his poems: "Thou who art the 498

innermost Spirit of my being, art thou pleased, Lord of my life" (p. 97). This still is vague. We may turn to a more definite statement. "It is definite (this is surely a misprint for infinite) and finite at the same time, the Eternal Person manifested in all persons. . . . Whatever character our theology may ascribe to him, in reality he is the infinite ideal of Man towards whom men move in their collective growth, with whom they seek their union of love as individuals, in whom they find their ideal of father, friend, and beloved" (p. 165). He has endeavoured to give practical expression to his ideal in education: "I tried my best to develop in the chadren of my school the freshness of their feeling for Nature, a sensitiveness of aul in their relationship with their human surroundings, with the help of lite moure, festive ceremonials, and also the religious teaching which enjoins us these me to the nearer presence of the world through the soul, thus to gain i dopre than can be measured—like gaining an instrument in truth by bring o dout its music" (p. 180). The end of such an education is spiritual freedon It Bondage in all its forms has its stronghold in the inner self, and not in thee stside world; it is in the dimming of our consciousness, in the narrowing of on deerspective, in the wrong valuation of things" (p. 190). While appreciativ fro describing the Hindu doctrine of the Four Stages of Life, he, as has alreadan een indicated, does not accept absorption in God as the goal. Without denyiat the voices of his own land, he is inclined to listen to other views: "Let ust mye faith in the testimony of others who have felt a profound love, which is intense feeling of union, for a Being who comprehends in Himself all things rolt are human in knowledge, will, and action. And He is God, who is not merce, a sum-total of facts, but the goal that lies immensely beyond all that is corificised in the past and the present" (p. 206). Here we seem to reach Theism 30 t cannot be sure that the Religion of Man is intended to lead us to God in to full sense of Theism.

ALFRED E. GARVIE.

The Living Mind. By WARNER FITE. (London: Vilejams & Norgate Ltd. 1931. Pp. ix + 317. Price 10s. 6d. net.)

The essays constituting this volume, and, with the exception of the first, reprinted from various magazines mainly between 1913 and 1918, are delightfully written and are a pleasure to read. They show how beginning the read of the rea fully written and are a pleasure to read. They show how clearly and effectively abstruse and difficult philosophical problems can be I indled. At first sight the essays seem to arrange themselves into two sets those dealing with contemporary practical questions such as Psychoanaysis, Birth Control, Advertising, and Bahaviourism, and those dealing with abstract epistemological questions. But though the practical essays may be read with interest and profit, there is yet a thought running through them ill which links them up with the others and gives unity to the volume, and which shows that philosophical problems lurk in the most practical questions of the day.

Professor Fite undertakes the task of defending consciousness from the attacks which he considers have unjustifiably been made upon it. His argument is considered that the task of defending considered the task of defending constants. ment is essentially a criticism of and a protest against the emphasis put upon scientific method with its supposed quality of impartiality and objectivity, The realist the physical sciences, moral and social studies, or in psychology. The realism of Russell, Moore, and the New Realists, and the extreme development ment in psychology known as Behaviourism, are the chief delinquents in this respect. In reacting from realism and rejecting the scientific prejudice he is at the same time anxious to avoid falling into the unduly subjective attitude of pragmatism. His own theory is an attempt to construct a via media

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between these unsafe philosophical pathways. He calls himself a believer in "critical intelligence." It is the critical motive which is so distinctive of idealism, and which realists, behaviourists, and mathematical and scientific intellectualists so painfully lack. And the result which he propounds is a doctrine which satisfies the pragmatic demand that truth is always being made, and is the satisfaction of our needs, and the realist demand that truth is independent of the knower and of his needs.

The "critical motive" takes account of the fact that "any object that is known is known by a person and hay be expected to have a character which reflects the point of view of the personal obj. "The world of consciousness is no world of impersonal obj." rather a world which, like the paintings of a master, reveals in every determine the personality of the conscious agent." Realism, on the other hand, both philosophy and in literature, "stands for the doctrine that consciousness! Orakes no difference," and its underlying

motive is "a distaste for consciolate bess."

The weight of Professor Fite's suments rests upon the initial, and what is for him a fundamental, distincy-in between the agent's and the observer's points of view. What he says a bent the distinction may be admitted, and it is important enough in so far do calls in question the adequacy of a psychology built on the basis of ovilly external observation, but its relevance to the physical and natural science is not so clear. His discussion of the distinction gives the impression the two points of view are necessarily those of two distinct persons, wher long a matter of fact each person is now an agent and now an observer; at is a rofessor Fite's own theory requires that this should be the case. But if the there is or should be no pure agent-consciousness and no pure observation, vie

In consequence, what are regued for remains by no means clear. There is a lack of clearness in Provisit ness, as to what is meant by "consciousness making no difference." There a list several distinct positions. First, consciousness may be wholly denied; sector, consciousness may be admitted as a condition of knowing, but not as a regarded as a condition of the character of what is known; third, it may be regarded as a condition of the character of what is known. The first position apparently is that of behavious as a parently is that of behavious areas as a parently is that of behavious as a parently is a parently in the character of what is known. The first may be regarded as cylermining the character of what is known; third, it position apparently in that of behaviourism though the position apparently in that of behaviourism, though the somewhat harsh statement of its own a titude may be apt to mislead and requires philosophical examination to disco er what has happened to consciousness; for it may be that behaviourism dipenses with consciousness only in the sense that by presupposing it as a position of the phenomena which it investigates it does not ne'd to take it into account as a factor in all its specific causal explanations.

The second position is that which realists can and do maintain. It is consistent with a great deal for which Professor Fite argues. In his examination of various practical questions, he emphasizes the importance of consciousness. Even in psychoanalytic theory the Unconscious, in spite of the causal agency assigned to it, is yet subordinate to consciousness when its character is known; and in economic life man is subject to the dominion of economic law only in so far as he remains ignorant of the laws. This is an important truth; but most scientists and most philosophical realists, unless infected with the fatalistic view of Russell, could agree. This is not, however, to say that consciousness makes no difference; but there is a big step from this to the third position which Professor Fite is anxious to defend. The realist position, according to him, would make consciousness merely photographic, and he protests against

In the development of this third position there is an ambiguity in his own 500

discussion. His treatment of the distinction between the agent and the observer suggests that he is identifying consciousness solely with the intimate personal experience of the agent, and is denying that consciousness is implicated in the experience of an external observer. He seems to identify consciousness with what is peculiarly private and inaccessible to outside observation. This is contrary to the rôle assigned to consciousness in his analysis of practical questions. Nor can it be said that he has very convincingly accomplished his purpose. His own analysis of what is involved in the "personal relation" in all knowing, and the analog which he uses in this connection, reveal the difficulty acutely. There are knower and the object; and this is a list contention which he admits. Where, however, the realist says that the don't all the only argument for his saying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is that the knower must come it don't all the only argument for his asying so is the truth is being discovered or reached, and the only argument for his asying so is the truth is being discovered or reached, and the only argument for his argument for his argument for his asying so is the truth is being discovered or reached, and the only argument for his argument for his argument f

B. M. LAING.

The Logic of Discovery. By R. D. CARMICHAEL. pificicago-London: The Open Court Publishing Co. 1930. Pp. ix + 280. 300ce \$2.)

This book has grown out of a series of articles, to dealing with some aspect of thought, and the title of the first article gives is title to the book. The result is that, taken as a book on the logic of discording, it is a little unsystematic, containing a fair amount of repetition. But for all that, it can be commended to the attention of readers who, having it is a little or no knowledge of mathematics, desire to know something of the significance for philosophy of modern developments of logic inspired by mathematics. Mr. Carmichael writes clearly and persuasively, and he has used a grad deal of illustrative material that has grown up out of attempts in Amelica to expound these developments in a simple and popular way.

The central part of his book is an endeavour to make clear to the ordinary reader the way in which, in logic or mathematics, syst ins of postulates can be elaborated, from which deductions can be made, without the entities about which the postulates are concerned being their selves defined. The deductions from the system depend on the postulates, and not on the nature of the entities with which they deal. The result is that when a set of entities is discovered which do obey the basic postulates, all the propositions deduced from the postulates are known at once to be true of these entities; and where several different sets of entities can be found which obey the postulates, several different bodies of doctrine can be at once enunciated.

This exhibits the nature of a purely deductive science, and the rôle of the subject-matter (numbers, geometrical relation, movements, forces, etc.) thereof: the subject-matter entering only as giving a particular interpretation to the basic postulates of the science, and not at all as enabling conclusions to be drawn from the postulates. There is, of course, nothing new in all this, and it has been explained often enough (for example) by Mr. Russell; but Mr. Carmichael puts it all very persuasively and clearly, and in a somewhat different light. A system of postulates with its deduced propositions (or,

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rather, propositional functions), in which the entities with which the system deals are mere undefined x's and y's and z's, has been called by Professor Keyser, of Columbia University, a "doctrinal function," after the analogy of Mr. Russell's "propositional function": "x is a man" is a propositional function; when x is given a significant value, say "That dark object," a proposition results. In the same way, when the x's and y's and z's of a doctrinal function are given values which satisfy the postulates, a body of doctrines results.

What Mr. Carmichael seeks to show, then, is the usefulness of doctrinal functions in the work of discovery anot merely in pure science, but in relation

to matters of fact.

For this purpose it is necessary not look at a body of doctrines from another point of view. It often happens met propositions are known in relation to a particular subject-matter befor nou pey are conclusively proved. Euclidean geometry is a case in point, which carried it over various absward places. The task of bringing these which carried it over various a b-sward places. The task of bringing these assumptions to light, and of red sug them to as small a number of independent postulates as possible, we have dealt with entities which were perinterpreted spatially; but once this spatial system was completely elabothood, d, the spatial interpretation could be dispensed with, and a pure doctroll function set up in its place, capable not only of a spatial, but of various y the spatial interpretations. It was possible also to modify certain of the positives, and to develop the consequences of this modification, so as to constant the possibility of alternative systems of geometry, which might perhips metry, which might perhinely

with fact than the Euclider A similar process is the tically possible in relation to any body of experimental facts (e.g. about riving bodies, or inherited characteristics, or association of ideas). The fit below is to systematise the facts, and to discover new ones. If a system in postulates can be elaborated from which the facts already known can be soluted, and from which propositions relative to facts not yet known can be soluted, we have a means of carrying our investigations further: for if investigation, confirms the deduced recovery. further; for if investination confirms the deduced propositions we have strengthened our fait ein the system of postulates, and can go ahead with new deductions; while tif investigation shows that the deduced propositions do not hold in fact, i)ur problem is to find a suitable modification of our postulate system so is to include the new facts. We can also work out the consequences of var Fous possible modifications of our postulates without waiting for the stimulus of fact, and widen and generalize in various ways. This is, of course, the well-known method of the formation of hypotheses; but linked with the lotion of a doctrinal function, the old method receives a new significance, and gives rise to new problems both of logic and of epistemology. And Mr. Chrmichael pleads for an extension of the method of postulation to fields such as economics, psychology, and ethics, where it has been used spasmodically in the past, but not systematically.

Mr. Carmichael illustrates and discusses some of the new problems arising. He is, of course, aware of the way in which a system of interpretation gives a colour to the "facts" in the system, so that in science we are rarely if ever in presence of hard and fast facts. He is aware also that interpretation in terms of postulates is the result of considerable intellectual construction, which to a very large extent could have taken a different turn, and often indeed takes one turn at one epoch of knowledge, another at another. And while all this makes him see that a logic of discovery is not necessarily a logic of proof, it makes him also alive to the fact that hypotheses cannot lightly be treated as "mere" helps for the gathering of facts, since the "facts" gathered tend to be

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coloured very considerably by the hypotheses by whose aid they were gathered. And if he has no final solution to offer, he is at any rate clearly aware of the various aspects of the problem and of the implications involved in them.

L. J. Russell.

The Sivadvaita of Srikantha. By S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI, M.A., B.Sc. (Madras: University of Madras. 1000) o. Pp. x + 393. Price 5 rupees;

Sivādvaita Nirnaya. An Enquiry into the movetem of Srīkantha. By APPAYYA DIKSITA. With an Introduction, less inslation, and Notes. Edited by S. S. SURYANARAYANA SASTRI. (1 dortas: University of Madras. 1929. English Introduction, Pp. 64; So derit Text, pp. 93; Translation, 1-161. Price 2 rupees 8 annas; 4s. It c

The Sāmkhya Kārikā of Isvara Kṛṣṇa. Wije the Introduction, Translation, and Notes by S. S. Suryanarayana dastri. (Madras: University of

Madras. 1930. Pp. xli + 130. Price frompees; 4s.)

The first two books treat of a monistic systand of Agama, called Shivādvaita (not to be confused with the Tamil Shaiva Sidlat nta), expounded by Srīkantha, a commentator on the Vedānta Sūtras, who to the suncertain, but who, in the opinion of the author, was probably a contest or oranged the great Vedantist Rāmānuja. Srīkantha's work was the subject of commentary by Appayya Dīksita, who flourished in the latter half of the e, ale enth century. The author is of opinion that from the metaphysical point liew Srīkantha occupies a position midway between Samkara and Rāmān He says that the Commentary of Srīkantha shows numerous affinities to that of Samkara. These two books are thus a particular form of Shaiva Āgalis. But what is an Āgama, and what are its relations to Veda? Some years ago, he dealing with the Shākta Āgama, which contains the Magna Mater worship of the Hindus, the reviewer suggested that Hinduism was composed of two lines are ligious thought and practice, namely, Vedic and Āgamic, the former hear the religious really. suggested that Hinduism was composed of two line. It religious thought and practice, namely, Vedic and Agamic, the former be by the religious culture introduced by the incoming Aryans, whose major deit was Indra, and whose nearest representatives to develop the composed of two line. nearest representatives to-day are the Smārta Brāhmai s and Ārya Samājists. The latter form of religious culture was that of the on-Aryan Dravidians and others, whose chief divinities were those of "le five-fold worship" of the sectarian communities, Sun-worshippers, wor hippers of Ganesha, Vishnu, Shiva, and Shaktas, the object of whose bult was the great Mother-Power of the universe. Many important questions are involved in a discussion as to the nature of Agama. Are they dependent or independent of Veda? Srīkantha's view is that the Vedas and the Shaivah Agamas are of equal authority, as both proceed from the Lord, the only difference being that the latter may be studied by persons of all castes, whilst the study of the former is restricted to the first three castes. The author regards the various historical questions which arise in an inquiry as to the Agamas as being outside the scope of his work, though he shortly alludes to them on pp. I-II, and at p. 81, where he cites the view that the Agamic rites were fashioned on the Dasyu rites, current from pre-aryan times. An inquiry, however, into the authority of the teaching of these books is relevant and called for. We express the hope that the author may some day undertake these historical inquiries. We are here told of Srīkantha's system.

After some general considerations, the author deals with the preliminaries to and presuppositions of Brahman knowledge, and then, after some criticism of various rival theories, treats of Brahman and the world he creates. As regards

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cosmic evolution, it is to be noted that a doctrine is taught similar to that found in the Tantras of the Shākta Āgama. The Brahman is regarded from two aspects, one static, which is that of the Power-holder, Shiva, and the other is active, as Shakti, or power. This Power is, as Chit-Shakti and Maya Shakti, both efficient and material cause of the universe. All change takes place in Shakti, Shiva being changeless. But the Power-holder and Power are one. The next topic is the embodied Spirit of Jīva, here and hereafter, followed by a discussion of release considered both as means and state, the author concluding with a general estimate and observes that "the major considerations of morality and religion receive and ill measure of attention at the hands of Srīkantha. The reality of the wor hand the individual, the relative freedom of the human will, the essentially nel red nature of the world, are the dominant ideas of Srīkantha's theism." "Touncerpret the Vedānta Sūtras as teaching a system of Theism, which had als Oraldependent support in the Shaiva Aganas, that was the service of Srīkanth base Vedantic thought" (p. 309). There are lastly Appendices and a Glossan spoth of which will prove of great utility. Of the former, the first gives re-ings unique to Srīkantha, readings common to Srīkantha and Rāmānuja, reinngs common to Srīkantha and Sankara or others, but not to Rāmānuja o pendix 2 notes doctrinal affinities to the Sruti-Sukti-Mala of Haradativijirya. Appendix 3A sets out resemblances between Srīkantha's comments and Rāmānuja, and Appendix 3B collects together the resemblances theween Sirkantha's commentary and that of Samkara. Appendix 3c dengarith topics distinctively treated by Srīkantha, and the last Appendix 4 gs at extracts from the commentaries of Nimbarka, Rāmānuja, and Srīkanthahej certain of the Vedānta Sūtras.

The first two volumes is ould prove of considerable value to advanced

students of the Agama a the Vedanta.

The third volume is part ced by the statement that there is need for a fresh translation of the Sāmit ra Kārikā, and that the adoption of the work as a textbook in several oits he Indian Universities has made the need all the greater. The author is El Aself Reader in Indian Philosophy in the University of Madras, and the we as also the last two on Srīkantha, have been published by that University. These facts are a guarantee of the worth of the author's labours, if an were needed.

JOHN WOODROFFE.

The Structure of Thught: A Survey of Natural Philosophy. By LUDWIG FISCHER. Translated by W. H. Johnston. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1631. Pp. 366. Price 16s.)

The strangeness on this strange book begins in the title. In the traditions of our speech "Natural Philosophy" means Physics: if here it is a translation of "Naturphilosophie," this is the usual German word for the Philosophy of Nature, or, more narrowly, for the philosophical examination of the principles and results of the natural sciences. In the book before us it has none of these meanings; it is made to mean "the philosophy of the natural order of Thought," which turns out to be a dialectical study of the categories of experience.

Although the book is full, monotonously full, of repetitions, I cannot pretend to have understood it. The author's technical expressions are simple in definition, but lose their definiteness in use; and so far as I can see the fault does not lie with the translator, who must have had an extraordinarily difficult task, and appears to have discharged it well.

The general attitude, however, is clear. Herr Fischer is inspired by the

504

mathematical ideal of knowledge in the form it has reached in the nineteenthcentury transformation of geometry. Every student is familiar with the form that ideal took in Plato—ascent through concepts of progressive universality to a supreme concept, and then a descent in which all the lower concepts are shown to be deducible from the supreme one. The total result would be the setting of the entire realm of concepts in a hierarchical organization, picturable as a pyramid. In Descartes, Spinoza, and Leibniz the ascent is suppressed, and only the deductive process exhibited. They assumed that by discovering a self-evident starting-point, and by proceeding from it by steps so infinitesimal that each was self-evid at, they would be able to unfold a complete, and completely demonstra mo system of philosophical truths. They were, of course, under the fascuess on of Euclid. Now the Euclidean system has been found to have a seri donfault, which the geometers of the last century undertook to remove. Theo deect was the presence of too many initial axioms and postulates; in othelt cords, the deductions of Euclidean geometry in its traditional form were ce twn from a plurality of apparently equal or ultimate, and so far unrelated, demises. Spurred by the ideal of a single starting-point, of a deductive systfroi depending from only one undeduced and therefore ultimate propositio and odern geometers are trying to reveal relations of superiority and inferioat r among the Euclidean axioms and postulates, and have achieved some st ness, though they have not yet derived them all from one. s tl

Herr Fischer clearly has the above considerofons at the back of his mind, and his work may be best described as an ac, and to do with philosophical concepts what the modern geometers have deficient the concepts of space. He seeks a "fundamental axiom" from which too duce all our categories and first principles. His procedure naturally reminto one of the logistic method. He admits that his system of categories was fill isworked out logistically. If so, I can only conclude that his lack of rigourant, clarity (for philosophical clarity is primarily rigour of reasoning) is due to take a well-intentioned desire to translate his logistic equations into the loosed brim of words; though I suspect that another cause is at work, namely, deposcillation between two quite distinct conceptions of the dialectic of the covegories, the logistic and the Hegelian.

The author's deductive derivation of the categoriquis preceded by what he calls the propædeutic system, in which he seeks he starting-point for the system proper. A category, of course, is an ordering ponception. He therefore looks for the main forms of order in experience. He finds three-space, which is the order of co-existence; time, which is the order of succession, and which in the notion of the present or actual includes a space; and knowledge or consciousness, which involves both space and tine, and is thereby the highest order of all. Each of these, he maintains, is szen on examination to be a manifestation of an utterly prime idea, the idea of opposition in unity, a relation whose terms, though opposite, imply and determine each other and consequently form a unity. This idea he expands into his "fundamental axiom," which he states as follows: "The Whole of human experience is one, and at the same time it is a multiplicity, and the whole of it is ruled by order. The prime form of all the reciprocal relations within this whole is opposition; this severs and resolves itself in the ultimate form or limit." And from this axiom he unfolds, by steps which remain dark to me, all the categories.

The above occupies only the first half of the book. The second half gives what is called a philosophy of philosophies: it runs through the entire history of philosophy and claims to show that every notable system has grasped, and from its peculiar point of view worked out, the notion of reciprocal opposi-

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tion. It is obviously impracticable to review such a survey; but I must protest that it is wearying and unilluminating to be conducted through the centuries and have nothing pointed out but the recurrence of the relation of the One and the Many in its various forms. It leads Herr Fischer to take the most abstract similarities as significant, and all particularizing content as insignificant. For example, he allows himself to assert that the system of Descartes "is a repetition, exact almost in each detail, of the fundamental ideas of Augustine."

It may be added that the auth and has no room for what is called a transcendent metaphysic: philosophy in nothing but the study of the order of experience. This position is, of could be defensible, but when it is reinforced by the assertion that "the whole of the lith is exhausted in the content" (p. 55), it seems to me to be nothing shoot paradoxical. The emphasis on experi-

encing is surely involved in the envaluasis on experience.

D_{SS} T. E. JESSOP.

The Science of Life. By H. G. P. Wells. Julian Huxley, and G. P. Wells. (London: Cassell & Co. P. 395, 339 illustrations. 1931. Price 21s. net.)

(London: Cassell & Co. Fig. 395, 339 illustrations. 1931. Price 21s. net.)

This is, of course, a very go may look, and it is opportune in its appearance. We have had a multitude of the second popular, so that the world-conception that the non-scientific reader tell and to adopt is shaped out by what he has read about stars and atoms, eleher ins, notions of space, and the idea of physical becoming as dependent or is the increasing randomness of the things in the universe. The conception the biology might enable us to formulate would be a very different one, and reader (as it is in the book under notice) in an attractive form. That is made in hardly be said about any big book on biology hitherto published in our times. This book is, of course, agreeable in the presentation of its subjections as to the nature of the second of ectoplasm tions as to the nature This ife, and ending with some account of ectoplasm and the trickeries of perile like Eusapia Palladino. It puts the whole pageant of life, as disclosed by placentology and systematic biology, before the reader, but it includes also full accounts of biological processes. Throughout its 900 pages the evident enjorment of the writers in their task never fails, and that means also that the general reader can take up the book with a confident expectation of sustained interest. The style of treatment has, of course, its defects. It is impossible to avoid emphasis on the fashionable lines of biological investigation, and it has not been practicable to state everywhere all the cautions and qualifications that would have been expressed in detailed expositions—of the "A.B.C. of Genetics" for instance. Here, and with regard to some other controverted biological problems the authors have to skate lightly over thin ice or (varying the metaphor) they flit delicately over many flowers of debate. Some things are stated too literally, let us say. There are about 3,000 genes in the chromosomes of Drosophila (which has been the domestic animal of genetic study). A gene is simply that which carries hereditary qualities, but, also, it is said that the gene of Drosophila has about 100,000 chemical atoms in its constitution. Perhaps, after all, the genes in the chromosomes of man are very much the same kinds of things—in respect of their numbers and physical constitution, of course. Now the methods and results of genetical study are still too full of perplexities and anomalous and contradictory findings to justify such statements, but it is difficult to see how,

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in this connection and elsewhere, the authors could have dealt otherwise with their subject in a book of this nature.

The volume measures II by 8 inches, has about 900 pages, weighs 6 lbs., and is printed on shiny paper. It cannot be held with any comfort. Why could it not be reprinted (when the time comes) in about half a dozen small volumes? It is interesting enough, even for professional scientific men and women, to entice one to slip it into a pocket or travelling bag on a journey. It is well illustrated, and the pictures (which are quite essential) would reduce without any detriment. The book may be commended without any qualification whatever.

______ JAS. JOHNSTONE.

The Origin and Nature of Man: an Inquist cato Fundamentals. By G. Spiller. (London: Williams & Norgate Ltce 131. Pp. xiv + 393. Price 15s. net.)

Mr. Spiller is already widely known and dewriter and lecturer on scientific and philosophical subjects. His new boofron a notable contribution to the general study of human life, and, though and point of view is definitely biological, it is of sufficient philosophical intelat to call for a short notice here. It is dedicated to the memory of Charles Dit non, and this serves to indicate the general attitude that is represented by is those who follow Alexander, Lloyd Morgan, Joad, and others in emphasizin roft; conception of "emergence" may regard it as being hardly up to date; but of, as may welcome a thoughtful treatment of the subject free from speculative rific uppositions. It can hardly at least be maintained that Mr. Spiller minimizgoone gulf that separates man from all other living beings on our planet. He doeto rt, however, regard the gulf as unbridgeable; and his book is mainly concern is with the consideration of the factors by which the transition has been effect?h, His general aim is stated as being that of "scientifically reconciling man's le ay animal origin with the potential nobility and grandeur of man"; and I td k most readers will feel that that aim has been successfully achieved.

He urges (pp. 73-84) that what, from a purely ovological point of view, differentiates man from the other members of the art all kingdom is that he is emphatically a "tool-using animal"—tools being duitinguished as material and mental. On this basis, the great laws of human deleelopment are stated as being: (a) the law of limitless increase . . . of diversity ? cultural or tool-made products, together with the secondary law of the graduil development historically of error, of anti-progressive habits and custom? and of cultural and social inequality; (b) the law of limitless improvement . . . of the cultural or tool-made products which tend to satisfy ideally mankind as a whole, together with the secondary law of the gradual elimination historically of error, of anti-progressive habits and customs, and of cultural and social inequality; (c) the law of the limitless growth, among peoples generally and through the ages, of co-operation, together with the secondary law of the historic development and subsequent elimination of the spirit of exclusiveness; and (d) the law of the limitless perfecting, among peoples generally through the ages, of the individual as a whole, together with the secondary law of the historic development and subsequent elimination of individual imperfections.

In what follows these laws are illustrated in a detailed and interesting way. Although the treatment is in the main biological and historical, the work of philosophical writers in the interpretation of social development is not ignored. The contributions of Hobhouse and Sir Henry Jones, in particular, are duly recognized and appreciated. On the other hand, as against ProfessorMcDougall,

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stress is laid (p. 92) on the natural originality of man-especially in his co-operative activities. Mr. Spiller's emphasis on the social factors in human development leads him perhaps to underrate a little the contributions of exceptional individuals. He seems inclined, for instance (p. 363), to question the generally recognized superiority of Shakespeare in comparison with his dramatic contemporaries—or at least to attribute his apparent superiority to his greater diligence. I am afraid literary criticism is not Mr. Spiller's strong point. But, in general, his work appears to me to be sound, thorough, and well balanced within the limits than are set by his method of treatment.

I. S. MACKENZIE. (q11)

Some Problems in Ethics. By H. W half Joseph, M.A. (Oxford: at the Clarendon Press. 1931. Pp. vi + 135. резу: 25s.)

Students of Ethics will be gristiful to Mr. Joseph for publishing these lectures, given last year at Oxforn indeed, their only regret will be that he has compressed their matter units such modest limits. His theme, the relation between Right and Good is much to the fore in contemporary discussions; and he handles it wifign he subtlety of discrimination, penetrative insight, and precision in argum, it that always mark his writings. He moves forward to his solution districally, on the time-honoured Aristotelian method; and it is sometimigatiard to discover whether a given statement represents a view put forway for examination or his own conviction. The book is not easy reading; et it the author's entire freedom from dogmatism and scrupulous anxiety toe of full justice to the views he criticizes make it singularly illuminating ar rittractive. He tells us (26) that there may be self-evident propositions it hics, but adds the words, "I find myself accepting much that is not so, as with the real have not reached knowledge, seems to me nearest the truth." My pover, he is keenly alive to the metaphysical issues that arise in the course, if his inquiry; in this respect his book compares for our poly with Mr. B. "I have not reached knowledge, seems to me nearest the truth." I have not reached knowledge, seems to me nearest the truth. The seems to me nearest the metaphysical issues that arise in the course have not reached knowledge.

favourably with Mr. Ro, 's recent volume on the same subject.

The need for a metalysical foundation is established in the two opening chapters. Ethics has to nake its account with two types of doctrine, each of which is a menace to is autonomy. There is, first, the view, of which Mr. Joseph takes Behaviou ism as an extreme example, that human conduct can be interpreted on the irniciples of uniformity and mechanical determination which have proved so ruitful in the physical sciences. The refutation of this view is clinched by an exposure of its self-contradiction, in that it not only robs morality of meaning, but abolishes the possibility of its own truth. "If thought is laryngeal motion"—as Behaviourism logically implies—"how should anyone think more truly than the wind blows? All movements of bodies are equally necessary, but they cannot be discriminated as true or false" (14). In the second chapter the claim of Psychology to furnish a groundwork for Ethics, in independence of metaphysical criticism, is shown to imply a similar breach of self-consistency. Here Mr. Joseph takes as his illustration Professor McDougall's republication of Hume's doctrine that reason is and ought only to be the slave of the passions. Reason, it is alleged, cannot create desire; all action is due to instincts, provoked into energy by perception; the intellect comes into play merely as regulating the development of instinctive desires. But how, asks Mr. Joseph, can it come into play at all? The doctrine in question "allows no sources of energy in the mind except to many distinct but complicable instincts. Each instinct is aroused by the perception of some object. A complication of instincts is not an object 508

of perception; . . . the desire to achieve it cannot be an expression of any one of the instincts whose complication is desired, nor of their complication. Though our intellectual faculties therefore might work in the service of this desire when once it had arisen, yet, unless they can give rise to it, it cannot arise" (23).

With the way thus cleared, Mr. Joseph passes to his main problem, starting, as in duty bound, with the concept of Right (chapters iii-vi). He examines first (chapter iii) the distinction between a moral act and a right act. It is admitted, both by Utilitarians like Professor Moore and by those who, like Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, build A Kantian foundations, that a right act, done because of its rightness, has moral value (i.e. goodness) as the expression of a good will. But the goodness is dependent on the rightness, not vice versa; for, ex hypothesi, the act is done for the sake of its rightness, not for the goodness that is manifested in so doing it. Now, what is this rightness for the sake of which the act is done? It cannot be the rightness of doing it. "We ought to do certain actions because they are right. That does not mean because we ought to do them; what then does the action being right mean?" (37). Mr. Joseph here finds himself confronted by two answers, neither of which is he able to accept. On the one hand, Professor Moore and the Utilitarians hold that a right act means one that is causally related to good. This answer covers many cases of obligation, but not all, and makes the goodness of a right action merely consequential. "Is there no intrinsic goodness in acting rightly?" (26). On the other hand, Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross maintain that right is ultimate and indefinable, and that, though the rightness of an action belongs to it because of its specific nature, "that nature need neither lie in its being causally related to any good consequence nor be good itself" (31). This involves the denial of value to right action, "except so far as, if it be done from a sense of duty, the world is better for that expression of a good will" (ibid.). "Is not duty," asksMr. Joseph, "insuch a case irrational?" (26). The difficulty is graver still when the right act is done from a motive other than a sense of duty. Not only is a gulf fixed between a right act and a moral act, but the rightness is declared to be independent of any goodness whatsoever. Mr. Joseph offers a solution on the following lines. Starting from the distinction between the obligation to do an act and the rightness of the act we ought to do, he seeks (a) to determine the nature of the latter rightness and (b) to determine it in terms of good. In cases where the act is productive of good results, Professor Moore's doctrine may be accepted; the agent, seeing its conduciveness to good, finds herein the reason why he ought to do it. "If, seeing this, he does not do it for that reason, he will not be acting morally, and there are motives which would make his act immoral; nevertheless, the act would, in a defensible sense, have been right" (28). Where, however, the rightness of the act is not grounded on its conduciveness to good, "it must have intrinsic goodness, which goodness must involve the agent's motive" (ibid.). Everything here depends on our being able to include in the action "some motive, being moved by which, or the manifestation of which is good" (37). Now this is just what Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, in company with many others, believe to be impossible; holding that motives are not in our power and cannot be constitutive of what we ought to do, that their inclusion involves a vicious regress ad infinitum, and that "from whatever motive a man does what is right, it is still what is right that he does" (ibid.). We cannot here follow out Mr. Joseph's detailed and convincing refutation of this position (in chapter v), or his positive argument (in chapter iv) to show that an act, taken apart from the motive, is, from the standpoint of Ethics, an illegitimate abstraction. "No act exists except in the doing of it, and in

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the doing of it there is a motive; and you cannot separate the doing of it from the motive without substituting for action in the moral sense action in the physical, mere movements of bodies" (38). The error springs from the failure to see that human action is a self-realizing process. "An intention does not lead to an action as the discharge of David's sling-stone led to the death of Goliath. . . . In any self-realizing process, that which is ultimately realized is somehow involved in the determination of the process by which or in which it is realized" (55). Mr. Joseph concludes the first half of his inquiry by pointing out the ambiguity in the word $Rig_{30}^{(r)}$. "A right act may mean either an act which I ought to do, or an act having a rightness (a sort of goodness) in virtue of which I ought to do it" (59). It was, he argues at length in chapter vi, the neglect of this distinction that led Professor Prichard, in his Inaugural Lecture on *Duty and Interest*, to charge Plato with misconceiving the problem which he set himself to answer in the *Republic*.

It is high time that a thinker of Mr. Joseph's distinction should have come forward to dispute the doctrine that the motive with which an act is done is irrelevant to its rightness. Our only doubt is whether he has gone far enough in his rejection of it. He appears to make an exception in the case of those acts whose rightness can be grounded on their conduciveness to good. This double-barrelled concession, to Professor Moore's Utilitarianism on the one hand and to Professor Prichard's exclusion of motive on the other, is surely unjustifiable. An act may be conducive to good, and I may be aware that it is so; yet if I do it, not for that reason, but from an unworthy motive, can it be said, in any "defensible sense," to be right? The principle that "no act exists save in the doing of it, and in the doing of it there is a motive," is applicable all along the line. It must hold also of acts done for duty's sake. These can no more be judged right in abstraction from the motive than acts prompted by benevolence or loyalty. Is it reasonable to maintain that if I pay my debts for fear of imprisonment or social obloquy, I have done my duty, in any sense in which the term duty is "defensible" in Ethics? The issue is a large one, and cannot be discussed here; it affects the validity of the distinction, on which Mr. Joseph lays so much stress, between the rightness of doing a right act and the rightness of what it is right to do. Hard as it is to question this distinction, to accept it seems harder still. How can an act be right and not morally right, or be morally right when taken in abstraction from the motive?

Building on this distinction, Mr. Joseph proceeds in the second part of his book (chapters vii-x) to consider the question "whether there is any character common to right acts, in virtue of which it is that we think we ought to do them" (73). He finds this common character of rightness (save when it is instrumental to good) in "a form of goodness to the realizing of which the actions belong" (104). In calling it a form, he means, negatively, that it is not a quality; positively, that it is a unity of a manifold, at once identical with and distinguishable from what is good, "as a unitary or single character is distinguishable from the diversity in and because of which it is present" (83). In the argument in chapter vii, directed against Professor Moore's position that good is a simple, unanalysable quality, Mr. Joseph is at his very best. He quotes the scholastic doctrine that God is not to be called "good," but "goodness," since "his goodness cannot be thought of as a quality, which he might get or lose, like the yellow of a Magnum Bonum plum, as it ripens and then decays. There is nothing in the being of God which does not contribute to, and indeed is not needed for, his goodness; he is good as a perfectly healthy body is healthy, through and through. But none the less goodness in him is one as health is one; only it is not simple, any more than

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God or health is simple" (78). This, be it noted, is no merely theological doctrine; it holds of goodness in any form, e.g., of the goodness of a poem or a human life. The chief difficulty is to find this structural form in particular goods which are not "organic wholes," such as certain pleasures, sounds, colours, and simple duties. Mr. Joseph argues at some length (in chapter viii) that these simple goods are found on examination to be good, not in themselves, but as elements in a more comprehensive system, whose goodness possesses the required complexity of structure. We have to look beyond them, not to their effects, but to their context e.g., to the rule of action of which the particular duty is a manifestation, and, further, "to the whole form of life in some community, to which all the actions manifesting this rule would belong, and ask, whether it, or some other form of life is better, which would be lived by the community instead, if this rule were not helping to determine it. If we judge that it is better, then the particular action is right, for the sake of the better system to which it belongs" (98). So, when faced by the alternatives of letting a friend enjoy a holiday or of taking it myself, though I may not be able to differentiate between them in respect of goodness within the scope of the actions, I may well be able to do so when they are viewed in the wider context of the plans of life to which they respectively belong. The moral is that we should use large maps in determining our simplest duties. The Kantian instruction, to universalize your maxim, does not go far enough; the criterion required is the "goodness in that form of life which the rule requiring this action would determine, if this rule had expression in the lives of others also who make up the community that lives this form of life" (100). Mr. Joseph does not need to be reminded that Kant himself came very near to this position when he elicited from the Categorical Imperative the "very fruitful" conception of a kingdom of ends, of a rational order harmonizing the wills of the members of a moral community. The Kantian appeal is to an other-worldly form of life, whereas Mr. Joseph restricts his outlook to life lived under actual historical conditions. In his closing pages (133-135) he is troubled by the practical difficulty of devising a form of good life for a large community, e.g., for a supernational human society, "that shall give to the private desires of each such satisfaction as will make the whole seem to resolve itself into, and be the unity of, the lives of all its members, in each of which it dictates some partial and particular form of good life." There ought, he says, to be such an absolute good; but are we not carried, as was Kant, in the search for it, to the thought of an ideal order that transcends the bounds of man's spatio-temporal history?

Mr. Joseph's two last chapters (ix and x) deal with questions ancillary to his main doctrine of the ground of obligation. In opposition to Professor Moore, who finds a contradiction in the phrase "my own good" and to Professor Prichard, who finds a contradiction in the phrase "a common good," he insists that the goodness of the whole form or system of common life "would be present in the goodness of each man's life; it would be his not exactly in the same way as, yet not less truly than, the goodness of his own life would be his; and it would therefore be a common good" (119). In chapter x he vindicates the possibility of a man acting at once from a sense of duty and from desire for what he judges to be good, against the two objections, (1) that a man acting under a sense of duty is often acting contrary to all his desires, and (2) that, since a man is not responsible for his desires, in acting from desire he is not free. His answers are convincing, and give rise to very interesting elucidations. Our only surprise is that he thinks the last-mentioned objection deserving of serious discussion. To deny a man's responsibility for his desires, on the ground that they proceed from his nature, is to jettison the most im-

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portant part of the moral life. The theologian, indeed, tells us that the divine initiative is requisite "to put into our minds good desires"; but is it not equally needed "to bring the same to good effect"? If, on the other hand, it is maintained on purely secular grounds that control of desire forms no part of moral obligation, we can only reply by asking, What does?

Our purpose has been to sketch in outline the course of Mr. Joseph's argument, rather than to cast doubts on its validity. His book not only offers an original solution to one of the hardest problems in Ethics, but is throughout a masterpiece of logical thinking. Wi a much of what he says we are in cordial agreement. But there is one quite fundamental matter on which he leaves us questioning. His main ground for insisting that the rightness of an act must be justified by its goodness is that otherwise the act is destitute of value. The champions of the autonomy of rightness, like Professor Prichard and Mr. Ross, seem prepared to acquiesce in this conclusion. They do more than acquiesce: they glory in it. We venture, in all modesty, to doubt whether it is true. It depends on the identification of value with goodness. But has rightness no value merely as rightness? When I judge an act to be obligatory or right, apart from any thought of its intrinsic or consequential goodness, I am surely indulging in a valuation. The two motives, sense of duty and the desire to realize a good, may indeed, as Mr. Joseph points out, go together; but when they do they still remain specifically different motives, implying specifically different standards of valuation. If this be so, the question, "What is the common character of rightness that makes all right acts obligatory?" is unanswerable, because illegitimate. The only possible answer is, "the common character of rightness." Are we not landed in the same impracticability on Mr. Joseph's theory, only a stage farther back, if we ask him "What is the common character of goodness exhibited in all good systems of life?" We shall doubtless be told that the view we are suggesting leaves us with a dualism of practical values, both within the purview of Ethics. We can only reply (1) that the facts of moral experience, i.e., the evident diversity of the two types of conduct, doing our duty and acting sub ratione boni, compel us to admit the dualism; and (2) that if a synthesis of the two standards is to be found anywhere, it must be in the field, not of Ethics, but of religion. There the Moral Law, as God's will to right, is the expression of the goodness which, as Mr. Joseph has shown so well, is identical with his whole being. But we do not dare to hope that this alternative solution of the problem will commend itself either to Mr. Joseph or to any other authoritative writer on moral philosophy.

W. G. DE BURGH.

L. T. Hobhouse, His Life and Works. By J. A. Hobson and Morris Gins-Berg. (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 360. Price 128. 6d.)

This book is divided into three parts. The first by Professor Hobson gives the story of Professor Hobhouse's life. The second by Professor Ginsberg gives a comprehensive account of Professor Hobhouse's major publications. The third part contains an essay by Professor Hobhouse on the social-economic situation in the post-war world and a few of the articles contributed by him to the *Manchester Guardian*. The articles selected show the wide range of his interest in the practical affairs of life and also his appreciation of literature.

Professor Hobson is very successful in his sketch. He enables the reader to trace the development of the character and personality that endeared Professor 512.

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Hobhouse to his friends. Descended on his mother's side from an old Cornish family, he may well have inherited the emotional temperament that rendered him sensitive to subtle situations. Although Hobhouse took a first in Moderations and in Greats and became fellow and tutor at Corpus, he found something uncongenial in the life of a University don. He was profoundly moved by the social conditions in the '80's and '90's. His interest in politics and a certain impatience with the intellectual idealism in vogue in Oxford made him welcome the offer of a position on the staff of the Manchester Guardian. Here he found an outlet for his advanced liberal views. To this period of his life belong the vigorous articles on the questions raised by the South African war. His occasional breakdowns date from this time of strain. He carried a double load, working hard for the paper while continuing his philosophical researches. In 1902 came the move to London and the formation of the Sociological Society. Secretarial work, lecturing and writing filled the next few years. For little more than a year he was political editor of the brief-lived liberal paper the Tribune. In 1907 he accepted the Martin White Professorship in Sociology at the London School of Economics, a position for which both his public work and his philosophical training pre-eminently fitted him. Professor Hobson is particularly happy in his chapter entitled "1914 and After." He portrays Hobhouse's sympathy with Lord Morley, and his loyal acceptance of national organization, and recounts his fine work on the Trade Boards. No account of his life could be intelligible that failed to show the source of inspiration and strength that Hobhouse found in his own home. With his wife and children he enjoyed to the full the happiness of family life. The death of his wife in 1924 robbed him of his greatest support. From then onwards he was depressed and handicapped by ill-health. None the less his death in the summer of 1929 was unexpected, as the illness from which he was suffering was not regarded as dangerous.

It is difficult to give an estimate of the man apart from some account of his philosophy. Professor Hobson does not wholly surmount this difficulty. There is thus some overlap between his concluding chapter and the subject-matter of Part II.

Professor Ginsberg brings to his task special qualifications. He was the pupil, assistant, and friend of Hobhouse. He gives the reader a survey of Hobhouse's philosophy which is written with insight and appreciation. He traces the influence of Spencer's evolutionary doctrines and Comte's positivism and humanitarianism on Hobhouse's thought, and thus enables the reader to see that to build up his social philosophy Hobhouse needed in the first place an examination of the facts of evolution in the animal world and in man (Mind in Evolution, 1901, supplies this). Hobbouse's next step was an inquiry into the goal of development in the light of the criteria deducible from the conception of a rational order. (Morals in Evolution, 1906; Social Evolution and Political Theory, 1911; and Social Development, 1924, belong to this inquiry. With these works we may also group The Metaphysical Theory of the State, 1918; The Rational Good, and The Elements of Social Justice, 1921.) As a synthesis of his teaching he put forward a metaphysical theory, applying the notion of development to the whole world order (Development and Purpose, 1913, revised and re-written 1927). From his studies of comparative psychology Hobhouse draws the conclusion that the essential function of mind is correlation. By his search for the criteria of moral and social progress he is able to relate phases in the growth of the social fabric to phases in the growth of mind. It is in Development and Purpose that the reader sees the conceptions governing Hobhouse's philosophy. He believes that the world order is shaped by both teleological and mechanical causation. In so far as the events which go to

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make up reality have determinate consequences and are indifferent one to the other, they follow the principles of mechanical causation. But there is at work a conative correlating activity which shapes the separate mechanically determined effects with reference to the requirements of the whole. Such a cooperation of teleological and mechanical principles is found in every organism. The teleological principle is Mind. Mind works in the lower organisms as blind striving, growth; in animals as instinct, and in man as conscious purpose.

It is no part of his scheme to furnish a criticism of Hobhouse's views, but Professor Ginsberg clearly realize, that this metaphysical theory and the social philosophy in which it is incorporated rests ultimately upon Hobhouse's belief in the reliability of a rational reconstruction of experience. Everything depends on his conception of the function of reason. Hobhouse's theory of experience and knowledge was set forth in his earliest book, The Theory of Knowledge, 1896. Written when he was Greats tutor at Oxford, the book is coloured by the idealism of Bradley and Bosanquet, and yet, as Professor Ginsberg points out, it is in many points an anticipation of critical realism. Hobhouse recognized that the idealists were right in stressing the fact that truth lies not in isolated items of knowledge but in the system of ideas. The difficulty for idealism is to pass from the system of ideas to the reality of particular existents. He admired J. S. Mill's use of empirical methods and asks himself whether man can reach knowledge by these methods, or whether he must fall back on intuition or feeling. Like the critical realist of to-day, Hobhouse insists on the objective reference of even simple sensuous apprehension. Something is asserted thereby, and there is truth or falsity in such assertion about reality. The reality asserted can be further scrutinized and relations discovered by analytic attention. It is mind that discovers the relations and builds the constructions, but it is not mind that makes the relations. It is the function of reason to connect, to discover grounds or conditions. "Every datum of experience has its ground." Given the ground, then the consequence follows universally. If we ask whence comes our knowledge of this principle of ground, Hobhouse's reply is in essence the same as Mill's. Our knowledge of it has the same source as our knowledge of any other principle or law. The principle of ground, which is the basis of all induction, is regarded as itself established by consilience of inductions. Deductions from generalizations confirm the inductions on which they are based. For Hobhouse there are no a priori truths, only a priori conditions of mental activity. The axioms of reasoning are found by analysis of our spontaneous methods of inference. They are in this sense "inferred" principles based on the given. "It is only as the formulation of 'successful' methods that axioms have logical weight" (Theory of Knowledge, p. 593).

Now if we are to accept Hobhouse's social philosophy and his view of Mind in the world order, we must accept this theory of rational knowledge. Can we do so? If one looks at a deductive system of knowledge, e.g. mathematics, one does not find that the validity of its conclusions owes anything to consilience of inductions. Its validity is not attested by success but by demonstration. The conclusions are reached from the definitions and initial propositions with which the deduction started, no successful application can prove these definitions and propositions to be true. Similarly, no successful application can ever prove the truth of the axioms of reasoning. To the reviewer it seems that Professor Hobhouse failed to recognize the fundamental difference between the formal validity of a deductive system and the experiential evidence reached by consilience of inductions. He transfers to the latter the demonstrative validity of the former. He does so in virtue of his belief that the given not only admits of the exercise of man's reason, but is itself rational.

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Reality for him is a system to which man's reason can find the clue because the system itself is formed and developed by a rational urge, by a Central Mind. The success of every step forward in the interconnection of fact is for Hobhouse proof of the belief. His theory of knowledge must be valid if his metaphysical theory is to be true, but his metaphysical theory must be true if his theory of knowledge is to be valid.

His view of the function of reason in the sphere of knowledge has as complement a parallel doctrine of the function of reason in the sphere of conduct. "Just as two rational judgments must not contradict one another, so two rational purposes must not conflict with one another" (Rational Good, p. 78). From this principle of formal consistency we pass to consilience of inductions and reach the doctrine that harmony of impulses in the individual and harmony of the purposes of individuals within society build the rational good. Now, though in fact the actions of an individual or the institutions of a society which we recognize as good are comprehensive in character and are such as harmonize many purposes, is it this that makes them good? In other words does consilience of inductions prove the truth of the hypothesis on which each induction is based, viz. that the good is a harmony of feeling and experience?

No criticism of Hobhouse's conception of the function of reason can blind one to the value of his work. His attempt to see social philosophy as a whole in its relation to metaphysics gives a special significance to his teaching. Considered on their own merits, apart from his system of philosophy, his contributions to sociology would win him a high place among his contemporaries. For Hobhouse social institutions are a means to an end; they possess nothing that renders them sacrosanct apart from the purpose they fulfil. His criticism from this point of view in *The Metaphysical Theory of the State* was both far-sighted and timely. As Professor Ginsberg points out, Hobhouse was a pioneer in comparative psychology and in the comparative study of morals, and his observations in both fields of research have been confirmed by later workers.

To appreciate and to understand any philosopher one must turn to his own writings, but it is safe to say that Professor Ginsberg's exposition of Hobhouse's work will enable a student to take up any one of Professor Hobhouse's books with a far greater ability to appreciate and understand it than would otherwise be possible. He enables the reader to see the originality of Hobhouse's line of thought and to survey the width of the field covered by his work.

BEATRICE EDGELL.

Personality and Will. By Francis Aveling, M.C., D.Lit., D.Sc., Ph.D. The Contemporary Library of Psychology. (London: Nisbet & Co. Cambridge: at the University Press. 1931. Pp. x + 245. Price 5s.)

One of the great merits of this book is its recognition of the truth that the problem of personality can only be adequately dealt with if the psychological method is completed by a philosophical treatment. In this subject, at least, it seems clear that no hard-and-fast line can be drawn between psychology and philosophy as concerned with the real. In Professor Aveling's view, as he has elsewhere argued, it is the facts themselves which the psychologist examines that lead us to reality. The effects of this standpoint are seen throughout, from the historical survey of philosophic theories, to the interpretation of the facts discovered in the special hunting-ground of the experimental psychologist. The author explains his aim to be that of reasserting "much that has been

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left out in recent works on psychology." It is especially the intimate association between will and personality which he is thus led to emphasize, both as throwing light on the true nature of will, and as pointing to the truth that personality is not a *deus ex machina* to be brought in, to account for the otherwise inexplicable fact of conscious freedom, but is present in all essentially human activity. Personality is expressed in activity, it is indeed a kind of energy.

The noegenetic interpretation of the origin of the idea of God as subject of the ontological argument is interesting. But I feel a certain difficulty in regard to the positions that the notion of the existence of God is derived from our experience of ourselves as existing, and our conception of His nature reached by analogy and negation, unless the meaning is that intellectual operations are performed upon a notion already present, and having a different historical origin. The view, however, appears to be that the notion of God is first formed by unconscious mental processes, which are consciously made explicit later in the rationalistic arguments. Is this supported by anthropological investigation?

I cannot do more than refer to the admirably lucid treatment of ancient, mediæval, and early modern theories of the self, and their value from a philosophical standpoint. The most original constructive contribution of the book, however, is found in the account of the experimental work on volitional processes, and the conclusions based on it. It is perhaps difficult for the layman to conceive how light can be thrown on the problem of the strength of will in what appears to be the highly artificial conditions of the laboratory. He may ask whether such investigations have been completed or tested, as it were, by experiments performed on the human agent ceaselessly by life itself, and sometimes faithfully reported by the biographer or poet,

"Between the acting of a dreadful thing And the first motion all the interim is Like a phantasma, or a hideous dream."

Will-force is tested by the success shown in overcoming the tendency to react only in one way, where, for instance, two-syllabled nonsense words have through learning by heart become inseparably attached, so that when one syllable is shown the other comes to mind by irresistible tendency. Can this be an index to will-force in actual life? It is all the more interesting to find that the result of such tests, removed from the practical arena in which character is formed, prove to be in harmony with the principle to which both introspection and philosophic reflection on the postulates required to make practical life intelligible, are pointing. It is in the will that personality is above all found. All the experiments point to an immediate presence of self-activity. The view which emerges, and the importance of which can hardly be exaggerated, is that "the self can modify its own nervous system and innate tendencies."

The distinction which Professor Aveling makes between will and conation appears to be new, at least in the form in which he expresses it, and suggests a very different analysis of the act of will from those of earlier modern psychologists. "If Ach's analysis is correct, the thought of the end to be attained, together with the sensations of tension and the effort, is to be distinguished from the 'I truly will,' which is the real characteristic of volition." What seems remarkable is the view that the experience of willing which initiates the striving may be itself quite effortless, that there may be no effort in the intention, whilst there is great effort in carrying it out. Was there no

effort in Brutus' "first motion," but only in his "acting of a dreadful thing"? Dr. Aveling's view is supported, as he tells us, by researches of Ach and Michotte, and it is obviously crucial, from his standpoint, that the sense of efforth should be separated from the will which is inseparable from the self, whilst the latter is something over and above the physical feelings. The problem of the relation of value to personality receives an interesting treatment, and the observation that it is only in the light of the conceptual values that we can discern value in the physical world at all seems profoundly true. A logical priority is thus accorded to the ideal values. Is this entirely consistent with the noegenetic theory of their derivation from experience, "by the process of correlate formation"? It may be suggested that the noegenetic interpretation masks the creative activity of personality.

The heart of the doctrine of personality lies in the conception of our knowledge of the self, completing on the side of knowledge the experimental work, which revealed in the realm of practice that the living intuition of the self as subject is an essential part of the experience of resolving. This subject-self, of which we are conscious in knowledge, is the noumenal being. We seem to be very near to Berkeley with his "notion" of the self, or "spirit." The soul and body problem is conceived by Professor Aveling in terms of a relation of different types of energy, the energy of self or substance activity, in relation to all the physical energies which enter into a higher organic unity systematized by the self. Thus the violent dualism of the historic theories would disappear. Or is the problem only concealed by this substitution of different types of energy for different types of substance? The discussion of the problem of freedom in the form given to it by the conception of the self and the reality of its immediate experience is of great interest.

The conclusions in regard to the power and freedom of mental energy are of the highest value at the present time, when contrary views are widely prevalent both in the study and the market-place.

HILDA D. OAKELEY.

Number; The Language of Science. By Tobias Dantzig, Ph.D. (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1930. Pp. viii + 260. Price 10s.)

The object of this book as described by the author is "to present the fundamental issues of the science of number without bringing in the whole intricate apparatus of the science," and in this difficult enterprise Professor Dantzig has been remarkably successful. The book somewhat resembles Whitehead's Introduction to Mathematics, but is on a larger scale. As the title indicates, the book is confined to those branches of mathematics which deal primarily with number, i.e. arithmetic, both finite and transfinite, algebra and analysis, the non-numerical branches of mathematics, such as projective geometry and theory of groups, being omitted. The treatment is on historical lines and is thoroughly clear and interesting. There are a few errors of detail, such as the statement that "only the small letters of the Greek alphabet were used as numerals. The Greeks had at their disposal the capital letters which they could, and indeed did, use as symbols"; whereas the use of Greek letters as numerals is much older than the distinction between small and capital letters. But in spite of such slight blemishes the book can be thoroughly recommended to any student who wishes to understand the outstanding principles and results of modern mathematics sufficiently to realize their bearing on philosophical problems but cannot afford time for a strict mathematical

PHILOSOPHY

Such a student, however, would need to exercise especial caution in reading Professor Dantzig's treatment of the problems of infinity. The question is, of course, a difficult one, and Professor Dantzig, rightly anxious to emphasize the difficulty, sometimes overemphasizes it and uses language which might mislead an unwary reader. For example, when he says: "The domain of natural numbers rested on the assumption that the operation of adding one can be repeated indefinitely, and it was expressly stipulated that never shall the ultra-ultimate step of this process be itself regarded as a number. The generalization to real numbers not only extended the validity of indefinite repetition to any rational operation; it actually abandoned the restriction and admitted the limits of these processes as bona fide numbers." He ignores the distinctions which Bertrand Russell draws so carefully between positive integers and signless integers and between real numbers and rational numbers. These distinctions, of course, bring their own difficulties, but merely to ignore them, as Professor Dantzig does, produces a misleading representation of the question.

Or when, desiring to stress the greatness of the advance made by Cantor, he quotes as follows from Gauss:3 "I must protest most vehemently against your use of the infinite as something consummated, as this is never permitted in mathematics. The infinite is but a figure of speech; an abridged form for the statement that limits exist which certain ratios can approach as we desire, while other magnitudes may be perimtted to grow beyond all bounds," and talks of "Cantor's open defiance," the reader might well think that Gauss was simply wrong. But Gauss and Cantor were speaking of different things, and each was perfectly right in regard to the matter with which he was concerned. The difference may be put roughly as follows: Gauss was dealing with statements about any or every number, Cantor with statements about all numbers. Gauss's meaning may be illustrated thus: $d(x^2)/dx = 2x$ means that for any or every value of ϵ it is possible to find h so small that $-\epsilon < \{(x+h)^2 - x^2\}/h - 2x < \epsilon$, but there is no quantity dx so small that $\{(x+dx)^2-x^2\}/dx$ is actually equal to 2x; and this statement cannot be interpreted in terms of all numbers or of Cantor's transfinites, but is

perfectly correct.

Neglect of these considerations appears to have misled Professor Dantzig when he comes to consider the connection between physics and mathematics. He says: "Whether we use a ruler or a weighing balance, a pressure gauge or a thermometer, a compass or a voltmeter, we are always measuring what appears to us to be a continuum, and we are measuring it by means of a graduated number scale. We are then assuming that there exists a perfect correspondence between the possible states within this continuum and the aggregate of numbers at our disposal; we are tacitly assuming an axiom which plays within this continuum the rôle which the Dedekind-Cantor axiom played for the straight line. Therefore, any measuring device, however simple and natural it may appear to us, implies the whole apparatus of the arithmetic of real numbers." This would imply that laboratory readings are always taken to an infinite number of decimal places! All instrument readings are of course not continuous but discontinuous. When a scientist gives a length as 10.3 millimetres, the most that he states is that it lies between 10.25 and 10.35, and he would not be convicted of error if it were proved that the length was 10.28 or 10.33. To this a limited arithmetic is clearly adequate. But do the mathematical processes to which the measurements are subjected imply continuity? The ordinary operations of algebra, addition,

¹ P. 236. ³ P. 211.

² Principles of Mathematics, particularly pp. 150 and 275. ⁴ P. 243.

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subtraction, multiplication, division, even exponentiation and the solution of equations, need not detain us long. If we operate in any of these ways on a set of quantities, each of which is known to lie between definite limits, the result will also lie between definite and calculable limits, and the careful physicist will take this into account and give his result with the accuracy which the particular experiment and calculations warrant. To this again an arithmetic of a finite number of real numbers would be adequate, and our ordinary procedure by means of a notation adapted to the continuum is really no more than a convenient device of terminology. When we come to operations involving the infinitesimal calculus the question becomes more complicated and interesting. An operation in the infinitesimal calculus is, as pointed out above, a statement that every one of an infinite class of inequalities is true. But our experimental evidence is not concerned with the whole of that class, but only with a part of it. If, to return to the previous example, we are operating with the formula $d(x^2)/dx = 2x$, we are only concerned with cases where the ϵ 's are large enough to be perceptible, and the assumption made is that in these cases the h's are large enough to have a physical meaning; what happens below these limits is of no concern to the matter in hand. What we do, therefore, is to state a class of propositions, and assume that not all, but only those that matter, are true. The investigation of the limits thus assumed would be as possible theoretically in this case as in that of the algebraical operations, but would be more complicated, and is not made in practice. Nevertheless our procedure does not imply that there is no limit to the numbers with which we are dealing, but only that, if there is a limit, it is beyond anything with which we are concerned in the particular case. Moreover, it is always possible to construct numbers which will satisfy the conditions required in any particular case; there may be some doubt as to the nature of the entities to which these numbers apply, but this is a question of physics and not of mathematics. In Mill's phrase, "as much of the premises is true as is needed to support as much as is true of the conclusion." It would seem then that the difficulties of infinity and continuity are not relevant to ordinary mechanics and physics.

Nevertheless, there is much to be learnt from Professor Dantzig's speculations and suggestions on the epistemology of mathematics in his last chapter, and this also is well worth reading by anyone interested in the

subject.

H. WALLIS CHAPMAN.

Mysticism. By Evelyn Underhill. (London: Methuen & Co. 1930. Pp. xviii + 515. Price 15s.)

This is the twelfth edition of a book which is recognized as a classic on the subject. Since the first edition in 1911, the author has worked on steadily upon the literature of mysticism, so that the new issue, which has been completely revised, is a monument of learning and a credit to English scholarship.

The hearty welcome given by the public to this and other studies of mysticism is of happy augury. It is now generally recognized that mysticism is religion in its most concentrated form; that it is not a name for abnormal states of consciousness; that the phenomena of trance and ecstasy are not the most important parts of the subject; and that the mystical experience

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par excellence is the act of prayer. No writer has done more to promote a sound understanding of mysticism than Miss Underhill.

The book is stronger on the historical, psychological, and religious sides than on the philosophy which may be held to underlie the whole theory and practice of mysticism. Indeed, I am not confident that Miss Underhill has strengthened her philosophical position since the first edition. It is plain, both from the introduction and from the body of the work, that she has recently been influenced chiefly by modern Roman Catholic writers, such as von Hügel, Cuthbert Butler, Chapman, and even Maritain. In the preface there is a quaint and unconscious echo of von Hügel's uncouth and ponderous style. Von Hügel, Butler, and Chapman are names to be mentioned with great respect; indeed, the first-named was one of the deepest religious thinkers of our day; but I am disappointed to find Miss Underhill surrendering so easily to the supernaturalistic dualism of orthodox Catholicism, a theory which is intended to rehabilitate nature-miracles, and which draws a line across the field of experience, dividing "natural" events from those which are "supernatural," directly caused by the intervention of a power beyond nature. The author thinks, wrongly in my opinion, that this theory, abandoned by all independent thinkers in the last century, is now coming back into favour. Perhaps she has hardly faced the consequences of intercalating a so-called supernatural order within the natural. The most representative thinkers of our day are not prepared to accept a theory which would throw all the sciences into confusion, nor do I think that Miss Underhill fully accepts it.

It is easy to see what influences have driven the author into this camp. The psychologists, many of whom have made elaborate and scientific studies of mysticism, have practically, though not explicitly, ruled out the hypothesis that the mystical experience is anything more than subjective. Thus from first to last they remain quite outside the mystic's own standpoint, which is always absolutist through and through. The mystic cares nothing for states of consciousness; his experience is of something objectively real, or for him it is nothing. This Miss Underhill sees, and also that the philosophy which underlies psychologism is what she calls naturalistic monism. Such a view of reality virtually condemns the mystical quest.

But it is more than questionable whether supernaturalistic dualism is the only alternative to subjectivism. The whole Platonic school, which has been always most sympathetic to mysticism, would answer in the negative. Unfortunately, the author is markedly out of sympathy with the one philosophy which could save her from subjectivism without reverting to a kind of dualism which our knowledge of nature seems to have definitely discredited.

Indeed, she is no friend to those who approach the subject from the intellectual side. "Metaphysics and science," she says on page 45, "seem to offer to the intellect an open window towards the truth, till the heart looks out and declares this landscape to be a chill desert in which she can find no nourishment." Such an attitude would leave most people a prey to mere Schwärmerei.

The philosophy of mysticism is thus the one branch of this great subject on which we shall not get much help from this volume. Not thought, but feeling, is for the author the vehicle of revelation. This omission does not seriously impair the value of an admirable book, if we once realize what we must *not* look for in it.

W. R. INGE.

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With the Door Open. By J.Anker Larsen. Translated by Eram and Pleasaunce von Gaisberg. (New York: The Macmillan Co. 1931. Pp. 112. Price 6s. 6d.)

This little book, which is translated from Danish, is recommended to all interested in the deeper aspects of immediate religious experience. It is a short autobiography indicating the way in which the writer was led by the necessity of his nature to discover the Eternal, and contains a vivid description of the blessedness of the experience. The book is virile in tone and of pellucid clarity, and no one who has read it can fail to be convinced of the genuineness of the events related. We are introduced to a realm which by most of us, harassed by the cares and problems of life, is but dimly if at all discerned. And yet this eternal realm would seem to environ us all, waiting to be discovered and enjoyed by simple hearts. On closing the book the reviewer could not but feel regret that he knew so little of this realm which the mystic enters as his natural home, and strongly suspects that the arduous life of the intellect is not the path along which it can most effectively be attained.

The author from his youth was compelled by an inner compulsion to search for the "pearl of great price": "I was young, and the world was beautiful, but I kept looking for a sunrise which was to make everything more alive." He first sought it in the Theological Faculty, but with no success: "To a thirsting soul, this is like a desert." Next, Metaphysics was essayed, but with no greater success. The years passed, years which were by no means easy ones, and no dawn as yet of the sunrise. From time to time the author took a glance at what he calls the "Family Documents," the writings of the mystics of all ages, who all speak of the same thing, whether they are Chinese, Indian, Persian, African, or European. It was the actual experience which these had enjoyed that the author felt he wanted. Theoretic knowing was not enough: he must get at the reality itself. And so he waited in expectancy for the revelation which was to make all things new. At length a hint came to him: "Except ye become as little children, ye cannot enter into it." This hint had been preceded by certain experiences, in hours of rest and just before going to sleep, of visual pictures from the author's childhood, mostly of landscapes, but sometimes of human beings, leaving him with a feeling that there lay hidden away in those forgotten experiences of childhood a profound happiness. Soon after this there began a series of events which step by step introduced the author to the eternal realm which is the unconscious goal of all the great mystics. These experiences he named "lightning" flashes which came of their own accord and apparently sprang out of "a direct perception of reality." They increased in frequency. "It was like the beginning of spring rains; the first drops are followed by others, and one may expect a steadily flowing stream in the dry river bed." At this stage the author began to feel strongly that "Providence" had appeared on the scene and that he was being guided. He was only too ready to conform to this will of Providence which he sensed since it agreed with his own inner urge. From this time onward a new series of events was experienced. The author began to see objects and scenes which belonged to his past as actually present. These events were not memories, but a new state of inner being, in which the past was genuinely in the now of present experience. There was no doubt in the writer's mind that at this stage of his pilgrimage he had found something "foundational." For example, Space and Time declared themselves to be not what they seemed.

The "flashes of lightning" which are called by the author "the bells of eternity," ceased to be lightning; they began to last. Time and Space loosened their handcuffs, and gradually things revealed themselves in their true reality—as aspects or modes of the eternal! And when the light became lasting, the

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author was compelled to name the experience "God," because something mighty and good had come to him—love, strength, security.

The latter part of the book is concerned with what the author finds very

difficult to explain—the meeting with eternity.

During the latter steps of his pilgrimage Time and Space had loosened their hold, and yearnings and painful longings—whether towards places or people to which he had become attached—were diminished. At length the supreme experience, compared with which his earlier ones were but introductory, came to him:—

"I was sitting in my garden one day after working. . . . It was still and peaceful around me and within me. Too good, in fact, to allow me to think much about anything. I just sat there: then it began to come—that infinite tenderness which is purer and deeper than that of lovers, or of a father towards his child. It was in me, but it also came to me, as the air came to my lungs. . . . This deep tenderness which I felt, first within myself, and then even stronger around and above me, extended farther and farther—it became all-present. I saw it, and it developed into knowing, into knowing all; at the same time it became power, omnipotence, and drew me into the eternal Now."

Here are some interesting remarks which the author makes about the Eternal which he regards as ultimate Reality. It is a Now which is and a Now which happens. There is no beginning and no end. It is a timeless Now. In the everlasting Now there is neither Space nor Time, neither limitation nor distinction. If we ask what is the Now which happens? the answer is—"the continuously active creation with all its birth throes: Time and Space are but instruments or functions of this creation. They came into existence with it, and they come to an end."

It was said above that the Now of being, and the agonizing Now of happening, are ultimately one and the same. The end of man is to actualize this truth by experiencing within himself both the eternal and the temporal nature of being, and achieve their fusion. In such a practical life all theories

of life disappear like a fog; reality lies in the clear light of day.

The author has written his book inspired by the belief that eternity is grounded deep in human nature, and that men are endued with the same capacity for experiencing the Eternal as the fleeting events of Time. For men of simple direct natures the road to the Eternal lies open, and once there true freedom may be enjoyed, since we are then emancipated from all narrow hopes and fears. Even the fear of that last enemy, death, vanishes, for death and life are, from the point of the Eternal, seen to be not at all what they are generally believed to be. "He who has experienced the eternal Now does not see a fathomless abyss between "life" and "death." The eternal Now is being; Time is existence. He who converts existence into being has nothing more to do with life and death."

There is much more of interest in this small volume than I have space to deal with. I will only say in conclusion that the translation has been well done, and that the sympathetic reader will not only find a refreshing well of spiritual water for his soul, but will experience delight in the literary charm of the book.

S. E. HOOPER.

Books received also:-

- ERNST KRETSCHMER (Tr. R. B. Cattell, B.Sc., Ph.D.). The Psychology of Men of Genius. London: Kegan Paul, Trench, Trübner & Co. Ltd. 1931. Rp. xx + 256. 15s.
- T. H. Pear, M.A., B.Sc. Voice and Personality. London: Chapman & Hall Ltd. 1931. Pp. viii + 247. 10s. 6d.
- CAROLINE E. PLAYNE, Society at War, 1914-1916. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 380. 12s. 6d.
- A. C. Cotter, S.J. Cosmolgia. Boston, U.S.A.: The Stratford Co. 1931. Pp. 404. \$3.50.
- From the Proceedings of the British Academy. Arthur James Balfour (Earl of Balfour, K.G., O.M., P.B.A.), 1848–1930. London: Humphrey Milford. 1931. Pp. 16. 1s.
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- C. Delisle Burns, D.Lit. Modern Civilization on Trial. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. 296. 10s. 6d.
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- Howard H. Brinton, Ph.D. (Introduction by R. M. Jones, D.Litt.). *The. Mystic Will.* London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. 1931. Pp. xiii + 269. 8s. 6d.
- An Essay concerning the Understanding, Knowledge, Opinion, and Assent. By John Locke. (Edited by Benjamin Rand, Ph. D., LL.D.) Cambridge, U.S.A. Harvard University Press, 1931. Pp. lx. + 307. London: Humphrey Milford; Oxford University Press. Price \$3.50. 15s.
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- G. SWARTS. Salut par la Foi et Conversation Brusque. Paris: Librairie Philosophiques J. Vrin. 1931. Pp. 319. 30 frs.
- LUCIEN LÉVY-BRUHL. Le Surnaturel et la Nature dans le Mentalité Primitive, Paris: Librairie Félix Alcan. 1931. Pp. xl + 526. 60 frs. 21s.
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CORRESPONDENCE

To the Editor of Philosophy SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON'S THEORIES

DEAR SIR,

I am glad that Professor Reichenbach realizes that my polemic against Sir Arthur Eddington is not really personal. But since the personal element seems to have misled him (and therefore probably others) concerning the real issue, may I

try to state it in strictly impersonal terms?

Can a distinction be made between the experimental and theoretical elements of physics? Professor Reichenbach will not deny that there is a difference between (say) measuring the spectrum of a substance and interpreting the measurements in terms of atomic structure; in practice the two elements are so distinct that they are often the work of quite different people. But he may deny that, as I assert, they are wholly separable. I admit fully that they are not actually separated by the prevailing use of the words "law" and "theory," and that therefore I may have been unwise to use those terms. I admit further that in all scientific propositions, as usually stated, the two elements are confused to some extent; in particular, theoretical terms are habitually used to describe experimental facts. But I maintain that the elements can be separated; that the experimental element can be isolated by stating all "laws" in the form that certain experiments, not necessarily describable in words, can be demonstrated; and that the part so isolated contains all of physics that has any practical "authority." I recognize that imaginary experiments (Gedankenversuche) present a difficulty, but I believe it can be overcome. I am not sure whether Professor Reichenbach would agree with me so far, but almost all physicists who have actual experimental experience would.

If the distinction is admitted, the question of the relation of the two elements arises. Sir Arthur Eddington would probably hold that they differ only in degree; that a theory concerns exactly the same "reality" as a law, but is a fuller, more profound, and truer account of it; that it differs from a law in somewhat the same way as an adult's account of some complicated event differs from a child's. (Law and theory are here used in my sense, of course.) On the other hand, I hold that they differ in kind, in somewhat the same way as the statement that Brutus killed Cæsar differs from the statement that Brutus was right to kill Cæsar, and that therefore they must be carefully distinguished in considering the philosophical implications of science. Which of the two views is right can be determined only by a careful study of the relation between the experimental and theoretical elements in some typical branch of actual physics. My own solution of this problem is contained in my Physics: The Elements (Camb. Univ. Press, 1919), though naturally now I should amend it slightly. My quarrel with Professor Reichenbach and most other philosophers of science is not that they have given a different solution, but that they have ignored

the problem altogether.

Yours faithfully, NORMAN R. CAMPBELL.

TO THE EDITOR OF Philosophy SIR ARTHUR EDDINGTON'S THEORIES

SIR,

It is of much interest for me to hear from Dr. Campbell himself that my interpretation of his opinion was true, and that his article really was based on the conception of a precise disjunction between experimental and theoretical physics. Though this is only one point of my former letter, it seems to be the basis of the

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difference between Dr. Campbell's opinion and mine, and therefore I may add some words now.

I do not deny that there is a difference between facts and theories, but what I deny is that laws are of the form of facts: they are nothing but theories of a more narrow form. And I must add that what a physicist calls a fact is a theory too: the real facts are sensuous impressions like blue and green and rigid, and to say that there are things of certain physical character is going further from facts to theories. Thus proceeding from absolute facts to propositions about "external" things is a way marked by the steps "physical facts;" "laws," and "theories," but there is no sharp frontière between these steps. What can only be said is that the probability of the proposition gradually decreases as we proceed. The physicist is not always conscious of this: he takes an "observed" spectral line as a "fact," and a relation between observed lines as a "factual law," as for instance the law of Balmer. But what he could only maintain here as a fact is that he saw some dark and light spots on a photograph—he never sees spectral lines, but must deduce them from the observed spots by theoretical construction.

The instance given by Dr. Campbell is not of the form of transition occurring in physics. "Brutus killed Cæsar" is of the character of a "physical fact," that is, it is deduced from facts (like the sensuous data in reading ancient chronicles) by theoretical construction. "Brutus was right to kill Cæsar" is no statement at all, because it states nothing about the world, but only informs us about a certain feeling of the speaker, his feeling of justice. In the whole of physics there is no proposition of this kind at all.

This view of facts being a principal train of my theory of knowledge (e.g. in my Ziele und Wege der physikalischen Erkenntnis, Handbuch der Physik, Bd. 4, 1829. Verlag J. Springer, Berlin), why should I be charged with having ignored the problem of facts? I think every theory of knowledge must deal with the given view of facts, if it wants to give account of what an experimental physicist does, and not of what he thinks he does.

August 1, 1931.

Yours faithfully,
HANS REICHENBACH.

NOTICE

The first volume of the Collected Papers of Charles Sanders Peirce, scientist, logician and founder of pragmatism, has just been published by the Harvard University Press. This volume is entitled The Principles of Philosophy, and is composed mainly of papers previously unpublished. It contains his system in outline, and his more important papers on the methods and classification of the sciences, phenomenology, or the doctrine of the categories, ethics, and æsthetics. It will be sold at \$4.50. The entire works will consist of about ten volumes; those subscribing to all the volumes will be entitled to a discount of 20 per cent. The second volume dealing with traditional logic, signs, methods of discovery, induction, and probability will follow very shortly. Nearly all the members of the Department of Philosophy at Harvard, as well as other friends of Peirce, have devoted much time to these manuscripts of these papers. The final work of arranging the papers and preparing them for the press has been done by Dr. Charles Hartshorne and Dr. Paul Weiss.

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INSTITUTE NOTES

THE Sixth Ordinary General Meeting of the Institute was held at 35, Porchester Terrace, London, on July 22nd. By the kind invitation of Sir Herbert and Lady Samuel, the meeting was preceded by a Reception, at which a large number of members and friends were present.

A resolution for the adoption of the Annual Report and Statement of Accounts for the year ended March 31, 1931, proposed by the Chairman and

seconded by Sir Herbert Samuel, was carried unanimously.

The Chairman in the course of his remarks referred to the crisis through which the Institute had passed during the past six months, and congratulated members on their successful efforts in rescuing the Institute from the danger in which it found itself in the early part of the year. By their loyalty and generosity an increased solidarity had been brought about, and if each would in the future do what was in his power to introduce new members, the work of the Institute could not only continue the useful work it was doing, but expand its field of service to a community which greatly needed guidance from philosophy in the troublous times in which we were living.

Sir Herbert Samuel said he felt the Council had conferred a great honour upon him by electing him to be President in succession to the late Earl Balfour. In the latter years of his long political career he had come increasingly to feel the importance and need of philosophy as a background to his work. In saying this he was only repeating what had long ago been taught to the world by Plato. One could not be a good statesman without taking the long and deep view of the events of the world which it was the special task of philosophy to bring to light. He urged the members to do all in their power to increase the influence of the Institute. There never was a time in which the ordinary citizen needed the light which philosophy could throw on the numerous problems which perplexed him more than at the present.

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MICHAELMAS TERM begins on October 9th and ends on December 16th. The following courses of lectures have been arranged to begin in the Michaelmas Term of the Session 1931-32.

"Philosophy and Evolution," a course of six weekly lectures by Professor Leonard J. Russell, M.A., B.Sc., D.Phil., on Fridays, at 5.30 p.m., at University, Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, beginning October 9, 1931. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONTEMPORARY LITERATURE," a course of six weekly lectures by C.R. Morris, M.A., on Tuesdays, at 5.30 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas Term, beginning October 20, 1931. Fee for the course, 12s. 6d. Members free.

"Introduction to Philosophy," a class by the Director of Studies on Wednesdays, at 5.45 p.m., at University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1, in the Michaelmas and Lent Terms, beginning Michaelmas Term, October 14th; Lent Term, January 20, 1932. Fee for the course, £1 is. Terminal, 12s. 6d. Members free.

The full syllabus for the Session can be obtained on application to the Director of Studies, University Hall, 14 Gordon Square, W.C. 1.

The first of the Evening Meetings for the Session will be held at University College, Gower Street, W.C. 1, on Tuesday, October 13th, at 8.15 p.m., when Sir James Jeans, D.Sc., LL.D., F.R.S., will give an address on "The Mathematical Aspect of the Universe."

It is hoped to form one or two reading circles at University Hall, Gordon Square, during the Session. Those desiring to join one of these should communicate with the Director of Studies.

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